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ABSTRACT
In an increasingly interdependent world economy, the need to attract foreign direct 
investment into various nation states, calls into question the long run economic 
rationality for the proliferation of mandatory local equity participation codes 
(legislations or decrees), in several host countries. With this question in mind, the 
m ain purpose of this study is to explore em pirically  the reflection of the domicile 
of a firm's majority control on its investment, external finance and dividend 
decisions in the host country.
The study is made up of two main stages:
The first comprises in-depth interviews of top finance executives of some large UK 
controlled Multinationals, plus questionnaire surveys of similar corporations 
domiciling within some OECD nation states. The aims are to gain a first hand 
knowledge of the financial decision considerations in foreign controlled affiliates, to 
enable one esterblish the operational basis for expecting a difference between foreign 
and locally controlled firms' financial behaviour, and at the same time generate 
qualitative information for explaining this difference.
The second comprises the adaptation of existing empirical models in the pertinent 
literature in the light of the knowledge gained from the first stage, and the 
application of single and simultaneous equation regression methods to test the 
hypotheses that corporate investment, external finance and dividend decisions are 
affected by the degree of foreign control of voting equity.
The findings from the interviews and mail questionnaires indicate that there is 
strong financial and production interdependences between multinational companies 
and their foreign base subsidiaries. This tallies with the strong preference of the 
multinationals to control the majority of their affiliates’ voting equity. It is also 
found that retained earnings is the most important source of affiliates' finance and 
they do not usually issue new shares as a means of financing investment. The 
dominant single market for the subsidiaries’ output is found to be more often the 
host country and thus, they are exposed mainly to similar economic and fiscal 
conditions facing the locally controlled firms.
The results from the empirical study clearly show that, there are differences 
between foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the relative impact of 
dividend, investment and external finance determinants. The degree of foreign 
control is found to have a significant impact on the financial decision triad studied. 
It is found to have a positive impact on dividend and fixed investment expenditures, 
and a negative impact on external finance behaviour.
The findings of this study have implications for the modem theory of finance. On 
the empirical level my evidence indicates that particular care is required to 
distinguish between foreign and locally controlled firms when empirical 
investigations are performed at company as well as aggregate levels particularly in 
countries where local industry is composed of substantial number of firms 
controlled directly from abroad.
In contributing to the debate on the appropriate regression method for analysing 
corporate financial behaviour, the results from this research suggests that as far as 
foreign controlled affiliates are concerned there is no clear choice between the single 
versus the simultaneous equation models. As for the locally controlled firms, 
additional insight is obtained when the three equations are estimated 
simultaneously.
Based on a close examination of the results, one finds no statistical evidence that 
foreign ownership control of a firm would in the long run have a detrimental effect 
on its investment behaviour relative to the equivalent locally controlled firms. 
Thus, on purely economic grounds, the policy of restricting equity ownership 
structure choice via mandatory local equity participation codes (legislations or 
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The issue of foreign versus local equity capital control of host base firms has 
occupied the centre stage of host and home countries’ foreign direct investment 
policies for some years. In some instances it has taken an emotional turn. Such was 
the case during the first-half of 1986 relating firstly to the W estland Helicopter 
Company Affair. The central issue was about the choice of alternative proposed 
participation in the voting shares of Westland Helicopter company by rival U.S. 
dominated as against ‘European’ groupings. The argument is, in effect, that if 
Westland could not stand on its own, it is preferable to be part of an European 
grouping rather than to be under the influence of a foreign grouping dominated by 
a U.S. firm. The conflict of choice and attitude between those favouring the 
European option and those favouring the U.S. grouping resulted in the resignation of 
two cabinet ministers in UK within one month (see Keesing’s contemporary 
Archives (1986)).
During the same period the Conservative government’s determination to sell Land 
Rover, Range Rover, Freight Rover (vans) apd Leyland Trucks (heavy vehicles) to 
the U.S. owned General Motors Corporation, met with much opposition both in the 
House of Parliam ent and in the ‘country’. The objection was on the ground that 
such a sale would 'see a large part of the remaining British owned motor industry 
pass into foreign ownership.... and this would lead to substantial job losses in 
vehicle construction and motor components manufacturing, the loss of independent 
British capability in design, R & D, and a further damaging reduction in Britain’s 
manufacturing base’ (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (op.cit., PP.34323-4)). 
Under this pressure, the government later insisted on holding 51 per cent of the 
voting shares, on the ground that no t to  do so would be co n tra ry  to  national
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in terest. General Motors (GM) declined to accept a minority holding and the deal 
was abandoned in March 1986.
A separate proposal to sell Austin Rover to Ford Motor company of U.S. was earlier 
abandoned under the pressure of public opinion in February 1986. Such is the 
strength of public opposition to foreign control of corporate equity in the host 
country. However, circumstances may change and a future UK government or the 
U.S. motor vehicle giant may change their minds later, after all the French 
government’s plans for full nationalisation of CGCT (a subsidiary of a U.S. owned 
ITT) was later abandoned in favour of French government being giving a majority 
stake in the French based subsidiary - a proposal accepted by ITT (see Financial 
Times 13 February 1982, P.21).
In both UK and other developed market economies considerable time and effort have 
been spent on parliamentary debates on the issue of direct foreign control of the 
means of production in the firm. In some cases these debates have culminated in 
parliamentary commissioned enquiries regarding the impact of foreign controlled 
companies on the domestic economies of the host and home countries. Some 
enquiries took place in Canada by Watkins Commission (1968), Grays Report 
(1972); in the United Kingdom, Steuer et al'(l973) and Reddaway et al (1968); in 
Australia. Brash (1966). and in the United States, Williams Report (1971).
The pressure, however, for local equity participation intensified in the developing 
countries within the last two decades or so. It started in India and Brazil from 
about mid 1960s and gathered momentum in the rest of the developing countries 
from early 1970s.
The Watkins Commission Study and the rest of the above mentioned enquiries as 
well as the proliferation of foreign direct investment legislations, codes and decrees 
follow the U.S. direct action to remedy the balance of payments problem partly
caused by the financing of campaign in Indo-China. From mid-March 1965, the U.S. 
government introduced the voluntary and later mandatory codes requiring the U.S. 
owned multinational corporations to take actions to improve the U.S. balance of 
payments during the period from 1965 to 1969. The government at the time 
specifically required the U.S. based firms to:
1. expand exports to all countries
2. postpone or cancel marginal direct investment projects in developed countries
3. rely more on funds raised abroad for financing direct investment in developed 
countries
4. accelerate the repatriation of income from developed countries
5. repatriate short-term financial asi;ets in excess of those needed for working 
capital in developed countries (see Brimmer. (1966)).
The impetus behind this 'extra-ordinary’ requirement hinges on the perceived 
inherent influence of the domicile of ownership and control of corporate equity. 
Thus, the home country’s authorities feel that by virtue of the registered domicile 
of the parent company, they are entitled to issue instructions to, and demand 
compliance from the corporations.
, »
Similarly, before 1979 when the exchange control regulations were in force, the UK 
governments required the locally domiciled corporations to repatriate two-thirds of 
their foreign source income to the home base. For outward bound investments the 
firms were required to acquire some of the investment currencies at a premium rate 
as a disincentive (see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (March, 1980, P.33-41)).
Due to different circumstances of various home countries, there are differences in 
terms of their outward FDI policies. Japan, for example, has in recent years been 
encouraging outward direct investment by her large corporations (especially in 
motor vehicles and electronics industries). The situation is however, different in
- 3 -
relation to U.S.A. and UK (for example). In these countries, the tendency has been 
to influence the financial decisions in their domiciled MNCs :
1. By requiring the local firms to obtain authorisation for outward capital flows
from exchange control authorities1. Some key technology investments may be
restricted. The outward FDI are more likely to be authorised, if a home base MNC 
*
would have a significant participation in the management and ownership of the 
foreign base affiliate; promote exports of goods and skills from home base, and 
generally improve the balance of payments of the home country.
2. There are restrictions imposed by the Trade w ith  enem y Act. and A nti-Trust 
legislations, whose requirements extend to corporate activities of U.S. owned 
subsidiaries abroad. Some tax legislations, such as the group re lie f provisions, 
extending to foreign source income, are only available to the home base MNC if it 
controls the equity voting shares of the subsidiary.
While the above two points relate to the economic side of the home countries’ 
aspirations, there is also the political side to it. Majority control of foreign base 
subsidiaries imposes on the home country the duty of protection of the host base 
firm2.
1. The exchange control restrictions have been removed since 1979. The control was however in force 
fOT most of the period covered by this study.
2. This duty of protection is well expressed by Senator Church when he stressed that when an American 
corporation ventures abroad, it takes with it the ‘umbrella' of protection provided by U.S. 
goverment; if its assets are nationalised overseas, the host government is subject to retaliation under 
the provision of the ‘Hickenlooper Amendment’; if a corporation and host country are involved in a 
dispute, the corporation often calls on the home country for assistance (see Congressional Record, 
Senate vol 120 part 15, (18, June 1974), p. 19571).
The existence of this duty of protection can be illustrated by the following events:
1. the stopping of U.S. aid to Chile at the aftermart of Chilean government's nationalisation of the 
copper mines owned by U.S. corporations;
2. U.S. intervention in Iran linked to the nationalisation of Anglo - Iranian Oil company (see Bill and 
Leiden (1974));
3. British - French invasion of Egypt in 1956-57 due to Naser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Maritime company (see Burchil (1970) and Bassiry (1980));
4. British government's pressure on the World Bank in early 1970s to prevent IDA loan to finance 
small-holdeT tea in Tanzania because of Tanzania’s expropriation of British based companies' assets 
(see Stewart (1972) pp. 11-14) and
5. U.S. 'pressure' on Jamaica against nationalisation of U.S. controlled bauxite affiliates (see Vagts 
(1973), p.269).
- 4 -
This is so, because the subsidiary is an extension of her legal citizen - the parent 
company. Thus, while the subsidiary has the duty of loyalty to the parent 
company, it also owes an indirect duty of loyalty to the home country. If the 
foreign affiliates are all minority held by home base firms, this chain of loyalty 
would scarcely exist. To the extent that home base firms depend very much on the 
foreign affiliates for much of their 'income’, the foreign affiliates would to some 
extent influence the policies of the home base firms, and (thus), indirectly influence 
some policies of the respective home countries. This may be interpreted as a case of 
‘host’ countries influencing the policies of ‘home’ countries. To prevent a possible 
dilution of ‘sovereignty’ (or autonomy of making decisions without recourse to 
foreign economic and political interests), a home country would prefer her 
registered firms to control the majority ownership rights of their foreign base 
affiliates. It is mainly on this basis shall it be possible for the home country to issue 
directives through the parent companies which would have some implications for 
the financial decisions in their foreign base subsidiaries.
As the home countries desire the ability to influence the financial decisions of their 
foreign base subsidiaries, the host countries equally desire to be able to influence the 
financial decisions of firms operating within^ their economies. The reasons for the 
host countries’ desire to influence the financial decisions of all firms in their 
economies are both economic and political. The most salient of the reasons are as 
follows:
1. The desire to achieve and maintain a favourable balance of payment, to sustain 
economic and (therefore) political stability: or
2. To check foreign financial transfer malpractices and preserve foreign exchange 
for the import of essential goods and services which the host country is not 
sufficiently endowed with.
3. The need to promote indigenous entrepreneurial and managerial development and
- 5 -
build up domestic capital markets by wider diffusion of ownership of shares.
4. Need for balanced economic development both industrially and spatially. This 
encompasses the desire for employment growth.
5. The desire to be able to influence economic decisions in all host base firms
through the application of monetary and fiscal policies without being frustrated by 
*
firms whose equity are majority controlled from abroad.
6. Related to the preceding reasons, is the desire to avoid the extra-territoriality of 
home governments’ policies through the foreign base parent companies’ direct 
influence on their host base subsidiaries. This is sometimes interpreted as 
tantamounting to a compromise of host country’s sovereignty3
To satisfy the above six main needs and desires, the host countries, particularly 
those in less industrially advanced market economies, feel that the enactment of 
mandatory local equity participation codes is the key answer. Apart from Brazil, 
India, Algeria, Philippines, and Lybia, who earlier introduced the codes, most of the 
rest of those with the codes introduced them since early 1970s4. The most far 
reaching of such codes is that of ANDEAN pact countries comprising Bolivia, 
Chile5, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. A rticle 30 o f Decision 24 of the 
code, requires the foreign subsidiaries’ equity shares to be sold to the local investors 
with the ultimate aim of cutting down foreign participation to minority holdings
3. For the sources of the synthesis of the above six reasons for host countries' desire for local equity 
control, see the following: Mikesell (1971), P.30; UN document ST/CT/46 (1983), p.61; 
Fayerweather (1966), P.77; Robinson (1983), PP.122-140; Boddewyn (1983), P.31; Dunning (1970), 
P.33; Sainsbury Report (1967), P.118; Mason (1973), P.5; Bharat (1970), P.24; UN doc. E/C.10, 
1984/2; Burchill (1970); Bassiry 1980); Edwards and Newens (1970), PP.7-8; Black et al (1978); 
Vagts (1973), P.269; Rubin (1975), P.55; Brimer (1967); Behrman (1967); Virgil (1969), PP.59-66; 
Financial Times (3 Oct. 1984), P.3; Steuer et al (1973), P.151, P.172; Congressional Records Vol.120, 
(June, 18 1974), P.19571; Stewart (1972), PP.11-14; Congressional Record-Senate vol. 120 (May 1, 
1974); Congressional Record Vol. 120, (29 Jan. 1974) Extension Remarks, PP.1272-1273; Wolfgang 
Pohle (1970); Frank (1981), PP.8-10; The President issue No. 21, (1982), PP.47-49; UN document 
E/C.1983/2; Singer (1950) and Behrman (1970), P.139.
4. see appendix A l.l  for the survey of foreign direct investment codes, legislations and policies of 53 
countries.
5. who later left the pact in 1976
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within a specified period. Following Andean group’s codes several host developing 
countries have introduced similar codes. Such countries include: Benin. Saudi 
Arabia, Garbon, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Republic of Korea, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain and others ( see Appendix 1.1 ) .
Rather than introduce mandatory codes on ownership of affiliates, the host 
*
developed industrial countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland and Canada, have 
mandatory codes requiring managerial control of affiliates’ operations. At present.in 
no OECD country therefore, is there a mandatory ownership requirement as a pre­
condition for in-coming foreign direct investments. Those that had such a 
requirement earlier, have now liberalized, e.g., Japan and Italy. Thus on the one 
hand, while the OECD countries established their Declaration on N ational 
T reatm ent Principle ( in June 1986 ) which aims to eliminate official 
discrimination against foreign owned firms ( whose parents domicile in member 
nations )6, on the other hand the less industrially advanced countries ( who are 
mainly host countries ) , feel that the only way they can ‘treat’ a firm as a ‘true’ 
national company is by sharing in the ownership of that firm to the point of 
diluting foreign majority in most cases to foreign minority participation.
The countries that introduce mandatory Ideal equity participation codes fail to 
‘consider’ the point of view of the MNCs. In their own part, these firms desire the 
freedom to choose the ownership structure of their foreign base affiliates like any 
other locally registered firm in the host country. The MNCs’ desire for ownership 
control of their affiliates are based on the following factors:
1. The need to internalize their ownership advantages of capital, technology and 
their specific knowledge for their ‘maximum’ possible advantages (see Dunning
6. Those ratifying the Declaration on National Treatment
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(1977));
2. The need to 'maximize’ their resource allocation efficiency, 'minimize’ their costs 
relating to the production and administration including tax costs on the global 
revenue and income distribution;
3. The need to minimize the costs associated with dealing in various national 
currencies, and thus be profitable enough to finance their research and development 
expenditures.
4. The need to maintain the parent company’s product-market strategies on a global 
basis. These strategies could either be, that of product-market concentration where 
the firm makes one or very few main products which are marketed world wide; or 
that of product-market diversification, where the firm makes many products specific 
to different markets. Whichever product- market strategy a firm chooses, it is 
easier to make decisions, relating to location of activities, production allocation on 
global basis, market servicing policies, financing activities, and control of 
information flows, if the MNC avoids possible internal power struggles that may 
result where ownership is shared m andatorily7.
In the point of view of the MNCs, if the investment climate in the host country is 
right, (irrespective of any transitory changes to the contrary) and if the subsidiary 
firm is making satisfactory profit contributions to the group, the subsidiary would 
be allowed to expand and grow in the host country.
Despite the reasons given earlier, for the host governments’ preference for local 
equity capital dominance, differences do exist in the FDI legislations and decrees
7. For sources of the synthesis of the preceding four reasons for MNCs’ desire foT ownership control of 
their affiliates, see the following: Safarian (1969), P.61; Swedenborg (1979), P.27; Buckley and Pearce 
(1978); McManue (1972); Hymer (1960, 1976), P-25; Friedman and Kalmanoff (1961); U.S. Dept, of 
Commerce Report (1976); Franko (1971); Behrman (1970), P.139; Vernon and Wells (1981), P.62 
Table 3.3; Dymsza (1972), P.205; Phatak (1971), P.88; Friedman and Beguin (1971), P.24; Behrman 
(1969), PP.109-110; Remmers (1969), P.263; Wilkins and Hill (1964), P.423; Otterbeck (1981), 
Holton (1981) and Friedman and Weg (1966).
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among various host countries. Some host countries follow mandatory route, some 
follow voluntary route and others follow a mixture of the two. Some countries 
had a code and later abandoned it, such as Chile, Sudan, Japan and Italy. Others 
were liberal and later legislated for mandatory local equity participation and 
management control. Why is this variance? Perhaps, it is due to a 
misunderstanding as to the long run implications of foreign equity control to the 
achievement of economic and political aspirations of the host (and home) countries.
This misunderstanding creates uncertainty in the host country’s investment climate. 
For the MNCs, and other foreign direct investors, this uncertainty becomes a 
component part of 'country risk’. This is because, mandatory ownership codes 
effectively limits MNCs’ operating flexibility. Thus, unstable host governments’ FDI 
policy positions on ownership of corporate equity would make long term business 
strategy difficult to establish - a situation that is neither advantageous to the host 
country, nor to the MNCs.
If the desire for increased economic growth is strongly behind the pressures for 
local ownership control of host base affiliates, does it necessarily follow that 
comparable locally controlled firms would always invest more in the host country, 
or ‘save’ more foreign exchange for the host country than the similar foreign 
controlled firms? The answer to the preceding question would contribute to the 
understanding of the implications of foreign control on the financial decisions of 
host base firms. This understanding would make it possible for the host countries 
to establish more definite and long term FDI policies. Similarly, the MNCs would 
be in position to establish more stable business strategies in a ‘settled’ investment 
climate.
- 9
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study is an attempt to examine empirically the following key question: Does 
the  domicile of a firm ’s m ajority  share holder(s) reflect on its ex ternal finance, 
dividend and investm ent decisions?
Since the MNCs have to share their loyalties between the home country, the host 
countries and other markets elsewhere in the context of satisfying their ultimate 
shareholders, they would not be expected to identify fully with all. This situation 
may well lead to a conflict of interest between the MNCs on the one hand, and host 
(and home) countries on, the other8.
Of the various research efforts that have been devoted by different researchers to 
the broadening of our understanding of the various facets of MNCs activities, only 
one pertinent study tapped directly at the area of focus of this study - that of 
Morgan and Saint-Pierre (1978). Even that study has major limitations (see chapter 
5 ).
Clearly a more detailed research study is warranted in the light of what appears to 
be a superficial attempt to study an issue that deserves a detailed empirical 
investigation. It is the ambition of this thesis to fill the yawning gap in the
i
available empirically based information needed for making more realistic long term 
FDI policies by the host (and home) countries.
More specifically, the purpose of this study is twofold:
1. To gain a first hand knowledge on the financial decision considerations by MNCs 
in their direct investments located outside the domicile of their u ltim ate  majority 
shareholders.
8. see for example Mikesell et al (1971); Bergster (1974); U.S. State Department study (1974); Negandhi 
and Baliga 1979), P.15; Chemical Manufacturers Association survey (1983).
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2. To adapt existing empirical models of dividend, investment and external finance 
decisions of host base firms in general, and use these models to explore the impact of 
foreign ownership control on the dividend, investment expenditure and external 
finance decisions of firms.
2. HYPOTHESIS*
The hypothesis advanced in this thesis is that, in addition to other factors that 
influence the financial decisions of firms based in the same ‘host’ country, their 
dividend, investment expenditure, and external finance decisions would depend also 
on the domicile of ownership conrtol of their voting equity.
3. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
1. In determining the formulation of their competitive strategies, host governments 
need to know whether in the long run, the financial behaviour of foreign controlled 
firms would be better, as good as, or worse than their locally controlled independent 
firms. This knowledge would, other things being equal, lead to more stable long 
term foreign direct investment (FDI) policies in the host countries and therefore 
enable MNCs establish more stable operating strategies for their global business. If 
anything is certain about international busihess (and even for domestic businesses 
too), it is that foreign direct investors detest uncertainty. A contribution towards 
providing the information base necessary for the elimination of policy uncertainties 
for both the host governments and the MNCs. is considered to be very important.
2. This study would contribute towards the enrichment of the theories of the firm, 
covering the dividend, capital investment and external finance theories in general. If 
the financial behaviour of foreign controlled firms in the host economy differ from 
that of locally controlled independent firms, to the extent that a host country has a 
substantial proportion of its corporate sector dominated by foreign controlled firms,
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a rigid application of the existing dividend, investment, and external finance theories 
of the firm for economic policy purposes may miss the point. Thus, the dividend 
theories as formulated by Lintner (1956), as well as that by Dhrymes and Kurz
(1967) and their respective followers, need to be reviewed. In addition, the 
investment theories such as put forward by Jorgenson (1967), Jorgenson and Siebert
(1968), and other variants by their followers need to be reviewed. The accelerator 
theories of investment such as that by Eisner (1962), as well as the various 
empirical models of investment using aggregate data comprising foreign and locally 
controlled firms data need to be reviewed. A review and modification is also 
required for models of external finance decisions of firms, where foreign and local 
firms data are used.
3. National Product forecasters and those concerned with building macro-economic 
models of the. host country’s economy, require full knowledge of the factors that 
determine the pattern of host country’s economic growth and employment. To such 
forecasters and macro-economists, it is important not only to know the degree of 
foreign control of the host economy,but also, for the quality of their forecasts and 
models, it is important to understand how the financial behaviour of the corporate 
sector is affected by the degree of foreign ownership control of host base firms. A 
difference in the financial behaviour of foreign and locally controlled firms would 
suggest a need for macro-economic forecasters to separate their aggregate data of the 
corporate sector between those relating to foreign owned and controlled firms and 
those relating to the locally controlled independent firms, and model them 
separately. From this angle, this study would contribute towards the enhancement 
of the quality of information required for proper economic management by the host 
governments.
4. The study would contribute towards filling a gap identified in the literature 
resulting from the studies of Dunning (1958), Safarian (1969), Brash (1966), as
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well as Remitters (1969) and Stopford and Haberich (1978). These studies appear to
indicate that the financial decisions of a firm would depend on the domicile of its
ownership control. In addition, this study would contribute in giving an empirical
verdict on two different views that exist in the literature regarding the investment
behaviour of foreign owned and controlled affiliates in the host country. The first
view hefd by Barlow and* Wender (1953) and Penrose (1956), better known as the
gamblers’ earnings hypothesis, argues that the foreign base subsidiaries’ earnings
are like gamblers’ earnings and are reinvested as they come until more is earned or
loss occurs. This implies that foreign controlled firms’ financial behaviour would be
similar to that of locally controlled independent firms. Another view, held by
Stevens (1970), is that parent companies and subsidiaries are interdependent both
in financial and production activities. Thus, the strategy of the parent in relation to
a particular host country would determine the subsidiary’s actions and therefore,
the subsidiaries can not invest independently as the gamblers’ earning hypothesis
suggests. Within this view falls Remmers’ (1969) assertion that affiliates
performance in the host country is biased towards the parent company's desires. By
implication this suggests that foreign controlled firms would behave differently
financially from locally controlled independent firms. By properly investigating,
* «
empirically, the relative financial behaviour of foreign subsidiaries and locally 
controlled independent firms, this study would add to the building of our 
knowledge about the financial decisions of firms operating directly in countries 
other than their controlling shareholders’ domicile of origin.
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
At the sight of the purpose of this study, a critical mind would immediately 
envisage some apparent limitations. However, before the reader reaches the end of 
this thesis, it will be seen that most of the drawbacks have been dealt with as much
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as empirically possible. Having said sc, a number of inporUnt limitations need to 
be noted if only to aid refinements as we proceed to build the knowledge on the 
financial behaviour of firms at home and abroad:
1. There are differences between Arms deriving from among other things, the 
variation in size and age. 3o:h these aspects are difieren but are in general related. 
Both would affect the behaviour of firms differently. h terms of the relative firm 
size, there is evidence that smaller firms do tend to expaid at higher rates thin large 
firms. Thus in comparing the financial behaviour cf firns in our context one needs 
to isolate the effect of varying size of the two sets >f firms. From what ever 
measure, it is almost impossible to get any neiningfu sample size of firms with 
exactly the same size in terms of capital employed, sdes, number of employees, 
total market capitalisation, or the number of shares on isue.
Similarly, the age of firms would influence not only their dividend paying ability, 
or ability to raise external finance but also the investment behaviour particularly 
regarding to replacement investments. New assets (plait,machinery and buildings) 
are not expected to be replaced in a very short term. So, the relatively younger 
firms would not normally be expected to have the samereplacement patterns as the 
older firms. To minimize the effect of age and size the frms selected atre matched on 
the basis of the size bands and all firms must be more ban 5 years old9. This does 
not mean that the firms are all the same size or of tie same age but ire within 
‘similar’ band of sizes and ages.
2. There is the problem of data availability and the comequent effect on the sample 
size used. Data for private limited companies(whi<h foreign subsidiaries are 
m o s t ly ) ,  are not sufficiently detailed in the few sourcesavailable. Efforts to cbtair
9. This is in idditicn to other matching criteria as vil] be seen h chaper 9
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statistical data directly from firms failed despite the promise by the author of 
confidentiality. Financial data about foreign subsidiaries are, according to the large 
number of firms contacted, highly sensitive and since majority if not all, are not 
published in any detail the sample size happen not to be very large. However, the 
available data is considered adequate enough to test the hypotheses.
3. There are unavoidable problems related to the period covered by this study. 
First of all, the number of years are not as extensive as one would like it owing to 
data availability problems. The accounting data are not available for most foreign 
firms in any useful details before early 1970s. Secondly, the period of 1970 to 1980 
was very unstable. This instability was caused by many economic factors ranging 
from introduction of investment incentives, such as capital allowances in 1972, 
variations in the percentage of dividend limits during the period - 5 per cent limit, 
from second half of 1972 to first half of 1974; 12.5 per cent limit from mid 1974 to 
1975; 10 per cent limit from then to mid 1979 after which the restraint was 
abolished. There was also the high inflation of 1973 to 1974 caused by the 
quadrupling of oil prices; then the recession of 1974 to 1975, and another recession 
between late 1979 and 1981. As all these changes took place so also were the 
interest rates and exchange rates resulting from government policies to tackle them.
4
These various changes would have a limiting (diluting) effect on the structural 
performance of the individual models. However, since the firms in the sample all 
operate mainly in the host country, the underlying structural changes would have a 
neutral effect on the hypothesis being tested.
5. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The study is divided into four parts as follows: P a rt 1, comprises chapters 1 and 2. 
The part introduces the origin of the research problem, the purpose, the hypotheses, 
importance of the study and its limitations. The conceptual basis for expecting
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foreign ownership control to influence the financial behaviour of the firm is 
developed in chapter 2.
P a rt II, comprises chapters 3 , 4 .  In this part the findings from the pilot interviews 
and questionnaires surveys are presented. The pilot study is aimed at generating 
factual basis for expecting a difference between foreign versus locally controlled 
firms’ financial behaviours and the qualitative information for explaining this 
difference.
P a rt HI, comprises chapters 5, 6 and 7. This part forms the theoretical foundations 
for the empirical study. The theory and empirical literature relating to the three 
aspects of financial decisions are reviewed for the purpose of gaining an 
understanding of the state of the existing theories needed for the construction of the 
respective models of the financial decision triad under study.
P a rt IV, comprises of chapters 8 to 12. This is the empirical phase of the study. In 
this part, the detailed expression of the hypotheses are presented, followed by the 
definitions of the dependent and the independent variables; the description of the 
empirical methodology and other details on the empirical implementation such as 
sample characteristics and so on. This is followed by the empirical results and the 
summary and conclusions. The part ends with the suggestions of the directions for
l
further reinforcement of the emerging-knowledge about the financial behaviours of 




DOMINANT EQUITY OWNERSHIP,ITS DOMICILE AND RELEVANCE
1. THE CONTEXT
The evolving theme from the preceding chapter is that the th ree  m ain parties in 
the FDI relationship - the MNCs, the home and host countries - each desire to be in 
the position to control the majority of all the voting equity capital in foreign 
affiliates. To the home and host governments, the contention is not whether the 
state government should directly own the majority of the shares of all firms 
registered within their jurisdictions, but that their indigenous investors be the 
ultimate owners of the dom inant equity  voting shares in the affiliates. So . long as 
this is the case, in their point of view, the governments would be able to influence 
the decision rules in the firms, irrespective of where in the world the firms are 
directly situated.
The conceptual question is: Why is majority ownership control essential for the 
purpose of influencing the financial decisions of the firms? In other words, could not 
the above three main parties be able to wield their ‘influences’ on affiliates without 
ownership control? These questions are fundamental and necessary for establishing 
the conceptual basis of this study. Accordingly, three main issues are discussed in 
this chapter:
1. The essence of corporate ownership control:
2. The link between ow nership and corporate financial decisions;
3. The link between the domicile of dominant ownership and corporate financial 
decisions.
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2. THE ESSENCE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CONTROL
While the reason for wanting to control the dominant equity voting shares in the 
affiliates are clear(see the introduction in chapter 1), it is not made clear in the 
literature w hy  ownership control is the key source of influence on corporate 
decision rules (strategy).
To establish why ownership is the key source of influence, it is convenient to start 
by defining it. O w nership is the widest legal right of the owner to use, dispose, 
allocate and enjoy a ‘property' and ‘benefits’ arising from it1. Ownership of 
corporate property rights or shares (whether acquired or inherited), accords the 
shareholder the right or the au th o rity  to take part in decisions of the firm whose 
equity capital ‘he’ owns. The exceptional right to decide on the allocation of a firm's 
resources is universally  accepted as an entitlement to the majority of the owners 
of the firm2.
Although the host and home governments have some powers to influence the
circumstances that may affect the affiliate, they have no authority to actually make
decisions in the firm regarding the legitimate allocation of its resources. It is this
universally accepted superiority of authority of ownership of capital to  allocate the
%
firm's resources that perhaps makes ownership of corporate equity the key source of 
influence on firms’ financial decisions. .Thus, whoever elects the chief executive 
officer and the majority in number at the Board of Directors of the firm would 
effectively determine the managerial decision rules for the optimal financial 
decisions of the firm. This is important here, since it is the domicile of those with 
the dominant authority to determine the financial decision of the firm that is the
1. and of course bear the disadvantages or losses resulting from owning the property.
2. Majority of the owners, not in terms of physical ‘head count', but in terms of the share holdings; that 
is, the holdings of the units of authority of capital.
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key 'variable’ in this study. For this reason, where one draws the dividing ‘line’ 
between the majority and minor equity authority is important.
Reading through the Companies Acts of the United Kingdom, it is found that the
point where one draws this line varies from one situation to another. In some cases,
the required majority for certain decisions is as much as 95 per cent. On other 
*
occasions, the majority is simply described as ‘more th an  half* in nominal value of 
a firm's equity. Some examples will suffice to highlight this point:
1. Minority shareholders with less th an  15 per cent of issued share capital of a 
particular class would be unable to apply to the court to cancel the variation in the 
rights attributable to their shareholdings if the majority of more than 85 per cent 
had already voted to accept such variation (C.A. 1948, s.72; C.A. 1985, s .127(2); 
(cf) C.A. 1985. S.157C2)).
2. Minority holders of less than 10 per cent of paid up share capital may not 
requisition for an extra-ordinary general meeting of the company (C.A. 1948, s. 
132, 134 and 140(2): C.A. 1985. ss. 368(2) and 370(3)).
3. Minority shareholders of less than 5 per cent of the total voting rights of all 
members having the right to vote on the date and at particular meeting, would be 
unable to requisition the company to circularise the members with the notice of any 
resolution(s) arrived at the meeting to which the resolution relates (C.A. 1948, s. 
140(2a)).
4. Members representing less than 10 per cent of the total voting rights of all 
having the right to vote at the meeting can not call a poll of the company(see C.A. 
1948. s.l37(lb); C.A. 1985, s.373(lb)).
5. Extra-ordinary and special resolutions requires not less than 75 per cent 
m ajo rity  of members entitled to vote in person or by proxy for the resolution to be 
passed. In other words, a minority of more than 25 per cent shall result in a 
resolution not being passed (see C.A. 1948, s .l41(l); C.A. 1985, s.378(l)).
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6. A majority holding not less than 95 per cent in the nominal value of shares 
giving that right may propose and pass a special resolution at a meeting of which 21 
days notice have been given. In effect a m ino rity  of more th an  5 per cent can 
block the passing of such a resolution( see C.A. 1948,s.l41(2) and C.A. 1985, s. 
378(2)).
7. A company shall be deemed to control another if it controls the composition of 
the Board of Directors and secondly, if it holds more than 50 per cent in nominal 
value of its ordinary share capital. In effect the minority here is just less than 50 
per cent of the nominal value of ordinary share capital of the affiliate (see C.A. 
1948, s .154(1), and C.A* 1985, s. 736(1)).
8. At least 90 percent of shareholders of a given class must accept to transfer 
their shares to a transferee company before the dissenting minority of 10 per cent 
or less can be acquired (C.A. 1948. s.209; and also C.A 1985, s.428(l)).
From the above eight instances, it is clear that what is minority or majority for the 
purpose of corporate decision making, varies from one case to another. For practical 
purposes, however,, the owner(s) of just more than 50 per cent of equity voting 
shares have the authority , conferred by the legitimacy of ownership control, to 
appoint the chief executive director and thp majority in number of the Board of 
Directors. This majority at the board are entitled as agents of the majority 
shareholder(s), to determine the priority objectives for the firm and in the same 
crucible determine the financial decision rules to achieve the corporate objectives. 
This, therefore explains why ownership control is the key source of influence on the 
allocation of the means of production in the firm.
3. LINK BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
DECISIONS
The financial decisions of a firm depends on its objectives subject to the prevailing
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business environment. Various objectives are put forward in the literature as being 
the main objective of corporate operations. These include, profit m axim ization, 
m arket value m axim ization, and u tility  m axim ization (see Modigiliani and 
Miller 1958).
The appropriate conceptual basis in the context of this study must be one that 
relates the objectives of the firm to that of individual shareholders. This is as well 
because the firm exists to satisfy the objectives of the majority of its shareholder(s), 
over and above those of other interest groups 3. Accordingly the choice of the 
appropriate conceptual basis must be made out of the above three objectives of the 
firm. Consider the profit and market value maximization objectives for the 
moment. Apart from the difficulties of measuring the precise point where the profit 
is maximized or identifying in whose point of view the market value is maximized, 
the major weakness of these representations of firm objectives is that they ignore 
the non- pecuniary objectives of the individual shareholders which form part of 
the purpose of investing in a particular firm. That shareholders have non- 
pecuniary objectives, can be inferred from the company shares’ information pages of 
the Financial Times4. From such share information pages, it can be seen that some 
shares perform better than others. At the s^me time, firms in certain industries do 
appear’ consistently to have higher share values than those in other industries. 
While this can be attributed (at least partly) to the risk profiles of the firms, if the 
profit maximization and market value maximization objectives are the only 
objectives of the shareholders, perhaps there is no rational reason to hold shares in 
firms operating in low risk industries5. Any argument attributing this to the need
3. This point w ill be reinforced later in the section.
4. Por example.
5. since their market yield would be inferior to those of xnoTe risky industries.
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for diversification does not seem to hold up to close examination. For example , a
market value maximizer can diversify within the most profitable industry, rather
than across industry. The failure to do this can not be wholly attributed to market
imperfection since there appears to be ample information in the market to pursue a
chosen diversifying options. A possible argument that the cost of acquiring shares 
*
in the high performing industries is responsible for the distribution of shares across 
various securities, is far from convincing since the pooling of funds in finance 
houses such as Unit Trusts and Investment trusts and various ‘managed funds’ 
makes it possible to acquire such ‘high cost stocks’.
The point, however, is that individual investors are naturally different in many 
ways including the following:-
1. their consumption patterns and thus investment and financing decisions:
2. their attitudes towards uncerta in ty , risk /secu rity  and therefore their 
investment characteristics: and
3. their ‘intrinsic* value of the perpetuation of control of the equity of a particular 
firm preferred by the investor among other alternatives. This includes the 
preference to invest directly or indirectly in certain firms operating in certain 
industries and (or) countries, based on moral,and (or) socio-political considerations.
These three attributes of the investors, would together determine their investment 
behaviour. The to ta l satisfaction expected from the firm is the investor's to ta l 
u tility  and its ‘maximization’ should be the composite objective of investing in a 
firm. This objective would form the focus of corporate decision rules.
The advantage of utility view point is that it encompasses both pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary bundle of benefits expected from the ownership of corporate equity of a 
chosen firm. Utility has its bearing to a ‘person’ (see Taylor (1969)). Since utility 
varies between investors, it serves as a useful basis for comparing the financial
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behaviour of two or more firms owned by different groups of investors, other things 
being equal.
Thus, o ther th ings being equal, the long run difference between the financial 
behaviour of two sets of firms operating under similar economic and market 
conditions can be attributed to the varying utilities of the majority owners of their 
voting equity.
However, some authors argue that in some circumstances, such as where the equity 
shares of the firm are widely spread in the market, it becomes doubtful if the 
ownership utility is indeed not subordinate to Managerial group’s utility, for the 
following reasons:
1. Firms do not often go to the equity market to raise fresh risk capital (see 
Baumol (1965), and Galbraith (1972));
2. The 'costs’ involved in detailed monitoring of the managements’ behaviour may 
be prohibitive (see Mayer (1981)).
On the basis of these two reasons, the argument is that since the management do not 
go to the market often, then, they would not be very much influenced by the 
owners of the firm who indirectly use the market mechanism to  influence the 
direction of the firm. In addition, where the cost of monitoring managerial 
behaviour at every point in time is prohibitive, there is at least a partial abdication 
of control by the shareholders (see Mayer op. cit., P.7).
If the arguments in the preceding paragraph are right, then it may be that the 
difference in the financial decisions of the firms would depend on whether the firm’s 
shares are closely held (by few investors) or w idely  held (by large number of 
investors)6. However, whether a firm is closely held or widely held, there are
6. This point is important since the sample used for this study is made up of foreign subsidiaries - a 
special case of closely held firms; and locally controlled independent firms, all of which are public 
limited companies (whose shares are of course widely held).
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overwhelming indications to suggest that the majority voting shareholders do have 
effective influence on the financial decision rules (or strategy) of the firm (see 
section 2 above). Thus, the ownership utility rather than the managerial group 
utility  would have the dominant influence on the financial behaviour of the firm. 
The locus of this control is more precise in Parent-subsidiary relationships. Here it 
is an expressed policy that the executive of a foreign subsidiary has to forgo his 
nationalistic feelings and patriotism in the effort to satisfy the parent company’s 
requirements. His loyalty must be to protect the shareholders’ interests (see 
Kenyon-Jones (1966)). The parent company through its appointed representatives 
on the subsidiary’s Board of Directors, is able to directly influence the key financial 
decision making in the foreign base affiliates (see Dunning (1958), PP.107-111; 
Brash (1966), PP.113-128; Safarian 1969), P.19; Remmers (1969). P.167; and Alseq 
(1971), PP.118-145).
Coming to the so called management-controlled firms, it is well accepted by most 
researchers that the Board of Directors in all firms controls the finance, capital 
expenditures, dividends, the setting of corporate objectives and policy, and nominate 
the chief executive (see, Oppenheimer (1970), Zeitlin (1974), Scott and Hughes 
(1976), Nyman and Silberton (1974)). So l<?ng as the owners appoint the majority 
of the members of the Board of Directors, these executives have the delegated 
authority of the members of the firm on behalf of whom they steer the firm.
Even though some differences may be found to exist between the profitability
l
performance of the ‘Management-controlled’ firms, and ’owner-controlled’ firms, 
that does not challenge the authority of ownership to ensure that the dominant 
shareholders’ utility  is the main focus of the firm (see Florence (1961), Kamerschen 
1968), Monsen et al 1968), Nichols (1969), Radice 1971), Larner (1970), Elliot 
1972), Holl (1975), Palmer (1973), and Boudreaux (1973). That the difference in 
profitability between the two types of firms does not indicate any difference in
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whose utility influences the firms financial decisions hinges on the finding by 
Auerbach (19779. He finds that clientele exists in the ownership of the firm. Thus 
as long as there are shareholders willing to hold the equity shares in the firm, that 
firm can be said to be satisfying their utility, even if profitability is relatively low.
♦
From a more theoretical angle, Jensen and Meckling (1976), have described the 
relationship between the shareholders of the firm and the managerial group, as being 
an agency contract. Each party in this relationship have their separate objectives 
which may be in conflict with that of the other party, but which are brought into 
equilibrium within the framework of the contractual relations. The managerial 
group would take decisions that yield increased rewards to the firm in order to 
enhance their own perquisites. In addition to this self control, the top management 
with whom the agency contract exists, would be bound to fulfill their own side of 
this contract or face the sanctions that exist implicit and explicit in their contract 
with the ownership group.
All in all, the dominant owners of the firm would influence its financial decisions 
through their authority to appoint (and dismiss) most of the directors charged with 
the responsibility of satisfying the utility  o f‘the majority shareholders.
Having established, why corporate ownership is the key source of influence on the 
firms’ resource allocation decisions, and how the ownership utility is the major 
determinant of the firms overall objectives, it is clearly plausible to attribute the 
long run difference in the financial behaviour between two or more sets of firms 
(other things being equal) to the differences in the utility of dominant shareholders. 
Thus, if the dominant shareholders change, (given a change in the ownership 
utility) one should expect some differences in the objectives the firm has to pursue. 
Where the dominant shareholders domicile in different countries (or cultures), it is
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likely that the financial decisions of the firms owned and controlled from different 
countries would differ (see the next section).
4. THE DOMICILE OF DOMINANT OWNERSHIP AND 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DECISIONS
Domicile as used in this thesis refers to the country of permanent abode of 
dominant(or majority) shareholders of a firm. More importantly, domicile 
composes the entire culture of the indigenous inhabitants and the complex 
intermingling of the situational circumstances that prevail during and between 
periods in that abode. Since the cultures differ between countries, and 
circumstances also differ, it is plausible to expect that the the investors’ expectation 
and behaviours would differ between cultures at any point in time.
Investors’ economic behaviours result from their motivation, the desire to satisfy 
needs, wants, and aspirations. These are in turn culturally determined to a large 
extent(see Webber(1969)).
To establish how the domicile of the dominant shareholders would influence their
utility  objective and thus the financial decisions of their firms, it is convenient to
center the discussion on three main aspects of the shareholders’ desires from their
$
equity .investments in the firm (mentioned in the preceding section). These three 
desires or utility subsets are as follows: *
1. Achieving and maintaining satisfactory consumption patterns commensurate 
with their desired standard of living:
2. Maintaining the perpetuation of control of the means of satisfying the utility 
objective:
3. Ensuring th e  security of the utility satisfying assets.
First, consider the consumption sub-utility . Investors irrespective of their 
domicile, would desire to enjoy a ‘high’ standard of living. They would also desire
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to improve and maintain it at a satisfactory  level.
What differs between cultures or countries may be the level at which this 
satisfactory standards of living are perceived as being reached, and thereafter 
maintained. Obviously, several factors would determine an individual’s desires at 
any one point in time, but over a period of time some patterns would develop which 
would relate not so much to individual’s instinctive desires in isolation, but 
instincts embedded in the culture in which the shareholder domiciles. For instance, 
the standard of living in developing countries is not the same as in highly advanced 
industrial countries 7. The amount and pattern of cash flow requirements would 
therefore differ among different cultures. Peer group competition, domestic price 
levels, cultural effects on the nature of product demand - Americans-and wide body 
expensive cars, Japanese people and more compact and relatively cheaper cars and 
consumer electronics (etcetera). All these come together to influence desires of the 
investors from their equity and other investments. There is also varying taxation 
between countries which would have some effects on reducing the disposable cash 
available but not the need for this cash. An investor with investment in other 
countries would consider the exchange value of his cash flow receipts as this will 
affect the net receipts. For this, the timing and amount of cash withdrawals would 
be different from that of an equivalent investor in the host country who need not be 
concerned with exchange rate fluctuation other than to the extent it affects the net 
income from import and export transactions.
On the basis of the above points, one would expect a difference in the financial 
behaviour among firms whose dominant or majority shareholders domicile in 
different countries.
7. Where high standard of living is simply one with plenty of material well-being; see, Fletcher(l966), 
p. 109.
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Secondly, consider the perpetuation o f control sub-utility. An investor may hold 
shares in a firm to generate cash flows to satisfy his consumption in perpetuity, as 
well as, for other personal reasons which when added to his cash flows needs, make 
up his utility. For personal reasons some investors may not like to relinquish their 
control of the voting rights in a firm operating in a certain industry (or industries) 
or geographical locations. For that reason, the cash flow requirement from the firm 
would come from dividends (and other similar receipts such as fees, royalties, 
management charges and receipts from sales of goods to the firm where applicable), 
and not from sale of his shares in the stock market or else where.
However, since the utility of majority shareholders may vary between firms at any 
point in time, some may decide not to withdraw dividends so as to build up the 
value of their firm for ultimate disposal. This decision would depend on available 
other sources of cash flow for consumption and other investment opportunities 
outside the particular firm.
Thirdly, consider th e  security  sub-utility . This cuts across the other desires 
discussed in the preceding two subsections. Security relates to the degree to which 
the majority shareholders expect to be rest assured that their desired consumption 
patterns and 'perpetual’ control over their investments in any particular firm and 
country are secure at all times. Their evaluation of the certainty about the future 
security of their investment would reflect on their immediate behaviour aimed at 
mitigating any foreseeable risks that may inhibit the fulfillment of the ‘purpose’ of 
particular investment.
Other things being equal, one is expected to see objects clear when they are closer to 
the focus of the viewer. In the same crucible, an object would be less distinct the 
'farther away’ it is from the viewer’s focus.
Applying this principle to the perception of risk, a foreign domiciled shareholder is
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more likely to view a foreign base asset to be more risky than the asset situating 
within his conceptual focus - an asset close to his home.
The uneven risk perception between investments based at home and those based 
abroad would emanate from several causes. First, there may be a feeling of 
powerlessness should his asset in foreign countries be ‘unlawfully’ confiscated 
without appropriate compensation. While the basis of confiscation may be lawful 
in the host country, it may not be the same as in the investor’s home country. Even 
when it is similar to what his home country’s authorities would do, he would be 
more able to understand and appreciate the decisions that is taken at home than that 
taken in a foreign country. Most importantly, he would receive earlier warning 
signals before a locally based firm is nationalized and appropriate decision rules 
would be established to minimize the financial loss or negative knock-on effects on 
his other investments. Where foreign countries are concerned, the secrecy 
surrounding such decisions and the apparent suddenness in some cases, exacerbates 
the feeling of powerlessness.
Secondly, the foreign investor remote from the operational scene may feel a sense 
o f confusion and u n certa in ty  where national and provincial or local government 
agencies hold different views regarding foreign direct investment in the economy. 
While provincial agencies may be promoting their areas to attract foreign direct 
investments, the national government agencies may be more concerned with 
sovereignty and balance of payment issues, which do not directly concern the local 
government leaders. This creates an air of uncertainty for the foreign investor. A 
locally domiciled investor need not consider any of the above issues as being of any 
major threat to his investment.
Thirdly, there is the demand o f dual loyalty  to two jurisdictions. On the one hand 
there is the home country’s laws and on the other there is the host country's.
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Possible changes in both of these laws would obviously influence the business 
judgement of foreign domiciled investors. The investment decisions in the foreign 
country would to some extent be influenced by the circumstances at home. In 
situations of inter-country conflict between the home country and the host country, 
the investment in the foreign base affiliate may be in jeopardy. The home 
government may demand by law that further investment by the affiliates be 
suspended or withdrawn altogether. Conforming to such home country’s demands 
would affect the expected returns and future security of the investments abroad if 
retaliation results from the affiliate’s adherence to the home country's directives (see 
for example Schollhammer and Nigh(l984)).
Since managers and investors in business organisations (and indeed people in 
general) would tend to respond more promptly to threat than to opportunities (see 
Cyert and March(1963)). the above risks would quickly filter into the financial 
decision rules of management in firms whose majority shareholders are domiciled in 
a country other than the domicile of the firm. The dividend decisions would be 
affected. This may result in more withdrawals of income from the foreign base 
firms not only through dividends but also through fees, royalties, interest payments 
to the parent company (for example), use of transfer pricing for intra-group 
transactions, excessive stock of materials bought from the parent’s group and 
forward payments to the parent company and delayed transfers of payments to the 
particular host base affiliates. In effect minimum liquidity would be allowed in the 
affiliate and as much as possible, host base assets would be matched with host source 
liabilities. The threat of insecurity may also lead to lower investment expansion in 
the host country. Where investment growth is sustained, it may be more financed 
from host country sources (external finance and internally generated funds).
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5. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter the conceptual basis for expecting a difference in the financial 
decisions of firms is established. Since the three major parties in the foreign direct 
investment ownership debate prefer to control the dominant ownership of equity of 
the affiliates, the first question is why ownership is the key source of influence on 
the firm’s resource allocation decisions. The answer is traced to legitimacy or the 
universal acceptance of the authority conferred by the ownership of the voting 
share capital; and the dominant rights of the majority of the shareholders.
The second conceptual question is how the equity ownership influence the financial 
decisions of the firm. The answer is traced to the ability of the majority 
shareholders to appoint and dismiss the majority in number of the board of 
directors who are delegated with the authority to act on their behalf. The utility of 
the dominant shareholders therefore, determine the overall objective of the firm. It 
is also argued that although the managerial group may have their own utility, theirs 
are subordinate to that of the majority shareholders with whom an ‘implied’ agency 
contract exists.
The final question is how the domicile of dominant ownership would affect the 
financial decision of the firm. The answer is traced to the influence of differing 
cultures on the utilities of the different .groups of shareholders (local and foreign). 
Thus, since cultures, and therefore, utilities differ in terms of consumption patterns, 
desire for perpetuation of control and risk/security consciousness, between the 
shareholders domiciled in different cultures, the objectives of the firms would differ 
and therefore their financial decisions.
Having advanced the conceptual/theoretical arguements for expecting a difference in 
the financial behaviour of firms, in the next two chapters the operational basis for 
expecting this difference between foreign and locally controlled firms is esterblished.
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CHAPTER 3
PILOT STUDY 1: THE INTERVIEW SURVEY1
1. THE CONTEXT
Having established the theoretical basis for expecting foreign controlled firms to 
behave differently from locally controlled firms in the host country (see chapter 2), 
there is also a need to establish the operational basis.
Accordingly, this interview survey is carried out for three main reasons:
F irst, to gain first Jiand insight into the financial decision systems and 
considerations relating specificlly to dividend, investment and external financing in 
foreign base subsidiaries.
Second, to augment the information gleaned from earlier surveys including 
Dunning’s (1958) survey of the nature of control and performance of US owned 
companies in the United Kingdom: Brash’s (1966) survey of foreign investment in 
Australia: Zenoff’s (1966) survey of dividend remittance decisions in some United 
States owned subsidiaries in Europe: Safarian’s (1969) survey of performance of 
foreign controlled firms in Canada: Remmers’ (1969) interview of. some foreign 
owned subsidiaries in the UK designed to provide a conceptual model of financial 
management in MNCs: Steuer et a l’s (1973) survey of some aspects of foreign 
controlled firms to enable them determine the impact of foreign direct investment 
on the united Kingdom, and Kimber’s (1976) interviews of some UK based MNCs, 
aimed at finding a link between the strategy (or method) used for achieving
1. It is important to point out here that due to the small number of firms involved 
in the in-depth interviews, the analysis of the findings may appear to lack 
depth. However, the semi-case study approach used seems to be the most 
appropriate under the circumstances. The purpose of the interview study is also 
the guide to the nature of this analysis.
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corporate financial objectives and the structure or the way the multinational 
corporate group is organised.
Third, to test some tentative questions before mailing them to a larger sample of 
multinational firms in manufacturing industries.
The overall goal of this interview is to enhance the available information needed for 
the construction of empirical models of corporate financial decisions applicable to 
both foreign controlled and locally controlled independent firms as well as to 
generate qualitative information for explaining the results of the empirical analyses.
2. THE METHOD AND SCOPE OF THE SURVEY
The survey was immediately preceded by a search to identify the appropriate firms 
to approach. For this purpose various sources were consulted. These include the 
following:
F irst, the Times 1000 List of corporations, from where a list was compiled from 
among the largest 250 corporations in Europe.
Second, to determine the extent of geographic and activity spreads, three further 
sources were consulted. These include the Extel cards, the published financial 
statement of corporations and the World Directory of Multinational Corporations.
Several requests for participation were made but in the end, eleven top group 
financial executives in seven large manufacturing MNCs domiciled in the United 
Kingdom were interviewed. In each case, an average of three and a half hours were 
used up for the interviews. Because of the small number of firms interviewed one 
can not claim, on the basis of numbers alone, that the responses are representative 
of all MNCs. The findings and conclusions drawn therefrom can be viewed as in the 
nature of pilot study. Having said so, the findings from interviewing such a high 
powered set of corporate executives of firms operating in different manufacturing 
industries, over several hours, can not by any standards, be under rated. It needs
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pointing out that all the firms interviewed are among the oldest, the largest, and 
therefore among the most experienced firms in each of their respective industries, 
both in the world wide, European and UK ratings. Thus, if relatively smaller and 
younger firms in the international business arena learn from the experiences of those 
in the field before them, one would plausibly expect that the experience of these 
firms interviewed, would be more widely applicable than the small sample size 
might at first sight imply.
It was intended to interview many executives from foreign controlled subsidiaries, 
but this failed due to lack of access as those written to failed to reply and those 
that did reply directed me to their parent companies based abroad. One is aware 
that interviewing only the parent companies’ executives could lead to findings 
biased by the headquarters’ view points. The implication is possibly that the 
generalists’ experience could mask the differences that may well exist between 
different subsidiaries of the same firm. However interviewing only the parent 
companies' executives does offer some advantages.
The findings would be more amenable to generalizations than would be the case if 
individual subsidiaries were interviewed. The chief executives of the subsidiaries 
are responsible to the corresponding top executives in the parent company; by virtue 
of this subordinate status, interviews directed at subsidiaries may result in 
responses from executives whose flexibility or decision scope vary depending on the 
degree of ownership control (see Dunning (1958), p.107). This subsidiary bias could 
result in responses so phrased or guarded, depending on the authority the 
respondent feels that he has to say things about his firm and its parent which may 
not be favourable to the image of the parent company. Obviously such guarded 
responses can not yield meaningful generalizations. Putting these points in 
perspective, each of the parent firms interviewed can be viewed as generalizating on 
the financial decisions of their several subsidiaries across industries and host
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countries.
3. THE PERTINENT FEATURES OF INTERVIEWED 
CORPORATIONS
Some top executives in a total of seven MNCs were interviewed. Each of these firms 
mainly operate respectively in any one of the following manufacturing industries: 
oil and chemicals, electro-mechanical and electronics engineering, food 
manufacturing, beverages and tobacco, and manufacturers of supplies to 
construction industries. These firms are generally very large manufacturing multi­
national independent parent companies with assets and sales running into several 
million pounds sterling. Their direct investments spread over several host 
countries, and as mentioned earlier, they are among the largest in their respective 
industries both in terms of capital employed and sales.
The interviewees are mainly group chief financial executives, group corporate 
treasurers and group investment executives officers (see Table 3A (below) for the 
analysis of the pertinent features of the firms interviewed).
4. TOPICS DISCUSSED AND STRUCTURE OF PRESENTATION
i
To put the issues discussed in perspective a few points needs to be borne in mind. 
The questions posed to the interviewees had no time reference. Thus there was no 
emphasis as to what the parent company would do or had done during any specific 
period. Rather, the questions were open ended and relate to how financial decisions 
are made and the factors that determine the decisions taken. Thus discontinuities in 
the politico-economic environment and fiscal changes (etcetera), are assumed to 
occur randomly. The foreign firms then react to such changes like any other firm of 
comparable size in the host country.
The questions also do not relate to the parent company’s financial decisions in any
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specific host country or subsidiary but rather relates to the subsidiaries in general 
irrespective of which host countries they happen to be located. Consequently the 
responses are of a general nature and so, the extent to which they relate more to any 
one host country or subsidiary than another is an empirical task, which must be 
preceded by additional data. For this study, the use of the present interview 
findings is to help in the formulation or the explanation of the empirical models of 
dividend, investment and financing of foreign controlled affiliates in the host 
countries.
Coming to the topics or questions discussed, seven sets of issues were focused on:
1. Parent company's ownership strategy. The aim was to discover the MNC’s 
ownership culture. That is. whether the company prefers and uses majority 
ownership than minority participation. What are the effects if any on the choice of 
host country, the nature of involvement and the subsidiary independence.
2. Parent's expansion strategy relative to the subsidiaries. The question was aimed 
at determining the implications of parent company’s ownership control on location 
of expansion investments - a reflection of product interdependence. The larger the 
tendency to expand at home relative to any one host country, the effect of 
production interdependence would result }n less rate of expansion in the host 
country.
3. Major firm-specific factors motivating foreign direct investment entry into host 
countries. The financial behaviour of a foreign subsidiary would be influenced by 
the need that brought the firm into being.
4. The corporate structure: How the group is organized internationally, the system 
of arriving at the dividend, investment and external financing decisions in the 
affiliates.
5. Influence o f degree o f ownership control on earnings repatriation Channel Choice: 
What is the main channel for distribution of earnings?
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6. Principal sources o f internal data and the country whose economic environment 
more than the others influence the financial decisions in foreign base subsidiaries.
7. The participants: Who has the final say on key financial decisions?
It was possible to obtain the financial statements of the firms interviewed which 
helped to clarify certain issues such as the industrial spread of the firms’ activities 
and the global spread of their direct investments.
Although the questions were listed, there was the tendency during the interviews 
for the respondents to give answers of other questions while answering another 
question. This makes it, difficult to structure the results precisely under each topic 
as listed in 1 - 7 above. Thus, the results are more conveniently restructured into 
four major headings:
1. Parent’s ownership preference/subsidiary independence
2. Group Investment allocation/Parent’s home as first choice
3. Motivation: Nature of Business/Parent’s Commitment in the host country
4. Financial decision system/manifestation of parent-subsidiary financial 
interdependence and information symmetry.
The first three headings corresponds respectively to the first three • question sets,
i
while the fourth heading is the combination of responses to questions 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
The responses are better dealt with in separate sections starting with the first 
heading (see the next section).
5. PARENT'S OWNERSHIP PREFERENCE/SUBSIDIARY 
INDEPENDENCE
The indication from the interviewed executives across the firms in the sample is that 
the degree of ownership control determines the degree of flexibility or discretion 
available to the parent company in terms of the freedom to allocate the financial 
resources of host base subsidiaries. What this has not said is whether the
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consequence of parent’s flexibility would entail less than optimal financial behaviour 
by the foreign controlled subsidiaries relative to the locally controlled independent 
firms. The most one can infer from their response on this question is that, other 
things being equal, the difference between the financial behaviours of two firms 
(say) would be explainable by the degree of ownership and financial control of 
either firm controlled by a foreign base multinational firm.
The importance attached to ownership control by the multinational firms can be 
observed from table 3B - 3D below. There is a clear indication that companies 
across industries show a strong preference to fully control the ownership of their 
subsidiaries. This is so irrespective of the host country of operation; that is, 
whether it is the home country or a foreign country.
Table 3B
PERCENTAGE NUMBI2R OF ALL AFFTLIATES >909b AND <90% CONTROLLED
NAME >90% <90% TOTAL AFFILIATES
BRICKS pic 78.3 21.7 115
ALLELECTRICO 76.0 24.0 146
OILSGROUP pic 62.6 37.4 302
KIDNEY pic 83.1 16.9 ' * 243
WINDOWS pic 70.8 • 29.2 96
LAMPSJET pic 70.8 29.2 113
COSMETICSPIPES pic 87.7 12.3 171
average 75.6 24.4 1186*
* Total number of affiliates owned by the firms interviewed
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Table 3C
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN BASE AFFILIATES >90% AND <90% CONTROLLED
NAME >90% <90% TOTAL AFFILIATES
BRICKS pic 63.3 36.7 49
ALLELECTRICO pic 59.2 40.8 49
OILSGROUP pic 61.1 38.9 262
KIDNEY pic 79.2 20.8 197
WINDOWS pic 64.1 35.9 64
LAMPSJET pic 61.8 38.2 76
COSMETICSPIPES pic 81.6 18.4 114
average 67.2 32.8 .811*
* Total number of foreign affiliates owned by the MNCs interviewed.
Table 3D
PERCENTAGE OF HOME BASE AFFILIATES > 90% AND <  90% CONTROT .1 .FP
NAME >90% <90% TOTAL AFFILIATES
BRICKS pic 89.4 10.6 66
ALLECECTRICO pic 84.5 15.5 97
OILSGROUP pic 72.5 27.5 40
KIDNEY pic 100.0 0.0 46
WINDOWS pic 84.4 15.6 32
LAMPSJET pic 89.2 10.8 37
COSMETICSPIPES pic 100.0 0.0 '51
average 88.6 11.4 375*
* Total number of home base affiliates owned by the MNCs interviewed.
On average, there is a higher tendency to fully own and control locally based 
affiliates than foreign based ones. The multinational corporations allow on average 
32.8% dilution of their ownership control of foreign base affiliates as against 11.4% 
in their home base (Tables 3C and 3D respectively). The reasons offered for the 
higher dilution abroad than at home are:
1. some host countries impose local equity participation by law directly, or 
indirectly via policy:
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2. the need for local acceptance and to cultivate good corporate image which is 
considered important for global market success (e.g reduce the possible detrimental 
effects of such campaigns as ‘buy British’ and ‘buy American’ ) ;
3. business judgement regarding the need to dilute exposure to political risk (e.g 
expropriation or nationalisation of subsidiary company’s assets) ;
4. need for market entry into a saturated industry by a ‘market seeking’ company, 
particularly in industrialized host countries. The foreign company may be willing 
to dilute its ownership of equity of the foreign affiliate in favour of a possible host 
based competitor with a complementary technology. By so doing the parent 
company is able to penetrate what would otherwise be a difficult market to enter 
with full control, and at the same time it will benefit image-wise from a 
‘partnership’ with a well known local firm.
The high degree of importance attached to ownership and financial control is 
particularly demonstrated by the executives of Cosmetics pipes Pic. Their response 
also demonstrate how the subsidiary’s independence is highly limited. In Cosmetics 
pipes pic, the top of its structure is the main Board of Directors who has the 
prerogative to map out corporate objectives and set out guidelines for the affiliates 
within the group. In particular the parent has the prerogative for the allocation of 
the group’s resources. Operating guidelines passed down to the operating 
subsidiaries are monitored to ensure that the sub-objectives of the subsidiaries 
synchronizes with that of the entire group. It is the need for this global co­
ordination, the executives said, that creates the need for maximum ownership 
control. Their response is borne out by the fact that more than 80 per cent of their 
affiliates are wholly owned (see Tables 3B -  3D above).
Where the ownership is shared, the executives reveal that what would have been a 
guideline for wholly controlled firms becomes an advice and in most cases, are 
accepted. Where the Cosmeticspipes pic holds a minority of equity shares a
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combination of holdings of shares are acquired to prop up the financial link with the 
affiliate. In addition, the share holding relationships are supplemented with 
'captive* trade arrangements between the affiliate and the rest of the group. As an 
illustration, the company’s shareholding structure in a certain Australian company 
as at 1979 was put as follows:
Preference shares 2%
Ordinary shares 41%
B ordinary shares 3%
Secondly, its shareholding arrangement in a Brazilian affiliate was at the time of 
the interview as follows:
A preference shares 24%
B preference shares .22%
Ordinary shares 17%
Thirdly, its shareholding structure in a Danish affiliate was at the time as follows:
A ordinary shares 33%
B ordinary shares 33%
C ordinary shares 33%
4
The executives point out that where dominant control is restricted, use of other 
formulae enables the MNC to have as much influence in the affiliates decisions as 
possible. However, where the company’s holding is small, the local management 
has to respond more to the local pressures from the local majority shareholders. 
This may not always accord with the interest of the MNC. One of the executives in 
the Cosmeticspipes pic interviewed, pointed out however that this does not happen 
often. As far as the company is concerned, he said, whether an affiliate is wholly 
owned or not, does not very much affect the firm’s influence on the foreign base 
affiliates. However, dividend decisions are decided upon by the affiliate’s
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management.
The executives of A llelectrico pic indicated that the parent company acts as the 
central pool of funds. Loans to operating companies are given to them by the parent 
company to whom account of expenditures are produced. The parent would thus 
have to approve of such expansion projects before agreeing the financing. The 
parent company prohibits as a matter of policy any cross lending between affiliates. 
This firm also prefers to control most of its foreign and local affiliates. With more 
than 59% of its foreign affiliates wholly controlled, it appears to be the most liberal 
of all the firms interviewed in sharing ownership of its foreign affiliates (see Table 
3C above).
Oils pic also controls the majority of its foreign base affiliate to the tune of more 
than 60%. Through the wholly owned service companies, the firm co-ordinates the 
centralized activities throughout the group. These activities include crude oil 
trading, marine transportation, planning, central financing, research, technical 
design and engineering. Thus the major aspects of the subsidiaries’ activities are 
centrally co-ordinated.
As for Kidney pic, more than 79% of its foreign base affiliates are wholly
»
controlled. The firm sets the strategic plans for the group. The subsidiaries’ chief 
executives are accountable for the funds invested in their companies. Although 
they have delegated autonomy, they must conform to the strategic plan. Research 
is centrally funded and the financial affairs of the group are centrally managed. 
The management of the group is under a committee of management and each 
member of this committee is responsible for the subsidiaries allocated to him. In 
this way, the co-ordination of the agreed group objectives are ensured throughout 
the group.
More than 64% of the foreign affiliates of W indows pic are wholly controlled. In
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this firm the subsidiaries are centrally controlled. The firm is an operating 
company. It is responsible for strategic planning, direction and financial policy of 
the group as a whole. Thus what obtains in the domestic operations would have a 
bearing on resource allocations in the foreign controlled affiliates.
Lamps jet pic wholly owns more than 61% of its foreign base affiliates. Its 
operations world wide are controlled by two management companies who together 
own the seven principal operating companies and their subsidiaries. The 
management companies charge fees for their services and at the same time receive 
dividends from the affiliates. The fees and dividends received from the affiliates 
reflect the needs of the parent company and that of the subsidiaries. The 
management companies are also responsible for the product-groups operations. The 
entire group appears to behave as one company despite their separate legal existence 
in different countries.
In the case of BRICKS pic, more than 63% of its foreign base affiliates are wholly 
owned. The executive stressed that they normally go for 100% ownership except 
when host governments compel the firm to share ownership control. The 
managements of the foreign controlled affiliates are managerially autonomous in a 
highly decentralized system. However whfen it comes to financial decisions, the 
subsidiaries are regarded as extension of the parent company overseas. The 
budgetary allocations are centrally controlled. When the ownership of the foreign 
affiliate is shared with local investors and where the foreign affiliate is quoted in the 
local stock exchange, the firm (Bricks pic), remains as any other shareholder; where 
it holds the majority shares it acts as a majority shareholder. Its influence on such 
local managements would be through the appointment of representatives at Board 
of Directors. The dividend decisions in such quoted subsidiaries remain that of the 
local management. Where such arrangements is accepted, it is for strategic 
purposes, for example to maintain a presence there, as is the case in one of its firms
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in Irish Republic. In other cases, the only influence the local management has in key 
financial decisions is the extent to which it can justify their investment submissions 
during the annual operational planning.
All in all it has been shown in this section that MNCs prefer to own and control a 
larger proportion of their foreign base affiliates. One can infer from this that, their 
choice between any two host countries, other things being equal, will be affected by 
a difference in the freedom of the firms to choose their ownership structure. From 
what has been reported, it is clear that the subsidiary has strictly no financial 
independence.
6. GROUP INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS : PARENT’S HOME AS 
THE FIRST CHOICE
The evidence from the responses of the interviewees suggest a common tendency to 
invest more in the home country than in any other country. Thus the home 
country is the largest single base of their operations, in terms of capital employed 
and sales. This is so even when the greater number of subsidiaries and principal 
associated companies are abroad. This can be supported by a few examples.
Looking at Table 3E below it can be seen that most of the large multinationals on 
average have more affiliates abroad than at home, except Bricks pic and Allelectrico 
pic.
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Table 3E
PROPORTION OF AFFILIATES BASED AT HOME AND ABROAD
NAME FOREIGN AFFILIATES(%) LOCALS(%) TOTAL(%)
BRICKS pic 43 57 100
ALLELECTRICO pic 34 66 100
OILSGROUP pic 87 13 100
KIDNEY pic 81 19 100
WINDOWS pic 67 33 100
LAMPSJET pic 67 33 100
COSMETICSPIPES pic 67 33 100
average 63.7 36.3 100
The sales from UK by Bricks exceeds that from any one of the host countries. In 
1981 and 1982 the sales from UK was 48.6% and 52.4% of the respective group 
turnover despite the recession and the possible effects of exchange rates on exports 
during the period. A similar result is shown by A llelectrico pic. Its sales from 
UK was 65% of the group's annual sales in 1982 of which 22.2% were exports in 
that year. For Oils group pic and Kidney pic both of whom are classified as 
European firms, evidence shows that their manufacturing investments are more at 
home than in overseas subsidiaries. In Oils pic for example, betw een 1972 and 
1980, the manufacturing capital investments at home as a percentage of the group's 
manufacturing investments are respectively 58%, 54.4%, 47.8%, 60%, 51.5%, 54.1%, 
63.5% 50.7% and 41.3%. Similarly. Kidney pic's capital employed at home from 
1975 to 1980 as a percentage of the group’s total for the respective years are 66%, 
63.7%, 64.2%, 63%, 63.6% and 63.2%. In W indows pic the sales from home 
country between 1981 and 1982 for example are 36% and 30% of the group’s 
turnover while investments are 65% and 37% respectively. The Lampsjet pic 
capital employed at home exceeds that in any one overseas country. In 1982 for 
example the percentage was 64% of the group’s capital employed at home. Finally,
Cosmeticspipes pic, invests more stock of fixed assets at home than in any other 
host country excluding U.S.A. where most of its affiliates operate. Even so the sales 
from the home country are not very much far from that in U.S. subsidiaries.
Thus, from the executives’ responses and the evidence from their financial 
statements, illustrated above, the impression is that parent companies would first 
consider investment expansion at home and then the host countries. Similarly they 
would consider sales from home bases and secondly sales from the host countries. 
This inference is justified by the fact that despite the fact that most of the firms 
have smaller number of subsidiaries at home, yet the investments at home on 
average exceeds that from any one host country. This tendency to consider home 
country first could have the effect of lowering (or delaying) the rate of expansion in 
the host countries due to production interdependences. This interdependence can be 
inferred from the higher proportion of sales from home despite having smaller 
number of subsidiaries at home than overseas (see Table 3E above).
7. MOTIVATION: NATURE OF BUSINESS/PARENTS 
COMMITMENT IN THE HOST COUNTRY
All the interviewees indicate that the political and economic as well as other
i
environmental factors are considered prior to entry into a host country. Once 
established, the risks become part of the environment which the subsidiary 
company has to ‘live’ with just like any other firm in the host country.
As for the firm-specific factors that motivate and determine the geographic direction 
of investment expansion in the host countries, the responses from the interviewees 
point to the nature of the  subsidiary's business vis-a-vis the parent company - the 
products and the markets for the output. The influence of the product nature and 
market is over and above the usual determinants of capital investment such as 
demand pressures, earnings expectations and so on. Firms that produce raw
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materials as well as processing or manufacturing of finished goods are compelled to 
expand investment in the host countries where the raw materials are obtained. 
Where the affiliates are solely in manufacturing, the parent firm has a choice of 
where to expand capital investment depending firstly on its degree of control of the 
affiliates and secondly on the relative advantages of one host country over the 
others, including tax considerations, political stability, exchange control (remittance 
policy) local demand and availability of capital sources open to both foreign and 
locally controlled firms alike.
Thus, the executive of Oils pic pointed out that the investment expansion in any 
host country would depend on whether the subsidiary carries out the complete 
production cycle; that is. from 'up stream’ to 'down stream’ activities or whether 
only one set of these activities are carried out. In Oil pic’s context, the upstream 
activities are mainly exploration and extraction of crudes; while downstream 
activities includes refining and processing as well as marketing. A host 
country/subsidiary where the full range of activities are carried out would have 
more investment expansion than those where only one set of these activities is 
carried out. While the investments in the upstream activities do not depend mainly 
on the level of host country demand but tha\ of the world markets, the investments 
in the downstream subsidiaries very much depend on the local demand base.
In this industry, the executives pointed out, host governments have much more 
influence on financial decisions than in other manufacturing industries being that 
energy is considered as a strategic resource. International price and volume 
agreements such as that by the OPEC are part of the governmental influence.
For the manufacturing industries where most of the affiliates market a world wide 
product in their respective host markets, the firms within the group supply one 
another and much interdependence exists. The executives of Cosmeticspipes pic
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pointed out that the government measures against its main line product have 
consequences on outlays on current research and leads to shift in the industrial 
distribution of investments within the existing portfolio. This therefore affects the 
direction of financial resources. An affiliate in the main line product such as tobacco 
may be making sales but the concern about the future of the industry would affect 
the corporate strategy of the parent company wrhich may result in divestment in an 
otherwise a profitable subsidiary in a particular host country.
The executive in Bricks pic indicated that in the first instance, their firm’s 
motivation to establish foreign plants rather than export home-made products, are 
mainly due to the fact that its products and specifictions differ from one host 
country to another depending on climatic and geological factors. There is thus a 
compelling need to compete with the local, firms on the ground. As a result each 
subsidiary’s investment expansion is highly dependent on the host market demand. 
Since the products are 'country specific’ the degree of production interdependence is 
much less than it would otherwise be expected.
In the case of Windows pic. a firm in a related market as Bricks pic, the executive 
indicated that their product is not strictly country specific. The company is export 
orientated and the entry into foreign direct production is firstly stimulated by local 
demand and secondly the bulkiness and handling costs which make it more cost 
effective to establish in the host country. There is also the need to avoid restrictions 
directed at foreign imports. For this the subsidiaries are viewed as extension of the 
parent company with much production interdependence and centrally controlled 
finance function. The situation of things at home base, would have a bearing on 
decisions in the subsidiaries: The strong supports the weak’, he said.
This expression of strong production interdependence is also supported by most of 
the executives interviewed whose main focus in foreign direct investment can be
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described as 'market seeking’. An executive in A llelectrico pic pointed out that his 
firm is basically an 'export company’. As such a good deal of intra-group 
transactions take place. Most of the afiiliates based overseas perform little 
manufacturing other than assembly and support productions, some of these 
subsidiaries are mainly there to provide technical assistance to overseas customers 
and provide after sales services to major customers such as government utilities. By 
the nature of these afiiliates activities, their plant size and thus investment 
expansion are limited in scope.
Similarly the executives in Lampsjet pic a firm in a similar industry as Allelectrico 
pic, indicated that his firm is basically an export company. By the nature of the 
firm’s products (mainly intermediate goods), it ties its geographic expansion 
strategy to that of corporate customers. The foreign base corporate customers a lot 
of times do demand continuous supply contracts allied with local production. 
Sometimes the demand for local production by the customers are due to commercial 
reasons such as consistency and certainty of supply of their key components or 
other ingredients, for their own manufacturing operations. In some cases, the 
corporate customers are compelled by the host country’s Local content 
requirements to establish contracts with suppliers directly manufacturing the key 
components in the host country. Thus Lampsjet pic develops its activities on a 
world wide basis with strong production linkages within the group. The firm 
designates its product sectors, from time to time, as 'priority’ sectors. Accordingly 
efforts are then directed to the designated sectors to strengthen its position relative 
to international competition. This effort is targeted at strategic locations’ where 
the product group's industries are expanding. Tramps jet pic being the ‘corporate 
bank’, the executive said, it can stall investments in one product sector in favour of 
another. Since 1970s and in particular from early 1980s, the executive continued, 
electronics has been the priority sector. Thus subsidiaries engaged in such a sector
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within the group's portfolio would experience different investment and dividend 
allocations relative to other subsidiaries in non-priority sectors at the meantime. 
Some subsidiaries in the non-priority sectors would be required to repatriate more 
earnings and thus less investment expansion so as to support activities of other 
sister subsidiaries in priority sectors. Since host countries are in different stages of 
industrial development, and since the firm’s products are in most cases producer 
goods, the cut backs in non-priority sectors differs from one host country to another 
depending on local demand.
In Kidney pic, the executives indicate that their direct investment in foreign 
countries is necessitated by the nature of the firm's main product. First, the raw 
materials are low value, heavy and high volume and therefore not economical on 
cargo space for export shipment. Second, food consumed in various countries differ 
to some extent due to differences in tastes which has to be monitored regularly on 
the ground. Third, religious beliefs make it unacceptable, for example, in Moslem 
countries to import foreign processed foods particularly from Christian countries. 
Fourth, there are usually negative feelings towards manufactured food imports and 
most governments endeavour to see that their nation’s foods are mostly made 
locally than imported. Fifth, certain agricultural plants can only thrive in specific 
climatic regions or vegetation belts. For these reasons, the subsidiaries’ outputs are 
very much host- country specific. Other things being equal2, the nature of local 
demand determines the extent the parent company would wish to commit funds in 
the host country on long term basis. The allocation of financial resources has strong 
central bias.
2. such as the financial management considerations, local regulations, including mandatory equity 
participation, and restrictions on local gearing requirements and remittability of earnings.
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As for Cosmeticspipes pic, the executives indicated (like others), that the nature of 
their product have much effect on the investment in the host country. The firm 
concentrates on fast moving consumer products. The manufacturing and sales of its 
main line products are mainly for host country market. For example, about 90% of 
tobacco production is sold in the host country where they are manufactured, with 
only about 10% exported to some 180 countries. However, neither the raw 
materials nor the production processes are of any significant difference from one 
country to another. The foreign direct production of tobacco, the executive said, is 
important to the firm as the effect of health campaigns against this product would 
be made worse if much of its supply is via imports, making it an easy target for 
import controls.
There is a high degree of intra-group transactions between tobacco subsidiaries, 
packaging and paper subsidiaries. The production linkages allied with the ‘cash’ 
nature of the main line business creates the grounds for strong central financial 
control of the subsidiaries.
All in all, the major firm-specific factors that influence the investment expansion in 
foreign base affiliates or subsidiaries are: the nature of each firm’s .main product, 
host country demand and host government^ regulations particularly affecting the 
specific affiliate’s operations.
8- THE FINANCIAL DECISION SYSTEM/MANIFESTATION OF 
PARENT - SUBSIDIARY INTERDEPENDENCES
Not much can be offered by way of generalisations on every aspect of procedures by 
which all the firms formulate and decide upon financial allocations in foreign base 
subsidiaries. However, one may state briefly that from these interviews, the general 
impression is that the communication flow regarding key financial decisions is 
usually from the parent to the subsidiary, except on rare circumstances when action
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plans come from the operating units and quick action is required. Approval of 
investment expansions in subsidiaries depends on corporate plans of the parent and 
its group. The financing has to be approved by the parent company. Most of the 
finance comes from the subsidiaries (where the expansion is to take place) and also 
from intra-group loans. Local borrowings are used to supplement subsidiary’s 
retained earnings depending on the host country ,s regulations for borrowing by 
foreign controlled firms within its jurisdiction. Most firms set limits of the amount 
that the subsidiary’s chief executives could invest, in particular, as it relates to 
replacement investment. In all cases, expansion projects have to receive the parent 
company’s clearance. In all cases the repatriation or dividend decisions are very 
much dictated by the parent company except in a minority of cases where the 
subsidiary is quoted in the host country’s stock exchange where for legal reasons, 
the parental influence is less direct - through the representatives at the subsidiary’s 
Board of directors.
To substantiate the above general impression, it is considered important to describe 
the financial decision systems of the interviewed firms as indicated by the 
executives. The details differ however, from one firm to another. This is due to the 
fact that some executives were more disposed to give more details than others and 
should not be read as an indication of the extent of the difference in procedures. In 
any case, the central 'message’ is that there is much interdependence between the 
parent company and its foreign base affiliates in the area of financial decisions. The 
investigation of the implication of this lack of total financial decision authority in 
foreign subsidiaries as compared with locally independent firms is the empirical 
task for this study. Since the MNCs interviewed are generally from different 
industries it is considered important to describe their respective financial systems in 
as much detail as is possible:
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8.1 "Cosmeticspipesplc
The firm has what the executives referred to as ‘10 years strategic period’. This is 
the time horizon for corporate strategy which sets out the long term direction of the 
group as a whole. Each overseas subsidiary has its own sub-focus which is linked 
with the rest of the group.
There is a five-years plan linked with the strategic period and in between are series 
of meetings during which plans are reviewed in the light of prevailing 
circumstances. This is an on going process during which the headquarter staff are 
present. By so doing, (the headquarter staff are in tact with details of each 
subsidiary.
All investment proposals are discussed and opportunities are studied at subsidiary 
levels. Beyond certain  lim its, the proposal would be submitted to the 
headquarters of the affiliate's sub-holding company who in turn keeps the main 
holding company (Cosmeticspipes pic) informed if within its assigned limit. 
Otherwise it will be relayed to the main parent company. This is a matter of 
formality because at least one m ain paren t company’s Board director must be 
present during subsidiary’s Board meetings and would have been aware of’the issues
i
before they are submitted to the main Board of Directors. The main or ultimate 
parent company (hereinafter referred to as simply the headquarters) communicates 
investment, and thus, financing guidelines in a ‘top-down’ direction except where 
action plans come from the operating units and quick actions are required. 
Otherwise, the dialogue is interactive to communicate the reasoning behind the 
group’s objectives3.
3. Unlike regimented reporting where all have to be poured into the centre as a Tule.
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Having studied the relevant information collected by the headquarter committee 
members about foreign based subsidiaries, in the light of group’s overall objectives, 
the group’s financial objectives are set out for the period and this becomes the 
guidelines for all the subsidiaries. This also serves as an expression of the 
headquarter’s desires to the non- controlled affiliates.
This company has what can be referred to as the decision cycle (see figure (3A) 
below). It consists of what is called by the executive, a Board paper. This paper is 
a conceptually argued paper which reviews existing situation as it relates to the 
group and individual comapnies within different product groups. The paper 
recommends to the board how the business clim ate affects the operating groups for 
decision purposes.
The paper is prepared by the headquarter staff responsible for the sub- holding 
companies. Any amendments are relayed through the staff to the responsible 
executive in the host country to enable the observed conditions to have the desired 
effect on the budget and operating groups plans.
The dividends (x) would take into account the inflation growth hence the real 
growth of 3%. On top of that, there are additional sums to cover headquarters
t
overheads. The relevant inflation growth requirement would take into 
consideration either that of the host country or the home country rates whichever is 
higher. The subsidiary is responsible for host country’s taxes (both underlying and 
withholding taxes), and also responsible for exchange commissions and other 
associated costs, since the 3% real growth and other additions to the parent company 
are on ne t basis.
The return on net assets (RONA) should yield 15% CCA trading profit before tax in 
other to yield equity return of 7%. The gearing or Debt-Equity ratio (D/E) would 
depend on characteristics of the industry of the subsidiary’s main activity. Retail
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trade normally should have D/E *= Nil; while paper and packaging would take 
higher debt input. It is up to the subsidiary’s chief executive to take appropriate 
steps to meet the guidelines.
These guidelines becomes a control system (as shown in figure 3B above) although 
the subsidiary holds its key to achieving the objectives.
When no expansion is planned for a subsidiary, more funds would be remitted 
while a company with approved investments would remit a little or nothing. The 
foreign base subsidiary with funds in excess of parent company’s dividend 
requirements and maintenance investments are required to deposit such non­
committed funds with the group’s finance affiliates who pay interests on such 
deposits to the depositor subsidiaries.
These firms are allowed to draw on their balances for approved investments. Thus, 
expansion by each foreign subsidiary must first be financed by that company 
through its retained earnings and borrowing usually from the host country. Funds 
deposited with the group's finance company can be used as a collateral for such host 
country borrowings. The use of the host country borrowing rather than from the 
group’s finance company would depend on the relative interest rates, the exchange
i
rates, availability of such funds when required (since they may in the mean time be 
employed by the finance subsidiary), and the host country’s legislation (existing or 
expected) on remittance of interests to related foreign base parent companies or 
other foreign lenders. In most cases such funds deposited with the finance affiliate 
by foreign base subsidiaries become resident funds in the home country and not 
often re-remitted to the host countries from where it was deposited.
The host base subsidiaries must insure their assests with the parent company’s 
insurance subsidiary company who charges the host base firms for the cover 
provided. The insurance subsidiary is usually 100% owned and also operates to
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achieve the guidelines on dividend growth and RONA, and would normally 
incorporate these on the premiums. For its own part,’ the insurance subsidiary 
insures with larger assurance companies based in the home country. The insurance 
subsidiary has to diversify its underwriters to avoid problems that might arise if 
the host and home countries have political conflict that could result in a damage to 
the foreign base subsidiary’s assets.
8.2 "LampsjetPlc
The subsidiaries submit their financial forecast to the group planning function of 
the management group (the domestic operating companies owned 100% by Lamps jet 
pic). Depending on the nature and the extent of capital expenditure to be involved, 
the group executive directors appraise the submissions on the background of 
corporate plans. If approved the financing will be determined.
The subsidiary putting forward the expenditure plan should be able to finance a
substantial part of the project and the subsidiary's balance sheet should be in such a
’shape’ as to afford some bank borrowings. Any short falls are financed by the
parent company inform of intra-group loans providing the host country does not
prohibit loan repayment to the parent where a subsidiary is wholly owned.
»
This parent company keeps to a rigid 7.5% guideline for dividend remittances by the 
subsidiaries. This is in addition to thfe various fees such as technical aid fees, 
royalty fees, loan repayments and interests and service fees. Usually no 
expenditure limits operate in the subsidiaries relating to investment expansion 
which have to be approved by the management Board in the home country.
The management control by the parent company over its subsidiaries is unique due 
to the nature of its operations. For example, the electrical product group 
management is responsible for electrical operations world wide and other 
management groups control their respective decisions world wide. The chief
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executives of the foreign subsidiaries are responsible for co-ordination of activities 
on day to day basis to conform with the corporate objectives predetermined at the 
group headquarters.
8.3 "Windowsplc
The financial allocation depends on agreed plans. The top executives from all 
subsidiaries gather together to discuss and agree on 3 years formal plan. The 
executives meet every three months to discuss details. During the meeting the 
various submissions are sim ulated before deciding w hich country  or countries 
th a t  is w orth  putting  a new  p lan t o r increasing capacity. The background data 
relating to demand and various host countries’ economic climate and the nature of 
regulations aimed at foreign firms, as well as the political situations are put in 
perspective in the selection of a country to expand investment in.
The company uses the ‘rule of thumb’ approach for dividend allocations in the 
subsidiaries. The foreign affiliates are normally required to remit at least 60% of 
their net profits.
As for Kidney pic, the procedure can be briefly stated: The company prepares a 
three-year strategic plan, identifies opportunities fo r  profits and grow th  for five
i
years period. Capital requirements are estimated for ten years including working 
capital and fixed capital expenditures.
The annual capital expenditure is based on the central Board’s approved capital 
projects. From the group budgeted expenditures each host base subsidiary receives 
its allocation covering all aspects of its operations. The approval is only required 
for projects in excess of capital expenditure limit for each subsidiary’s chief 
executive.
In approving projects for each subsidiary, the circumstances of the host country is 
taking into consideration. Dividends required from the subsidiary is not a fixed
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percentage of net profit but depends on the opportunities for investment in the light 
of available financial resources. A poor performing subsidiary would attract less 
investment except where the poor performance results from acute competition in 
the host country. Under such a situation there may well be a case for providing 
more funds to the subsidiary to improve its position.
Despite the apparent autonomy allowed to the foreign executives, the level of 
parent company's influence on decisions in the affiliates remain high as the following 
indicates:
1. the ‘hiring’ and ‘firing’ of top executives of the subsidiaries are the 
responsibilities of central Board of the parent company
2. the subsidiaries are highly dependent on the centre for management advice, 
research and development services, technical staff and financial planning and 
funding:
3. authority has to be obtained from the Board to exceed certain limits of capital 




There are authority levels depending on the size of the subsidiary. The chief 
executive may be given an operating limit of up to 20million pounds sterling. In 
case of need for excesses, advice and guidance would be required from the parent 
company.
The investment proposals may either come from the operating subsidiaries or from 
the service companies. In the case of the operating companies, opportunities are 
identified usually in the main stream business sectors in their areas. Having done 
the necessary investment appraisal calculations, the next stage is for experts in the 
sector concerned to add their own data input into the decision process. When proper
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balancing of major issues have been achieved the action program would be drawn 
for implementing the decision. Major capital expenditure propositions by the 
operating subsidiaries are subject to consideration and ratification by the group 
holding companies where it would be discussed with the directors both executives 
and non executives.
On the other hand the initiation of new investments could come from a specific 
sector in the service companies. The service companies collect and process data 
regarding potential business opportunities for the group. When an opportunity is 
identified, a team will be delegated to evaluate the possibility of the opportunity 
falling within existing group company or new operating company have to be set up 
to take advantage of the opportunity. If the existing company is able to take up the 
opportunity, the company’s executive would be encouraged to explore the 
possibilities of the opportunity being profitably exploited. If yes the next stage is 
the financing arrangements. The financing of new projects by existing subsidiary 
may come from its retained earnings, financial input from the parent company and 
(or) local borrowing.
The necessary expertise are obtained from the service companies within the group. 
There is no specific percentage of annual net profit that each subsidiary has to remit, 
where wholly owned subsidiaries are concerned. Where however the affiliate is co­
owned with the host government or other organisations, allocations of earnings 
depend on agreed formula. In oil and gas partnerships with the host governments, 
earnings may be received in form of ‘equity oil and gas’. That is, an agreed 
proportion of output is shared between the participants.
8*5 A llelectricoplc
There is no fixed percentage demand from the foreign subsidiaries for dividend 
remittances. Allocations are dealt with on periodic basis.
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The local management is responsible for putting forward recommendations to the 
sub-parent. The parent company then considers the individual cases in the light of 
the following factors:
a) the role of the subsidiary and how well it is functioning in accordance with the 
set objectives for that subsidiary;
b) future requirements of funds for working capital and replacement expenditures 
that are usually allowed;
c) the group’s expansion needs - the sub-parent may wish a particular project to be 
delayed or in a particular year, one subsidiary may have been allowed a certain 
project which would attract resources, as a result some subsidiaries have to wait 
while the other(s) are allowed to go ahead with an already agreed project.
d) Local economic and political future as it may relate to the sub-group.
Having considered the sub-group’s circumstances in the light of economic and 
political future, the recommendations are submitted to the main parent company 
who takes over the next stage as the ultimate owner of the operating sub-groups, 
their affiliates and sub-subsidiaries.
The main group Managing Director assesses the recommendations with the experts 
knowledgeable about the sub-subsidiary company under discussion as well as the 
knowledge of the project(s) concerned. These experts are backed up by research 
staff. How the main group managing director and the experts view the future of 
that territory (after other considerations) would indicate as to whether to expand 
or to delay the expansion project for some time if possible, or even not to expand at 
all.
If the expansion projects are approved, the next decision is about how to finance it. 
Dividends could still be declared but not remitted while it is relent to the 
subsidiary and interest payments later remitted. The subsidiary would also use its
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retained earnings and the parent may be required to introduce more funds and (or) 
where possible local borrowing would be used while the parent's funds are put into 
use in other host country where there is less opportunity for local external 
financing.
Finally, the financial decision process in Bricks pic is as follows: At the annual 
budget planning the foreign as well as the domestic subsidiaries submit their 
proposals regarding maintenance and expansion expenditures to the respective 
regional chief executives who scan the proposals in the context of their divisional 
zones. These chief regional executives are also members of the group panel of the 
Board of directors headed by the group Chairman and chief executive.
The regional chiefs then pass on the proposals with their recommendations to the 
group headquarters (the parent company). At the parent company the proposals for 
each subsidiary company are studied and put in the context of the overall group 
investment policy and plan for each year. For example, the parent company may 
decide for some reasons not to get involved with any major expansion programme in 
a particular year no matter where. As such, no submission may be approved for 
major expansion programmes. - -
i
Capital expenditure proposals for replacement of mobile plants and vehicles are 
invariably approved and this would normally be met from the depreciation charged 
to the profit and loss account of the respective subsidiaries.
The approval of investment proposals in the subsidiary is considered in the light of 
the following factors:
a) the overall amount available for reinvestment generated from the subsidiary’s 
operations. Hence, the subsidiary’s managements are evaluated on the basis of 
annual operating profits generated.
b) The profitability that could be obtained elsewhere that is, the opportunity cost
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of investing in one subsidiary rather than in others.
The policy of the company in relation to dividends is that subsidiaries are to 
repatriate all net earnings and then funds are made available to the subsidiaries and 
affiliates as unsecured loans repayable not less than twelve months notice.
9. INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
In interpreting the findings, the normal caveats applying to interview surveys have 
to be borne in mind. In particular, the sample is, of course not representative of all 
the multinational corporations and thus does not allow one to make an emphatic 
claim about the definitiveness of the findings. For this reason, the interpretation of 
the responses from the interviews, so far as generalisation is concerned, is at best 
suggestive.
The main.findings are as follows:
1. Multinational companies prefer to control the voting equity of their affiliates 
whether they are based in the home or in foreign countries. This enhances the 
administrative flexibility or discretion available to the parent company in terms of 
the authority to allocate the group’s resources efficiently and effectively on world 
wide basis.
2. Approval of investment expansion (or cutback) depends on the parent company’s 
strategy towards investment in a particular host country. It also depends on the 
corporate plans of the parent company. There is the tendency to consider the home 
base first and secondly the host country as a recipient of investment.
3. Various multinational corporations operate directly in various host countries for 
various motives. Some indicate the need to protect their former export market 
against possible controls by the host governments. Some indicate the need to serve 
the overseas markets more effectively by establishing production bases a t or near
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the point of sale, to match competition on the 'ground'. Others indicate the need for 
raw materials as the major motivation (eg. petroleum and mining firms). In the 
case of food industries additional factors include the differences in climatic 
conditions necessary for the growth of certain crops and vegetation, as well as 
differences in tastes, differences in religion which restricts imports of processed or 
manufactured food products, for example, from Christian to Moslem countries. For 
manufacturers of supplies to building industry, there are additional considerations 
relating to the geological factors specific to different countries.
4. From the financial decision systems within the hierarchical structures 
(organisation structures), of the different firms interviewed, there is evidence of 
considerably high degree of information flows between the affiliates and the parent 
companies.
5. Within the multinational corporate groups, production interdependences exist, 
but the extent depends on the nature of subsidiary’s business vis-a- -vis the parent 
and its other affiliates.
6. There are clear indications of strong financial interdependence within each 
multinational corporate group irrespective of the nature of the subsidiary’s business 
in relation to the rest of the group. Allocation of funds depends on the subsidiary’s 
need for funds and those of the rest of the group within the groups strategic plan. 
The parent company effectively decides ©n the level of earnings to be repatriated to 
the home base (or other convenient base). It decides on the level of fees, transfer 
prices, and interest charges on intra-group loans and credits payable by each foreign 
base subsidiary. These are charges to subsidiaries’ profits before tax. In effect, the 
parent company indirectly influences the level of reported profits and since 
dividends are paid out of this, the parent company both directly and indirectly 
influences the flow of dividends.
7. Retained earnings are the most important source of finance for the foreign
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affiliates operations. The parent company considers the subsidiary’s need for funds 
for projects already agreed in advance within the strategic plan. Where the host 
country's regulations ’allow’, that is, where the exchange control regulations do not 
restrict (via high withholding taxes, for example) flow of interest payments to the 
foreign parent companies, intra-group loans are important sources of funds to the 
subsidiaries. However ‘country risk’ considerations also play a part in the degree of 
intra-group loans and credits used in the affiliates. External borrowing is also used 
to supplement the internal funds available to the affiliate. Major use of external 
sources of finance require the approval of the parent company.
8. The most important single market for the foreign base subsidiaries is generally 
the host country, followed by other countries. However where petroleum and 
mining industries are concerned, the markets for the crudes are usually more in the 
third countries. That is affiliates in mining and petroleum industries are more likely 
to export higher level of their outputs than those in manufacturing industries or 
those whose outputs are host country-specific.
9.1 Im plications for The Empirical Study
Based on the findings from this interview reported above the ownership control of 
an affiliate by a foreign base parent company‘has the following implications:
First, there is information symmetry. The parent being the majority shareholder is 
clearly aware of financial needs of the subsidiary as well as the sources of funds 
and amount available to it. The parent company is able to put into perspective its 
own financial needs and amounts available from other sources, in deciding on the 
dividend payments by the foreign affiliates. For this, and other reasons expressed 
earlier, dividend payments in foreign subsidiaries are likely to be less stable, in 
comparison with that by locally controlled independent companies, particularly 
those whose equity are widely distributed or those whose shares are freely 
marketable.
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Second, by virtue of production interdependences between the affiliates and the 
foreign parent’s group the rate of growth of investment in the affiliate would be 
influenced by strategic considerations over and above the need to satisfy demand 
pressures profitably. Over a long period, depending on the nature of the 
subsidiary’s business, one would expect the rate of investment to be negatively 
related to the degree of foreign control. This is also because the linkages between 
the affiliate and the rest of the group is likely to cut down the length of the 
production cycle and thus requires lower level of capital stock in individual 
affiliates relative to the domestic independent firms of similar sales volumes.
Third, foreign affiliates are expected to use more of their retained earnings for 
financing of their operation and less dependence on external finance. This flows 
from the finding that the parent considers the subsidiary’s need for funds before 
demanding earnings repatriation. Since investment plans are set out some periods 
earlier, funds would be set aside for the planned projects and current dividend 
payments have to take this into consideration. The use of intra-group credits and 
lagging of payments for intra-group supplies would also mean that dependence on 
external finance would be negatively related over a long period with the degree of 
foreign control of the affiliate.
Fourth, the nature of the affiliates business would influence the direction of 
investment expansion within the group. Firms in business to extract raw materials 
are compelled to expand investment in the host country for this purpose; they 
however, expand less than those who both extract raw materials and at the same 
time process them in the same host country. For this reason, the sample of firms for 
empirical study needs to be matched across industry bearing in mind some industry 
differences in the use of capital assets as well as the growth rates.
Finally, the host market is the most important single market; thus, both the foreign
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affiliates and locally controlled firms are faced with the same economic and fiscal 
policies of the host government at any one point in time. These factors can be 
conveniently taken as being neutral in a comparative study of both sets of firms, 
other things being equal.
To remedy the handicap of small sample of firms interviewed, a mailed survey was 
carried out and the result is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
PILOT STUDY II : THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
1. THE CONTEXT
Identical to the purpose of the interview, this questionnaire survey aims to generate 
information directly from parent companies, regarding the financial decisions in 
their foreign base affiliates. The survey is additionally necessary because of the 
small number of firms interviewed plus the desire to obtain information from 
several home countries to ground the information obtained from interviewing firms
t
from only one home country.
Broadly the questions are the same as thosed posed during the interviews but put in 
more precise terms. The link between the interviews and the questionnaires is 
mainly that the responses from the former are used to frame the various answer 
options in the later.
2. THE SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The sources of the basic information about the firms to whom the questions were 
mailed to. are the same as those used for selecting firms to whom initial requests for 
interviews were made ( see the preceding chapter ).
It would have been more appropriate in carrying out a survey of firms domiciling in 
non-English speaking countries for the questionnaires to be translated into the 
official languages spoken in the home countries. Unfortunately this was not done 
due to limitation of my finances. As a result the English version of the 
questionnaires had to be mailed to all the firms made up of 300 large MNCs from 
home basses including Belgium. Canada. Denmark. England. France. Finland. 
Scotland. Sweden. Switzerland. United States of America, W. Germany. Japan and 
Holland. The firms comprise those operating mainly in either of the following
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industries: chemicals, electronics and electricals engineering, drink and tobacco, 
mechanical engineering and instrument engineering, petroleum and other mineral 
mining industries.
The initial mails of the questionnaires received few responses. Reminders were 
mailed out in the effort to improve the number of responses. Despite this effort, in 
the end only 16 large MNCs responded by 1984/85 academic session. As no further 
improvement was possible, one has to make use of what is available. This low 
response, however, restricts the ability to make emphatic generalisations regarding 
the decisions in all MNCs. It is however perfectly appropriate to draw some
t
conclusions on the bases of these responses considering the na tio n a lity  spread of 
the firms, their experiences and industrial spread of their activities.
3. ANALYSIS OF PERTINENT FEATURES OF THE 
RESPONDENTS
To give the indication as to the strength of the findings and the impressions 
therefrom, it is important at this point to analyse the pertinent features of the 
responding firms. These features are analysed in Table 4A1 below.
Although the number of the respondents are relatively small, this is to an extent 
compensated for by a good number of countries and a wide variety of industries or 
product-markets, where the respondents mainly operate. Most of the respondents 
are MNCs domiciled in U.S.A. The rest domicile in countries such as Sweden. 
Finland. Belgium, England, W. Germany, Denmark. France, and Scotland. The 
industries where the respondents mainly operate include: Forestry products, metal 
manufacturing, machinery, office equipment manufacturing, chemicals, office
1. This table contains the analysis of the responses to the first question in the questionnaire.
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electronics, foods and drink processing and manufacturing, industrial products 
distribution, Bearings manufacturing. Petroleum and chemicals, automotive supplies 
and equipment manufacturing, manufacturers of steel wires, and textile 
manufacturers.
Most of the firms have had a considerable number of years of experience and do 
control several numbers of foreign base affiliates. The most popular region as a 
foreign base is Western Europe.
From the table it is clearly evident that most MNCs w ho responded to  the 
questionnaire prefer to control t their foreign base affiliates. Indeed, almost a 
hundred per cent of manufacturing MNCs hold their manufacturing affiliates in 
form of majority ownership. This mode of holding control of subsidiaries appears 
to be less common where the affiliates are in assembly operations, distribution and 
minerals mining, including petroleum.
The extent of group sales originating from abroad indicates the importance of 
foreign direct investment to the responding firms’ global operations and therefore 
the reason for the preference to control the affiliates.
The calibre of the officers responding to the questionnaires is indicative of the 
credence one attaches to the responses and the likelihood that the findings may be 
more widely applicable.
4. THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND STRUCTURE OF RESULTS
The questionnaire consists of two sets of questions. The first sought information of 
a qualitative nature; while the second sought quantita tive  data on the financing of 
foreign base affiliates.
The qualitative set of questions, in turn, consists of six sets of questions. They 
covered the following topics:-
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1. The industry, size of foreign direct investment, ownership of equity, the 
experience and the number of foreign base affiliates, the major area of operations 
and activity of the foreign base affiliates. The aim of this set of questions is to 
generate information on the pertinent features or characteristics of the responding 
firms for classification purposes.
2. The most used and therefore the preferred ownership control structures by the
MNCs and the major reasons for that preference; the motivation for direct
investment abroad; the degree of intra.-group transactions; the major market for the
foreign base affiliate’s sales. The question on the intra-group transactions aims to
*
identify the degree of production interdependences between the affiliates and the 
parent’s group. The question on the dominant market is to identify the country 
whose economy influences the affiliate’s operations more than others. This is 
important for the comparative study.
3. The major performance criteria, in other words the factors important for the 
parent’s commitment in the host country; the major channel for the subsidiary’s 
earnings repatriation; how fees are set and how interest charges on intra-group loans 
are determined.
4. The factors influencing the allocation of earnings between dividends and 
reinvestments, the key risk variables that influence periodic earning allocation to 
investment and dividend flows; the impact of local competition and major interest 
groups in a firm; the economic indicators and the economy of most importance, 
whose desire is more important for earnings allocation - the needs of the parent or 
those of the affiliates.
5. The method for arriving at the sum that is paid out as dividends to the parent 
company.
6. The most important sources of funds for financing foreign base affiliates’ 
operations.
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The second set of questions sought quantitative data to find out the distribution of 
methods of financing affiliates across major geographic regions and band of years.
The response rate of about 5.33% of 300 firms, is by any standards low. However
since no similar cross country survey on these topics are available, comparison with
earlier research is not possible. One reason that immediately comes to mind for
explaining the low response rate particularly from non-English speaking countries is
the possible problem of language, and perhaps suspicion as to the use of the
information in a foreign country. This would not however explain the equally low
response from the United Kingdom where only 2 out of 39 large MNCs responded
%
to the survey.
Based on the replies from those who would not complete the questionnaire the 
following are the two main reasons given:-
1. The questions go beyond the type of information normally published to the 
shareholders. Thus the information required are so confidential that they refuse to 
pass such data to other bodies or to discuss the surrounding circumstances;
2. Lack of time.
4.1 Structure o f The Results
None of those who responded completed the quantitative questionnaire (see 
Appendix A4). As a result the analysis relates only to the qualitative question 
responses. In addition, the number of respondents does not allow detailed 
classification of firms into various attributes such as size of foreign operations, sales 
and so on.
The structure of the result is as shown in table 4B below.
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Table 4B
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES
Question Description Ranks Summary Paragraph
numbers Findings Reference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2.1 Control preference 1 A *68.8% 1
2.2 Reason for (2.1) 1 A=43.8%, B=37.5% 2
2.3 Motivation for FDI 1 B«43.8%, C=31.3% 3
2.4 Supplies to affiliates 1 Intra-group supplies 
strong
4
2.5 Dependence of subs, on 
parents
1 High degree of inter­
dependence
5a
2.6 Subsidiaries' Main Mkt. 1 . A=93.8% 5
3.1 Performance measure 1 Differs in 54% of firms 
A=*55.2%, B=27.6%
6
3.2 Major earnings Transfer 
Channel
1 « No diff. in 69.2% 
A=55.2%, B-31%
7
3.3 Reason for (3.2) 1 A=75%, B=25% 8
3.4 Calculation of fees n/a
3.5 Int. on parents' loans 1 No difference
to subsidiaries A=30%, B=25%r C*25% 9
4.1a Main environmental 
risk of concern
1 H-48%, A=24%, B=8% 
No diff. 91.7%
10
4.1b Foreign risk Insurance n/a
4.1c Government influence 
on div. and investment
1 A-78% 11
4.2 Effect of competition 1 B-37%, A-29.6%, C-25.6% 12
4.3 Affiliate's Management 
relative influence
1 A-57%, B-28.6% 13
4.4 Relative Country 
economic effect
1 A-88.9% 14
4.5 MacTO economic 
variables effects
1 Mainly Host country 
no difference
15
4.6 Relative need of 
parent/affiliate
1 B=51.8%, A=44.4% 
A=49%, B=45.1%
16
4.7 Mgt. flexibility B*67.9% 17
5.1 Div. allocation 1 F=50%, C=40%, D-33% 18
6.1 Financing of subs. 1 C=63%, D=18.5% 19
Note: The alphabetic codes in column 4 are simply the answer 
options ranked accordigly by the respondents. See appendix A4.1 
for the full questions and the answer options.
The F irst column shows the question numbers corresponding to those in the 
questionnaire. One set of the questionnaire is included in appendix A4.
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The second column shows the description of the main purpose of the questions.
In most cases, the questions require the respondents to rank their answ er options 
starting with their first choice, (i.e., 1st. 2nd. 3rd and so on). The options are 
numbered A. B, C. D and so on, depending on the number of answer options 
provided for each question. Column 3 shows the respondents ranks given to the 
respective answer options. To simplify this analysis, in most of the questions, only 
the 1st ranks are shown.. Where necessary, however, the 2nd and 3rd ranks are also 
shown.
Column 4 shows the summary of the results. The contents of this column is
«
arrived a t.by  counting the answer option codes and finding the percentage of the 
sum of each over the number of firms responding to the particular question. Again, 
to simplify the presentation further, not all option codes percentages are shown. In 
all cases the highest answer option codes selected by the respondents are shown. 
However, where the first, the second, and the third choices are close, their 
percentages are shown, to highlight the relative importance of the answer options.
Where applicable, the respondents were asked to differentiate what would normally 
be the case if the ownership is wholly owned against when the ownership is partly 
■ owned2. Thus in column 4. where a difference exists between what applies to 
wholly controlled against partly controlled affiliates, it is indicated by a percentage 
which is calculated by counting the number of firms that ranked different answer 
options for the different ownership control types and finding the percentage this 
sum bears to all those that ranked their answers for both ownership control types. 
As an illustration, consider six firms that ranked answer options to a certain
2. Where this is the case and where the respondents answered accordingly, their ranked options are 
shown side by side; the rank for the answer option applicable to partly owned affiliates are 
superscripted in a second degree. See appendix A4B p.401-402.
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question as follows: AA 2, BB 2, CA 2. BC 2. BA 2, B —, respectively. It can be
seen that the last firm failed to rank an answer option against the partly owned
firms. Therefore, the five firms that ranked accordingly indicate that there is a
difference between the behaviour of wholly and partly owned affiliates to the tune
3
of about 60 per cent ( l ^ ) x  100. The ranks also show that answer option 'B* is 
more popular to the firms than other options to the tune of about 45.5 per cent 
(-j—O x  100. Similarly the second most important answer option for the same
question is 'A ', to the tune of about 36.4 per cent 100.
i
Finally, colum n 5 shows the paragraph or the row references to which the 
summary findings are referred to in the next section.
Names of the responding firms are not disclosed due to the researcher’s promise not 
to do so as a precondition for their responding to the questionnaire3.
The results as presented below corresponds to the question sets as referenced in 
column 1 of table 4B above. The answers to the first set of questions are already 
analysed in table 4A above.
5. THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL 
STUDY
5.1 The ow nership control preference
Table 4B shows that the MNCs prefer to, and do own wholly the equity of most of 
their foreign base affiliate4. From column 5. row number 1, the summary findings
3. An interested reader may be supplied with such details in confidence if necessary only for the purpose 
of appreciating the findings of this survey.
4. All the columns and rows in the rest of this section refer to those in table 4B shown in the preceding 
section.
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in column 4 shows that about 69 per cent of the firms across home countries 
indicate this preference for fu ll ownership and control of foreign affiliates. Of the 
31 per cent of the firms responding, a good number of them are in minerals 
extraction and processing business, where host governments have the tendency to 
insist on shared ownership.
When asked about the factors influencing their choice of ownership, about 44 per 
cent of the responding firms indicate that the main factor is the need for managerial 
and administrative convenience ; while about 38 per cent of the firms point to the 
nature of the subsidiary's business, including its riskiness, research content, and
t
capital intensity. The rest, point to the host country's regulations (see row 2 
column 4 ).
The above results corroborate those from the interviews reported in the preceding 
chapter, and show the extent to which the firms do prefer to internalize their 
ownership advantages. The implication of this is that any forced local participation 
codes by the host country, would influence the MNC’s mode of operations and 
perhaps its direct investment commitment in the host country.
It has been suggested, in the preceding chapter, that the commitment of a foreign 
firm in the host country would be influenced by the motivation for entry into that 
country and thus the nature of the affiliates operations there-in. When asked about 
their motivation for foreign direct investment, the most prominent reason given by 
about 44 per cent of the responding firms is the need for foreign market penetration 
and to guard against possible importing government’s import controls. 31 per cent 
of the respondents indicate that the need to satisfy the world market more cost 
effectively by establishing at. or, near the point of sale, is the most important 
motivation for their foreign investment. As expected, the firms in the natural 
resources industries such as petroleum and mining of minerals indicate the desire
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for raw materials as the major drive (see row 3 column 4). The significance of these 
findings lie in the link between motivation for entry into a host country, and the 
nature of operations of the foreign affiliate; and therefore, the possible industrial 
differences in financial behaviour of firms5.
It is plausible to expect that the extent to which a multinational firm expands its
fixed investment in a manufacturing affiliate depends, among other factors, on
whether or not the affiliate’s production is ‘fu ll cycle'. To the extent that one firm
depends more than others on external supplies for significant proportion of its
components, it would be expected that the capital stock growth or investment
%
expansion rate would differ between that firm and others who manufacture most of 
their intermediate materials and components. To find out the degree of 
interdependences between the foreign base subsidiaries and their parent companies, 
the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they supply materials 
and fixed assets to the affiliates. Row number 4, column 4 demonstrates the 
existence of a considerable intra-group trade in materials, components and supply of 
fixed assets by the parent to the subsidiaries. There is also .evidence of 
interdependence for finance, market outlets and supplies of technical expertise 
within the corporate group.
The interdependence reported above corroborate similar findings from the interview 
survey. Indeed written replies to questions 5.1(b) to 5.3 of the questionnaire bear 
this out. For instance, an Executive in Swedish forest wrote: ‘Parent determines 
strategy: market is penetrated: investment and profit are calculated", financing is 
solved: project is carried through; repatriation as to ability'. The executive in US 
Machines wrote: 'The subsidiaries are integrated from a management point of view
5. Firms in natural resource industries or those whose products are country- specific and use mainly 
local materials would be expected to invest more in the host country than others.
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and only formed in separate corporations for sovereign, legal and tax reasons. The 
intent is to have a world wide business which can deliver dividend to its owners’. 
Similarly, the Group Financial Policy manager of a UK based multinational foods 
and confectionery firm wrote that his firm reviews, modifies and approves long 
range plans for the subsidiaries and the group as a whole: estimates net cash 
available for repatriation or net requirement for additional capital: reviews and
updates strategy for optimum methods of repatriation and additional investment....
The group is. organised in area or regipnal basis. There is an export division at the 
headquarters. Each subsidiary has a managing director who reports to the relevant
t
regional Managing Director who in turn report to the group CEO. There are two 
advisory boards which consider matters of concern to the confectionery and soft 
drinks business respectively on a world wide basis. The interdependence between 
the affiliates and the parent corporation is also demonstrated by the written reply 
from a Danish Industrial goods distribution MNC:
The group Chief executive wrote: ‘investments in subsidiaries depend on approved 
investment plan for the group at large and then the approved investment plans for 
the subsidiary. Wholly owned subsidiaries report directly to group management 
and the group management executives are main Board members. In our large partly 
owned subsidiaries in which we have overall control the chief executive officer 
reports to the Board on which we have three members - a non-executive chairman, 
the vice chairman and the chief executive officer of our company. There is an 
informal close contact between our subsidiary’s chief executive officers and the 
holding company’s CEO. Similarly, a top executive of the Scottish Textile MNC 
describes the relationship as follows: ’Each subsidiary or affiliate is directly 
responsible to the managing director in the head office - the parent company’.
Given the implications of the organisational relationships between the foreign 
affiliate and the parent company, the separate effect of the nature of subsidiary’s
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business is of much importance. The vice president corporate Development of a U.S. 
Metal Mining and processing MNC wrote: all investment decisions depend on:
a) need for operating improvements
b) Changes in the Ore body
c) long term appreciation of investment
d) whether there are earnings or losses in any particular year'.
In comparing the effect of ownership control on the financial behaviour of any two
sets of firms, other things being equal, the two sets of firms should, to a great
extent, be faced with similar market conditions. The respondents were asked to
«
indicate by ranking three answer options, which country makes up the major 
market for their foreign controlled affiliates sales. The result shows that for 94 per 
cent of the MNCs, the most important single market is the host country (see row 
number 5 column 4). The second most important are the third countries other than 
the home country. Only in a minority of firms could one find the foreign affiliates 
exporting to the home country. These are mainly petroleum and mining firms as 
well as electronics firms. This finding suggests a possible impact of global market 
allocations by the parent companies on their affiliates.
The implication of the above findings relating to production interdependence and 
market allocations is that the foreign base subsidiary’s capital stock growth or 
investment expansion is expected to be relatively less as the degree of foreign 
ownership control increases.
5.2 Key Firm-Specific Variables in Subsidiary's Investm ent
To identify the key firm-specific variables in the investment considerations for 
existing operating affiliates, the respondents were asked to rank the answer options 
in question 3.1 (see the questionnaire Appendix A4.1), and to indicate what applies 
to the wholly owned as against partly owned affiliates. Their responses show that
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there is a difference between the key factors as they apply to wholly owned against 
partly owned affiliates, in 54 per cent of the firms. The most important variable is 
the return on investment, shown in 55 per cent of the cases. The second important 
factor is the level of earnings repatriated to the parent company, shown in 28 per 
cent of the firms. This later factor is particularly important where the foreign 
affiliate is partly owned (see row number 6, column 4).
It is plausible to expect that other methods of drawing earnings from the foreign 
base affiliates may influence the use of dividends as a means of drawing foreign 
source earnings by the parent company. To find out the position of dividend in 
relation to other channels, the respondents were asked to rank the various channels 
depending on their respective importance or frequency of usage. They were also 
requested to indicate their ranks separately for wholly owned and partly owned 
affiliates. Evidence from the responses show that in 69 per cent of the MNCs (who 
ranked accordingly), there are no differences between the different ownership 
control types as to the most important channel for earnings repatriation from 
abroad. At the same time dividend appears to be the most common channel in 55 
per cent of the MNCs. This is followed by fees in 31 per cent of the casts (see row 
number 7 column 4). The choice of the dividend among the alternative channels 
according to the firms, depends on the company's circumstances and the convenience 
afforded by the degree of ownership control of equity. This is followed by the 
consideration of the cost of alternative channels particularly as it relates to the tax 
treatment of the various other possible routes of repatriating foreign base earnings 
(see Row number 8 column 4). The use of other channels other than dividends to 
the tune of about 45 per cent of the cases suggests that a difference would exist 
between the dividend payments by locally controlled independent firms and foreign 
controlled firms operating mainly in the same host country.
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Some existing econometric models of investment and financing of firms (see chapters 
6 and 7 below ), express the cost of external finance in terms of the rate of interest 
charged to outstanding loans at the end of the year. While this may well serve as a 
useful proxy when one is investigating the financial behaviour of independent firms, 
where foreign controlled firms are concerned, it does not seem equally useful. To 
find out the mostly charged interest rates in foreign affiliates which in some ways 
differ from the independent firms because of incidence of intra-group loans, the 
respondents were requested to indicate their interest rates more often charged on 
intra-group loans to affiliates. They were also asked to rank what applies in wholly 
owned as against partly owned affiliates. Evidence from their responses shows no 
clear difference between wholly owned and partly owned affiliates in terms of 
interest charges. It is also shown that in- 30 per cent of the instances, the parent 
company charges a fixed rate of interest on its loans to the foreign base affiliates. On 
25 per cent of instances'the interest charges are variable rates based on the lending 
rates in the host country. Similarly in 25 per cent of the instances the parent 
company charge variable rates based on home country’s lending rates. There thus 
appears to be no common rate that could equally apply to foreign and locally 
controlled independent firms (see row number 9 column 4).
5 3  The M acro-economic environm ent o f the host country
For the purpose of investigating the comparative financial behaviour of two sets of 
firms as to the impact of domicile of ownership control, it is important that both 
firms are exposed m ain ly  to a common environment. The respondents were asked 
to rank the main environmental risks as they affect their dividend and investment 
decisions in their wholly and partly owned foreign base affiliates. In about 92 per 
cent of the respondents who ranked the answer options accordingly, evidence shows 
that there is no difference in the environmental factors that affect the wholly owned 
and partly owned affiliates. However the mostly mentioned concern is about the
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possible devaluation of host country’s currency (in about 48 per cent of the 
rankings). Nationalisation and expropriation of host base affiliates are indicated as 
major concerns in 24 per cent and 8 per cent of instances respectively, (see row 
number 10 column 4). This low concern about nationalisation and expropriation 
ties in with the fact that according to the respondents the most important region to 
them is Western Europe where most of their major affiliates operate. The history of 
nationalisation and expropriation of foreign assets are scanty in Europe relative to 
the industrially developing regions (or countries).
To determine the country whose regulations and economic conditions affect the 
financial decisions in the affiliates most, three related questions were asked requiring 
the respondents to indicate which country’s regulations and economic conditions 
have more effect on their financial decisions. They were also asked to rank some 
macro-economic variables as they apply to decisions in wholly and partly owned 
affiliates respectively. In 78 per cent of the respondents, host country’s regulations 
are of most importance, as compared to home and third countries’ regulations. 
About 89 per cent of the firms indicate that the host country’s economic factors 
affect the financial decisions in affiliates most (see rows 11 and 14 column 4). To 
check the responses in rows 11 and 14, the respondents were requested to rank some 
macro-economic indicators as to their respective importance indicating what applies 
to wholly owned and partly owned affiliates respectively. They were also required 
to indicate whether it is the host or home country's economic indicators that are 
more important. The evidence suggests that the host country’s indicators are more 
important. However the home country’s indicators are also important. This is as 
one should expect since the circumstances of the parent company would indirectly 
influence decisions affecting the foreign base subsidiaries.
The implication of this finding is that, in comparing the financial behaviour 
between two sets of firms (e.g. foreign owned and locally owned firms), as long as
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both set of firms operate mainly from the same host country, other things being 
equal, the economic and fiscal factors common to both firms within the host 
country’s environment can be assumed neutral and need not enter directly into the 
models of their financial behaviour.
In comparing the effect of ownership control on the financial behaviour of two firms 
(say), one needs to compare like with like. This means that competitors need to be 
compared against each other. To test the effect of competition on the financial 
decisions of the affiliates, the respondents were requested to indicate the extent to 
which anticipation of the competitors’ actions influence financial decisions. Evidence
i
indicates that in 37 per cent of cases, competitors actions have a fairly strong 
influence. 26 per cent of the instances competition has little effect (see row 12). 
Putting these two responses together the indication is that in about 63 per cent of 
the instances host country competition have some influence on the financial 
behaviour of foreign controlled affiliates. The implication of this is that in 
investigating the financial behaviour of foreign controlled firms in a host country 
there is a need to use as a ‘control group’, the comparable competitors indigenously 
owned and controlled.
5A  Foreign Ownership Control/subsidiary. Management 
F lexibility
One form in which foreign ownership control manifests itself in the subsidiaries is 
the impact it has on limiting managerial flexibility for independent financial 
decisions (see Dunning (1958)). Thus, the freedom for independent decisions 
becomes less as the foreign ownership of the firm increases. To test this hypothesis, 
the respondents were asked two related questions: First, they were requested to 
rank various interest groups according to the weight of their respective influence on 
the financial decisions in the foreign base affiliates. They were also required to
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indicate separately what holds in wholly owned as against partly owned affiliates.
Evidence from the respondents (see Row number 13. Column 5). suggests that in
the greater percentage of multinational firms, the parent’s management dominate
the financial allocation decisions in the foreign controlled affiliates. This holds in
more than 57 per cent of the responses. In the firms that pointed to the contrary.
the majority of them are those where the local equity is high (from about 40 per
cent upwards). In the few instances where the parent's control is substantial, yet
the subsidiary management are indicated to be playing more significant role in
financial decisions, the parents are relatively young in foreign direct investment and
*
their main focus are at developed market economies. As one executive pointed out, 
this is more likely where the foreign subsidiary is acquired or as a strategy to 
encourage local management commitment in a new firm.
Where the equity of the foreign base affiliate is shared, evidence suggests that the 
local management has more flexibility since the board is made up of representatives 
of both local and foreign investors. In 25 per cent of the firms responding, the 
management influence varies between wholly owned and partly owned'affiliates. In 
shared firms, decisions are more influenced by the shareholders in agreement while 
in wholly owned subsidiaries the final decisions are dominated by the parent 
company’s management. The 25 per cent of firms are those with substantial level of 
local equity participation, except that in one case the responding firm is relatively 
young in foreign operations, so that even though local equity participation may be 
low. the subsidiary management appears to have more influence.
The second related question, asked the respondents to indicate to which extent the 
subsidiary’s management influence earnings allocation decisions in their firms. 
Evidence from the respondents shows that in about 68 per cent of the cases, the 
chief executives of the foreign base affiliates while providing the data base which
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aids dividend and investment decisions, they have no veto on such decisions. The 
parent company's board of top management have the final say on repatriation of 
earnings and reinvestment decisions and thus indirectly determine financing of 
affiliates’ operations. Where the partly owned affiliates are concerned, the tendency 
is that the local executives have a greater say in the earnings allocation decisions, 
(see row 17 column 5).
The implication of the above findings is that the dividend and investment 
allocations in host base .firms would* vary depending on the domicile of equity 
ownership control and thus, the decision flexibility of local management.
5*5 Internal Factors and Approach to Financial A llocations
In the preceding sub-section it is suggested that the flexibility of local management 
for financial allocations becomes limited as the ownership control by the foreign 
firms increases. To test the implication of this on financial allocations in the 
affiliates, the respondents were requested to rank between the parents needs, the 
subsidiary’s needs and the principal affiliates' gearing according to their importance 
on foreign source earnings allocations.
The evidence from the responses (see row number 16, column 5) suggests that, 
when determining the earnings allocations in foreign base affiliates, the 
multinational firms would normally consider first, the parent’s needs for funds and 
secondly the affiliates needs. Thus in about 52 per cent of the cases the parent’s 
needs are considered first while in about 44 per cent of the cases the subsidiary’s 
needs are considered first. However when the first and second ranked options are 
considered together, the affiliates needs for funds becomes more prominent ((49 per 
cent against parent’s need at 45 per cent) see row number 16 column 5))6.
6. See appendix A4B p.402.
- 8 4 -
This cross-over of influences suggests that there is no significant difference between 
the consideration of the parent’s needs and affiliates needs in allocating foreign 
source income from subsidiaries. This is plausible because, o th e r things being 
equal, the availability of earnings to be allocated depends on it being available to 
the subsidiary in the first instance. This in turn depends on its level of investment.
From the responses, there does not appear to be a clear difference between the 
consideration in wholly owned affiliates in comparison to the partly owned ones. It 
is perhaps worth pointing out that this may be influenced by the fact that the 
ownership types are wholly and p a rtly  owned rather than m ajority ' owned and 
m in o rity  owned affiliates. Even so, the finding here is quite interesting. It suggests 
that although the local management may loose some of their flexibility for 
independent decisions, when it comes to allocation of funds to dividend and 
investment, the loss of flexibility becomes of little or no practical consequence. 
O ther th ings being equal investment has to be made in case of need, considering 
local competition and the nature of the affiliates’ operations.
The simultaneous consideration of parent’s and affiliate’s needs fbr funds in 
allocating the subsidiary’s annual income would suggest a difference in the dividend 
behaviour between foreign owned and controlled subsidiaries and the locally owned 
and controlled independent companies: That is, the dividend payments in the 
affiliates would be less stable than that of independent firms. To test this view, the 
respondents were requested to indicate how; they arrive at the sum to be paid out of 
foreign subsidiary’s income to the parent company, and to show'whether the 
approach differs between wholly controlled and partly controlled affiliates.
The evidence from the responses (row 18. column 5) shows that, of the firms 
responding to the question, the most popular approach is to charge variable 
percentage of earnings depending on the parent company’s liquidity situation - 40
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per cent indicated this approach out of six alternative options; secondly some 33 per 
cent of the respondents indicate that the main factor is the amount allowed by the 
host country’s regulations- As to what happens where the affiliates are partly 
owned by the local investors and the foreign firm, the evidence suggests that in 
most cases, the dividend allocations depend on agreement with the other co-owners 
(50 per cent of those responding accordingly indicate this approach out of six 
options). It is plausible to expect that such agreements may not change so often, 
and if so it is likely that dividend payments in partly owned affiliates would be 
more stable than those of wholly owned affiliates. In the same crucible one would 
expect that based on the above findings that foreign controlled firms’s dividends 
would be less stable than those of locally controlled independent firms.
5.6 Financing o f Foreign Affiliates Operations
If foreign controlled firms by virtue of their control from abroad, remit more funds 
out of the host country, then to finance its growth it needs more external finance in 
its capital structure than those firms locally controlled. To test this view the 
respondents were asked to indicate the main source of finance for the affiliate’s 
operations, showing separately what holds in wholly owned and partly owned 
affiliates.
The evidence from the responses shows that, in a majority of cases (63%), retained 
earnings are the most important source of finance for the affiliates operations (see 
row 19 column 5). This is followed by loans and credits from local sources, then 
parent company’s loans and lastly new permanent capital. From the responses there 
is no evidence to suggest that the financing of wholly controlled affiliates differs 
from that of partly owned affiliates. It is again important to bear in mind here that 
the respondents are considering wholly owned and partly owned affiliates rather 
than majority controlled and minority owned. In the case of the later, it is likely
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that ‘parents’ loans may not be applicable: even if it does apply, it would be 
uncommon.
The implication is that for foreign controlled firms, the use of external finance is 
likely to be smaller when the retained earnings and other forms of financial support 
from the rest of the group are put together, in comparison to what would hold in 
locally controlled independent firm.
6. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MAILED SURVEY
The similar sample size handicap that dilutes the generalisation from the interview 
findings presented in chapter 3. applies to this mail survey. However it is only a 
dilution of emphasis. This is so since a result from surveying what amounts to a 
‘random’ sample of multinational corporations from different home countries and 
across various industrial activities can not under any realistic grounds be 
disregarded. With this key note in mind, the findings are of much significance to the 
investigation of the financial behaviour of multinational corporations (through their 
controlled affiliates) in countries other than the domicile of the majority 
shareholders.
F irstly , the mail survey results corroborates the findings from the interview 
survey. It also corroborates the findings from similar surveys by other researchers 
mentioned in chapter 3.1 (above). There is evidence that the degree of foreign 
control would influence the degree of flexibility of the local management. However, 
when it comes to the influence of flexibility on its own on investment allocations, it 
does not appear to be of much importance. This is perhaps because where 
investments need to be expanded, the fact of no flexibility for independent action by 
the affiliate would have little influence. It appears that what is important is the 
nature of the affiliates business in the host country and the interdependence between 
the affiliates within the group. This interdependence depends on how the parent
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company organises its entire group. Since the individual subsidiary’s operations in 
terms of dividends and investment plans has to fall within the group’s corporate 
plans as approved by the foreign base parent company, it would appear that the 
financial decisions of the affiliates are biased towards the wishes of the parent 
company.
In deciding on earnings allocations to dividend, and reinvestment in the host base
affiliates, the parent’s needs for funds as well as that by the affiliate are
simultaneously considered. The pressure resulting from the parent’s needs which
may vary from time to time would also imply that dividend payments by foreign
«
controlled affiliates would be less stable (or indeed unstable) in comparison with 
that of locally controlled independent firms. This situation would also be enhanced 
by the consideration of risks including local currency devaluation of the host 
country.
The fact that the parent’s need for funds is of key importance, as well as the 
subsidiary’s needs of funds, suggests high degree of financial interdependence 
between the host base affiliate and its foreign parent (majority shareholders). This 
level of interdependence is not expected between the large independent locally 
controlled firm and its widely spread shareholders.
Similarly, the fact that the parent company based abroad determines the overall 
plan for the group, monitors the performance of each affiliate closely, and 
determines the financial allocations in these firms, suggest that there is clear 
information symmetry between the parent - the main shareholder- and the affiliate. 
This level of symmetry is unlikely to exist between the local management and the 
shareholders, where these are widely spread in the market. As a result, one should 
expect a difference in the dividend behaviour of the two sets of firms.
Another important point flows from the fact that the host country is the major
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market for the affiliates sales. Therefore as between the foreign owned subsidiary 
and the locally controlled firms, other things being equal, macro-economic and 
non-discriminatory fiscal policies become neutral when comparing their financial 
behaviours, since both sets of firms are mainly exposed to that same environment.
Finally, foreign controlled firms have been shown to depend heavily on internally
generated funds for their investment in the host countries. Thus the more the
earnings, the tendency would be to use less external financing. While one may not
expect much difference between the-foreign controlled affiliate and the locally
controlled independent firm on this count alone, it is plausible that due to other
«
forms of funds available to the affiliate from the rest of its parent’s group, such as 
intra-group supplies and credits on ‘current account', the foreign affiliates may 
resort less to external financing than the comparable locally controlled independent 
firms.
From both interviews and mail surveys, there are strong indications pointing to the 
existence of a difference between the financial behaviour of foreign controlled versus 
locally controlled independent firms in their operations mainly in the same 
host/home country. The-next phase of this research is an. attempt at an econometric 
test of this hypothesis. Accordingly the following three chapters are devoted to the 
review of the pertinent literature for the purpose of constructing the empirical 
models for the testing of the generated hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 5
DIVIDEND THEORIES AND MODELS
1. THE CONTEXT
This chapter is concerned with the review of the theory and empirical literature on 
the corporate dividend distribution decisions. The aim is to lay the foundations for 
the construction of the dividend model later on in the thesis1.
The extant theory of dividend is of two main strands, commonly referred to as
active and residual theories of dividend respectively. The structure of this chapter
«
follows along these lines. Thus, section 5.2 reviews the major empirical studies 
based on the framework that dividend is an active decision. Section 5.3 reviews the 
major emperical studies based on the residual theory. Section 5.4 discusses the 
issues peculiar to dividend decisions in foreign controlled affiliates. Section 5.5 
provides the chapter summary.
2. THE ACTIVE THEORY OF DIVIDEND
Under this theory of dividend behaviour, the firm is said to distribute dividends as 
it has always done in the past. This dividend payment is based on the target pay 
out ratio established sometime in the past by the management from their experience 
of the firm's cash flow (and perhaps the nature of the majority shareholders of the 
firm - the clientele hypothesis). The firm adjusts towards this target ratio 
depending on the management’s expectations that the currently observed earnings 
position is permanent or maintainable in the future.
1. Since this study is the first of its kind, with virtually no similar studies to build on, this review has 
to trace the theory and empirical studies in the general area as far back in time as one considers 
necessary. The problem is not made less by the-fact that recent studies on dividend (investment and 
financing) have mostly concentrated on firms quoted in the stock market and therefore used market 
related variables. This obviously offers little help for a study such as this where (fifty percent of) 
the sample are closely held and not quoted in the stock market.
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As the shareholders begin to expect this stable pattern of dividend receipts and 
incorporate them into their personal financial planning, and budgets, the 
management would be inclined to pay dividends consistently, irrespective of the 
firm's short term financial requirements for investment activities. Both the 
management and majority of the shareholders are aware of this stable dividend 
expectations. Therefore, any changes in the absolute amount of cash dividend 
payments conveys some information signals to the shareholders. This signaling 
phenomenon is said to exist due to in fo rm ation  asym m etry  2 between the 
shareholders, who possesses less ‘up-to-date’ information about the actual current 
earnings performance of the firm/ and the management who is clearly more aware 
of the up-to-date position3.
That dividends convey some information to the market, has been the subject of 
many research works and results have shown that this hypothesis, at least partly 
contributes to the dividend being viewed as an active or independent decision 
unrelated to investment and financing considerations (See Pettit (1972,1976); Watts
(1973,1976); and Fama et al (1969), Ross (1977), Bhattacharya. (1979) and 
Edwards (1981))............................
Further reasons in support of the proposition that dividend is an active decision are 
more conveniently grouped together as follows:
First .U ncertain ty  about fu tu re  earnings prospects and thus fluctuations in  the 
capital gains: This may be due to unexpected business risk as well as to tax law 
changes. Gordon (1962), argues that under uncertainty, investors are not 
indifferent between current dividend receipts and future capital gains. Thus,
2. Unequal possession of information.
3. See foT example Miller and Rock (1983) for a more recent discussion on this subject, especilly, 
p.1031).
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postponement of all dividends in favour of capital gains in the future would not be 
favoured by the majority of the shareholders. This preference for current 
dividends is also acknowledged by Solomon (1963). He asserted that dividend 
speaks louder than a thousand words in the world of uncertainty. This has been 
put in another way by Graham et al (1962). They stated that for the greater 
majority of shareholders, a dollar of dividend has on average about four times the 
impact on share prices as a dollar of retained earnings. Diamond (1967), reported 
that in more mature industries, a dollar of dividends continues to be preferred by 
investors. However within payment ranges, the market appears to have a slight 
preference for dollar retentions in firms within industries with a moderate or bright 
growth prospects4. Wood (1975) supports Gordon’s (1962) view. He introduced 
the 'Bird in Hand’ hypothesis as an explanation of why firms pay dividends. His 
suggestion is that share holders prefer a certain and tangible dividends to an 
uncertain capital gains since the future is unpredictable5.
Secondly, uncerta in ty  as to  th e  tru e  figure of the  reported profits: Sometimes, 
the shareholders may view that portion of reported earnings not confirmed by a 
dividend as a less reliable indicator of a company’s true performance (see Arditi
(1967,1976)). This is perhaps due to the ability of the management to influence 
reported earnings via such means as depreciation methods, provisions, valuation of 
assets including fixed assets, raw materials and finished goods inventories as well as 
the work in progress.
Third, n a tu re  of shareholders: The nature of the shareholders would play a part in 
determining the pattern of dividend flows. Certain institutional investors have
4. For a similar evidence in chemical industry,see Friend and Pocket (1964).
5. A number of studies appear to justify the shareholders preference to expect dividends on regular 
basis. These include Rayner and Little (1966) and Baumol, Heim, Malkiel and Quandt (1970) who 
suggest that retained earnings are not used as efficiently as debt finance and new issues.
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statutory limitations as to the characteristics of the firms in which they can invest 
fiduciary funds. One of the requirements for including a firm in the list of the 
wider range investments,6 includes among other requirements, that the firm has paid 
dividends over a certain number of years (see Trustee Investment Act 1961).
Fourth, na tu re  o f th e  firm : where the firm’s equity shares are not publicly quoted
or listed in the market, such as in private companies, the main sources of receipt
from the firm is the dividend .This is so because the shares in such a firm is not
easily (or freely) marketable due to 'contractual obligations as well as statutory
limitations (see Davies (1972), and Companies Act 1948, s.28(l)).
\
On the background of the above factors, there is a case for expecting dividend 
decisions in firms to be an active or primary decision independent of investment and 
financing budgets.
Lintner’s (1956) research study on the subject of corporate dividend distributions 
forms the basis of most empirical models of the dividend decisions since late 1950s. 
However before Lintner’s study, there were already indications from other 
researchers interested in business-cycle forecasting on economy-wide basis. Such 
earlier studies include those by Tinbergen (1939), Modigiliani (1949), Dobrovolsky 
(195l),and Koyck (1954).
Tinbergen (1939, p.115) advanced one of the earliest hypotheses to account for the 
behaviour of corporate dividends. He postulates that aggregate dividends are chiefly 
determined by current and lagged profits and by the aggregate reserve position7. His 
model is of the form:
6. such as investment in shares of listed companies. This is a legal term used in the trust law.
7. That is, the balance of profits after deducting the attributable dividend of the particular year (or 
period)).
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where D ,P ,N , denote dividend.profits and net reserve position (or retained 
earnings) respectively; $o . are the coefficients while t  , denotes time period
under investigation. This model tested on U.S. corporate data gave a high correlation 
between the dependent variable (D t ) and the explanatory variables (P and N) for 
the period investigated ( that is.1919 to 1932).
Tinbergen's model was later slightly modified by the addition of a constant term by 
Modigiliani (1949). Modigiliani was then interested in estimating corporate 
dividend policy under ‘normal’ conditions. In accord with Tinbergen he 
hypothesised that current dividend is explained by current and lagged profits and 
the aggregate ‘net surplus’ of the corporations. His main estimated model is of the 
form;
Dt =  a + 0 ^ + / 3 2 / >t _ i+ /3 37Vj_1 (2)
where OL, is the constant term. He explained that the introduction of lagged income 
variable (Pt _^) is to account for the fact that in general, dividends are paid 
sometime after income is earned. There is however no explanation as tc the addition 
of the constant term which he said is expected to be close to zero. This failed to be 
zero and indeed the coefficient of this term turned out to be significant at 5 percent 
level (see Modigiliani (1949). p.414: note 64). Finally there was no explanation by 
neither Tinbergen nor Modigiliani as to the reasoning behind the inclusion of lagged 
net surplus position, and what they expected from that variable is not very clear. 
It is therefore not surprising when Modigiliani became highly sceptical as to the 
high explanatory power of net surplus position (Op. cit. p.414). However 
Modigiliani concludes that the variable net surplus is. for systematic reasons, a good 
ind irec t measure of other major factors (ibid). What these ‘major’ factors are, 
were not suggested directly. Modigiliani does appear to be suggesting that
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investm ent requirem ents and the whole path of past income are additional factors 
influencing corporate dividends and savings. This inference is drawn from his 
statement, thus : ‘in view of the sluggishness o f dividends and of the exceptional 
investment requirements o f corporations, dividends may be expected to rise only 
gradually, even i f  income is maintained’ (op.cit.p.415). He also noted that there are 
strong reasons to suppose that corporate savings are influenced by investment 
opportunities. Despite this, investment requirements were not fully measured 
directly or indirectly in both Tinbergen’s and Modigiliani's dividend models.
Dobrovolsky (1951), built on the hypotheses of the preceding two studies. He was 
at the time concerned with corporate financing decisions ; this is of course the other 
side of the dividend question. He followed Modigiliani’s (op.cit.p.412) approach . 
but rather than hypothesising an initial simple relationship between dividend and 
current profits, he hypothesised as a starting point, that retained earnings or 
corporate savings is a function of income. Thus:
Nc =  ot+(SPt (3)
This simple model is further extended by introducing lagged dividends, lagged 
reserves and lagged asset expansion to arrive at his extended model of corporate 
savings as follows:
Nt =  oc-\-(5Pt +cDt _i+dN t ^ - \-e E t (4)
where E f - \  is the lagged asset expansion. The model is reported to perform well 
but the variable N t ^ i ,  the preceding year-end reserves, failed to be significant. For 
this reason, Dobrovolsky dropped it and was left with a model of the form:
Nt =  ct+($Pt -hcZ)j_1+ e £ ^ _ 1 (5)
In his cross-section estimation of corporate savings behaviour, lagged dividend 
( A - i >  was replaced by Dt _ 2. One point that is worthy of note is that the very
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poor performance of lagged net surplus position led to it being eliminated from 
Dobrovolsky’s model. This poor performance reflects the strengths of lagged 
dividends and lagged asset expansion variables both of which are absent in 
Tinbergen’s and Modigiliani’s dividend models (discussed earlier). In effect the 
influence of the aggregate net surplus position as picked up by Tinbergen’s and 
Modigiliani’s dividend models, is , as Modigiliani pointed out, only an indirect 
measure of other major factors. These major factors turn out, as Dobrovolsky’s 
model shows, to be lagged dividend and asset expansion (see equations (4), and (5) 
above). The inclusion of lagged asset expansion reflects the fact that current 
corporate savings would result from past investments, and lagged dividends reflects 
the influence of past profits.
Koyck (1954), further developed on this later point. He hypothesised that dividend 
is a function of profits series in a distributed lag framework. In his view both the 
lagged net surplus position and lagged asset expansion are not directly relevant in 
the dividend model. His distributed lag model of dividend behaviour can be 
expressed in the following form:
D t =  OL(Pt +(3Pt _ 2+&3Pt - 3+  Pt - n  ) + € r (6)
where ol, and 3  are constants with 3 ^ 1  : is the error term. From equation (6)
the expression for the preceding year’s dividend payment (jDt _ j)  is derived as 
follows:
A - l  =  <*(^£ - l + f t P r _ 2 - 3 + 3 3P f - 4 +  &n Pt -n  + l ) + 6r -1  ^
where n  represents a particular period in the past. By substituting equation (7) 
into equation (6 ) the current dividend model is of the form:
D t =  otPt +($Dt - 1+ V t (8)
where V t = € t + 3 ^ t — i
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What is clear from the above survey of early dividend models is that, before 
Lintner’s (1956) study, there were indications of the importance of profits and 
lagged dividends in explaining the current dividend behaviour of firms. Koyck’s 
formulation more clearly shows that lagged dividend series is the surrogate for the 
effect of past profits and other variables including industry specific effects (see also 
Prais (1956)).
2.1 THE LINTNER MODEL
Lintner (1956) formalized equation 8 (above) by the addition of a constant term. 
However, what is more important is the two key concepts he introduced into the 
explanation of corporate dividend behaviour. These two concepts are, the target pay 
out ratio, and the speed of adjustment factor. The introduction of these concepts 
are based on his interviews with corporate dividend decision makers in 28 well 
established U.S. companies. The interviews focused upon determining the factors 
which entered most actively into dividend decisions. The key finding from his 
interviews, central to his model, is that the first question the managements ask 
themselves when dividend decision is being considered is w hether' the existing 
dividend rate should be changed, and thereafter by how much. From this Lintner 
gets the indication that dividends represent the primary and active decision variable 
in most situations, while savings in a given period are largely a by-product of 
dividend action taken in terms of pretty well established practices and policies 
(op.cit. p.97).
As far as Lintner is concerned, the investment requirements do not come directly 
into the dividend equation. However he suggests that firms establish an ‘ideal or 
target pay out’ ratio sometime in the past based on the companies’ experience, 
objectives and pattern of operations. Among the more important factors that enter 
into the selection of the target pay out ratios - the proportion of the current profits
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that can be distributed year by year - and the speed of adjustment towards this 
'ideal' ratio are as follows:
i. the growth prospects of the industry and in particular, the growth and earnings 
prospects of the particular firm:
ii. the average cyclical movement of investment opportunities;
iii. working capital requirements and pattern of internal funds flows;
iv. the relative importance attached by management to long term capital gains as 
compared with current dividend income for its shareholders;
v. the normal pay outs and speed of adjustment of competitors or those whose
«
securities are close substitutes:
vi. the financial strength of the company, its access to the capital market on 
favourable terms and company policies with respect to the use of outside debt and 
new equity issues;
vii. managements’ confidence in the soundness of earnings figures as reported by its 
accounting department and its budget and projections of future sales, profits and so 
on (see Lintner (op.cit.p.104)).
It appears that, from Lintner’s view, once the target payment ratio has been 
established in the past, there is no place for investment as an explicit independent 
variable in the dividend equation. Thus although earnings may fluctuate, dividends 
remain stable and any investment opportunities in excess of post-dividend income 
would be externally financed if the returns expected justify the marginal cost of 
borrowing . Otherwise the investment would be abandoned. For the firms that 
could not borrow, their capital budget would be cut to fit the available funds. 
Therefore, investment requirements have generally little direct effect in modifying 
dividend behaviour except in some limited instances (op.cit. p. 106).
Lintner’s theoretical extrapolation from his interviews can be expressed 
symbolically as follows:
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Dt ~ D t =  a-hc (D*—Dt _ x)+ v t (9)
where D* is the ideal or target dividend rate which the firm would wish to pay out 
in period, t : C , denotes the speed of adjustment or the adjustment factor reflecting 
the fact that firms do not generally adjust fully to the maximum pay out ratio each 
period. This C . indicates the fraction of the difference between this target dividend 
D* and the actual payment made in the preceding year Z)£_ j_. The target dividend 
ratio is unobservable but is derived as a function of current profits, that is:
D* =  TPt ' (10)
where T, is the target pay out ratio. Equation (9) and (10) when combined are 
readily transformed to
D t =  aH-j3 Pc +8.DC _ i+ v t (11)
where j3 = c r and S = ( l —C ). The introduction of the constant term according to 
Lintner is to reflect the management’s reluctance to change the existing rate, (taking 
the shareholders and other financial community into consideration). Where changes 
have to be made it is very much determined by the change in the net income 
expected to be long term. By applying this model to time-series data of 800 U.S. 
firms across industry, over the periods 1918-195L and 1946-1954, the high 
performance of the model led him to argue that although investment outlays have 
over long periods been consistently and highly correlated with current profits, sales 
volume and internal fund flows, allowances for these relationships are built into the 
dividend policies sometimes in the past , in such a way that firms can pay dividends 
with considerable consistency over periods of time, and do so with considerable 
comfort and success (op.cit. p. 113).
It is perhaps worth pointing out that Lintner’s model was tested during the period 
of post war prosperity and relatively little inflation: the consistency found may 
have been affected by these factors8, as he indeed recognised, (op.cit. p.101). In
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addition, he accepts that firms do not fully adjust to the ideal pay out ratio but he
fails to explain why not. These points are important as it is upon them that the
next hypothesis of dividend decision is based. We shall come back to this in the
next section. The difference between Lintner and Koyck's distributed lag model as
shown in equation (8) above is the absence of the constant term, which Lintner
suggests must be there, to reflect the firm’s tendency to pay dividends on consistent
basis. This was indeed found to be significant at 5 per cent level by Modigiliani (op.
cit),although no indication was given by him as to why the constant term form part
of his independent variables (see Modigiliani (op.cit. p.414).
*
Darling (1957), contends that Lintner’s model fails to account for some important 
factors such as liquidity and expectation and that the use of lagged dividends only 
explains how current dividend level developed from the preceding period, using as a 
bench mark for each period, the value of one period lagged dividend series 
(op.cit.p.217). He argues that the management’s goal of maintaining financial 
manoeuverability by planning for an adequate level of future liquid balances places 
the dividend decision within the constraint of the budget equation. Darling adopted 
the concept of target pay out ratio and the partial adjustment hypothesis. However, 
unlike Lintner, he argues that dividends are related to the flow of current profits 
but adjust only part way towards the level of dividends that would be appropriate 
if profits remained constant at the new level over a substantial period of time. This 
'reluctance' or 'inertia’ factor is viewed as a tendency to cling to  past profits, in 
determining current dividends (op.cit.p.216). It is not clear though, whether the 
firm clings to the past profits as a source of funds or as a reflection of the current 
profits position. One wonders how realistic it is that corporate management, in
8. During a period of relative prosperity, firms may be more able to look ahead so that the more stable 
rate of inflation coupled with availability of resources would enable them carry out their financial 
allocation plans.
- 100-
making decisions on current dividends, would 'cling’ to past profits. This, thus 
casts doubts on the meaning of the lagged profits variable in the divided equation.
Apart from the foregoing criticism. Darling's work has introduced new elements in 
the dividend model since Lintner’s (1956) research study on the subject. His tested 
model is of the form:
Dt =  Oi+fiiPt +/32Pt +/348*Sf +Vt (12)
where A , is the annual depreciation and depletion allowances and SS is the change 
in sales over the preceding two years. The change in sales is used as a proxy for the 
net working capital needs, while annual depreciation allowances represents inflow 
of funds so that high values for At relative to profits Pt , will diminish 
uncertainty as to whether a new higher level of dividends can be maintained.
The estimation of Lintner’s model and that of Darling shows that Lintner’s model 
performed better than the later. Lagged dividend has a stronger explanatory power 
than lagged profits. However all the variables in equation (12) above appear to be 
significant in explaining the variations in dividends. Darling concludes that the 
function based on lagged profits attempts a more comprehensive explanation of 
w h y  dividends reached their current level than the function based on lagged 
dividends which only explains how the current dividends developed from lagged 
dividends. At any rate, the function based on lagged dividends is very useful for 
predicting short run dividend behaviour of firms, but Darling argues that since his 
version explains dividend behaviour nearly as well as Lintner’s model, then, 
Lintner’s D t — ^  is simply a surrogate for a composite of past profits and other 
unspecified influences that if they are known , explain why dividends are at their 
current level.
This indicates that there are other factors in the dividend decisions other than 
current profits and lagged dividends contrary to Lintner’s suggestion.
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Brittain’s (1964,1966) attempt to incorporate profits and depreciation failed to out­
perform Lintner’s model. This perhaps reflects the fact that although depreciation 
represents a source of cash flow to the firm, its incidence is fairly certain over a long 
period of time, since in most cases firms use straight line method to provide for 
their fixed asset depreciations.
What is common with all the dividend models discussed so far is the absence of 
corporate fixed investment requirements, although Darling includes a proxy for the 
working capital requirements which turns out to have a consistently significant 
negative relationship with current dividends (see Darling (op.cit), p.217). This
i
suggests that a flow of cash in to  working capital as proxied by persistent increase in 
sales operates to limit dividends. One wonders why working capital requirements 
are expected to have some influence on current dividend pay outs while fixed 
investments are not. Since changes in sales variable used by Darling to proxy the 
working capital requirements is positively related with fixed capital investments (as 
Eisner (1962), demonstrated in the accelerator theory of investment), it appears 
that the coefficient of this variable in Darling's equation (op.cit. p.217, Table 2), is 
reflecting the influence of fixed investment as well as working capital investments. 
If this is the case, then Lintner's claim that all other factors including current and 
future investment requirements are implicitly accounted for by the target pay out 
ratios and adjustment factors set in the past, is rather ‘hard’ to appreciate. This is 
even more so, since he indicates that it is the situation of the current and foreseeable 
profits that is more generally significant in influencing the dividend decisions: future 
profits depends of course on current investment decisions. Therefore to say that the 
target pay out ratios and the speed of adjustment only change in line with current 
and foreseeable profits gives less than the full explanation of the level of current 
dividends. This criticism also apply to other research works that offer an 
explanation of dividend behaviour using Lintner's model in their investigations.
Such researchers include Alpine (1968), who applied Lintner’s model directly and 
also in a logarithmic form in his investigation of dividend behaviour of firms in 
UK’s brewery industry and found an R 2 of up to .99; similarly Bates and 
Henderson (1967), Fama (1974), Fama and Babiak (1968), Morgan and Saint-Pierre 
(1978), Theobald (1978), and McDonald et al (1975). all found support for 
Lintner's model within the context that dividend is a primary decision independent 
of all other financial considerations. As to finding out w h y  and how  current 
dividends reached its existing levels, it is clear from the foregoing discussions that 
both current profits and lagged dividends are important variables at least for 
’short-run’ considerations. For the long-run situation however, a firm must make 
financial decisions that accords with the constraints of the budget equation (i.e., the 
constraints of sources and uses of funds). Under this situation it would appear that 
current profits and lagged dividends are not the only factors in dividend decisions of 
the firm.
3. THE RESIDUAL THEORY OF DIVIDEND
Under this explanation of corporate dividend decision, the firm is viewed as saving 
as much out of its current earnings as is necessary, so that when ’m atched’ with 
‘appropria te’ level of debt, it would be adequate to finance investment projects 
whose returns exceed the ‘cut- off’ rate. If no such investment opportunities exist, 
or where there are ‘left-overs’ from the financing of acceptable ones, the earnings 
are then distributed to the shareholders. This implies that in the extreme, dividends 
would fluctuate between zero and a hundred per cent of net income of the firm. In 
effect the theory suggests that sometimes dividends are zero per cent of income and 
in some cases it would be a hundred per cent of income depending on whether or not 
acceptable investment projects exist.
However, under normal circumstances, it is plausible to expect that most dividend
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'payments’ would fall within the two extreme positions due to such factors as, 
liquidity needs, the imprecise nature of the occurences of investment opportunities, 
the firm’s ability to borrow considering the rate of increasing uncertainty about 
future finance costs (interest rates, for example), as well as the rising prices of 
operating fixed assets which may require increased funds than depreciation 
allowances to replace. There is also the need to avoid excessive exposure of the firm 
to the competitors through frequent share floatations, or raising of debts, ( 
debentures and corporate bonds) which result in much detailed information 
disclosures to the market. Similarly, the dilution of shareholders’ control may 
occur if a ll income is frequently paid out, and some shareholders are unable when 
called upon, to introduce new capital, when the need arises in their firm.
Although shareholders may require regular dividend income without loss of their 
ownership ‘control’ of a certain proportion of the voting equity, it does not 
necessarily mean a negation of the residual theory  of dividend, rather it suggests 
that this theory holds within bounds.
Coming to the empirical models that fall within the residual theory, the importance 
of financing consideration for dividend decisions was hinted in Tinbergen (1939) 
Modigiliani (1949), and Dobrovolsky (1951) models (see the preceding section). In 
addition Darling (1957), introduces working capital requirements in his dividend 
model with the variable found to be consistently significant and has the expected 
(negative) sign.
Perhaps the strongest case in favour of the residual theory was made by Dhrymes 
and Kurz (1967). They argue that due to budgetary constraints, investment 
expenditures both in fixed and working capital are independent determinants of 
dividend behaviour. They contend that lagged dividends have no place in the 
current dividend equation. In the long term, they argue, the cash flow or budgetary
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constraint of the firm results in current dividends and investment expenditures 
being competing uses of funds. Accordingly a negative relationship should be 
expected between them. In effect, they contend that investment and financing 
considerations are explanatory variables in the current dividend model. In effect 
they seem to argue that a profit maximizing firm would endeavour to minimize its 
external cost of funds. Under this rationale, the firm would be more secure with the 
use of internally generated funds than it would if its finances depend heavily on 
externally borrowed funds especially in an uncertain and a highly competitive 
environment, despite the apparent tax disadvantages of retained earnings relative to 
debt finance.
The residual theory and the interdependent hypothesis are based on the assumption 
that the shareholders know the facts about the firm’s current performance; and 
trust the corporate management for future profitable use of the financial resources 
available to the firm. The knowledge of the full facts by the shareholders is 
through their top managerial agent - the chief Executive. The firm, therefore, needs 
not pay out in one year, dividends that depend mainly on past dividend levels, but 
must consider the current and future financing needs of the firm in the light of its 
investment opportunities.
Given the above points Dhrymes and Kurz put forward the following functional 
relationship:
Dt =  f  (It ,EFt ,Pt ,Nt ) (13)
where I  JEF, and N  represents fixed capital investment, external finance from 
borrowing and net current asset investment respectively.
Building on Dhrymes and Kurz. Pogue (1968.1971) elaborated on the theoretical 
link between dividends and investment decisions which directly opposes the 
primary or active theory of dividend. He argues that corporate savings and thus,
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dividend payments are determined by:
i. the firm’s demand for funds for net investments in fixed assets and working 
capital: and
ii. the relative costs of external and internal funds.
Like Dhrymes and Kurz, Pogue’s theoretical point of departure is the company’s 
cash flow identity thus:
K  +  W = ( \ - d ) P + B + E  (14)
where K  and W denote fixed investment and working capital respectively: B and 
E denote term borrowing and new issues of shares respectively: d and P denote 
current dividend rate9 and current profits respectively.
He argues that for a profit maximizing firm, the optimal mix of the sources of funds 
C( 1—d ) /> ,B and E ). would depend on that which minimizes the market and 
inputed cost of financing the firm’s investments, subject to cash flow constraints10. 
The specification of the marginal cost of debt and that of retained earnings form the 
pivotal theme of Pogue’s construct. The idea is that the minimization of the market 
and imputed cost of financing a given flow of investment project is at the point 
where the m arket and imputed cost of borrowing would equate the market and 
imputed cost of retained earnings. Pogue defines m arginal cost o f debt q B to 
be a function of financial risk as proxied by capital gearing b , the market rate of 
interest i , business risk R , and the average indebtedness in the industry b . The 
relationship is expressed in the form:
q B =  f  (b ,i ,R ,b) (15)
He defines the marginal cost o f retained earnings to be a function of proportion of
9. dividend-profit rate
10. that is subject to the supply of funds.
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income retained ( l  —d  ), the average pay out ratio of similar corporations (d  ). and 
the market rate of interest on corporate debt i ; Thus:
qs =  f  ((1— d ),d , i)  (16)
D CBy equating q =  q , Pogue arrived at his basic dividend model:
D  =  /  0 ?  ,d  ,b Jb) (17)
By estimating this model (see Pogue (op.cit. p. 198)). he found that industry effects 
are not significant, while variables reflecting cost of funds have the predicted signs 
and are statistically significant. He reports that the negative coefficients for income 
variability and indebtedness variable ( R  and b ). suggest that dividend policy of a 
corporation is sensitive to financial risk. This is as well since the firm’s management 
would aim to minimize the risk associated with over-dependence on external 
borrowing11. The investment spending coefficients are found to be negative as 
predicted and also statistically significant (op.cit p.205), both in the pooled sample 
results and in most of the annual cross-section results (op.cit. p.206). When the 
sales change variable is introduced as a proxy for the demand for investment funds, 
the regression results strongly support the hypothesis that dividends are influenced 
by demand for investment funds.
Similar negative relationship was found by Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) using 
simultaneous equation methods of three-stage least squares variety. In their annual 
cross-section regressions, the coefficients of fixed investment and that of net current 
position consistently show a negative sign when ever significant (see Dhrymes and 
Kurz (op.cit. Tables 11 and 14)). The coefficient of the external finance variable was 
also found to be positive when significant in the dividend equation.
11. This is in sympathy with the expectations based on the theory of increasing risk of Kalecki (1937).
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All in all, these two major studies corroborate that of Darling (op.cit) in
demonstrating that there are some other variables other than current profits and
lagged dividends or lagged profits that would strongly explain the dividend pay out
behaviour. There are indeed various other researchers whose empirical evidence
support the view that dividend is a residual decision in the context of budgetary
considerations. Such various studies include those by Mueller (1967), Higgins
(1972), McCabe (1979), Kumar (1982,1984), and Peterson and Benesh (1983). All
these studies using disaggregated corporate financial data introduced investment
demand and other variables in the dividend equation and found that in the majority
♦
of cross-section regressions the financing considerations significantly influenced 
dividend pay outs. Even when aggregate data is used such as in Andeson (1983), 
evidence shows that demand for investment funds do have independent influence on 
dividend pay out. Anderson developed a dividend model that incorporates the 
views of Lintner and that of Dhrymes and Kurz as well as the view that share 
prices capitalize only potential net of tax dividend streams. From his results, he 
concludes that it may be mistaken to rule out a role for investment expenditures in 
a dividend equation. He also pointed out the need to view the internal financing 
decisions of firms within the context of simultaneous equation framework (see 
Anderson (op.cit), p.214).
3.1 M odigiliani & M iller, Dividend Taxation and Dividend 
Theory
A brief mention of Modigiliani and Miller’s (1961) study here is not'only because 
the main contention is in consonance with the residual theory but also because it 
perhaps forms the beginings of the most recent studies on dividend decisions of the 
firm. Both researchers demonstrated theoretically that under perfect capital market 
situation (i.e., no uncertainty) and in absence of taxes market value of the firm is 
not affected by its dividend decisions. Thus a firm could pay out all its net profits
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and raise funds from the market to finance investment projects, or retain all its net 
profits while the shareholders use arbitrage process to satisfy their preferred 
leverage. In each case the market value of the firm remains unaffected.
Since early 1970s several studies have concentrated on relaxing the two main
assumptions of Modigiliani and Miller’s (MM) study by inroducing taxation
(corporate and personal)12, and uncertainty13. The point being made by those who
suggest the existence of tax effect on dividend distributions is that if an investor
would be taxed more when he receives dividend than from capital gains, then he
would prefer to receive the later. Thus if m  is a shareholder’s marginal' tax rate his
%
net income after tax would be 1—m  . Where the imputation system applies (as in
UK since 1973). he/she will receive the benefit of imputation and the net income 
^
becomes —— — ; where b is the imputation rate (normally basic rate); and capital 
1— b
gains would depend on this ratio referred to as tax discrimination factor, (see for 
example King (1977)). In effect, if g is the effective capital gains tax14, and tc is the 
transaction cost rate per unit of share disposed, the shareholder would prefer 
dividend if 0 > ( l —g —tc ); where 9 is the tax discrimination factor. Thus, as 0 
1 , the more indeflferent the shareholder becomes detween receiving dividends and 
capital gains. In this way the higher the 9 the higher the expected dividend 
distribution by firms.
The general approach by the advocates of tax effect has been to incorporate tax 
discrimination factor into Lintner (1956) type model as an additional regressor.
12. See for example Elton and Gruber (1970), Feldstein (1970, 1972), Fane (1975) King (1972, 1977), 
Auerbach (1979,* 1983), Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982), Litzenberger and Ramaswany (1979,1982), 
Bradford (1981), Hess (1982), Poterba (1982), Poterba and Summers (1983, 1984, 1985) and Lasfer 
(1987).
13. The effects of uncertainty has been discussed earlieT in section 2
14. AfteT allowing for the threshold, i.e., the amount allowed by the Finance Acts to be deducted before 
capital gains tax.
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Most of the studies used time-series data and computed the tax factor based on the 
national average personal tax rates. The handicap of this approach for cross-section 
data is that the factor becomes common for all firms and therefore unable to 
capture any tax effect for individual firm’s dividend behaviour. However a recent 
study has attempted to get round the problem (see Lasfer (1987)). He distinguished 
between firms in terms of the percentage of the respective firms’ shares held by the 
directors. The marginal income tax rate of the directors are computed using the 
statutory higher rate for each year.^ He computed the average income tax of 
shareholders in each firm as follows:
mit =  DIRt *HRt H l - D I R i  )ARt
where D IR i  is the % of directors interest in each firm i ;
HRt is the higher rate of income tax for each period t :
ARt is the national average rate of personal tax rate for the period t. Using this he 
arrived at the tax discrimination factor thus:
l-rrc,-,
l - c t
where Ct is the standard imputation rate for each year.
Lasfer’s attempt to distinguish between firms through the use of directors’ interests 
has an apparent drawback. This is because both the average rate of personal 
income tax and the higher rates used in his study are the same for all firms. Thus, 
his tax discrimination factor appears to be measuring the effect of ownership 
structure of the firm rather them tax effect. For example, if a director leaves the 
firm and a new one is not appointed the effect is to reduce the percentage of 
directors’ interests in the firm. If on the contrary a new director is appointed whose 
interest is high then the percentage of the directors’ interests would increase. In 
large firms it is likely that most of the directors are marginal tax payers. The
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important point is their tax status not the size of their holdings, thus since his 
marginal tax rate is the same accross firms, it appears that he is measuring the effect 
of ownership structure. This is perhaps borne out by his results which show that 
although the tax factor is signifinant in the pooled sample regressions, it is 
significant only once out of 11 seperate years of cross-section regressions when SUR 
technique was used but not significant in any of the 11 annual regressions when 
ordinary least squares method was used.
These results have n o t. yet established beyond doubt that tax factor is very 
important in dividend decision. The introduction of tax exhaustion has equally not 
proved to be an important determinant of dividends in a cross-section setting (see 
Edwards et aL (1985)). Indeed Cadle and Theobald (1985) surveyed 217 UK firms 
(189 public and 28 private unlisted companies) to find out the major factors in their 
dividend decisions. Out of 19 factors listed in their questionnaire, shareholders’ tax 
status featured as the second to the last factor.
Apart from the above points, there are other factors peculiar to this research which 
make the introduction of shareholders tax status as a factor in dividend decisions of 
firms inapplicable in this study:
1. Finding the composition of the various shareholders in each firm as well as their 
tax brackets every year: identifying their nationalities where they pay tax is almost 
impossible.
2. The shares in foreign subsidiaries are not often directly quoted in the host 
country’s stock market and therefore not easily marketable. As a result, the 
alternative of capital gains rather than dividends may not be always applicable.
3. The MNCs pay corporation tax rather than personal taxation and the size of 
dividend income does not affect the rate of tax they bear on their profits.
4.- The assumption that directors’ interests would act as a guide to the share holders 
as to whether to hold their shares or to sell as implied by the Lasfer’s study is not
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applicable where the parent company takes or plays the key role in the dividend 
decisions of the foreign controlled subsidiaries.
5. Where large multinational corporations are concerned, the directors’ interests 
reported in the consolidated accounts includes the interests of those who are not 
necessarily residents of the parent company’s home country, and whose tax status 
depends on the tax regimes in the country where each pays his/her own income tax. 
In addition.the tax exhaustion factor calculated on the bases of tax regime in UK (or 
any other home country) is not necessarily applicable to foreign base subsidiaries 
whose fixed assets investment expenditures make up the group total for any one 
period. Thus, the relevance of introducing tax factors into dividend (investment 
and external finance) models of the large corporations is open to question.
All in all, a model that does not introduce a separate independent variable to 
represent dividend tax effect in a cross-section regression model can not be said to be 
mis-specified as far as the present evidence is concerned.
4. THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY CONTEXT
Up to this point in the chapter, the discussion has centered on the survey of 
dividend determinants in general, without any distinction between independent 
domestic firms and foreign controlled affiliates. Indeed, much of the dividend 
theory ignores any implications that subsidiary status may have on a firm's 
dividend distributions; yet there are indications suggesting that such a difference 
may well exist and therefore warrants the separate discussion in this section (see 
chapters 3 and 4 ).
Firstly, dividend pay outs by independent domestic firms represent outflows from 
the firm while dividends paid by the foreign controlled subsidiary do not 
necessarily flow out of the group directly except to the extent of such annual 
payments to minority shareholders. Dividends to the parent company may be made
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available back to the affiliate in the form of intra-group loans. While much have 
been written in the literature regarding the stable dividend policy in independent 
firms, such a degree of stability may not exist in the case of dividend payments 
from affiliates to the parent company shareholder abroad. According to Remmers 
(1969), to minimize taxes and for other reasons, different forms of trasfers may be 
substituted for dividends as a means of repatriating earnings from host countries. 
Such other ways of distributing subsidiary's income in place of conventional 
dividend channel include, the use of transfer pricing of intra-group trade in goods 
and services through fees and royalty payments adjustments, . reinvoicing 
transactions, purchase of capital ’goods and or commodities for group-wide use, 
purchase of local services for the group-wide use, conducting of R & D for the 
group, hosting of the group’s conventions, acquisition of airline tickets for the 
group’s executive travels, payment for technical assistance and head office cost 
allocation, as well as captive insurance premiums. There are also avenues available 
that would directly affect the cash flow of the subsidiary; such as leading and 
lagging of cross- country payments and receipts, back-to-back financing 
arrangements, parallel loans and currency swap arrangements as well as straight 
intra- group loans.
The choice of any combination of these means of intra-group fund flows between 
the affiliates and the parent company-shareholder, depends on the circumstances of 
each parent and also on the regulatory constraints of the host countries. In addition 
it depends on direct and indirect cost considerations, such as. tax implications, the 
imputed costs of possible future litigations and the long term effect on the 
company’s image in the existing and other prospective host countries. As a result of 
the above possible channels of earnings transfers to the parent company-shareholder 
and the consequent strong financial interdependence, the consideration of financial 
charges and risks may not be as stringent in the subsidiaries if the bulk of its loan
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are from the parent company. Such loans may be perceived as 'risk capital* and 
where much of it is a re-lending of dividend allocations back to the affiliate, it may 
well be perceived as part of retained earnings.
Secondly, much ‘weight’ has been given to dividend as an information medium 
between the corporate management and the external shareholders. Miller and Rock 
(1985) for example, assert that in a world of rational expectations, the firm's 
dividend announcements provide just enough information for the market to deduce 
the unobservable data about its current earnings. This is so due to the existence of 
in fo rm ation  asym m etry, which implies that the corporate ‘insiders* (or top
t
management) know more than outside investors about the true state of the firm’s 
current earnings. Thus, to  the  ex ten t th a t  fu ll in form ation  exists about the 
firm’s financial performance, prospects and plans, to both the management and the 
shareholders), dividend would have no extra information content. Under such a 
circumstances, the firm operating in the best interest of the shareholder(s) will 
choose the values of dividend, investment and external finance that maximize the 
total utility of the majority owners of the firm subject to the budget constraint (ie. 
sources and uses of funds equilibrium). However w here parent- subsidiary 
re la tionship  exists, research evidence has shown that the parent company demands 
and receives ample details about the foreign base affiliate’s operations and 
performance. Indeed, the autonomy of the subsidiary’s top executive is often very 
much diluted so that effectively, the parent-company-shareholder has a dominant 
say in financial allocations (see for example. Zenoff (1967), Dunning (1958), Brash
(1966), Safarian (1966, 1969) and Steuer et al (1973. Chp. 7). Given this 
information symmetry, dividend payments by wholly owned subsidiaries in 
particular and other subsidiaries in general may be much less stable than would be 
expected in large independent domestic firms with large numbers of external 
shareholders.
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Coming to the empirical explanation of the dividend payments in foreign controlled 
affiliates, only very few published attempts are available in the literature. Two 
such studies are those by Morgan and Saint-Pierre (1978) and Kopits (1973). The 
indication from these two studies is that it is possible to apply the dividend models 
developed for local firms to investigate the dividend behaviour of foreign controlled 
firms. Before discussing the work of Kopits in this regards, a few points need to be 
made regarding the applicability of the conventional dividend theories to the case of 
foreign affiliates. We are here referring to the primary and residual theories already 
discussed in the preceding two sections of this Chapter.
i
It has been argued above that the existence of information symmetry eliminates the 
relevance of the information content in dividends which various researchers indicate 
to have some effect on the steady dividend payments by independent firms. It can 
be argued that the elimination of information content would not necessarily negate 
the primary theory in the context of foreign controlled affiliates. Rather, other 
factors in particular the desire to minimize foreign country risk, both financial and 
political, would generate influences (similar to that of information asymmetry) that 
would make dividend a primary decision in relation to the foreign base firms. Thus, 
like the risk averse shareholders of independent locally controlled firms, the parent 
company would be averse not only to host country risk but also to the domestic 
regulations and policy changes, such as balance of payment rescue programmes, 
exchange control regulation changes, devaluation of host or home country’s 
currencies and other changes to which the group’s foreign base income may be 
exposed. Taking foreign risk into consideration, foreign base earnings would be 
perceived as having a desired value only when they have been repatriated to the 
home country or to a country considered as safe as the home base (e.g., a tax heaven 
country). Kimber (1976, p. 127) has shown from his survey of multinational firms 
that the two most important factors that determine foreign dividend remittances
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are: host country's regulations with a weighting of 25%, followed by home 
country’s regulations at 18%: while other factors such as parent company’s 
liquidity requirements at 13%. financial needs of the subsidiary at 13%, Tax 
planning 10%, political image 8% and other factors 13%, (See also Channon and 
Jalland (1979, p.149). Kindleberger (1963) reports of 50% rule by which over half 
of some subsidiaries’ profits are consistently remitted to the parent company. 
Ekblom (1971, p.20) reports that European multinational companies maintain 
dividend flows even in the face of adverse profit conditions. Zenoff (1967) surveyed 
30 U.S. controlled affiliates and reports that firms in his sample pay regular 
dividends to the parent company to maintain continuity, so as to avoid future 
restrictions by the host countries (see also Manser (1973), and Remmers (1969, 
p.88). Where the parent company depends on inflows from the foreign base 
affiliates to pay its own shareholders, the expectations of the shareholders in the 
‘market’ would have an indirect effect on dividend demand from the subsidiaries. 
Finally, the use of dividends as a control tool by the parent firms vis-a-vis the 
foreign base affiliates creates a view of dividend as a primary decision, in relation to 
the affiliates.
At the same time, because of the existence of strong financial interdependence 
between the affiliates and the parent company coupled with the free flow of 
information about the foreign affiliate’s current earnings performance and future 
prospects and plans, there may be occasions when the parent company would 
postpone dividend demand from certain affiliates. This may happen particularly in 
wholly controlled foreign base affiliates when major investment projects are 
planned. Zenoff’s survey as well as that by Kimber and Remmers indicate that the 
parent company’s and the subsidiary’s needs for funds are considered in 
determining the dividend distribution in the foreign base affiliates. This policy is 
clearly consistent with the residual theory15.
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4.1 Kopits (1972) Model o f Foreign Income Repatriation
He proposed a model based on residual theory to explain the repatriation of income 
from U.S. direct investment overseas. His hypothesised dividend behaviour is that 
the higher the net earnings of controlled foreign subsidiaries, or the lower the 
growth of their desired capital stock, the larger is their dividend pay out to the U.S. 
based parent corporations. The basic framework of the model is an adaptation of 
the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation of Jorgenson (1963) to the 
study of dividend repatriation decisions in foreign affiliates. He argues that the 
parent company aims to maximize the present value of its world wide income. This 
objective determines the equilibrium stock of fixed assets to be held by each foreign 
base subsidiary. To maintain its equilibrium stock of fixed assets, each subsidiary 
would retain the proportion of current earnings required to finance the desired level 
of capital asset accumulation; the balance of the income are remitted to the parent 
company.
This residual approach, he indicates, results from the fact that dividends paid to the 
parent firm are in effect, equity transfers (and not directly paid out to 'the external 
shareholders who perhaps expect steady flow of income from their investments). In 
specifying his model he argues that current dividend is*a function of the supply and 
demand for internal funds given respectively by the current earnings and changes 
in the value of equilibrium capital stock of each affiliate. The tested model can be 
expressed as follows:
A  =  +ff2( t^ t * 1 ) + f e ( y ~ 7 r ~ ) A  (18)
o t _ i  1—t7t
15. It is perhaps instructive to point out that the ability of combining the active and residual theories in 
an operational framework is possible in the long run if there are retained earnings ( resulting from 
past dividend policy ) and particularly if external finance can be raised.
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where D denotes dividend pay out for the period by the affiliate; E , denotes post­
tax earnings of the affiliate; P . denotes price of output; Q denotes quantity of 
output; St , denotes user cost per unit of capital services deflated by price of capital 
goods: St is calculated by the formula :
i - e ,
where 8 is the fixed asset depreciation rate; yot . is the discount rate (given by the 
parent's after tax rate of return on equity), and 0 is the corporation tax rate in the 
host country; T , denotes the difference between tax on retained and tax on
t
distribute4 corporate income16. V. denotes the error term.
Relating the above equation (18) to the present research study, a few critical points 
need to be made. Consider the user cost of capital. S . The key to calculating this 
variable is yot • This represents the parent’s after tax rate of return on equity. 
Firstly. Kopits ignores the incidence of transfer pricing on goods and services within 
the group which would obviously influence output prices. Secondly he ignores the 
production interdependence between the members of the corporate group (flowing 
from the scale economies). This would influence the quantity of output, 
particularly where the foreign base affiliate’s ’output’ is composed of large 
proportion of intra-group components imported from the parent company as well as 
finished goods marketed via the foreign affiliate originally imported from the parent 
company or other ’sister’ affiliates. The above two factors (transfer pricing and 
production interdependence) make it unsuitable to apply the user cost of capital 
based on the parent company's discount rate, for estimating the desired level of 
capital accumulation in the foreign base affiliates.
16. This is applicable only in those host countries that impose a high tax rate on retained than on 
distributed corporate income (that is a split tax rate system).
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However, since gross fixed investment in a given period is a function of changes in 
the value of the equilibrium capital stock, one can conveniently substitute current 
fixed investment expenditures for the change in equilibrium capital stock; that is:
fy Q t—~---------- - -----------  as shown in equation (18) above. In addition, because split
\  \  -1
tax rate system does not operate in UK since 1973, there are no tax savings resulting 
from dividend payments. Thus the variable representing foreign tax savings on
T t
subsidiary income by virtue of the split rate (i.e., , A— ) will be zero. Kopits
l —0t
model can be re-written in the following general form:
i
Dt =  + clt + €f (19)
where is the error term and and 11 is the gross fixed investment expenditures 
during the test period. The result of his regression shows that the coefficient of post 
tax earnings is significant and positive as hypothesised while that of investment 
demand variable is negative and significant. Thus there is evidence that investment 
demand competes with dividends for the allocation of the subsidiary’s post tax 
earnings and therefore consistent with the residual theory of dividend.
4J2 Morgan and Saint-Pierre (1978) Study
The main focus of their study is however at the investigation of the view that 
corporate dividend and investment decisions are not interdependent. Their extension 
to look for differences in the behaviour of dividend and investment in the 
independent and subsidiary firms in Canada is only peripheral to their main study.
The model they used is based on Lintner (1956) formulation. However due to their 
methodology, not much can be drawn from their results regarding the comparative 
behaviour of foreign and locally controlled firms. The following are the major 
drawbacks for the applicability of that study:
F irst, their classification of firms into independent and subsidiaries does not accord
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with legal reality as contained in the UK's Companies' Acts (1948 - 1985). They 
classified a firm as being a subsidiary if at least 30 percent of its voting shares are 
held by another company. Similarly, they defined an independent company as one 
whose voting shares are less than 30 percent held by any one company. This was 
arbitrarily selected in order to enable them obtain a good sample size. However, it 
implies that if a firm is 70 percent held by indigenous investors, but 30 percent 
owned by a foreign firm, such a company is a foreign controlled subsidiary. This is 
hardly an acceptable definition for our purpose since the majority shareholders at 
home would elect the larger number of members of the board of directors and 
effectively determine the decision rules of the firm17.
Second, the 31 independent firms and 21 subsidiaries making up their total sample 
are neither matched in terms of industries, nor in terms of age. The nationality 
differences of the parent companies were not taken into consideration neither in the 
sampling, nor in the models estimated. There is no clear indication from the authors 
as to the number of the so-called subsidiaries that are foreign controlled. Indeed, 
the fact that their cut-off rate is as low as 30 percent ownership may ve il result in 
large number of the 21 ‘subsidiaries' being locally controlled in the legal sense. If 
so. then, it is not certain that their study is directed at locally controlled versus 
foreign controlled subsidiaries.
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter the dividend literature is reviewed. The objective is to indicate the 
deficiencies and the advantages of some of the more pertinent dividend models as 
they relate to the dividend model to be developed in this thesis.
17. Although a holder of 30 percent of voting shares would have some influence on the decisions of the 
firm, legally he can not determine the decision of the firm against the wishes of the majority of the 
shareholders.
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The impression one gathers from this literature review is that the explanation of 
corporate dividend decisions fall into three groups. The first group argues that 
corporate dividend payment is an active or primary decision taken consistently 
while investment and financing decisions are separate and have no direct influence 
on it. For those holding this view, current dividend payments depend only on 
current net of tax income and lagged dividends.
The second group, argues that the budget constraint dictates the limit a profit
maximizing firm could pay out in dividends. For this group dividend is a residual
decision. In their view, lagged dividend has no place in the dividend equation: thus
%
only the variables that represent the sources and application of funds need explain 
the dividend behaviour in the long run.
The th ird  group, argues that neither the above two extreme positions individually 
explain the actual dividend decisions. They argue that both lagged dividend patterns 
and current sources and uses of funds play a part in explaining corporate dividend 
decisions. Thus, while managements are re luctan t to cut absolute dividend per 
share, at the same time, they have to consider the investment requirements and 
financing, under the condition of risk, uncertainty and competition. Thus, dividend 
and financing decisions are simultaneously made.
The choice of the theoretical basis for the construction of the empirical model for 
dividend decisions has to be made out of the above three positions: this choice 
favours the th ird  group. The construction of the dividend model for this study is 
described in Chapter 8.
- 121 -
CHAPTER 6 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT THEORIES AND MODELS 
1. THE CONTEXT
The extant theory of capital investment decision is of four main strands, namely:
1. The accelerator theory:
2. The profit/L iquidity  theory:
3. The ‘neo-classicaP theory:
4. The securities valuation (or th e  ‘q') theory .
The structure of this chapter follows along these lines. Thus, section 6.2 reviews 
the major empirical studies based on accelerator theory: 6.3 deals with those based 
on profit/liquidity theory: 6.4, deals with those based on the 'q* theory: and 6.5 
deals with those based on neo-classical theory. Section 6.6, discusses the issues 
peculiar to foreign subsidiaries. 6.7 presents the chapter summary.
2. THE ACCELERATOR THEORY
This theory has its origin from the research study of Clark (1917). He set out to 
construct an exact formulation of the relationship, in quantity and in time, between 
demand for products and demand for the means of production. His task was 
prompted by a question perturbing the business cycle theorists at the time: namely: 
*why business adjustm ents do no t stop a t a point of equilibrium  but go on to  a 
po in t from  which, a more o r less violent reaction is inevitable and so on 
w ith o u t apparent end' (op.cit..p217)
Clark’s answer to the preceding question is the acceleration principle of investment. 
He contended that the demand for enlarging the means of production varies not 
w ith the volume of demand for the finished product but rather with the 
acceleration of that demand, allowance being made for the fact that the
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equipment can not be adjusted as rapidly as demand changes, and so may be 
unusually scarce or redundant to start with in any given period (op.cit., pp.234- 
235). Clark went on to argue that, the maximum and minimum points in the 
demand for producers’ goods tend to  precede the maximum and minimum points in 
the demand for the finished products, the effect being that the change may appear to 
precede its own cause (ibid).
Thus, the accelerator theory argues that with a lag, investment in fixed assets is a 
positive function of changes in demand (or sales) of finished goods. The lag is 
explained in terms of excess capacity which has to be used up first before new
t
additional capacity is necessary, supply delays due to construction, delivery and 
installation, in addition to administrative delays due to decision lags (see Clark 
(op.cit), pp.223-224).
The earliest version of accelerator models ( the so called naive accelerator model), 
hypothesised that the desired capital stock has a constant relationship with output. 
Thus the adjustment coefficient ( l —\ )  is assumed to be unity. This coefficient is 
the speed of adjusting from the actual to the desired capital stock. Thus, if A. is 
assigned a zero value, then 1 —X.= 1. This means that the actual capital is equal to 
the desired capital; or that the adjustment takes place instantaneously (at a unit 
period). Under this assumption the net investment is directly proportional to the 
change in the desired capital stock (see Jorgenson (1971), p . l l l l ) ,  and Junankar 
(1972), p.36). That is:
N I t =  K t - K t —i =  K - K ? - !  ' ( i )
where N I t , is the net investment at time, t ; K  is the capital stock. Since
K  =  aQ t , by simple accelerator hypothesis, then K *_j =  a  l - Where Q is
output or sales, oc -  constant. Equation (1) can be re-written as:
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N I t =  a Q £- a Q r - 1 =  <*AQt (2)
Therefore :
AT/t =  OiAQt (3)
Equation (3) is the simple accelerator model. The assumptions underlying this 
model are that:
1. the production function has fixed coefficients and so, the relative prices of capital 
and labour are neutral to changes in capital stock. Thus only a maintainable 
increase in output would lead to capital stock growth
2. firms produce at capacity level at all times (i.e., no under capacity or excess 
capacity exists)
3. only expansion investments take place: thus, replacement, modernisation and 
autonomous investments such as expenditures on research and development 
hardwares,and cost reduction investments in such assets as computers, are ignored.
4. there is no budgetary constraint: that is, firms would have no difficulty in 
obtaining funds for investment. In effect, profit considerations have no direct 
influence on investment expenditures. Once sales are made, profits are taken for 
granted.
This model has been found to work well in tracing, investment behaviour during 
up-swings but not equally so , during the down turn in economic activity (see 
Goodwin (1951)). The model has over the years been modified and extended 
following the rejection of u n it period adjustment by some researchers including 
Tinbergen (1938), Chenery (1952), Koyck (1954) and Hickman (1957) . Following 
these studies, the distributed lag relationship of outputs (or sales) and investment 
as well as the influence of existing capacity become a feature in the acceleration 
theory. This resulted in the so called flexible accelerator which suggests that the 
adjustment coefficient (1—K) is not unity.
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Acceleration principle has support of several researchers the chief of whom is 
Eisner. Eisner’s research studies span most part of 1960s (see Eisner (1960. 1963. 
1964, 1965, 1967. 1969), Eisner and Strotz (1963), Eisner and Nadiri (1968). 
Eisner (1960) hypothesized that gross investment in a period is determined by the 
distributed lag values of output (or sales) changes, distributed lag values of profits, 
current depreciation allowances and existing capital stock. The level of capital 
stock determines replacement investments and depreciation allowances represents 
source of funds. Thus:
A 0 , £iCS*—St_i) /32(Sf_i—£*-2)
T  = 0O+— T ------  (4)
'  -2~ $ t - 3) —3  St _ 4)  /3S( / Jt )
S* S '  F
, t e P t - 0  . 0 7 ^ - 2) . , J39(£>) , /310QV ) ,
+ — — + ~ — + ~ — + ~ — + ~ — + v <
where I  . is the gross capital expenditure, S is the sales. F denotes gross fixed 
assets at cost: P , profits: D , depreciation: N  , is net fixed assets: V is the error term: 
t is the time period F JS* . D ,N are of the same base period (i.e. 1953).
Eisner fitted this model on data of 200 U.S. firms and found that the coefficient of 
change in sales are positive and significant, while that of profit (though positive) 
was not significant. This result precipitated his strong conviction that profits play a 
relatively minor role as a determinant of investment expansion. Eisner’s contention 
in support of accelerator theory found an early support from Kuh(l963). Kuh 
compared the performance of sales and profits as investment determinants. Using 
both cross-section and time series data covering the period from 1935 to 1955, he 
came to the conclusion that sales are superior to profits in explaining investment. 
Kuh’s result also shows that one year lagged profit variable perform better than 
current profits. This is attributed to the importance of lagged profit as a source of 
funds.
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Similarly, Bischoff (1969), critically analysed Eisner and Nadiri's (1968) study 
based on the accelerator theory, against that of Jorgenson based on the neo-classical 
theory, and came to the conclusion that both output (sales) and relative prices are 
important determinants of investment. He pointed out that investment responds 
more quickly to changes in sales than to changes in relative prices. This is explained 
in terms of the so-called putty-clay model in which the production function is such 
that factor substitution is possible before the initial investment but after that, 
factor proportions become fixed. Therefore changes in relative prices of factor 
inputs, in the short run. would not have any effect on fixed capital-investment
i
expansion, until the old capital assets are worn out. During the intervening period, 
it is the maintainable changes in sales that mainly determine investment.
The effect of change in sales is more clearly seen when one considers two firms 
operating under similar conditions. Under this situation both firms are exposed to 
the same exogenously determined input prices, including interest rates and inflation. 
To the extent that one of the firms expands quicker than the other, the accelerator 
theory contends that this is mainly due to the difference in their relative sales 
growth.
Various other researchers have found support for the'accelerator theory, including 
Smyth (1964), Nobay (1970), and Junankar (1970:1972, p.69). Many more 
researchers have introduced change in sales as one of the explanatory variables in 
the investment equation, such as Mayer and Kuh (1957), Dhrymes and Kurz
(1967). Mueller (1967), Dimsdale and Glyn (1971), Higgins (1972), Fama (1974), 
McDonald et al (1978), McCabe (1979), Meeks (1975. 1981), Peterson and Benesh
(1983), and Kumar (1982,1984). There are some evidence from these studies in 
support of the acceleration principle, as reflected by the coefficient of the change in 
sales variable in the investment equation.
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3 . TH E PR O FIT /L IQ U ID IT Y  THEORY
The central contention of the profit/liquidity theorists is that fixed investments 
depend on the level of profits. Tinbergen (1938, 1939), was the first to formally 
argue a case for profit as an independent determinant of fixed investment 
expenditures;1 Using U.S. Iron and steel industry data. Tinbergen found that the 
fluctuations in investment activity are in the main determined by the fluctuation in 
profits earned in the period preceding the test period (op.cit.p.49). In other words, 
the rate of investment depends on the supply of funds.
One of the first to support Tinbergen is Klein (1950. 1951). Klein like Tinbergen, 
argues that profit is the mainspring of economic action in a capitalist society: that 
entrepreneurs expand when profits are anticipated to be high and contract when 
profits are anticipated to be low. He fitted the following model on U.S. industry 
data covering 1921-1941 using both ordinary least squares method and three- 
equation system model. His investment equation is of the form:
N It =  0 o+ 0 1Pt +/32P£_ i+ 0 3 ^ f - i + y t (6)
where N It is net investment; P , profit in constant dollars: K t denotes the stock 
of capital at the beginning of the test period. The variable K t — i is included to 
reflect the argument that not only are absolute profits important but also their 
relation to existing stock of capital (op.cit. p.60). Klein's least squares and systems 
results both support his hypothesis. It is also found that the systems coefficients 
have better estimates than the least squares results. In the equation-system result, 
lagged profits are found to have higher weight than current profits variables (op.cit., 
P.75).
1. although the importance of profit was hinted earlier by Clark (op.cit. pp. 232-233).
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Various researchers have examined the profit/liquidity theory and the majority 
conclusion is that profit is an independent variable in the investment equation. 
However the research evidence suggests that it is significant during periods of low 
rate of activity (e.g.. during recession) as firms use mainly internally generated 
funds for investment in replacement and acquisition of further cost-saving plant 
and machinery. During rapid rates of growth, firms are able to make use of external 
finance (eg new issues of equity and loan capital), so that the influence of profit is 
over taken by pressure on existing capacity exerted by rising demand (or sales). 
The studies that indicate these conclusions include Goodwin (1951), Mayer and 
Kuh (1957). Duesenberry (1958), Tsiang (1951), Heller's survey result (1951, 
P. 100), Kuh (1963), Meyer and Glauber (1964), Anderson (1964). While these 
researchers use realised profit as an independent variable to measure profit 
expectations effect and also the effect of profit as a source of funds, Grunfeld (1960) 
argues that although profit is an influential variable, realised profit is an 
inappropriate measure of expected profits. He rather favours the use of the value of 
the firm’s outstanding securities (see the next section).
Most empirical models of corporate fixed investment do now introduce some form 
of liquidity variable in the investment equation side-by-side with capacity or 
accelerator variable and the empirical results support the liquidity theory (see for 
example Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Peterson and Benesh (1983) and Kumar
(1984)).
4. THE SECURITIES VALUATION (or THE ‘Q0 THEORY
This theory is in a way related to the profit/liquidity theory discussed in the 
preceding section. Its development is preceded by the research work of Grunfeld 
(1960) who first argued in favour of the market value of the firm as the sole 
determinant of corporate fixed investment expenditures.
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Consider firstly Grunf eld’s argument. He contends that realised profits are not the 
appropriate measure of future profit expectations which is the major determinant of 
corporate investment (as indicated by the proponents of profit theory of 
investment). Rather, it is the discounted future earnings less costs of future 
additions to capital that is the better measure of profit expectations. He 
hypothesized that desired capital stock is proportional to the value of the firm’s 
outstanding securities. Based on the stock adjustment hypothesis, he derives an 
expression for the gross fixed investment expenditures of the form:
I t =  Oi+fiVt - i+ c K t - i  (7)
*
where I t ' denotes gross investment in plant and machinery plus maintenance and 
repairs, Oi, j3, and C are coefficients, Vt —1 anc* 1 are tagged market value of the 
firm and capital stock respectively. The Vt —\ is the sum of market value of debt 
plus equity; Using ordinary least squares method, he ran a regression on the time 
series data of 8 large U.S. based firms for the period from 1935- 1954. He found a 
significant relationship between gross fixed investment and the market value of the 
firm. Further he ran a regression using realised profit in place of market value of 
the firm and finds a significant relationship between gross investment expenditures 
and realised profit. However, when he repeated the' exercise but keeping lagged 
capital stock constant2, his partial coefficient of determination of investment with 
lagged profit variable shows a poor performance (op.cit., P.219. Table 3, row 1). A 
similar exercise with market value of the firm shows a generally good explanatory 
power (op.cit., P.233, Table 10). On the basis of these findings he argues that profit 
is inferior to market value as a determinant of investment.
2. i.e., by normalising the dependent and independent variables by lagged capital stock.
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Since 1960, further developments have been made regarding the importance of 
market value of the firm as the principal explanatory variable of corporate fixed 
investment. However, rather than market value per se as indicated by Grunfeld 
(op.cit.), it is the ratio of market value of the firm to the replacement cost of the 
physical assets they represent that determines investment . Brainard and Tobin
(1968) first introduced this idea. They argue that investment is stimulated when 
capital is valued more highly in the market than its replacement cost or when the 
market yield on equity is low relativ.e to the real returns to physical investment 
(op.cit., p. 103). They point out that an increase in market value of equity can occur 
as a result of an increase in the marginal efficiency of capital (or profitability), but 
may also occur as a consequence of financial events that reduce the yield that 
investors require in other to hold equity capital. This they point out, is the sole 
linkage in the model through which financial events including monetary policies 
affect the real economy (op.cit.. p. 104).
The general form of the valuation model most commonly found in literature can be 
stated as follows:
where N I t is net investment in capital assets for the current period, ot, and j3 are 
coefficients and Q is the valuation ratio: t , is the time subscript. Net investment is 
normalised by lagged capital stock to control heteroscedasticity: Qt —\ is used to 
carter for the fact that some investment decisions are taken in the year prior to the 
recording of the expenditure to which it relates (see Poterba and Summers (1983, 
p. 156). By regressing their model on time series data for British industrial and
" jr ~  ~  <*+#2t-l+Vt At-1
(8)
It has also been expressed in Poterba and Summers (1983) in the following form:
<*0+<*lQt +<*2Qt-l+vt (9)
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commercial companies for the period 1950-1980, they conclude that the securities 
valuation model can be quite powerful in explaining the observed investment 
behaviour of British industry. They find that about 60 per cent of total investment 
response to Q , occurs within a year of change in the valuation ratio.
Some other researchers have used the lessons of q' theory for modelling
investment behaviour with some mixed results. Von Furstenberg (1977), and Clark
(1979), are not in full support of the theory while others such as Sheldon (1976),
Malkiel et al (1979), Jenkinson (1981), and Oulton (1981), find support for the
securities valuation theory. All these studies and indeed the bulk of the published
%
research studies based on the ‘q* theory to date, use time series data and in most 
cases they are at aggregate level. Thus, discontinuities in investment expenditures 
which are likely to exist at disaggregated (firm) level are eliminated.
Although the valuation ratio proxies the incentive to acquire new capital where the 
ratio is above unity (Jenkinson (1981, p. 12). the amount of cash required for a 
project can not be increased or reduced because 'q' is above or below unity. In 
addition although the fq ' is said to reflect the likely future earnings,' Ciccolo and 
Fromm (1979) indicate that in some cases firms having equal earnings do differ in 
their ‘q' ratio. At a more disaggregated level it is not entirely clear how the q 
ratio would encourage a firm to acquire new fixed assets or reduce its existing level, 
since the market value of the firm depends not only on its fixed assets base but also 
on combination of other factors including its current assets position. In any case, if 
the ratio is below unity the corporate management would have to strive to improve 
the firm’s position. But the proponents of this theory indicate that if the ‘q* is 
above unity the management is encouraged to invest more to ‘balance-up’ the 
position. Thus, either way it appears that management is likely to act in the same 
way, other things being equal. This state of affairs perhaps led Jenkinson (op.cit., 
p i7) to suggest that lq ratio is a summary financial measure of other factors.
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However, the theoretical role assigned to the ‘q1 relates to the apparent cheapness of 
fresh issues of the firm's equity and debt, when the ratio of the market value of the 
firm to the replacement cost of its physical assets is above unity. Thus, Poterba and 
Summers (1983) assert that, ‘it appears that in making investment decisions, 
corporations act as if marginal investment is financed through new share issues’ 
(op.cit., p. 164). The examination of disaggregated data on companies' sources of 
funds would show that new issues contribute only a very small proportion to most 
firms' pool of funds annually. Indeed, new issues finance is highly discontinuous at 
firm level.
t
Like profit/liquidity theory . the valuation model ignores the demand function for 
the firm's finished goods which creates the need for capacity expansion. One other 
criticism in addition to the above is that the theory only applies to firms whose 
market values are objectively determined in the market and so does not apply to 
large number of firms whose shares are not freely marketable such as private firms 
and subsidiaries of foreign firms. How could a researcher realistically estimate the 
replacement cost of a ‘custom built' plant and machinery supplied by the parent 
company in some cases at transfer prices? Even for independent firms, such custom 
built plants and machinery can hardly be reasonably estimated from any one price 
index, particularly where components from different industries from host country 
and abroad may be involved in the construction of such plants.
Finally because the theory assumes perfect capital market (or at least an efficient 
one), it becomes inapplicable in countries where the stock market is not 
sophisticated or well developed such as in developing countries.
Therefore the use of post-tax profit lagged one period would serve as a useful 
simplification and for practical purposes would convey the spirit of the ‘q’ theory so 
far as it relates to incentive to invest based on future profit expectations. Net
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profits also serve to reflect the ‘ability" to invest, subject to the dividend and 
external financing decisions of the individual firm. A good number of researchers 
have applied lagged profit as a ‘measure’ of both ability to finance new investments 
and as an ‘estimate’ of incentive to invest reflecting future profit expectations (but 
see Grunfeld (op.cit.) . The results from such research studies show that profit 
performs both roles together well (see for example, Meyer and Kuh (1957, P.110, 
Table 10), Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Mueller (1967), Dimsdale and Glyn (1971, 
P.167), McDonald et al (1975), McCabe (1979, P.127, P.131), Peterson and Benesh 
(1983. P.447, P.449).
%
5. THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
This theory is commonly associated with Jorgenson’s model of fixed investment 
behaviour of firms (see Jorgenson (1963, 1965, 1967)). He and his colleagues argue 
that the desired capital stock depends not only on output (Q ) - as argued by
accelerator proponents - but also on the ratio of output price ( / >) to the implicit 
rental price of capital services (c  ). This rental price or "shadow" cost of capital 
depends on the price of investment goods ( q ), the rate of return, the rate of 
depreciation, the rate of growth of the price of investment goods and the tax 
structure. Thus
K t'  =  a Q ( j )  (10)
where oc, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital services (see Jorgenson 
(1965. P.53)).
The fundamental basis of this model is that the objective of the firm is to maximize 
its present value; to do so it requires to accumulate optimal level of capital stock in 
the context of a production function which allows it to substitute capital for labour 
or vice versa, subject only to administrative and delivery delays. The elasticity of
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substitution is unity. The deciding factor as to whether additional investment in 
fixed assets will take place is the relative factor costs of capital and labour. Thus if 
capital is cheaper than labour or less than the previous equilibrium level, then the 
firm would acquire more capital services in place of labour to maximize its market 
value (see Jorgenson and Siebert (1968)). This maximization of market value 
according to Jorgenson (1971, P.1116), implies the maximization of profit at every 
point o f time. In this context, profit is defined as net revenue on 'current account’ 
less the rental value of capital services.
Although output is considered in the model, Jorgenson’s innovation is mainly the
%
introduction of ‘C ’, the shadow cost of capital services since the output or sales 
( PQ  ) influence has earlier been the central hypothesis of the accelerator proponents 
(such as Clark (1917) and Eisner (i960)).
Turning now to the specification of the neoclassical model, it is convenient to reduce 
the amount of detail by skipping much of the theoretical expositions leading to 
Jorgenson’s and his colleagues’ empirical specifications. The empirical model is 
presented and discussed below together with the factors that hinder its wider 
application in this study.
The neoclassical model is based on the following main assumptions
1. The desired level of capital is proportional to the value of output divided by the 
price of capital services (the shadow cost of capital);
2. Investment projects to expand capacity require time for completion and 
therefore net investment in every period is a weighted average of past starts:
3. The level of new starts is equal to the change in desired capital from period to 
period. Under these three assumptions net investment is hypothesized to be a 
distributed lag function of past changes in the level of desired capital (Jorgenson 
and Sierbert 1968, P.1127)). By adding the expressions for lagged net investment
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and replacement investment (where replacement is equated to depreciation), the 
neoclassical model usually used for most empirical work is in the following form:
It =  g o + g x C ^ - - />t~ l Q l ~ 1 )  ( 1 1 )
c t  c l — 1
+/32( P t~ 1&- 1- />t~2&- 2)-/33(/t _ - 8 ^  _1)+SA:s _ !+ € j
c t  - 1  c t  - 2
where I t denotes gross investment in the period t . /3q is the coefficient of the 
constant term. j3j_. &2’ $3 are coefficients representing otyQ, &y\ and 
respectively in Jorgenson and Siebert’s model (op.cit.. p.1131). P . is the price of 
output. Q the quantity of output (i.e.. sales plus the change in inventory stock): 
K t - i  is the capital stock at the beginning of the test period or preceding year-end 
capital stock 3: 8 is the rate of replacement or depreciation assumed to be constant : 
6 is the stochastic error term: t  is the time period and C denotes the shadow or 
accounting price of capital services before taxes: ( / £— 1 - 8Kt _^) represents the net 
investment during the preceding period, introduced to represent the time structure 
of investment process: 8Kt implies that the rate of replacement is proportional 
to capital stock.
The central element in the neoclassical model is the ‘c' . This element has been 
defined in two main forms. The first is popular with researchers engaged in the 
study of aggregate industry or sector investment behaviour. These often aim to 
identify the impact of changes in selected macro-economic variables (such as 
government fiscal incentive measures), on capital investment. It is commonly 
defined as follows:
3. see Jorgenson and Siebert (op.cit., p.1129) for the details of the calculation of capital stock
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(12)1—v  v 1—v 1—v q
where q is price of capital goods (the ratio of cost at current to cost at constant
prices); 7 is the rate of interest; is the rate of change of capital goods prices or
the capital gains rate, V is the corporate income tax rate: V, 0) and X are 
proportions of depreciation, cost of capital, and capital gains (or losses) respectively 
chargeable against taxable income.
The second definition of ‘C ’ is introduced by Jorgenson and Siebert (op.cit.,. for the 
application of neoclassical model at firm level. Thus:
c =  q 1
1 —v







The capital gains term in both equations (12) and (13) are usually assumed to be 
transitory in both price of capital services and cost of capital and therefore ignored 
in calculating the operational ‘c’ . As a result equation (13) reduces to:
c =  Y 2—1— V T + (l“ VO))S (14)
The difference between equation (14) or (13) and (12) is in the definition of the cost 
of capital, 7. While 7 represents the market rate of interest in equation (12), in 
equation (13) and (14) it represents an after tax rate of discount defined as earnings 
yield plus its growth rate:
R — D . d)7 =
0) 0) (15)
where R , is the cash flow: D is the direct taxes; 0) is the market value of the firm 
0)
and —  is the growth rate of the market value ( see Jorgenson and Siebert op.cit.,
p.1126).
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For the sake of clarity, let us look more closely at the meaning of the shadow cost 
of capital services or implicit rental of capital services C . This is composed 
essentially of four elements adjusted for the effect of corporate income taxes (as 
already defined). Thus:
c  =  q ( r + 8 —^-) (16)
<1
or
c — q T+q &—q £
<1
q T is th§ opportunity cost, that is, the income that would have been earned from 
investing the equivalent funds in the financial market rather than use it to acquire 
physical assets, q 8 is the depreciation cost, that is. the cost due to the decay of the 
original capital through the passage of time or usage : thus. 5 per cent of capital 
goods price disappears with progression of time, q is the amount of appreciation in 
the price of capital goods and serves to reduce the sum of q 8+q T by the rate of
. . q_ ■ .appreciation
The neoclassical model essentially stresses the importance of C . Thus as soon as ^
is greater than unity a profit maximizing firm has to take advantage of the 
relatively cheaper cost of capital services by acquiring more fixed assets 
(irrespective of need). The firm can also borrow as much as it needs without limit. 
The model also assumes that the value of ‘c' is exogenously determined. However, 
Pogue (1971). has demonstrated that the existence of retained earnings do have 
some effects on the imputed cost of capital by the market. As Kalecki (1937). has 
demonstrated, higher external dependence on borrowed funds by a firm increases its 
risk and so would discourage high level of gearing. There is ample support for the 
view in the literature that management of firms treat retained earnings as cheaper
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source of funds and indeed they use it to a greater degree for financing their 
operations (see Deusenberry (1958), Mayer and Kuh (1957), Eisner and Strotz 
(1963). Smith (1961), Evans (1969), Baumol et al (1970), Feldstein and Fleming 
(1971,p.406). and Mueller (1975). Despite these points the neoclassical model 
ignores any explicit consideration of financing and dividend decisions.
While researchers such as Savage (1977) and Bean (1981) find little support for the 
neoclassical model using U.K. data, others such as Anderson (1981b), Boatwright 
and Eaton (1972), Sinai and Eckstein* (1983), Rawley (1972) and Siebert (1966), 
find much support for the model. Perhaps the strongest challenge to the neoclassical 
model comes from Eisner and Nadiri (1968). They used Jorgenson’s own basic 
quarterly data for total U.S. manufacturing industry to test the critical points of 
departure in the neoclassical model of Jorgenson’s variety. They found that the 
assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function is not supported by the result of 
the tests since the elasticity of substitution is not unity. Most importantly, they 
found that the role of relative prices, the critical element in the neoclassical model, 
is not confirmed (op.cit., p.380).
Apart from the above deficiencies of the model, there are other considerations 
peculiar to this study which hinders direct application of the neoclassical model to 
this investigation. Firstly, the crucial element in the neoclassical model - the 
shadow cost of capital - becomes neutral in the context of a comparative study of 
investment determinants. This is because both groups of firms are exposed to the 
same economic depreciation, tax rates, inflation and interest rates used for 
calculation of the shadow cost of capital (c  ). Secondly, where the earnings yield 
plus its growth rate is used as an alternative to the rate of interest at firm level as 
used by Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), the same limitation as is indicated in the case 
of ‘Q* theory applies. That is T can not be objectively determined for firms whose 
shares are not freely marketable such as private firms and the subsidiaries of
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foreign based parent companies making up 50 per cent of our sample. No 
alternative approach to calculating V  based on the stock market value in the host 
country, such as the use of capital asset pricing model (CAPM) approach to 
calculate the discount rate for each firm can reasonably measure the cost of capital 
in foreign subsidiaries with much financial interdependence with the parent 
company. Thirdly, the economic depreciation more applicable for host base firms 
assuming that the assets in question sure bought or replaceable from host country 
sources, may not equally apply with custom-built plants or equipment supplied by 
a foreign parent company some times at transfer prices from foreign countries with 
different rates of inflation to that of the host country.
Although the neo-classical model is not directly applicable in full in the context of 
this study, its contribution to the theory of investment is used indirectly in the 
model of investment developed in this study (see Chapter 8.4. below). To see how 
the contribution of neoclassical model is taken ‘on board", let us go back to the 
basics. The neoclassical model in so far as it relates to net investment, is essentially 
composed of two effects: a demand or output (the scale) effect, as in accelerator 
theory, which relates increase in capital stock (i.e.. net investment) to maintainable 
or permanent increase in demand or sales: and the relative factor price effect, which 
relates increase (or decrease) in capital stock to the decrease (or increase) in relative 
factor costs. The importance of relative factor price effect hinges on the assumption 
that the objective of the firm is to maximize its market value which is identical to 
maximization of profit at each point of time.
Although Jorgenson’s and Siebert’s definition of profits differs from the accounting 
measure of profit, in that they define profit as revenue less costs in the "current 
account" and also less current cost of capital services, in the long run the difference 
between the two may well be insignificant. The main importance of this profit in 
the point of view of the shareholders is to enable them estimate the likely future
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earnings stream, the discounted value of which determines the market value. 
Accordingly, researchers such as Miller and Rock (1985) have equally argued that 
current and past net of tax profits form the basis of future earnings estimation by 
the market. Indeed Anderson (1981b) has pointed out that since changes in 
profitability (i.e., rate of return on capital) are simply the result of changes in  
re la tiv e  prices and productivity (which may have some impact on investment 
expenditures over time), it is not surprising that evidence of a relationship between 
investment and profits has been so difficult to obtain. What one can deduce from 
this is that profits can be usefully substituted to reflect the effect of changes in 
factor costs. That is, as profits are arrived at after deducting attributable costs, it 
would act as an incentive to invest, having discounted the attributable factor costs. 
If however losses are made the implication is that, for the individual firm, the 
factor costs may have increased relative to its revenue for the period. It is 
important however, to bear in mind that poor productivity may lead to poor profit 
performance, yet investment may have to be made to correct the situation. In 
addition, spare capacity may exist in the firm so that improvement in profitability 
and thus profits may not lead to additional investment. For mature firms it is 
plausible to expect that patterns would have developed in terms of productivity, 
and that past profit patterns would serve as a useful estimating basis for future 
earnings and thus the market value of the firm.
Coming back to the output or demand (sales) effect this is taken account of v ia  the 
introduction of accelerator variable. Indeed if the shadow cost of capital 'c' is 
constant as would be the case in a cross- section data where the components of C 
are virtually neutral (particularly if the firms in the sample are of similar risk 
class), the neoclassical model essentially boils down to the flexible accelerator model 
(see Jenkinson (1981, P.10), Eisner and Nadiri (1968, pp.380-381), Dhrymes and 
Kurz (1967, P.430)).
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6. THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY CONTEXT
The trad itio n a l theories and models of fixed capital investment as we have seen 
make no distinction between firms in terms of whether they are foreign controlled 
affiliates or a locally controlled independent firms. By implication they assume that 
there is no difference between the two sets of firms as far as the determinants of 
fixed investment are concerned.
However, there are reasons to expect a difference between the two sets of firms as 
discussed in chapter 24. First, there is the production interrelation factor. By virtue 
of this type of interrelationship, the subsidiary has at least four options: It could 
import mainly finished goods from the parent and sister affiliates, repackage and 
sell. It could import mainly components from the parent, then, assemble and sell: it 
could partly import finished goods and components: and (or) it could choose to 
manufacture the full range under licence from the parent company. In the context 
of the group, subsidiary companies’ output would be complementary to that of the 
parent company. One who engages in modelling aggregate investment behaviour 
needs to know or predict how the decision is taken as to which option or 
combination of options that each of the subsidiaries selects. Secondly, the influence 
of the parent company within the context of world-wide utility maximization may 
result in decisions which consider the risks and uncertainties of investing in a 
particular country given alternative opportunities in other foreign countries. This 
is related to the influence of financial interrelations where the parent company’s and 
subsidiary’s expenditures are complementary.
There is indeed an empirical evidence that point to the difference between foreign 
controlled subsidiaries and the domestic independent companies (see Stevens (1969,
4. See chapters 3 and 4 for survey findings.
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1970)).
Stevens extended the traditional investment theory for the purpose of explaining 
the investment in property, plant and equipment of 71 well-established foreign base 
affiliates of U.S. corporations in manufacturing industries.
Firstly, he formulated an investment model using the components normally applied 
in explaining the investment behaviour of domestic firms on the basis that 
subsidiaries are autonomous profit centres. Secondly he introduced measures of 
subsidiary-parent interdependence and ran the two models using ordinary least 
squares technique. He finds that the fixed investment behaviour of foreign base 
affiliates is consistent with the theory of world-wide profit maximization vis-a-vis 
the parent company; he finds no empirical support for the view that foreign 
affiliates take investment decisions independent of the majority shareholder(s) (the 
parent companies): he also finds a significant country effect on gross fixed 
investment so that foreign subsidiaries have the tendency to expand more in some 
countries more than in others. Two groups of variables are suggested by Stevens to 
explain subsidiary companies fixed investment behaviour. The first group comprises 
the factors specific to the individual subsidiaries. These are: sales and lagged 
capital stock of the given subsidiary or country. The second group comprises the 
factors measuring the interdependence or interrelationship between the affiliate and 
the foreign parent firm. These are: domestic, sales of the parent company, total 
sales of the parent firm in other foreign countries, cash flow and dividends of the 
total international firm (parent), net capital flow to the subsidiary from the parent 
company, and the host country of investment. The net cash flow to the subsidiary 
comprise capital transfers to the subsidiary less dividend payments to the parent 
from the particular subsidiary or country. Steven's study show that investment in 
foreign affiliates is negatively related to the measure of the alternative investment
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opportunities open to the parent company, and positively related to the measure of 
expected demand of its own products.
Therefore, the nature of the firm as to whether it is an independent local firm or a 
foreign controlled subsidiary, would have some effects on the relative explanatory 
power of variables in the existing models of corporate fixed investment.
7. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, the investment literature is reviewed. The objective has been to 
survey the extant models of corporate fixed investment, trace their development 
and identify their deficiencies and applicability to the empirical model to be 
constructed later in this study.
Four theoretical models are identified in the literature - the accelerator, the 
profit/liquidity, the neoclassical and the valuation (or the ‘q’) theories. The 
advocates of these models make no distinction between subsidiaries’ and 
independent companies* investment decisions. However, evidence from our survey 
and other empirical studies suggest the existence of some interdependences in 
production and financing of subsidiaries and (the foreign base) parent companies.
Due to this deficiency in the existing models of corporate investment, it is intended 
to construct a model that would be simple but general enough to encompass the 
competing models and take into consideration the peculiarities of investment 
decisions in foreign controlled subsidiaries. This model is described in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7
EX TERN A L FIN A N CE THEORIES A N D  MODELS
1. THE CONTEXT
The chapter is divided into four main sections: Section 7.2 surveys the theoretical 
attempts at the f ormulation of models of corporate borrowing. Section 7.3, surveys 
some empirical implementation of the theory. Section 7.4, discusses the additional 
dimensions resulting from the subsidiary-parent relationships and section 7.5 
presents the chapter summary.
2. MAJOR THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS ON CORPORATE 
DEBT DETERMINANTS
Looking through the pertinent literature one notices no clearly established models 
of corporate borrowing. But attempts have been made on the issue. The most 
prominent attempt at the theory of corporate borrowing during the interwar years 
is Kalecki’s (1937) th eo ry  of increasing risk . His starting point is that current 
profits depend on past investments. Idealy, profits would increase relative to 
marginal additions to investment. However, under the im perfect capital m arket,
i
a point.is reached when profits would begin to decline relative to marginal additions 
to investment. Other things being equal, this decline results from the lenders’ 
response to the increasing risk. This would arise where the capital input (equity) of 
the firm relative to the total financing becomes smaller as investment rises. The 
lenders would then internalize this perceived risk and reflect it in their pricing or 
may decline to lend. The increased cost of borrowing would then put pressure on 
profits forcing the firm to curtail its operations.
The impression from Kalecki’s theory is that the proportion of capital input by the 
firm relative to external borrowing, (other things being equal) would determine the
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risk profile of the firm. In effect there is an optimal mix of debt and equity in the 
firm’s capital structure at which its profits and thus market value are maximized.
The post war challenge to this view came from Modigiliani and Miller (1958). 
They argue that the market value of the firm is independent of its capital structure. 
In other words, that the capital structure of the firm has no effect on its market 
value; the market value depends on investment opportunities and the expected 
earnings neither of which have any relationship with the way in which it happens 
to be financed. This proposition has been criticised by several researchers as being 
inappropriate in the real world. Gordon (1962) and Solomon (1963) suggest .that 
the value of a firm is a concave function of its leverage (gearing) and indicate that 
there is a point along the curve after which the value of the firm begins to drop. 
The structure of the curve among other things reflects taxation and bankruptcy 
considerations which were assumed away by Modigiliani and Miller in their 1958 
study.
Later, Modigiliani and Miller (1963) corrected the perfect market view by 
acknowledging the effect of tax differentials between debt and equity financing on 
the market value of the firm. They show that the existence of lax subsidy on 
interest payments by firms would result in ‘the value of the firm increasing by the 
amount of capitalized tax subsidy. This on its own suggests that, given a stable 
pre-interest income, the firm would be better off if it is financed at a maximum 
possible debt in the presence of corporate taxes. However they point out that the 
existence of tax subsidy does not imply that firms use maximum amount of debt in 
their capital structure due to limitations imposed by lenders and other real world 
problems such as managerial need for flexibility (op.cit., 1963, P.442). This aspect 
of flexibility is also stressed very much by Marris (1964) and Galbraith (1972). 
Thus far, no consensus as to the theory of corporate borrowing was established.
- 145-
Although Modigiliani and Miller relaxed their tax irrelevance view in 1963, a 
number of studies provide support for earlier view1. However their second 
sweeping assumption relating to bankruptcy risks has not received equivalent 
number of theoretical support2. The main arguement is that under the imperfect 
capital market, the possibility of bankruptcy makes a levered firm less attractive to 
the investors than an unlevered firm . Kraus and Litzberger (1973), and LLoyd- 
Davis (1975) have incorporated bankruptcy costs in the presence of taxes and show 
that there is an optimal capital structure where equity is at a maximum if positive 
bankruptcy costs exist. This, in the extreme, would imply zero debt.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that, since debt exists and did so in the capital 
structure of firms before interest tax subsidy was introduced, existing studies have 
not yet identified the optimal capital structure. Recall that the whole idea about 
optimal capital structure is that it is the mix of financing that yields the maximum 
value and thus the minimum cost of capital; so, the factors that contribute to this 
maximization of market value would determine corporate borrowing. Jensen and 
Meckling suggest that the optimal capital structure is at the point where the agency 
cost of debt plus the agency cost of new issues is at the minimum, (where the 
agency cost includes the amount of drop4 in the value of the firm and other 
monitoring costs (op.cit., p.119)). This proposition ignores the use to which the 
borrowed funds would be put. While it is at best difficult and at worst a guess 
work to calculate the correct agency cost of debt before it is borrowed, the 
indication is that there is an optimal capital structure at which the market value of
1. Such researchers include Robichek and Myers (1966), Hamada (1969), Stiglitz (1969, 1974), Schall 
(1972), Rubinstein (1973) Baron (1974), Merton (1974) and Stapleton (1975(a) and 1975(b)).
2. See for example Robichek and Myers (1965), Baxter (1967), Hirshleifer (1970), Tumovosky (1970) 
and Stiglitz (1972); But see Stiglitz (1969, 1974) who demonstrated theoretically that under the 
assumption of costless bankruptcy corporate financial policy is irrelevant to the maTket valuation of 
the firm.
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the firm is at the maximum.
However, Lister’s (1975) thesis indicates that a firm’s decision to borrow is not so 
much dependent on the agency cost of debt but the market opportunities open to the 
firm. Briefly. Lister tested the hypothesis that corporate debt capacity exercises a 
significant influence on corporate financing preference on occasions of external long 
term fund raising. He concludes that a recourse to debt is determined more 
significantly by a firm’s size and market opportunities than by individual internal 
financial criteria of debt capacity.
From a similar angle of view, as Lister (op.cit.,), Myers (1977) characterizes a 
firm’s growth opportunities as ‘call options’ and argues that its value depends on the 
discretionary future investment. He suggests that corporate borrowing should be 
set at a point where the market value of the firm is maximized. Thus there is no 
question of zero debt. Indeed Kim (1978) has shown that under income taxes and 
bankruptcy costs, debt capacity3, occurs at a point less than its full capacity. He 
asserts that the market value of the firm increases at lower levels of debt and 
decreases as financial leverage becomes extreme.
While researchers appear unanimous that bankruptcy risks exists and’have influence
i
on the financial decisions of the levered firm, the problem has been how best to 
define it4. The modern approach is to tincorporate gearing into the capital asset 
pricing model and use the resulting beta as the measure of bankruptcy risk on the 
assumption that the risk premium required by the shareholders is a function of 
debt-equity ratio of the firm (see for example Hamada (1969, 1972), Mandelker and 
Ree (1984) and Lasfer (1987))5. Empirically these studies have demonstrated that
3. Proportion of debt which the firm is allowed to borrow by the market ot the level of debt which 
keeps the market value of the firm positive.
4. See Myers (1977) and Kim (1982) who defined it as valuable opportunities forgone and the amount of 
non-debt tax subsidy forgone.
5. The literature in this area is indeed vast; as they relate entirely to market based data we shall not 
continue in that direction. See for example Chen and Kim (1979) and Mandelker and Ree (1984) for a 
mention of these studies.
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\there is a strong relationship between the financial gearing and the security 
systematic risk6.
The problem as far as this study is concerned is that there is yet no evidence as to 
the applicability of the modern approach to the investigation of financing behaviour 
of firms whose shares are not quoted in the stock market including foreign 
controlled subsidiaries. Thus the models based on CAPM  are not directly applicable 
in this study. However it is possible to find a an indirect link which satisfies both 
samples (i.e, quoted and unquoted firms). Sarma and Rao’s (1969) study provide 
this link. They regressed the market value of the firm on expected tax-adjusted 
earnings, its growth rate and debt, and found a strong relationship between the 
market value of a firm and its debt ratio. They conclude that investors prefer 
corporate to personal leverage and therefore, the value of a firm rises up to a 
leverage rate considered prudent.
In effect the attempts at formulating the theory of corporate debt decisions, have 
turned a full circle pointing at the Theory of Increasing Risk put forward by 
Kalecki (op.cit.,). Let us now look closely at the theory. Assuming an initial 
equilibrium gearing level, the theory of increasing risk indicates that a profit 
oriented firm would borrow in relation to its savings. That is, starting from the 
point at which a firm pays only the ‘finest’ rate of interest (or its optimal gearing 
level), marginal borrowing would relate to marginal savings in such a way as to 
keep the optimal gearing unchanged.
Thus, to keep the initial equilibrium unchanged, the marginal borrowing (B n ) can 
be represented as follows:
6. Hamada (1972) and Mandelker and Ree (1984) used time series data and found stTong relationship, 
while Lasfer found strong relationship in his pooled sample his result from annual cross-section 
regressions are not so strong as this variable is significant in 2 out of 11 years.
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1Bn =  S ( L )  (1)
where JL , denotes optimal leverage rate, L> <  1 ; S , denotes current savings, that is
S =  P - D  (2)
where P and D represent current post tax profits and current dividend 
distributions respectively. As an illustration, consider a firm that saves 10 pounds 
sterling and operates at an initial equilibrium gearing (or leverage) of 50 per cent. 
From equation ( l) , the marginal borrowing would be:
Bn =  10 50100
Thus, by saving 10 pounds sterling, the firm can borrow another 5 pounds sterling
debt
to keep the equilibrium rate C :— ) unchanged.
e q u ity
The introduction of savings in this way brings in dividend decision into the 
corporate borrowing decision. Since the purpose of savings and borrowing are 
plausibly for corporate investment, the theory of increasing risk effectively links all 
three main areas of corporate financial decisions - external finance, investment and
l
dividend decisions.
Higgins (1972) proposition, appears to ‘hinge on the theory of increasing risk as 
illustrated above. He proposes a fixed relationship between n e t borrowing and 
corporate savings. Thus:
Bn = a ( P - D ) (3)
where Bn is the net borrowing: P , and D  are current net -  of - tax profits and 
current dividends respectively: and a  is the optimal debt equity ratio or the fixed 
change in borrowing resulting from one unit change in corporate savings.
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\Where a disequilibrium state currently exists and the capital structure is viewed as 
being unoptimal, Higgins hypothesizes that the amount of new borrowing should 
depend on the speed 7, with which the firm wishes to adjust to a new optimal 
debt/equity ratio Qt* , as well as on the amount of retained earnings ( P —D  ). 
Thus, net current borrowing (Bn ) can be expressed as follows :
Bn =  oc ( P —D )+ tE (a* —a ) (4)
where the first term denotes net borrowing resulting from new desired debt/equity 
ratio applied to current savings: while the second term denotes the reaction 
coefficient T, times the new borrowing resulting from the change in capital 
structure7. E . denotes the book value of existing equity (see Higgins (op.cit.,), 
pp.1529 - 1530 ). The speed of adjustment would very much depend on the firm’s 
investment plans and general demand conditions for the firms products.
So far it appears that the need to maintain an optimal capital structure under the 
condition of taxes, as well as agency costs and bankruptcy costs has been widely 
acknowledged. It is also acknowledged that the market value of the firm will be 
maximized when the capital structure is composed of optimum mix of debt and 
equity. However, the point being made by M odigiliani and Miller', fcnd echoed by
i
Lister and Myers, appear to be that although the market value of the firm is 
maximized when the capital structure is a t the optimal mix of debt and equity, it is 
not this deb t/equ ity  ra tio  that maximizes the market value of the firm but its 
investment opportunities and future earnings expectations8.
7. ( (q ;  —Oi)  approximates the balance of debt capacity to achieve the optimal capital structure based 
on existing equity position ( i.e., excluding the current savings ).
8. In effect, two frnns with equal debt/equity ratio would not necessarily have the same market value. 
Thus , other factors play a part in corporate debt decisions in addition to the consideration of capital 
gearing.
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3. SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS OF CORPORATE BORROWING
While on the one hand the theory of capital structure, discussed in the preceding 
section, appears to indicate that debt financing is an active decision (firms would 
maintain an optimal debt-equity ratio), on the other hand, empirical studies appear 
unanimous in viewing debt financing as a residual decision.
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), proposed and tested a model of corporate borrowing 
decision which expresses external finance to be dependent on current dividend 
payment, current fixed investment expenditures, current net profits, current 
depreciation provisions,. current rate of interest (measured by dividing interest 
charges by the long term loans outstanding) and lagged capital gearing ratio 
(measured by dividing long term debt outstanding at preceding year end by the 
book value of capital stock less the long term loan). They also introduced dummy 
variable to capture industry contrasts. Their external borrowing figure does not 
include short term loans and bank overdrafts. In addition their equation fails to 
consider investment in working capital. Their result show some support for their 
hypothesis. In some years the gearing and interest rate coefficients have the right 
signs and are significant. Dividend variable fail to support the use of fund 
expectation and turns out to be negative when significant. Profit turns out to be 
positive in most cases while depreciation has the expected sign when significant. The 
most important factor inducing external borrowing is fixed investment 
expenditures. This variable has the expected positive sign in eight out of ten annual 
cross - section regressions (op.cit.,. Table 16, p.457 ) and is significant in seven out 
of the eight years.
A similar hypothesis is put forward by McDonald et al (1975). in their study of 
borrowing behaviour of French firms. The differences between Dhrymes and Kurz’s 
model and that of McDonald et al lie mainly in the introduction of investment in
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the net working capital and the exclusion of interest variable by the later. They 
preferred to proxy interest rates by long term debt. By normalising all their 
variables by the firm size measure (sales), they apparently fail to introduce gearing 
in the conventional sense. They find that the level of investment is the most 
significant determinant of external financing. Dividend and profits are 
predominantly negative but not significant. The leverage proxy turns out to have 
positive sign in six of the seven years regressions, while depreciation and net 
working capital investment are mostly negative but non-significant (op.cit.. Table 3, 
p.753 ).
McCabe (1979). hypothesizes that net new debt is a function of capital 
expenditures, current dividend, current cash flow (profit plus depreciation) current 
profitability, average interest rate paid by the firm, a measure of risk (the coefficient 
of variation of the firm’s cash flow) and industry group the firm operates in. Like 
the previous two studies investment has the expected positive effect on debt 
behaviour; dividend show a positive effect in most of the annual regressions but not 
significant. The cash flow variables has the negative sign in all years- and also 
significant in all but one year. The interest rate has the expected sign but significant 
in only one year as well as in the pooled .sample regressions. The coefficient of 
variation of profits was not significant in any year as well as in the pooled 
regression. Unlike other two studies discussed above, McCabe fail to include gearing 
variable directly in his model (op.cit., p.124, p.134).
The fourth pertinent study is that of Kumar (1984). Kumar hypothesizes that 
external finance is a function of corporate gearing ratio, current profits, gross fixed 
investment expenditures, acquisition expenditures and current dividend payments. 
Although he expects depreciation to have some influence on external finance, he fails 
to include it in his estimated equation. Similarly he expected a negative relationship 
between external finance and rate of interest, but failed to incorporate it in the
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estimated equations (Kumar (op.cit.,0, p.118, and p.190 Table A3.4; and p.192 Table 
A3.8). His result based on ordinary least squares method, shows that investment, 
acquisition and dividend variables have the expected positive impact on external 
borrowing. Similarly, profit has the expected negative relationship with external 
borrowing (although only significant in one cross-section out of his seven annual 
regressions). The gearing variable turns out to have mostly positive signs rather 
than negative, and significant in three years when it was positive. The result from 
the three stage least squares estimates is not much different although investment 
turns out to have negative relationship with external borrowing in three years, two 
of which are significant.
Finally Peterson and Benesh (1983), hypothesize that net new debt is a function of 
capital expenditures, current dividends, current profits, interest expense, capital 
gearing and a proxy for business risk (measured as the standard deviation , of 
operating earnings over ten years preceding the current period). This model is 
similar to that of Dhrymes and Kurz (op.cit.,), except for the exclusion of 
depreciation and the inclusion of business risk proxy. All their variables except 
interest rate measure turn out to be of the expected signs whenever significant. 
Interest rate measure has the wrong sign in all the years and positively significant in 
three out of the five years. This poor performance of interest rate proxy is 
attributed to its inability to capture the effect of expected interest rate which it is 
meant to reflect.
In general, it appears that the most significant and consistent determinants of 
corporate borrowing are investment expenditures and net earnings (or profits ). 
Capital gearing does not appear to have much direct influence on external finance 
decisions.
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4. THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY CONTEXT
The indications from various sources are that the financial behaviour of foreign 
controlled firms would not be quite the same as those of independent domestic 
controlled firms9. From Stevens’ (1969) empirical study the evidence shows that 
there is a significant financial interdependence between the foreign controlled 
subsidiary and the parent company. This does not necessarily imply that the parent 
company supplies most funds to the foreign base affiliate, but that unlike the 
shareholders of large independent domestic firms, the parent company-shareholder, 
is more aware of the financial position of the subsidiary at each point of time. Most 
of the shareholders of independent companies depend on data published in arrears 
and are not often certain of the true position. This awareness of the affiliate’s 
financial position at each point of time means that at times the subsidiary may call 
on its parent company for short term financial help and the parent have that 
obligation to help. Thus, although the subsidiary in most cases is expected to meet 
their own financing needs either from its own cash flow or local borrowing, in the 
same way as domestic independent firms would do, the closeness with the parent 
would mean that there are other sources open to it which will affect its use of 
external source of funds. The parent company may assist the subsidiary by lagging 
payments for intra- group supplies made to it either from the parent company or 
from other sister affiliates (see Tugendhat (1971), p.188).
Other sources of difference between the domestic independent companies and the 
foreign affiliates hinges on the degree of flexibility available to the subsidiary’s 
management. In the independent domestic companies, the management decides on 
necessity for new equity issues and calls on the public to subscribe although
9. See also chapters 3 and 4
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priorities are given to the existing shareholders. In the case of subsidiaries of 
foreign firms, their access to new capital is dependent on the parent companies 
approval; and so this alternative source of capital 'is limited in its use by the 
affiliates. Indeed, according to Tugendhat (op.cit.,. p.188), the parent company 
decides where the subsidiary should borrow large amounts locally, where it should 
feed in funds from outside the host country, and where it should keep a subsidiary 
short of cash. Dividend remittance requirements by the parent company is one of 
the means of controlling the liquid balances in the subsidiaries. Other means 
include use of transfer pricing on goods and services supplied to the subsidiary, and 
various types of fees.
In relation to the points in the preceding paragraph, the decisions of the parent 
company in each case are, in the main, guided by its risk minimizing strategies 
particularly relating to exchange risks, host country taxation regulation relative to 
other alternative foreign locations, and the scope of double taxation treaties between 
the home country and the respective host countries. In some cases, for control 
purposes, some parents sometimes require as a matter of policy, that foreign base 
subsidiaries pay large percentage of their annual earnings as dividends and (or) fees 
(see Zenoff (1967, p.423) and Remmers (1969, p.8l). However, in some cases 
instead of remitting the dividends or fees, they may be converted into intra-group 
loans back to the affiliate. But of course the parent’s willingness to follow this 
route depends on the nature of tax regulations at home as well as the relative 
withholding tax rates between dividend remittances and interest remittances. 
Where the withholding tax on dividend remittances exceeds that on interest 
remittances, the foreign based parent may sometimes use the later channel for 
earnings transfers. Such parent loans which accumulate from lagged dividend and 
(or) fees allocations are in most cases classified as part of current liabilities (short 
term credits or loans). That means that they can be called up by the parent
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company at short notice in case of need (see Remmers, (op.cit.), p.126-127).
Such was the case during the mid 1960s’ sterling crisis. According to Remmers, 
during 1964-1965 period, up to 60 percent of the 113 foreign subsidiaries he 
surveyed, reduced their exposure to foreign exchange loss (that was expected from 
the imminent UK sterling devaluation) by reducing or eliminating their liabilities to 
parent and affiliated companies (or by increasing their intra-company assets in 
debtors). The implication of such sudden out-flows or increase in current assets is 
that the subsidiary’s borrowing may fluctuate with changes in exchange rates.
While such exchange loss minimizing transfers may be made by some locally 
controlled independent companies to their foreign base subsidiary companies, in the 
final analysis, the effect will be minimal since on consolidation, intra-group credits 
and liabilities are normally eliminated.
As a result of the financial interdependence mentioned above, it is plausible that a 
subsidiary of a well known MNC can be more able to raise large loans from local 
banks and other institutions on the 'passport’ of the corporate group, at fine rates of 
interest. While such loans are recorded in the subsidiary’s books, they may not 
always be for its own investment, but for the parent or by the parent’s order in 
favour of sister affiliate(s) in another country. In such a situation, the usual 
considerations in the independent firms sjich as the relationship between gearing and 
financial risk would have little practical effect on the subsidiary’s borrowing where 
the parent company guarantees such borrowings. Even if the parent company does 
not guarantee such borrowing, the fact that it is aware of it and takes part in 
investment decision where such funds will be channeled to, is enough. The 
subsidiary’s gearing does not appear separately in the group accounts and need not 
cause ‘panic’ to the shareholders of the parent company10.
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However, many host countries have some regulations for controlling excessive use 
of debt in the capital structure of foreign controlled firms. Such regulations are 
popularly referred to as ‘th in  equity  provisions'. This is particularly applicable 
where the debt is supplied by the parent company directly, (or indirectly through 
its controlled affiliates resident abroad), to such an extent as to lead to a subsidiary 
being financed to a greater degree by related company loans, for tax avoidance 
purposes. This provision particularly apply to loan capital and does not affect 
reliance on short term bank loans and overdrafts. Thus borrowings by the 
subsidiary on behalf of the rest of the group or the lending by the parent company 
to the subsidiary on ‘cu rren t account' escapes the thin equity rule as it stands 
presently. These short term borrowings create short term assets in the books of the 
subsidiary and thus may lead to a situation where net borrowings by the foreign 
affiliate would be positively related to the net investment in current assets.
This does not suggest that foreign controlled firms do not borrow on long term 
basis. But the exchange risk minimization strategy (mentioned earlier in this 
section) requires that the maturities of external assets and liabilities are matched. 
Thus where long term loans are undertaken by the affiliate, it is more likely that 
they would be used for fixed asset expenditures. Therefore, like the independent 
firms, one should expect a positive relationship between net borrowing and fixed 
capital investment.
Having said so, the parent company by virtue of its control, may restrict the use of 
external debt (long term loans) finance by the subsidiary. This is not just because it 
would lead to large outflow of funds from the firm in form of interest and front
10. In the consolidated account, an increase in external borrowing by one member of an international 
group may be neutralised by a reduction in another. In this way a large borrowing by an individual 
affiliate may not diTectly reflect on the valuation of the parent company's shares in the home 
country's stock market.
- 1 5 7 -
payments to the lenders; but perhaps also because certain information that are 
closely guarded in the subsidiaries may be disclosed in the process of seeking 
external finance. Foreign controlled firms may therefore be inclined to use less 
external debt and fresh share issues, but more short term liabilities. If so, one 
would expect some instabilities in their external finance behaviour relative to large 
locally controlled independent companies.
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, the major theoretical and empirical models of corporate debt 
decisions are reviewed.' The objective is to identify the main determinants of 
corporate debt behaviour at firm level.
While it appears that no cohesive theory on corporate borrowing exists, similar to 
those on dividend and investment, it is however possible to deduce two strands of 
views. The first is that external borrowing is an active decisions. This hinges on the 
theories of optimal capital structure, which suggests that for a firm’s market value 
to be maximized in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs, its gearing 
(or leverage), has to be at a certain mix. Thus, a firm has to set the maintenance of 
this debt^equity mix as a primary focus of its external finance decision.
The second strand of view, is that market value of the firm depends not on the way 
the firm is financed, but on the firm’s investment plans and the expected future 
earnings streams resulting from its investment activities. Thus, considerations 
about borrowing are dependent on investment decisions, and therefore corporate 
borrowing is a residual decision.
Empirical models are essentially an ‘integration’ of the active and residual elements. 
Such models contain as explanatory variables, the internal sources and uses of 
funds in addition to variables that capture the need for optimal capital structure 
and business risk. However, since investment expenditure decisions depend on
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availability of funds from either internally generated earnings or from external 
sources or both, it interlocks with dividend and financing decisions. In this regard, 
external finance and investment decisions are simultaneous.
So far the literature contains no models of external finance decisions of foreign 
controlled affiliates even though there are indications that there are circumstances 
unique to such firms.
The construction of a model that would be simple, yet sufficiently general, to 
encompass the two strands of views identified in the literature on corporate 
borrowing, and take into consideration the peculiarities of external finance decisions 
in foreign subsidiaries is described in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8
CONSTRUCTION OF THE EM PIRICA L MODELS
1. THE CONTEXT
In this chapter the hypotheses are • operationally stated, elaborated on, and the 
construction of the analytical models for the empirical testing of these hypotheses 
are described.
2. CLARIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESES
From the preceding chapters, there are clear indications pointing to the existence of a 
difference in the financial decisions (and therefore the financial behaviours) between 
foreign controlled affiliates and locally controlled firms.
Accordingly, the m ain  hypothesis to be tested is that in  a universe of large 
industria l corporations, other things being equal, th e ir  financial behaviour 
would depend, among other factors, on the  domicile of th e ir  respective 
ow nership control.
This main hypothesis is, for convenience, referred to as the first level hypothesis. 
In the context of this study, financial decisi6n (and thus behaviour) is made up of 
three components :- dividend, invetsment and external finance decisions. The main 
hypothesis is tested in two main stages, for convenience, referred to as second and 
third level hypotheses respectively (see figure 8A below).
The ‘second level hypotheses’ are stated as follows :-
In a universe of large industrial corporations, there would be a difference between 
foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the re la tiv e  influences of some 
explanatory variables in the :
1. dividend equation;
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3. external finance equation.
In carrying out the second level tests, each model is applied to testing the 
hypotheses for each sample set. The purpose is to find out how each variable 
performs in explaining the respective dependent variables for the separate samples. 
While the results would show the relative influence of the individual variables, one 
can not say that it is due to the difference in the domicile of ownership control apart 
from the fact that the researcher knows that the two samples come from different 
'population’. This leads us to the second stage of the analysis, referred to as the 
‘third level’ hypotheses. In this stage the two samples are combined and foreign 
control factor is introduced to test the hypotheses that in the long run, other things 
being equal, the degree of foreign ownership control of a firm would have an 
independent (non-zero) influence on its dividend, investment and external finance 
behaviours.
The various methods used to test the hypotheses are discussed in the next chapter.
3. THE DIVIDEND MODEL
Following the review of dividend literature,in chap ter 5, one derives an empirical 
model of dividend behaviour which encompasses the elements of active and residual 
theories of corporate dividend decisions. Underlying this model is the accounting 
identity which characterises the firm as:
1. generating funds from current profits plus net additions from external sources of 
finance, and
2. appropriating the generated funds to dividend and investment expenditures 
(both fixed and net current assets).
The model incorporates the view that firms are reluctant to cut the absolute value o f 
cash dividend per share and thus would take into consideration their existing
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dividend policy in establishing their appropriation plans for any particular 
accounting year. In other words, transient changes in the sources of funds would 
not have a major influence on the absolute amount of cash dividend per share in 
each period.
On the basis of the above view of the corporate dividend decisions, the dividend 
equation for testing the second level hypothesis is expressed as follows:
D t. =  ot+^lD t _!. + $ 2Pii + 3 31 tf +&4EFBt. +  &sNCPt . + v t. (1)
where D ti is the gross dividend distribution by firm i at time t . D t —i is the 
lagged dividend; P t is the current net of tax earnings; 11 is the gross investment 
expenditures on fixed asset additions; EFBt is the net addition to total borrowing 
of the firm; and NCPt is the net addition to opening net working capital (or net 
addition to opening net current assets). /3; and Oi are coefficients and the constant 
term respectively; V t . is the error term.
Before giving a fuller definition of the variables as well as their respective a priori 
expectations, it is perhaps more convenient to describe the construction of this 
model.
The variables in the model (equation ( l) , above), are justified on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds as discussed in chapter 5. The current net earnings (P t ) and 
the lagged dividend variable (Z)t _^) have their bearing from the empirical work of 
Lintner (1956). Similarly, the introduction of ( / r ), (NCPt ), and EFBt have 
their bearing from the research work of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). The 
combination of active and residual elements in the equation has its bearing from the 
research study of Peterson and Benesh (1983).
Since there is as yet no one universal model of dividend, in constructing this model, 
one has to relate to other empirical models. Some apparently applicable variables
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used by other researchers happen to be ignored. These variables and the reason for 
ignoring them are as follows:
F irstly , depreciation as used by Darling (1957) and Fama (1974). as well as the use 
of Cashflow profit (profit plus depreciation) by Brittain (1964) and McCabe (1979) 
are not adopted. Most firms use 'straight line' method of depreciation and so, 
although one understands the argument that depreciation provision is a source of 
funds to the firm, it would not appear that firms whose assets depreciate faster and 
therefore need replacing should be distributing higher dividends. In addition to this 
reason, Ang (1975) has pointed out that the use of either cash flow profits or net of 
depreciation profits makes little or no difference. Profit net of depreciation is more 
widely accepted in the literature.
Secondly, the introduction by McCabe (op.cit). of profit rate variable side by side 
with profit plus depreciation is ignored. One profit variable is considered enough to 
explain the effect of earnings on current dividend distribution.
T h ird ly , the inclusion of lagged profits by Darling (1957), Fama and Babiak 
(1968), Fama (1974), Theobald (1978), Peterson and Benesh (1983), Edwards et al 
(1985) and indirectly by Poterba and Summers (1985) appears redundant. By
I
Koyck’s (1954) transformation, lagged profits are a function of lagged dividends 
(see chapter 5). It therefore appears to.be double counting to include both lagged 
dividend and lagged profits as explanatory variables in the same equation. 
Similarly the inclusion of two-year lagged dividend by Theobald (op.cit) is ignored.
Fourth ly , the inclusion of lagged new debt issues by McCabe (op.cit) is ignored 
since even from his tests such a variable have no 'meaningful* effect on current 
dividend pay out behaviour. Current borrowing is a more superior variable than 
lagged new borrowings. Similarly the explicit introduction of interest payments in 
the dividend equation by Anderson (1983) is ignored. While his theoretical
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reasoning appears sound, interest payments do not appear in practice to have much 
independent effect on dividend distribution. Anderson’s result testifies to this point. 
This is perhaps because the net profit which is a key element in the dividend 
equation already discounts the interest .payments. Similarly, Fama’s (1974) 
inclusion of GNP (gross national product) as proxy for demand in the dividend 
equation is ignored. Apart from this use of GNP being in a minority in the 
literature, for a cross section study, it becomes a constant and thus redundant for 
the purpose of a comparative study.
F ifth ly , other variables specific to some studies such as the inclusion of acquisition 
expenditure as a separate variable in Kumar (1982, 1984) is ignored, because 
investment in capital assets variable takes account of all new fixed investments and 
need not be separated. Similarly the inclusion of R and D expenditures in the 
dividend equation by Mueller (1967) is ignored, since expenditures on acquisition of 
R & D hardwares would normally be recorded as part of fixed assets, and thus need 
not be separately included in the equation as an explanatory variable for our 
purpose.
Sixthly, variables used by some researchers to represent industry, dummies are 
ignored. Not only because of there being no‘consensus as to the significance of such 
dummies but because the sampling method used in this study precludes the need for 
industry dummies (see chapter 9). Similarly, taxation related variables and 
dummies representing changes in tax rates as used by Edwards et al (1985), and 
Poterba and Summers (1985), are ignored since profit variable being used is net of 
taxes. In addition, the large firms are all exposed to the same tax law, and the 
matching sample of firms in this study ensures this equal exposure by both foreign 
and local firms. Any difference in the effective tax rate of the firms are entirely 
related to their performance and timing differences in their tax deductible 
expenditures. The standard tax rates over the period covered by this study are
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virtually unchanged. The existence of tax clientele in the ownership of the firm 
would plausibly make taxation not to have a significant influence in a cross-section 
sample, particularly when the sample is made up of firms in similar size bands and 
in similar industrial activity spread, (see e.g.. Edwards et al (1985).
Having described the construction of the dividend model for testing the second level 
hypothesis, it is as well to express the model used for testing the third level 
hypothesis relating to the independent impact of foreign control on the corporate 
dividend behaviour. This model is expressed as follows:
Dt. =arb/31Dt _x. + 0 / 1. +ftAEFBt. +&sNCPt +/36FCt. (2)
The symbols in equation (2) are defined exactly as those in equation ( l)  above. FC 
is the foTeign control dummy variable.
3.1 Definition o f variables, and their apriori expectations 
^  ✓ DIV n DIVD t is defined as ( —^ — )t ; where ——— is the current dividends divided by
current net sales (ie Turnover after deducting value added tax). The current 
dividends include both dividends paid and proposed to ordinary shareholders and to 
preference shareholders. It is possible to define dividend in terms of those 
attributable to ordinary shareholders alone. However, certain considerations make 
the chosen definition more appropriate for the purpose of this study. Firstly from 
the information one came across during the interviews, there is evidence that 
sometimes, parent companies and institutional investors hold both preference shares 
and ordinary shares in the same firm. It is therefore plausible that due to 
alternative receipts from preference share dividends, a preference shareholder who 
happens also to be a majority shareholder may put less pressure on the firm for 
increased ordinary dividends. Secondly, where local voting equity participation is 
mandatory, in other to preserve the statutory equity balance, new ordinary voting
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issues are seldom floated. Under such a situation, foreign parent companies 
sometimes acquire preference and, or, other non-voting shares in the affiliate. It 
may happen that much of the dividends are made in form of preference dividends 
while ordinary dividend distributions are kept at a ‘minimum’. This would enable 
the affiliate have the needed funds, enable the foreign firm obtain some earnings 
transfers which is less conspicuous than the ordinary dividend remittances. This 
arrangement keeps the status quo intact1.
has been defined as net sales at time t . It is important to bear in mind that in 
diversified firms such as the firms in the sample for this study, the sales figure 
reported in the operating statement includes those from service receipts such as 
licencing fees, royalty fees and other service fees from non-related customers 
(firms). Thus, the sales turnover may not only be from sales of physical goods.
D t - l  : This is the lagged dividend variable. That is the dividend paid and proposed 
in the preceding accounting reference period (year). The definition of dividend is as 
shown above. Thus:
A - i  =
DIV
■t-i,
As for the a priori expectations for this variable, it is expected to have a positive 
sign. This hinges on Lintner’s finding and supported by others (see chapter 5 above). 
Between the locally controlled firms and foreign controlled firms the magnitude is 
expected to differ. The magnitude is expected to be higher for locally controlled 
companies than the foreign controlled companies. In the former, Lintner has found 
that lagged dividend has a positive influence on current dividend. Theory attributes
1. This status quo relates to the relative voting power that maintains the foreign versus local equity 
balance in the firm.
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this to information asymmetry. Since no such asymmetry would normally exist in 
subsidiaries vis a vis the parent company, the effect of lagged dividend is expected to 
be positive but less in magnitude in foreign controlled firms as compared to the 
locally controlled firms. Other factors that would contribute to lower magnitude of 
this variable for foreign controlled firms, include the availability of other channels 
for remitting foreign source income, such as through licencing fees royalty fees, 
transfer pricing of intra-group transactions, lagging of intra- group payments due to 
the foreign affiliates or prepayments for future supplies from the parent and so on.
Oi is the constant term. Its inclusion in the dividend equation derives from the view 
put forward by Lintner(1956), that firms are usually reluctant to cut absolute 
amount of dividend per share. They have the tendency to maintain a steady 
dividend per share and adjust it usually upwards but downwards only when a 
change foreseen to be long term occurs in the economic environment. However, 
maintenance of constant dividend per share does not necessarily imply a constant 
dividend per pound sterling o f sales or indeed constant dividend per pound sterling 
of profit after tax. For foreign risk minimization reasons, foreign controlled 
companies are expected to remit some part of their foreign earnings annually. 
However, considering other possible channels for transfer of foreign source income 
it may happen that there would not necessarily be a constant dividend-sales ratio 
also for foreign controlled affiliates.
Pt : This is the current profit after tax but before appropriations. It, thus excludes 
interest charges and depreciation for the period. It is defined as
*  =  ( ^ )
where NPF is net profit as defined earlier. Being the main source of distributable 
earnings, profit is expected to have a positive relationship with current dividend 
rate. Assuming information sym m etry  between the management and the majority
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shareholders one would expect a tendency for the firm to pay out more dividends in 
the years it can afford it and less in the years when it is less able to do so. However 
when information asym m etry  exists, the tendency would be for a lower speed of 
adjustment so that a smoothing effect occurs, resulting in average dividends being 
paid in both relatively ‘poor years’ as in ‘good years’. This would dampen the effect 
of high profits relative to that of low profits under a situation of information 
asymmetry. Since there is normally more information symmetry between the 
subsidiary and its majority shareholder (the parent company), and less so when the 
majority shareholders are widely spread as in large public limited companies 
making up our sample (see chapter 9 below), it is plausible to expect that the 
coefficient of profit rate would be higher in foreign controlled affiliates than in 
locally controlled independent firms.
(E F B  ) t : This is the net change in total borrowing in the current year over the 
outstanding borrowing in the preceding year end. It is defined as follows:
(EFl x ,  W W j
Where (TBF )£ is the total balance of borrowed funds at the end pf year t, while 
(:T B F \_ !  is the corresponding balance at' the end of the preceding year. Total 
borrowing means all monetary liabilities raised in form of loans of all terms 
including debentures, Bank loans and overdrafts and intra-group loans. It excludes 
trade credits and sundry creditors. It excludes issue of shares of all descriptions. 
This variable being a source of funds would normally be expected to have a positive 
sign. This is because the ability to raise funds from external sources would make it 
possible for a firm to carry on with its investment plans while at the same time 
being able to pay dividends even if current earnings are low relative to its current 
financial needs. However, where public limited companies are concerned, there may 
be adverse reaction by the market if it transpires that the firm borrowed for the
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purpose of paying dividends. Since the top management in such firms would be 
unlikely to risk being seen to transmit wrong signal to the market and the 
consequent lack of trust in future signals, with its ramifications for the share 
values, one would expect a negative relationship between net change in borrowing 
and current dividend rate in large locally controlled independent firms (all of which 
are pics).
As for the foreign controlled firms, external finance is expected to have a positive 
relationship with current dividend rate for the following additional reasons:
1. the exchange risk minimization policy of matching foreign base assets with 
foreign base liabilities. Thus as profits increase and has a positive influence on 
dividends and retentions, additional borrowing would be made to match the 
retentions.
2. Parallel effect of dividends and intra-group loans and credits. Dividends 
‘declared’ by a foreign controlled affiliate may sometimes be unremitted to the 
parent company, but instead converted to intra-group loans of short term nature. 
If this is the case ‘borrowing’ by the affiliate would increase as dividend increases. 
This parent’s ‘loans’ may result also from fees not remitted, and accounts payable 
delayed in the host country awaiting favourable time to remit.
I t : This is the addition to fixed assets for the current year t. It is a gross addition 
which means that it includes expansion, and replacement of disposed assets, plus 
other fixed asset acquisitions, such as office equipments, properties and so on. The 
figure for this variable is taken as given in the financial statements and n o t derived 
from deducting opening book value of fixed assets from the balance at the end of 
year t. This therefore avoids the distortions that would otherwise be caused by 
different methods of fixed asset revaluations and timing between firms. The 
distortion may even be more in host countries where the repatriation of earnings by 
foreign controlled firms are based on the book value of net assets and ‘temptations’
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exist to overvalue the fixed assets. In such a situation, the difference between 
closing and opening values would not necessarily reflect actual investments in the 
current period.
Thus, this variable is defined as follows:
(.PPAt +PMAt )
1 1 =  —;-------    : where PPA is the property additions and PM A is the
additions to plant, machinery and equipments during the current year. It would 
have been better to ignore property additions on the ground that they may be 
discontinuous. However, in most financial statements both properties and plant 
additions are shown as a combined figure. At any rate, both additions to property 
and plant and machinery and other equipments, indicate a firm’s commitment in the 
country' of investment, and therefore the addition of property and plant and 
machinery is appropriate in the context of this study.
As for a priori expectations, I t is a use of funds and for the allocation of current 
earnings one expects this variable to have a negative sign in the dividend equation. 
However, where locally controlled firms are concerned, the smoothing effect of 
stable dividend policy would result in a build up of ‘stock’ of retained earnings. 
This would make it possible for dividend^ to be maintained from the current 
earnings while z l  the same time new investment projects go on with funds from 
existing retained earnings. In addition locally controlled public limited companies 
are more disposed to tap new funds from the stock market in a way not expected of 
the foreign controlled affiliates. In the case of the later, the foreign parents would 
like to maintain their ownership control. In addition to this point, the dividend 
policy in foreign affiliates as already pointed out. would be based on clear 
information symmetry so that dividends would respond to profits than to past 
dividends. In this case dividends and investments would more clearly reflect their 
competing nature. Putting all the above points together, it is expected that in large
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locally controlled independent firms investment would have a negative sign while in 
foreign controlled subsidiaries (or firms whose shares are not freely marketable or 
private firms), investment would have a negative sign in the dividend equation but 
the magnitude would be larger for foreign than for local firms.
NCPt : This is the net additions (decrease) in net current assets investment during 
the current year. It is defined as:
NCPt =  ■ -g  -  : where Nt =  TCAt ~(TCLt —BKFt ) and
Nt =  TCAt —(TCLt —B K F t _ j )  : TCA is the total current assets: BKF,
is the bank loans and crver draft and short term loans: TCL is the total current
liabilities. Thus, Nt is the closing balance of net current assets and Nt is the
corresponding opening balance. From this definition it can be seen that Nt 
include the assets financed by bank loans and overdraft and short term loans. This 
therefore differs from the conventional definition of this term as Total current 
assets less total current liabilities, where this later term includes short term loans 
and bank overdrafts. The definition adopted here is appropriate because of the 
definition of external finance variable which includes both long term and short term 
loans and bank overdrafts.
I
As for. the a priori expectations in the dividend equation, the behaviour of this 
variable would be similar to that of I t /since both compete with dividends as uses 
of current earnings. The coefficient of the variable is expected to be larger in foreign 
controlled firms, since for foreign risk minimization reasons the parent would act to 
minimize the size of the liquid balances held in the foreign affiliates2.
FC: This is the foreign control dummy variable and is assigned the value of unity
2. This howevcT depends on the relative volatility of the host country’s exchange rates.
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when a firm is owned more than 50 per cent by a foreign domiciled corporation 
whose ultimate majority shareholders also domicile in the same (home) country.
It is assigned the value of zero when the firm is locally controlled; that is, where the 
majority of the shareholders are domiciled in the host country'. This variable is 
used to measure the relationship between foreign control of ownership of firms and 
their financial behaviour in the host country.
As for the a priori expectation for this variable in the dividend equation, it should 
be positive in the long term. The reasons are as follows;
1) dividend payments by affiliates as already pointed out depends not only on the 
affiliates need for funds but also the need by the parent and indirectly that of the 
rest of the group. This reflects the financial interdependence within the group.
2) Anticipation of permanent changes in host currency values such as devaluation, 
could cause large outflows of funds in various forms including dividend 
remittances3. Since the locally owned and controlled firms do not have to consider 
explicitly the alternative investments available to the individual shareholders 
before its annual dividend payments, nor consider the currency devaluation or risks 
in the home country for the purpose of dividend decisions, it is plausible .that there 
would be a positive relationship between foreign control and the dividend behaviour 
of firms (if only for the feeling that home is safer than foreign country and the 
possibility that not all the funds remitted to the parent represent outflows from the 
group).
In sum. one supposes that dividend payments will depend on current profits, 
existing dividend policy proxied by lagged dividends, its fixed investment plans, its 
net investment in working capital, the external finance obtained from corporate
3. See Remmers (1969), Brook and Remmers (1970), and Tugendhat (1971) foT evidence of large out 
flow funds preceding sterling devaluation in the mid 1960s.
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borrowing (both long term and short term loans and overdrafts) and whether the 
firm is local or foreign controlled.
4. THE INVESTMENT MODEL
To put into perspective the background of the investment model developed later in 
this section, it is important to appreciate the nature  of capital investment in firms. 
This will make it easier to see the various motivations that induce investment 
actions. By so doing, the extent to which each of the four main theories or models 
of capital investment (reviewed in chapter 6), falls short of explaining the total 
motivation for investment expenditures would be more clearly understood.
4.1 Nature o f Capital Investment
Capital investments in firms can be sorted into four main types, according to the 
respective needs each has to satisfy:
The first type is referred to as expansion or capital widening investments. This 
relates to the acquisition of additional plant and machinery or equipment, 
construction or acquisition of additional factories and (or) extension to the existing 
ones. Under this type of investment, the firm’s technology of production remains 
essentially as it were, only the level of production changes4. The observed trend in 
demand and expectation of permanent increase in its pressure on existing capacity is 
the most plausible factor for expansion investment. However, a firm can not be 
expected to expand in absence of profits or cash flow resources. But profits (and 
cash flow) may be made even when the firm is producing at less than full capacity 
depending on the nature of competition in the finished goods market. Thus existence 
of profits makes i t  possible to acquire new machines but not necessarily lead to
4. In economic jargon, this simply involves a shift in the production function.
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expansion.
The second type of capital expenditure is referred to as technology substitution or 
capital deepening investments. This involves a change from relatively high labour 
intensive production technology to a lower one. The use of more fork lift trucks 
rather than human packers, the use of computers for design and production rather 
than human hands, are examples of this type of investment. The main factors 
inducing capital deepening investment could plausibly be attributed to relative 
advantages of capital assets over labour in terms of productivity. Also, a change in 
the nature of materials being used for production, for example hazardous chemicals, 
or heavier materials, may create a need for capital deepening investment. In 
general, this type of investment would be induced by relative cost advantage of 
capital to labour. This type of investment may indeed take place even when sales 
are not expanding, but where the objective is for cost savings. The pressure on 
profits can plausibly be expected to be at the background of capital deepening 
investment.
The th ird  type of capital expenditure is referred to as innovation  investm ents. 
This includes investments in Research and Development hardwares carried on the 
balance sheets of firms. This type of investnient may be induced by various factors 
such as need for process improvements to enable the firm produce more units of the 
desired quality  cost effectively; new product developm ent engendered by 
competitive pressures; fall in demand in the existing product-markets or declining 
profits from sales of existing products. In process innovation, both sales and 
profits are important. The innovation may be targeted at how to increase 
production volumes of the existing or improved quality. It may also be targeted at 
how to produce the existing quantity and quality at reduced cost and thus at 
improving profitability.
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The Fourth  type of investment is for replacement or modernisation of existing 
machinery, plant and property. The inducement to replace existing fixed assets may 
be due to physical wearing out With consequent increase in maintenance costs and 
‘knock-down’ effect on output volumes. New development may make existing 
machinery obsolete. The shift in consumer tastes may need changes in the models 
of the finished goods and may compel the firms to buy new equipments even when 
the existing machines have not been fully depreciated, and irrespective of relative 
factor costs. Advances in production techniques may also induce replacement 
investm ent.
By putting the above four types of fixed capital investment in perspective it could 
be seen that none of the various theoretical models of investment has managed to 
incorporate the various inducements. Indeed there are other considerations ignored 
by economists attempting to propound investment theories based on stock 
adjustment hypothesis (see chapter 6). First, an individual firm needs not buy the 
fixed assets ‘outright’. They can be leased or hired in which case, the necessary 
capital services are being received by the firm while their cost may not be recorded 
as part of the firm’s capital stock in the balance sheet. Sometimes it is suggested 
that these off-balance sheet assets are so financed because of lack of available profits 
to set off the capital allowances that would otherwise accrue to outright acquisition 
of the assets. However, there are other practical reasons even when profits may be 
available ; such as the speed of change of product innovation and technology, which 
may result in high obsolescence costs. The usage ratio or the length of time the 
machine (and buildings) are effectively used for productive purposes, would also 
determine the cost effectiveness of acquiring new capital assets or leasing them. 
Under this situation the stock adjustment hypothesis (ATt —K t _j) would indicate 
no investment if K t < X t_j after adjusting for depreciation, even if capital 
services are being obtained through the use of leased plant and machinery.
- 175-
Secondly, in individual firms, the purchase of hew fixed assets are lumpy or discrete 
so that capital expenditures in one year need not be repeated in the following year 
just because of change in the relative price of output to the 'shadow* cost of capital 
services as neoclassical model would suggest. Where industry or sectoral aggregate 
investments are being considered, the discreteness would be suppressed because 
firms do not all acquire physical assets during the same accounting reference 
periods. Thus, models used for aggregate investment studies may not necessarily 
yield the same results when applied to investment at firm level.
Thirdly, replacement machinery and plant need not cost more than those being 
replaced. A new machinery may indeed cost less than the one being replaced and 
equally more efficient. The cost of computers several years ago was higher in real 
terms than today. Indeed a replacement machinery need not be new from the 
factory. In some cases they may be second hand and costing much less than the old 
one being replaced. For stock adjustment hypothesis these are just replacement even 
though additional capacity may have been acquired. Such acquisitions may simply 
be in response to attractive investment opportunities by imaginative and skillful 
management and nothing to do with systematic disequilibrium in the relative price 
of output and shadow cost of capital. ,
4.2 THE MODEL
The review of corporate investment theories in chapter 6, shows that no concensus 
exists in the literature as to any one universal model of corporate fixed investment 
expenditures. Thus, those who support the neoclassical model view the relative 
factor costs as being the prime elements. Under this view, the relevant elements are 
the interest rates, depreciation rates, changes in the price of capital goods and tax 
considerations, as it relates to the effective cost of capital. The deficiency of this 
model is that the strength of individual elements in the cost of capital may not be
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very clear. Real interest rates, for example, may be low yet firms may be unable to 
increase their capital stock. This would be the case where demand condition is not 
favourable and where the individual firm has borrowed up to the ‘safe’ limit. As 
for the tax allowances, it can be there for every firm to take advantage of, but each 
firm has to  earn  a pre-tax profit first, before it could be in the position to take 
advantage of tax subsidy. Evidence of the existence of unused tax allowances 
exists, showing that the mere existence of tax allowances does not necessarily induce 
capital investment for its own sake5. Although corporate taxation changes can 
influence the timing of investment expenditures (see Greenwell and Co (1984); and 
Levis (1985)). it can not explain the difference between the investment behaviour of 
two sets of firms exposed to the same tax regime.
Those who support the accelerator model, argue that it is the permanent changes 
in sales or demand for a firm’s products that induce investment expenditures. As 
far as this view is concerned, the cost factor has been taken into consideration in the 
pricing of the firm’s outputs. Thus, between two firms, the one that invests more 
would be the firm with larger sales increases.
Those who support the  p ro fit/liqu id ity  model argue that it is the ability to make 
profits that act as an inducement to invest. Thus where two firms have equal sales 
value, the one that is more profitable (and more liquid) is likely to invest more.
Those who support the  securities valuation  (or ‘q’) model argue that capital 
investment in a firm is induced by the disequilibrium between the market value of 
the firm and the realiseable value of its physical assets. This is perhaps because the 
shareholders are willing to put up more risk capital for expansion and so the firm 
would be induced to take up such an offer.
5. see the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (March, 1984, P.70)).
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Considering the discussion in the preceding section regarding the nature of fixed 
assets investment in firms, for the purpose of this study, the above models of 
investment can be narrowed down into two: the accelerator model and the profits 
model. The later is a ‘combination’ of neoclassical, profit/liquidity and the 
securities valuation models. While neoclassical model centers on costs, the profits 
model indirectly accounts for the effect of costs. Similarly while, the securities 
valuation model considers the market valuation of the firm, such valuations would 
normally reflect the earnings expectations from the firm’s investment opportunities. 
The market expectation would be based on the existing pattern of earnings 
performance. Early studies of investment such as those by Meyer and Kuh (1957. 
Kuh (1963), De Leeuw (1962), Meyer and Glauber (1963), all point to the 
importance of sales and profits. Sales and profits are found to alternate, with sales 
being the inducing factor during the boom while profits become more important 
particularly during periods of re la tiv e ly  low economic activity. This brings time 
factor into the investment models (see Eisner (1972)).
Putting all the above points together, for a research study such as this one, where 
complex econometric model building is far away from the objective, it becomes 
necessary to build a compromise fram ew ork. This framework should be simple, 
yet in the spirit of the standard theories of investment. This approach is not 
w ithout support. Solow et al (1963) assert that one can not choose strictly between 
a profits theory on the one hand and an accelerator theory on the other. In 
addition, they point out that profits theory and accelerator theories are not 
m utually exclusive. They obtained more stable empirical results when corporate 
profits and demand variables are included in their estimation equation. Similarly 
Abel (1979) has shown that simple securities valuation model and the neoclassical 
model give the same equilibrium capital stock. In addition, the tests of some of the 
existing models by Jorgenson et al (1970) suggests that ne ith e r of the approaches
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alone is satisfactory. Rather a combination of the elements of the main theories is 
required to provide a more balanced and satisfactory account of empirical behaviour 
of gross fixed investment (see Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), P.428).
On the basis of the foregoing discussions, one derives an empirical model of 
corporate investment expenditure decision. Underlying this model is the usual 
accounting identity (see the preceding section), which characterises a firm as being 
constrained by the following budgetary equation:
Internal Cash flow + external finance *= (Fixed investment expenditures)
+ (net current asset investments)
+ (Dividend distributions)
+ (unidentified item)
Gross investm ent in fixed capital assets depends, therefore, on the competing uses 
of funds as w ell as the  sources of funds. It also depends on the incentive to make 
more profits by expansion to meet capacity pressures, replacement or modernisation 
in previous periods. The model can be expressed as follows:
I t. =  a f + 3i CAVt. +@2 Pt - i ,  +£*3 ^ 1  - i , +$4 DEPti
+/35A i+ 36£ F £ t.+ 0 7A O >t.+t/t.
*
Where I t,, a, Dt ., EFBt ., NCPt. and V t are as defined in the preceding section. 
CAVt. is the capacity accelerator variable: Pt — i is the lagged profit, Pct is the 
lagged capital stock at book value: DEPt. is the depreciation provision by the firm 
i in the time period t .
Before providing the fuller definition of these variables together with their a priori 
expectation from the model estimation, it is convenient at this point to describe the 
construction of this model.
First the variables in equation (3) above, are justified on both theoretical and
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empirical grounds as discussed in chapter 6. The capacity accelerator or change in 
sales (C A V t ) is based on the accelerator theory and have bearing from Eisner 
(1960), while the definition as will be seen later relates to the suggestion by Eisner 
(1963, P.90), that very short lags are inappropriate. Other researchers such as 
Anderson (1967), Meyer and Kuh (1957). Higgins (1972) and Meeks (1975, 1981) 
adopted some form of output - capital ratio as the capacity accelerator variable. 
The original definition of this variable is adapted in this study (see the next sub­
section).
The lagged profit variable (P j —j ) derives from the profit/liquidity theory.. It 
accommodates the 'spirit’ of neoclassical model in taking care of the actual effects of 
factor costs on the ability of the firm to acquire new fixed assets ; though in the 
context of a different technological assumption (see for example Anderson (1981a)). 
It also accommodates the spirit of the securities valuation (or 'q ’) theory; since the 
market value of the firm upon which *q’ model depends, is the discounted 
extrapolation of the firm’s current and lagged profit experiences by the shareholders 
(see Miller and Rock (1985)).
The lagged capital stock (P C t _ j )  more commonly expressed as i.K t _q) in the 
investment literature, reflects both the replacement investment and other factors 
such as the time path of investment process as characterised by de Leeuw (1962) 
and Almon (1965). The use of lagged capital stock to reflect depreciation or 
replacement investment has been criticised by Feldstein and Rothchild (1974) on the 
ground that replacement investment is influenced by the same economic factors that 
influence new investments. While this point is taken, the inclusion of a variable to 
capture the effect of replacement demand is not inconsistent with their view since 
the implication of their arguement is that replacement demand has its own series. 
This variable also reflects the available capacity and being a net book figure, it takes 
account of the age effect represented explicitly by Meyer and Kuh (1957) and
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Meeks (1975, 1981).
The current depreciation provision (DEPt ) reflects the effect of cash flow variable; 
while (EFBt ), the addition to external finance stock during the current period, 
reflects the ability and willingness of the firm to borrow at the going rate of 
interest. The dividend variable (Z)£ ) and the net current asset investment 
(NCPt ) find their justification from the constraints of the budget equation 
expressed earlier in this section. The variables mentioned in this paragraph are all 
commonly found in empirical models of fixed investment (see chapter 6).
Although it is important- to relate the model developed in this study to those in the 
extant literature, some apparently applicable variables used by other researchers 
happen .to be ignored. These variables and the reasons for ignoring them are as 
follows:
F irstly , the factor used in all neoclassical-type models is ignored. Similarly
the use of market value of the firm by Grunfeld (1960) and the ‘q’ ratio model are 
ignored. In the first instance ‘C’ (the shadow cost of capital), becomes constant in 
a comparative study based on cross-section data. In the second instance, market 
value of foreign controlled firms whose shares are not freely marketable is not
l
objectively measurable as those of the locally controlled independent firms in the 
sample.
Second, the use by Jorgenson and his colleagues of lagged new investment and the 
introduction of age proxy explicitly by Meyer and Kuh (1957), Eisner (1960) and 
Meeks (1975, 1981) are ignored. It has been empirically found that the age proxy 
has no significant separate effect, on investment (Meeks 1981, P.136). Thus the use 
of lagged Capital Stock (PCt _ ^) is enough to capture the age effect (if any) on 
replacement investment as well as the effect of earlier starts of investment, so that 
lagged new investment need not be explicitly represented in the model.
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T hird ly , the use of current sales as a proxy for profits by Meyer and Kuh(1957) 
and Meeks (1981) is ignored since higher turnover does not necessarily mean high 
profits even where there is some correlation between the two variables in aggregate 
studies. Similarly their introduction of lagged net liquidity and lagged depreciation 
variables are ignored, in favour of lagged profits.
This reflects the ability and incentive to invest and has its bearing to the usage in 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Peterson and Benesh (1983), Kumar (1984) and in the 
distributed lag framework of Eisner (1960).
Fourth ly , the use of gross national product term by Fama (1974), earnings yield 
and rate of interest by Anderson (1967) and Mayer (1981) are ignored. These 
variables would be neutral in a cross-section study and can not explain the 
difference in investment between two firms operating from the same economic 
environment. As for earnings yield, it is not directly calculable for non-listed firms 
forming 50% of this research sample.
F if th ly , the introduction of distributed lags of net new debt by McCabe (1979) is 
not adopted. It does not appear plausible that firms would borrow in advance of 
usage since it could be more expensive. Indeed none of the lagged • coefficients of
I
external debt are significant. Interest charges introduced by McCabe explicitly in 
the investment equation is ignored since the existence of net new debt variable 
already shows that the firm is willing to borrow at the going rate of interest.
S ix th ly , the use of gearing and financial risk variables by Mayer (1981) is 
considered more appropriate in the external finance equation. As explained in the 
preceding paragraph, the introduction of net new debt variable directly in the 
investment equation makes gearing and financial risk variables redundant in a 
cross-section study. At the same time, the introduction by Mayer (op.cit) of a 
variable to reflect dividend signal is also redundant where current dividend is
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introduced directly in the investment equation. Where subsidiary companies are 
among the sample, the parent company need no information signal since they have 
more efficient ways of obtaining information about the firm’s performance.
Seventhly, acquisition expenditures introduced by Kumar( 1982,1984) and research 
and development and advertising expenditures saperately introduced by Mueller
(1967) are ignored. Acquisition is highly discontinuous. Where acquisition is 
financed more by share-for-share exchange scheme, its effect on pool of available 
funds would be small. Indeed, Kumar’s result shows an inconclusive evidence of 
the effect of acquisition on capital investment. The coefficient of the acquisition 
variable turn out to be significant and positive in two years while significant and 
negative also in two years (see Kumar(1984), p.122, Table 7.2 and p.126, Table 
7.6). It therefore serves as a useful simplification to ignore acquisition of 
subsidiaries in the investment equation. In the case of Research and Development 
and advertising expenditures, there is no need to include these expenditures 
separately since any hardware acquired for use in the respective departments, which 
are not written off in full from operating statements of the year of purchase, are 
normally recorded as part of fixed assets. Such hardwares will be part of the gross 
investment variable used in this study. ,
Finally, there is consideration of lags for some independent variables to allow for 
the delay between the change in investment stimulants and the actual investment 
expenditures. Various researchers suggest different lags ranging from 6.5 quarters 
in Anderson (1964), 8.5 quarters in Jorgenson and Siebert (1969), 8.7 quarters as 
indicated by Meyer and Glauber (1964). From these.it appears that a lag of at least 
one year is necessary for some variables (see Eisner (1964), pp.139-140), Gould
(1968), Chenery (1952) and Jorgenson et al (1970), pp. 199-200). Therefore, 
Meeks’ (1981) approach of choosing to use a 'current’ version of his model (where 
the incentive variables are unlagged) in his reported estimates is not considered
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appropriate for our purpose. Such an approach appears to be quasi-mechanical and 
does not appear to have theoretical basis except that the current version yields 
higher goodness of fit statistic ( R  2) in 78 per cent of industry-years he studied (see 
Meeks (op.cit), p. 133).
Having described the construction of the investment model for testing the second 
level hypothesis, it is as well to express the model used for testing the third level 
hypothesis relating to the independent effect of foreign control of corporate equity 
on investment behaviour. Thus:
It. = a+&iCAVt.+P2f>i - i i+&3PCi-i+&4DEPii '
+($sDti +&6EFBti +&nNCPti +&sFCt.
This model is similar to equation (3). except for the introduction of a variable FC 
which is the foreign ownership control defined in the preceding section.
4.3 Definition of variables and their a priori expectations from 
empirical implementation
I t is the gross fixed investment, as defined in section 8.3 above.
Oi is the constant term. It is expected to have a positive coefficient. This expectation
»
is based on the assumption that replacement investments take place on depreciation 
grounds. In addition it would reflect the lag effect of investment projects starts that 
take sometimes to complete. That is. new starts would overlap with old projects 
still running their course and for which additional expenditures are currently being 
made. As for the magnitude, the foreign controlled firms is expected to have a 
lower constant coefficient, due to the production interdependence explained earlier.
(CAV : This is the capacity accelerator or change in sales variable. It is defined
(s, —s t _2)
as CAVt = ------   . This definition falls between that used by Peterson and
(St-S,-!)
Benesh (1983) who defined the same variable as being equal to -------=--------  and
(S: - S t_ 3 )
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) who defined it a s  ~----------
\ - 3
This later definition suffers from the problem arising from the fact that the 
dependent variable is normalised by a. different variable (current sales) so that by 
multiplying through by sales, it induces a bias on the accelerator coefficient (see 
Dhrymes and Kurz op.cit P.484). Peterson and Benesh, avoided that problem by 
normalising all the variables by current sales value.
As regards to the more appropriate definition of the accelerator variable (variously 
defined in the preceding paragraph), it is important to refer to Eisner (1964). Eisner 
had earlier reiterated the need for an appropriate lag since one can not expect the 
firms to respond to an immediate change in sales due to delays (and such things as 
existence of excess capacity). Thus, rather than follow Peterson and Benesh with 
near automatic response, a two year change in sales is adopted as an estimate of 
accelerator variable. This seems appropriate in the era of rapid change when 
opportunities has to be taken or lost as fast as it comes. It would have been equally 
in order, to try  using three years change in sales but this would reduce the number 
of years of regression further without much additions to the explanatory value of 
the variable.
I
As for the a priori expectation, the coefficient of this variable is expected to have a 
positive sign in all firms since an increase in pressure on capacity would normally 
induce additional investment expenditures. However the magnitude of the variable 
is expected to be lower for foreign firms in comparison with that for locally 
controlled firms. This is based on the production interdependence already 
mentioned in this section where affiliate’s total sales may contain substantial 
quantity of intra-group supplies. Thus, increase in sales may not have as much 
effect on investment as would be expected from locally controlled firms. Evidence 
of high level of foreign content in some UK based car manufacturers clearly
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supports the interdependence hypothesis. General Motor’s use of UK content fell 
from 89 per cent in 1973 to only 26 per cent in 1983, Ford’s Car from 86 per cent 
to 43 per cent local content, Talbot’s Cars from 97 per cent to 37 per cent; while 
UK’s Austin Rover’s Cars local content fell from 100 per cent to 92 per cent over 
the same period (see Financial Times 18 January, 1985 p.6).
P t This is lagged post-tax profit and is defined as:
p  - c ^ o
where NPF and S, are as defined in the preceding section. This variable is expected 
to have a positive relationship with investment from two perspectives. First as a 
source of funds and second, as an incentive to invest. Similarly, prolonged loss 
making .would discourage investment. As for the magnitude of the coefficient of 
this variable it is not immediately obvious which set of firms would have a higher 
coefficient. However on the basis of Dunning (1958, 1966), Safarian (1969) and 
Brash (1965) where foreign controlled firms are found to be more profitable than 
the locally controlled firms in UK, Canada and Australia respectively, it is expected 
that the magnitude of this coefficient would be higher for foreign firms than for 
locally controlled firms. Where losses are being made, it is expected that the foreign
i
parent would more easily restructure or close down its subsidiary faster than the 
independent local firm would do. So either way the magnitude of the coefficient is 
expected to be higher for foreign controlled firms than the locally controlled 
independent firms.
(P Q -i)  : this is net fixed assets at the end of the preceding year. Net means, net 
of depreciation and amortisation allowances as well as disposal of fixed assets.
(.N T A \ _ j
Thus \PC \  — i  — -------  , where NTA is net tangible assets. This represents
the opening stock of fixed assets and the coefficient would reflect the size of 
replacement investments as well as the impact of lagged investment starts. It is
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expected to have a positive coefficient whose size would be larger for local 
independent firms who are expected to have larger stock of older assets than the 
relatively 'younger* foreign controlled subsidiaries.
(D ) t : This is the current dividend payments as defined already in the preceding 
section. Being a competing use of funds with investment, it is expected to have a 
negative coefficient in this equation. However, the sign and size of the coefficient 
may be influenced by the nature of information flows between the shareholders and 
the firm. Where as, in subsidiaries there is information symmetry one would expect 
that when funds are needed for investment (in the affiliate) the dividend outflows 
would be reduced depending on the size of investment and of course profit. But 
where in the locally controlled independent firms there is information asymmetry, 
dividends are more stable and so investments could proceed at the same time as 
dividends are paid due to existing stock of retained earnings. The coefficient would 
therefore be negative and ‘higher’ in foreign controlled firms than in locally 
controlled firms.
(NCP ) t : This is net additions (reductions) in investment in net working capital 
(net current assets) as defined in the preceding section (8.3). As a competing use of 
funds it is expected to have a negative coefficient in this equation. If a firm has large 
stock of capital tied in stocks of finished goods inventory it is hardly an incentive 
for an increase in investment in fixed assets. As for its magnitude, it is expected to 
be higher in foreign controlled affiliates where production interdependence would 
mean that more intra-group supplies of finished and semi-finished goods would 
result in lower fixed investment rate as compared to the locally controlled firms.
EFBt : This is the net additions (reductions) in external finance during the current 
period. As a source of funds, the ability of a firm to raise external funds without 
raising its costs to the point of jeopadizing its profitability influences the size of
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investment projects it can accept. Thus, this variable is expected to have a positive 
impact on investment. As between foreign and locally controlled firms, the 
difference in the size of the magnitudes of the coefficients is rather difficult to 
predict. However assuming a highly competitive and ‘politically stable’ host 
country,to avoid disclosure of information to third partes through the external 
suppliers of capital, the foreign parent may provide intra-group funds as far as 
possible to the affiliate leaving it to depend rather less on local loans relative to the 
locally controlled counterparts. Given this scenario, one would expect the 
coefficient of this variable to be lower for foreign firms than the local firms. If 
however the host market is not competitive in the sense of having large numbers of 
competing firms , and if the host country is ‘politically unstable’, it may be the case 
that foreign firms would use more local borrowing to match local projects, without 
much concern over competition. Under this scenario, it is not clear that the 
magnitude of this variable will be less for foreign controlled firms. As UK is a 
highly competitive host country and also politically stable , the former scenario is 
more applicable in the context of this study.
FC, as already defined, this is the foreign control dummy variable assigned a value 
of unity when a firm is foreign controlled t,o the extent of more than 50 per cent, 
while zero if otherwise. It is expected to have a negative coefficient for the reasons 
of production interdependence, international product-market allocation by the 
parent, and inertia imposed by the perception that ‘home is safe and foreign 
countries are risky’Csee chapter 2).
In sum. one supposes that gross investment is positively related to change in sales, 
profits, depreciation provisions, lagged capital stock, and external finance; while it 
would be negatively influenced by the competing uses for dividend payments and 
additions to net current assets (investment in inventories, debtors and liquid assets 
for precautionary purposes), as well as by the degree of foreign control of voting
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equity of the firm.
5. THE EXTERNAL FINANCE MODEL
The impression from the extensive literature review on corporate borrowing (see 
chapter 7), is that there is not yet a cohesive theory on this subject, as compared to 
dividend* and investment decisions. However, it has been possible to deduce two 
strands of thought:
F irst, the theory of optimal capital structure implies that for a firm to maximize its 
market value in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy (and agency costs), the corporate 
leverage must be such as to minimize these costs under competitive conditions. The 
implication of this is that external finance decision is an active one. Thus a firm 
m ust take advantage of tax subsidy available from borrowing for its normal 
business operations to the extent that minimizes the firm’s total cost of capital. 
Secondly, the firm’s market value has been argued as being dependent on the 
investment opportunities available to it, its investment plans and its future earnings 
expectations, none of which is determined by the way in which the firm is financed. 
From this view, external finance is a residual decision.
However, it can be argued that the way in which a firm is financed would determine
4
its cost-of capital (see Pogue (1971)). Since this in the main determines the 'cut-off’ 
rate for accepting investment projects, it would also (at least indirectly) influence 
the amount of investment opportunities the firm can really undertake. In the same 
crucible, it would influence the total amount of future earnings. There is of course 
a limit as to the firm’s ability to finance as much projects as it likes through 
external financing. This limitation arises because investors (lenders and 
shareholders) are risk averse since business uncertainty is such that the safety of 
their investments may not be always guaranteed. This fact brings investors’ risk 
factor into the external finance equation.
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Thus, in absence of a clear cut model of corporate borrowing, various researchers 
have approached the problem differently. However an overwhelming number of 
them appear to view the borrowing decision as a residual decision. The tendency is 
therefore to integrate the capital gearing requirement with the sources and uses of 
funds from the ‘budget equation’ and to add one or two risk proxies.
On the basis of the above views of corporate borrowing decision the external finance 
model for testing the second level hypothesis is expressed as follows:
EFBt. =  a+/3i Dt. + $ 3^1, +&4DEPti ^
+&5INGt. +/36CAGt . + 0 7NCPtl +vt.
where INGt. is the income gearing and GAGt is the capital gearing of firm i 
at time t  — 1. The rest of the variables are as already defined in the preceding two 
sections.
Similarly the external finance model used for testing the third level hypothesis 
relating to the influence of foreign control on the external finance behaviour of firms 
is expressed as follows :
EFBt. =  a+/31£>t|+/32/ ti+/33/ >((+/34£)£PI) . . .  (6)
+05INGt, +/3 6CACt _ 1( +H7NCPt;+HsFCti
Before setting out the more detailed definition of the variables and their a priori 
expectations from the empirical implementation of the models, it is convenient at 
this stage to describe the construction of the model.
The variables in equations (5) and (6) are justified on the basis of theoretical and 
empirical grounds as discussed in chapter 7. The dividend Dt , fixed investment I t 
and net current asset additions NGPt , represent the uses of funds. Profits Pt and 
depreciation provisions DEPt represent the internal sources of funds. All these 
variables enter the external finance model through the budget equation (see section
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8.4 above). The remaining two variables: income gearing and capital gearing are 
both included as risk proxies. INGt is included as a proxy for business risk 
reflecting the proportion of earnings before interest (but after tax) belonging' to the 
external suppliers of borrowed funds. The larger this proportion, the less willing 
the prospective lenders to invest in the firm even at low gearing levels. The capital 
gearing variable CAGt , is included to reflect the capital structure effect or the 
financial risk. It has its bearing from the theory of increasing risk (see Kalecki 
(1937)).
Apart from the theoretical justification for the inclusion of these variables, there are 
also empirical support in the literature. For example. Dt , I t , Pt . DEPt , and 
C A G t —i' have their bearings from the models of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), and 
Peterson and Benesh (1983) and others (see chapter 7). The income gearing replaces 
interest rates which are used by a host of other studies to reflect the premium for 
risk required by external lenders which should discourage borrowing as the rate 
increases. NGPt takes a bearing from McDonald et al (1975).
Since one does not believe that a firm borrows for borrowing sake, that is. firms do 
not have to borrow in the current period simply because they borrowed in the 
preceding year, lagged additions to external finance ‘stock’ does not form part of 
this model. This simply reflects the view that external borrowing is a residual 
decision.
In constructing this model, one has to relate to other empirical models. Some 
apparently applicable variables used by these models happen to be ignored for the 
purpose of the models expressed in this section. These variables and reasons for 
ignoring them are set out as follows:
F irstly , the use by Peterson and Benesh(1983) of a variable representing the 
standard deviation of operating earnings over the preceding ten years is ignored for
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two reasons: the first reason is lack of data: the second is that two other variables 
reflecting business and financial risks seem enough to measure the risk factor. Thus 
the addition of a third risk proxy appears to be superfluous. McCabe (1979) applied 
such a risk variable instead of income gearing but it failed to be significant for the 
entire eight years of cross-section regressions. Its exclusion from our model 
therefore, serves as a useful simplification .
Secondly, the introduction of acquisition expenditure as a variable separate from 
fixed asset investment by Kumar (1984) is ignored for the reasons explained in the 
preceding section : It is highly discontinuous; the usually packaged deals in 
acquisition schemes is likely to reduce the proportion of acquisition settlements paid 
for in cash and would therefore not lead to substantial increase in external 
borrowing.
Third, the use of cash flow profit as a variable, instead of profit and depreciation 
separately, as done by McCabe (op.cit) is ignored. Dhrymes and Kurz (op.cit) show 
that while depreciation has the desired sign consistently, the profit variable is not 
stable and displays a cyclical pattern: tending to be positive when economic activity 
slows down and negative during up swings or peak years. This led them to assert 
that to use the sum of depreciation and profits as a variable would be a statistically 
an unsound procedure (op.cit.p.46l).
Fourth , the introduction of industry dummy variables by Dhrymes and Kurz and 
McCabe is ignored. This variable is shown to have no separate significant effect on 
external finance behaviour by Dhrymes and Kurz. The non inclusion of this 
dummy is a useful simplification and is not expected to have any detrimental effect 
on the result of our comparative analyses based on a matching sample of firms (see 
chapter 9, below).
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5.1 Definition of variables and their a priori expectations
EFBt is the external finance from borrowing as already defined except that it is the 
dependent variable in equations(5) and (6).
Oi, this is the constant term. In this equation it is expected to be positive. This 
expectation is based on the usual financial prudence of utilizing a firms debt 
capacity and the tendency of firms not to utilise zero debt in their capital structure 
(see chapter 7). As for the magnitude of its coefficient it is difficult to predict 
between foreign and local firms. However, if the tendency for subsidiaries is to use 
borrowings on current account, the coefficient of this term is likely to be lower in 
affiliates than in the independent local firms who are able to use relatively more 
long-term borrowing. This would result from the effect of sales and other receipts 
deposits on the balance of borrowings in the current account.
D t : This is the dividend payments as defined in section 8.3 above. Being a use of 
funds it should have a positive influence on external finance from borrowing. 
However for the reasons already given in section 8.4 regarding the effect of 
information asym m etry  in locally controlled independent firms whose shares are 
widely held, and information sym m etry  between affiliates and the fbreign parents,
i
this variable would have the sign of external finance in the dividend equation for 
each set of the firms in this research sample.
l t : This is gross fixed investment as defined in section 8.3. It is a use of funds and 
should have a positive influence on external finance. If foreign firms' investment 
have to match foreign liabilities, it is expected that this variable will have a 
positively higher coefficient than locally controlled firms.
Pt , is a profit variable. Profit being a source of internal funds, it should have a 
negative relationship with external finance in the world of uncertainty.
- 193 -
If, as it is already noted earlier, foreign firms borrow more on the 'current account’ 
then increase in profits receipts would lead to lower borrowing balance. Other than 
the nature of external borrowing of foreign firms, profit would have less effect 
since according to the table in appendix A8.2, foreign firms appear to borrow more 
than the locally controlled firms.
DEPt : Similar to Pt . depreciation variable is a source of funds and is expected to 
negatively influence demand for external finance. As already pointed out in the 
preceding section, foreign firms tend to write down their foreign base assets faster 
than locally controlled firms. This is perhaps due to the perception that foreign 
base assets are more risky than home base assets, (see appendix A8.1).
INGt : This is the interest gearing or more technically the income gearing for the 
current period. This is defined as the proportion of current profit before interest 
accounted for by net interest payments. It reflects the vulnerability of company’s 
profits to sharp swings in interest rates irrespective of the level of the nominal rate 
of interest. This is the proxy for business risk. Thus:
INPt
1 ”  INPt +NPFt . .
Where ( / NP  )t is interest payments in the current year and (JSfPF ) t is the net 
profit after tax. This may not be the best available measure of business risk but in 
the circumstances this is the most appropriate. For example, it would have been 
equally appropriate to use the capital asset pricing model to calculate the risk for 
each firm (the beta coefficient): but in most cases where the foreign subsidiaries are 
not quoted in the host country’s stock exchange, it is almost impossible to obtain an 
objective estimate of their respective ‘betas’. This is because their values are very 
much linked to those of their parent companies based abroad. Similarly, the use of 
interest rate calculated by dividing interest charges by the balance of long term loan
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at the end of the current year is not appropriate for the reason of the nature of 
affiliates borrowing already discussed (see 8.3 above). The fluctuations in the 
'current accounts borrowing’ results sometimes in very large interest rates and in 
some cases where the borrowing is zero it gives a rate of ‘infinity’.
If the income gearing is observed to be high the closing borrowing balance is 
■»
expected to be reduced on the basis of financial management prudence.
The negative coefficient for this variable is expected to be h igher in local firms than 
in foreign controlled firms. The explanation of this expectation is that
a) to the extent that subsidiaries sometimes borrow for the rest of the group if the 
host country rate of interest is favourable, the fact of high interest charge may not 
have the desired discouraging effect on borrowing;
b) to the extent that subsidiary’s loans are mainly or at least substantially made up 
of parent’s loans used for the purpose of earnings transfers via interest charges, the 
fact of high income gearing may not have the desired discouraging effect on 
borrowing. However, where much of the affiliate’s loans are on current account it 
may be more able to switch out when interest charge rises (or the underlying profit 
declines). Similarly where local firms borrow long term a t variable.rates.they may 
incur large income gearing and yet unable to switch off due to contractual terms 
(see the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September, 1984 especially Page 372). 
The local firm’s borrowing may as a result be less responsive to interest gearing than 
foreign controlled firms.
CAGt —i'. This is the capital gearing or financial risk proxy. It is defined thus:
T B F t -1  
, - 1 “  {TB F l _ 1+EQ Tt _ 1} ,
Where (jTBF  ) t _  j is lagged book value of total borrowing as defined in section 8.3 
above. (EQ T  ) t _ i  is the lagged value of equity of the firm. The use of total
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borrowing in calculating the capital gearing is in recognition of the fact that new 
financial arrangements result in loans which would otherwise be classified as long 
term being in the category of short term loans. Examples are revolving loan 
arrangements, Bank loans and overdrafts which more or less form a permanent 
feature of most balance sheets. Indeed Bitros (1981) seem to acknowledge this view 
when he asserted that firms use short term loans for financing fixed assets. Where 
subsidiaries are concerned, parents loans are often for legal reasons classified as 
short term loans and credits, even though they may be used for a period longer than 
a short term (ie. 12 months).
Capital gearing is expected to have a negative coefficient. This expectation is based 
on Kalecki's (1937) theory of increasing risk discussed in chapter 7. It also reflects 
the modem theory which suggest that under uncertainty, the value of the firm is 
strongly dependent on its financial gearing. Thus assuming that management has to 
satisfy the shareholders, it has to anticipate their preferred gearing. They can do 
this by using their recent experience as a guide. The foreign controlled firms would 
have a larger negative coefficient since they are constrained by the 'thin equity 
provisions’ of the Inland Revenue (which restricts the proportion of foreign 
subsidiary capital financed from external borrowing in the host country). Secondly, 
given other sources of finance within the group, the fact that excessive external 
borrowing would mean large interest outflows from the group, would dampen the 
need for large external borrowing.
NCPt : This is net additions (reductions) to net investment in working capital. 
Being a use (source) of funds, it is expected to have a positive relationship with net 
borrowing. The coefficient is expected to be higher for foreign controlled firms than 
locally controlled independent firms. This expectation is based on two main 
reasons:
1. Production interdependence which would mean that intra-group supplies could
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require some short term loans to acquire; or credit for such supplies being recorded 
as intra-group loans and credits;
2. Financial interdependence may result in borrowings being obtained by the 
affiliate for the use of the rest of the group, and such on-lending to the rest of the 
group recorded as a current asset in sundry debtors.
FC : The foreign control dummy variable as defined in section 8.3 above. Due to 
restrictions on borrowing, the concern to minimize information exposure in the host 
country, the need to reduce outflows of interests from the group and the smaller 
rate of fixed investment growth due to production interdependence, this variable is 
expected to have a negative sign in the external finance equation. This would also be 
influenced by the nature of affiliates loans (on current account) with tendency to 
fluctuate as earnings receipts are banked. There may be fluctuations from year to 
year to changes in interest rates which may result in the affiliate borrowing for the 
group. In such a case the coefficient of this variable may turn out to be positive. In 
the long term, however, the coefficient of the foreign control variable would be 
negative in the external finance equation.
6. CHAPTER SUMMARY
«
In this .chapter, the main hypotheses for the empirical study are clarified. The main 
hypothesis is rather a summary hypothesis and aims to establish that in a universe 
of large industrial corporations, foreign and locally controlled firms would differ in 
terms of their dividend, investment and external finance decisions.
The second level hypotheses aim to establish that other things being equal, the 
dividend, investment and external finance behaviours of foreign controlled firms 
would differ from those of locally controlled firms, in terms of the relative 
influences of the common factors in each of these three aspects of corporate financial 
decisions.
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TABLE 8A APRIORI EXPECTATIONS (PREDICTED SIGNS AND
DIRECTION OF DIFFERENCES)
EQUATIONS DIVIDEND INVESTMENT EXTERNAL
FINANCE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES F L F L F L
Constant term cC + > + < + + <  + +
Dividend payments (D^ ) n.a n.a. -  > - + > +
Lagged dividends <+ + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fixed investments Clt > -  > - n.a. n.a. < + +
External finance CEFB)^ + - + > + n.a. n.a.
Post-tax profits (P )^ + > + n.a. n.a. “ > -
Lagged post-tax profits n.a. n.a. + > + n.a. n.a.
Investment net current assets  
(NCP)t - > - - > - + > +
Capacity accelerator (CAV)^ n.a n.a. < + n.a. n.a.
Depreciation allowances (DEP)^ n.a. n.a. + > + - > -
Lagged capital stock CPC) n.a. n.a. o + n.a. n.a.
Income gearing (ING)t n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. < -
Lagged capital gearing CCAG)^^ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - > -
Foreign control dummy (FC) + - - -
+>  Positively greater in foreign than in local counterparts
n.a. = variable not in the equation
>  o r <  indicate that the relative weight of the independent variable is 
greater or less in foreign controlled firms than the locally  
controlled counterpart.
+ or -  indicate the arithmetic sign of the coeff ic ients  of the independent 
variable.
-  >  means the coeff icient is  negatively greater in foreign than the 
local counterparts.
F = Foreign Firms
L = Local Firms
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The third level hypotheses aim to establish that in the long run, other things being 
equal, the dividend, investment and external finance decisions of a firm would be 
independently influenced by the degree of foreign ownership control of its voting 
equity capital.
The models for testing these hypotheses are developed based on theoretical and 
empirical foundations.
Current dividend is hypothesised to depend on lagged dividend, current net profits 
after taxes, fixed investment expenditures, net new addition to stock of external 
borrowing, net additions,to net working capital or current assets.
Gross fixed investment expenditure is hypothesised to depend cn change in sales, 
lagged net earnings, lagged capital stock, current depreciation allowances, current 
dividend payment, external borrowing, and net investment expenditure on net 
current asset.
External finance is hypothesised to depend on current dividend distributions, fixed 
investment expenditures, net profits, depreciation allowances, income gearing, 
capital gearing and net addition to net current asset investments.
The above three models are used to test the second level hypotheses. To test the 
third level hypothesis the foreign control dummy variable is introduced into the 
above models as an explanatory factor.
The a priori expectations as to the signs and the relative magnitude of the 
coefficients of the independent variables are summarised in Table 8A above.
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CHAPTER 9 
THE EM PIRICAL METHODOLOGY
1. THE CONTEXT
This chapter describes: the pertinent attributes of the model host and home 
*
countries: the sampling criteria: sources of data and sample structure: industry 
breakdown of the sample: nature of data and data organisation: statistical issues - 
the normalisation scheme: hypotheses validation procedures - selection of techniques 
and their justification.
2. THE CHOICE OF MODEL HOST COUNTRY
In the first chapter of this thesis, there are clear indications that the legislations, 
codes, or decrees on mandatory local equity participation in locally based firms are 
more prevalent in the less technologically advanced nations - mainly non- OECD 
market economies otherwise referred to commonly as Less Developed countries 
(LDCs). It would therefore have been in order, to center this research on a 
developing host country as a means of verifying the economic rationale behind these 
legislations. However, certain factors justify the choice of one of the oldest 
advanced nations - UK - as th e  model host country for this study:
1. The availability of statistical data (although not easy to obtain), particularly for 
foreign controlled affiliates.
2. The researchers acquaintance with UK than any other country outside his 
country of origin (which falls within the category of a developing country without 
the necessary data plus other limitations).
3.UK is both an experienced host country as well as one of the first home countries 
of foreign direct investing companies. The country’s stock of outward direct 
investment is almost as high as the stock of inward direct investment (see Stopford
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(1979, P.9)). Being a signatory to the OECD’s National Treatment Declaration, 
foreign direct investors would 'feel at home' in UK. This balanced experience as 
home and host country is an essential attribute of a model host country.
4. UK has effectively no legislations, including labour Laws, specifically aimed at 
discriminating against firms purely on the basis of the domicile of majority 
shareholders. A foreign controlled affiliate would enjoy the same incentives offered 
to firms in general. There is no restriction as to the amount of dividend transfers to 
the parent company abroad. Any restriction to distributable earnings apply to all 
firms. The 'thin equity provision’ in the Tax Law is merely an anti-tax avoidance 
provision to avoid excessive use of intra-group debt relative to equity as a means of 
enjoying tax subsidy in interest payments. This 'open* policy makes it possible to 
compare the financial behaviour of foreign versus locally controlled firms.
5. UK is a politically stable country. Political instability is one of the major 
factors that adversely influence the flow of direct investments into host countries 
(Levis (1979). This would also influence the nature of operations and commitment 
in the host country by MNCs with alternative locations. If the study were to be 
based on a politically unstable host country, it may be difficult to disentangle the 
influences of such discontinuities from that attributable purely to the effect of
l
domicile of dominant equity, under normal conditions. In effect, the result from 
such a study can only relate to corporate behaviour during ab~normal conditions, 
and therefore lacking in wider generalisations.
6. UK is a ‘homogeneous economy’. For example in the area of fiscal legislation the 
law is applicable to all areas. Unlike in the U.S.A. where there are different state 
economies with different tax laws. Some states require state taxes charged to 
corporations to be based on proportionate share of a state-base firm’s income to the 
nationwide and world wide group income (the concept of Unitary-taxation). Thus 
the decisions in firms may differ depending on which state they operate in. UK has
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none of these problems.
7. UK has a competitive market so that firms are subjected to similar market 
discipline thus making it appropriate to compare the foreign controlled and locally 
controlled independent firms on the framework of rational expectations.
The implication of positioning this investigation on a model host country is that the 
results would be more balanced and thus form the model or the point of reference 
for future studies of this kind in other host countries.
3. THE CHOICE OF MODEL HOME COUNTRY
It would have been better to investigate the financial behaviour of a mixture of all 
foreign controlled firms operating in the model host country. The ground would 
have been that, it would give a total view. However, one country is selected as the 
model home country for the following reasons:
F irst, it is the intention of the researcher to create a situation closer to the ceteris 
paribus condition. This condition can not be created if firms from all nationalities 
are mixed together in one sample. Although it would be nearly impossible in 
practice to make ‘o ther things* exactly equal, it would help if firms from one home 
are used in this study than otherwise. Other researchers suggest that cultural
l
differences influence the behaviour of firms from different home countries (see for 
example Negandhi (1966) and Stevens (1971)). In addition, Stobaugh (1977) has 
pointed out that a firm’s activities in the home country (U.S.). can affect its 
competitive position in other countries. A mix of firms from different home 
countries may blur the picture from this type of study and so it is preferable to 
select firms from one home base.
Secondly, there are home-country-policy induced corporate behaviour which would 
affect the comparison between a m ix ture  o f foreign and local firms. Such home 
country policies include fiscal policy differences in the areas of domestic and foreign
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taxation, procedures for income assessment for tax purposes and the terms of 
bilateral treaties between the various home countries and the model host country. 
The U.S. balance of payments programme of 1965-1969 (discussed in chapter 1) and 
the United Kingdom’s exchange control regulations prior to 1979 regarding 
remittance of foreign source income, are examples of home governments attempts to 
influence'corporate financial behaviour in the host countries.
T hird ly , some home countries are yet relatively in their early years as home 
countries and their governments actively encourage foreign direct investment of 
their firms. In Japan for example, international pressures on the government to 
reduce their export quotas of certain goods (or to open their markets to foreign 
imports) compel that country to encourage outward flows of direct investments 
particularly to the industrialised western countries (see for example. Roemer (1976, 
P.91)).
From the above three points, it can be seen that for this type of investigation it is 
more appropriate if foreign controlled firms from the same home country are 
compared with those owned and controlled by the indigenous shareholders of the 
model host country.
Having made the above point it is important to provide the reasons, why U.S.A is 
selected as the model home country for this study:
F irst, U.S.A. is the single largest foreign direct investor in the UK economy and her 
private direct investments cover most industrial sectors. Over the decades, U.S. 
manufacturing affiliates’ book values have for each year exceeded 60 per cent of the 
UK’s total direct manufacturing investment from overseas. The U.S. participation 
in non-manufacturing sector has similarly been substantial although after the UK's 
entry into the EEC in 1973, the size of U.S. non-manufacturing dropped. Even so, 
she still remains the single most important single inward investing country (Table
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9A below illustrates the point).
Of all the countries within the EEC, UK receives about 41 per cent of all U.S. direct
investment while the second largest recepient is the Federal Republic of Germany
receiving 19.3 per cent (see Financial Times survey (January 8, 1986, P .l), and
British Business (February 22, 1981)). Similarly, UK is the foremost direct 
♦
investor in the U.S. economy (see Buckley (1981, PP.172-173)). Thus, the U.S. 
being the dominant home country for foreign firms operating directly in UK, it is 
plausible that relatively new comers from other countries would learn from them 
and so the measured behaviour would reflect the long term expectation from all 
foreign firms.
Table 9A
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN U K *
Year Mnfg(%) non-mfg(%) All(excl oil)% World
1965 68.0 56.0 65.8 100
1968 68.5 58.3 66.8 100
1971 66.9 50.3 64.1 100
1974 65.7 29.8 55.8 100
1978 65.5 37.1 58.3 100
1981 66.9 29.3 56.3 100
* as a proportion of total inwaTd direct investment in UK 
Source: UK Business Monitor MA4 (1981) Supplement PP.41-43
Not only is the book value of the US net assets larger than that of any other home 
country, the annual inflows continues to exceed that of any other single country, as 
table 9B shows.
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Table 9B









Source: UK Business Monitor MA4 (1980), PP.54-55
Second, between U.S.A'. and UK, there is that ‘air of friendship’ and cultural 
similarity which would diminish any chances of either governments introducing 
policies ‘deliberately targeted to harm the other politically or economically (see 
Hodges (1977, P.194)). The implication is that the U.S. controlled affiliates would 
‘feel at home’ in UK.
T hird , on technical grounds, U.S. accounting conventions are similar to that of UK. 
Thus, accounting data have the same meaning and this makes it possible to use the 
accounting data without adjustments for differences that would otherwise need to 
be done if accounting data of firms from other home countries are used. The
t
adjustments would have been necessary due to differences in accounting policies 
fundamental to the recording of the accounting data in the financial and operating 
statements from where the empirical data are extracted.
Fourth , the U.S. Corporate tax rate and the ‘overall limitation assessment 
procedure’ on foreign source income tax, means that there is no disincentive for U.S. 
firms in UK to remit as much income as they wish. This is in addition to the 
comprehensive double tax treaty between the two countries relating to withholding 
tax on interest payments, royalty and other fees as well as on dividend remittances. 
The effect of these treaties between UK and US is to make such intra-group
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transfers virtually tax free and perhaps encourage the use of such channels rather 
than the less transparent transfer prices channel. In any case, the U.S. controlled 
firm in UK is free to decide how to allocate its financial resources without much tax 
disadvantages on rem ittance to U.S.A. (see Deloitte et al (1983), PP.239-241).
From the above four points it is clear that U.S. (at least at the present time) is the
f
‘closest’ major home country to UK. If a systematic difference is found in the 
financial behaviour of UK-based U.S. controlled affiliates relative to UK owned 
independent firms, then, one would have empirical grounds to generalise that a 
systematic difference exists between foreign controlled affiliates and locally 
controlled firms in general.
4. THE SAMPLING CRITERIA
The nature of this investigation imposes strict criteria for the sample selection.
Since the focus of this study centers on finding out the reflection of foreign control,
over and above other factors, on the financial behaviour of firms, ‘a lot' of variables
need to be similar between the two sets of firms (foreign and local firms) except for
the domicile of the majority shareholders. This point is indeed taken into
consideration in the selection of the model host and home countries (as discussed in
%
the preceding two sections). Similarly, the following criteria happen to be imposed, 
and met in selecting the firms in the research sample:
1. The firms must be registered and be operating mainly in the United Kingdom and 
must be substantially owned by the private sector. Thus state owned and 
controlled firms are virtually absent in the sample. The choice of private sector 
firms only, is due to suggestions that state owned firms are not necessarily in 
business solely for financial gains, but in most cases operate to satisfy a ‘social’ 
objective (see for example, Mazolini (1979), Walters and Monsen (1979), and 
Rugman (1983, P. 12)).
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2. The foreign firms must be directly owned and controlled by U.S. domiciled 
MNCs. This results from the choice of model home country discussed in the 
preceding section (9.3 above). The choice of foreign firms from US only has the 
additional advantage of minimizing possible differences in the principles underlying 
the recording of the accounting data relative to those of the UK controlled firms 
used in 'th is study, thus contributing towards the satisfaction of one of the 
stochastic assumptions underlying the use of ordinary least squares method. This 
assumption requires that the explanatory variables are measured without error (see 
Koutsoyiannis (1984, p.57)).
3. The firms must all be of age. This means that no firm in the sample is under five 
years old from its first year of establishment in the UK to the lower ‘cut-off’ year 
for this'research (that is, 1972). The five years age mark, is an arbitrarily chosen 
figure, but is hoped to be adequate since the aim is to avoid the possible impact of 
'teething’ problems on the financial behaviour of firms. The age criteria is also 
necessitated by the need to introduce some lagged independent variables in the 
respective empirical models (see chapter 8 above).
4. The number of foreign and locally controlled firms in each industry selected 
must be identical so as to minimize as much as possible the likely impact of
l
differing industry activities on the over all financial behaviour of the two sets of 
firms.
5. The size of the foreign and locally controlled firms, in terms of their capital 
employed must be identical, to minimize any possible size effect on their respective 
financial behaviours (see section 9.5 below, and Appendix A9.1)
6. The data available for each firm must cover a continuous period long enough to 
incorporate business cycles (alternation of booms and depressed periods) in the 
economy of the host country. This is considered important to give a balanced view 
regarding the structural performance of the models on periodic (annual) basis.
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Models applied to cross-section data covering only the boom periods or only the 
decline periods, would yield an incomplete picture when interpreted in isolation of 
structural considerations in the economy. The cross-section data available to the 
researcher from 1972 to 1980 satisfy this requirement.
7. The degree of multinationality of the foreign base parent companies may 
possibly affect their circumstances in terms of alternative investments and income 
opportunities else where in the world, other than in UK base affiliates. While one 
would wish that the parent firms do have equal activity spreads, it is impossible to 
achieve such a perfect situation. One accepts this unavoidable limitation. However, 
there are ameliorating considerations. F irst, to the extent that the respective parent 
companies operate to satisfy the utility of the ultimate shareholders, the differences 
in the 'relative utilities of the home base shareholders among one another, 
correspond to the relative differences of the utilities of indigenous shareholders 
among each other in the host country. Second, to the extent that oligopoly 
hypothesis of Hymer (1960) has not been disproved, and as the follow the leader 
argument of Kindleberger (1963) still stands, it is plausible that competing parent 
companies in the same home country and industry would act (or are free to act) to 
eliminate (or minimize) any competitive disadvantages confronting them in their 
main product-markets (see also Calvet (1981)). If so, it is not apparent that the 
relative differences in the degree of multinationality of the foreign base parent 
companies of host base affiliates are large enough to adversely affect the empirical 
results of this investigation.
5. SIZE AS A MAJOR SAMPLING CRITERION
A critic may ask how a meaningful comparison can be made between a foreign 
controlled chemical and pharmaceutical subsidiary operating in UK with (say) a UK 
controlled chemical and pharmaceutical firm such as ICI w ith geographically and
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industrially diversified interests. This is an important question. However, this 
concern is dealt with adequately through the size criterion used for selecting the 
firms as will be described below.
Before one goes on to discuss the importance of size, it is as well to point out that 
the concern may be misplaced in the context of this study. There is no legal 
discrimination limiting the extent a foreign controlled firm is allowed to grow in the 
industries selected for this study. So, it is entirely open to the foreign affiliates to 
choose their speed and the extent they are prepared to grow, be it geographically, 
vertically, horizontally and laterally or to diversify. To the extent that monopolies 
and mergers legislations apply, they do so equally to foreign and locally controlled 
firms. This fact and the use of age criterion mentioned in the preceding section 
dispel any reservations about a meaningful comparison between the financial 
behaviours of foreign controlled versus locally controlled independent firms.
Coming back to the size criterion, it is considered reasonable to expect that 
providing the two sets of firms operate in identical major industrial activities and 
are within identical size bands, one would have dealt adequately with the critic’s 
concern about the re la tive  strengths of the foreign versus local independent firms. 
Leaving industry criterion aside, there are research evidence showing that there are 
close relationships between size and a firm’s performance. In this context 
performance is measured in terms of growth, profitability and the extent of 
overseas operations. Buckley et al (1978) investigated the relationship between:
1) size of a firm and its rate of growth: where size is defined in terms of sales, and 
growth is defined in terms of change in sales over a preceding year:
2. the relationship of size of the firm and its profitability: where profitability is 
defined as net income after taxes divided by the net book value of capital stock: and
3. the relationship between growth of a firm and the degree of multinationality: 
where multinationality is defined in terms of a proportion of sales originating from
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overseas based affiliates to the firm’s world wide sales. Their sample comprise 
mainly the largest American and European (including UK based) independent 
firms. From their regression analyses, they found that there is a high relationship 
between size and growth, though non linear. Again there is a relationship between 
size and profitability, though not as high as in the case of growth and size. A strong 
relationship was found between growth and degree of multinationality. One could 
then deduce that there would be a high degree of relationship between degree of 
multinationality and size. Put another way, most large firms are those that are 
geographically wide spread internationally.
Kumar (1984) replicated the above study using 672 UK-based industrial firms 
covering the period 1968-1976. Using similar formulations and reasonings as in 
Buckley et al (1978) and Rowthom (1971), he found from his regressions that, 
among other things, size is related to overseas operations. Part of the explanations 
are that, large fixed costs and thus higher risks as well as much experience are 
involved in searching for and obtaining information, and successfully setting up 
foreign operations. Such costs can be borne mainly by the large firms. Kumar goes 
on to suggest that as the degree of overseas activity increases, problems of 
managerial co-ordination increases so that the relationship between size and overseas 
diversification may be non linear.
All in all, the above findings including those of Penrose (1959), Bates and 
Henderson (1967), Smyth et al (1975), Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975), Samuels 
and Chesher (1972) and Meeks and Whittington (1975, 1976), suggest that there are 
differences between the behaviour of firms depending on their sizes. The implication 
is that one can meaningfully compare foreign and locally controlled firms operating 
in identical industries if they are of similar sizes. Indeed, Rowthom (1971) 
concludes from his study that the large firms tend to have more uniform growth 
rates than small firms but that their average growth rates seem to be much the
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same. He goes on to suggest that, there are proportionately fewer slow-growers 
among the large firms; but equally there are proportionately fewer fast-growers and 
much the same is true of profitability. Large firms do not seem to enjoy higher 
profit rates than small firms but their profits do, however, seem to be less variable 
(P.2).
One other important aspect of size which makes it important for this study’s sample 
selection is put as follows; large independent UK firms are exposed to the financial 
press and their ownership structures comprise increasingly of 'active’ shareholders 
such as insurance companies, finance houses, unit trusts, investment trusts, pension 
funds, banks and other commercial and industrial companies. These active 
shareholders are aware of much information about their firms to enable them exert 
influence on policy through their appointed representatives. This would put the 
local management in a similar position as those in foreign controlled affiliates where 
the majority shareholder(s) being active investors are aware of much details and 
therefore able to influence policy1.
Finally, by selecting firms in identical size bands, one is attempting to make sure 
that the firms are of similar competitive strengths in their respective main line 
industrial activities and thus exposed to similar types of technology of production. 
In addition while they all operate mainly from UK, all the selected firms are 
exposed to similar political, fiscal, economic and market conditions.
6. DATA COLLECTION I: SOURCES AND SAMPLE STRUCTURE
Various sources were consulted. Although there were difficulties in obtaining 
disaggregated data for locally controlled firms, it was when it came to obtaining
1. Although in the case of the later it is more direct while in the former the influence is indirect, the 
legitimate right of control of policy is howeveT, the same for both sets of shareholders.
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sufficiently disaggregated data on the foreign controlled subsidiaries that the 
difficulty was so severe as to nearly result in the abandonment of this study. Firms 
are often heard about, but information about who actually controls the majority of 
the voting shares and thus the domicile of the authority of capital control is not 
always easily obtainable, A UK registered firm is not necessarily a UK owned and 
controlled firm. The bulk of published sources of financial data do not contain 
disaggregated financial statistics of unquoted foreign controlled subsidiaries.
The failure to obtain statistical data from the parent companies (of foreign 
subsidiaries) using questionnaire, as described in chapter 4, discouraged any attempt 
to approach subsidiaries directly for detailed financial statistics on their activities. 
Because the financial statements of foreign controlled (unquoted) subsidiaries are 
not generally published, secondary sources were not widely available. However, it 
was possible to search some private data bases.
The first such sources one consulted is the Cambridge University data base. This 
data base stores financial data of some UK registered firms on a disaggregated basis. 
It has company control codes (K19) indicating whether a firm is an independent 
company, a UK controlled subsidiary, a U.S. controlled subsidiary, subsidiary of 
other overseas company and jointly owned company. The major data source for the 
Cambridge University data base is the Business Statistical Office (BSO) of the UK's 
Department of Trade and Industry. The BSO's data entry comes from a confidential 
v o lun tary  annual inquiry conducted by the Government statistical service. 
Because this is a voluntary exercise, the foreign firms filling their data on a 
continuous basis happen to be small. This results in a disjointed data with some 
years missing here and there, and at any rate some data were only available only up 
to 1977 and updates are not thus regular. Some data points were missing for earlier 
periods but entered into the data base later. Due to these problems one became 
compelled to abandon this source after several months of effort and delays.
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However, it was possible to pick some names of foreign controlled firms while the 
search for the data turned to another source.
The second source consulted is Companies Registration Office (CRO) in London and 
Cardiff. The UK registered firms are under the companies Acts 1948 to 1985 
required to file their annual financial statements at the CRO. Searching companies
V
records is an expensive business, in terms of money cost as well as time consumed 
in the processes. To search a company’s record one needs to know the names of a 
firm and its CRO number. Apart from a few names picked up from the Cambridge 
data base, some other sources of names of U.S. controlled subsidiaries in UK are, 
Dunning’s (1958) list of U.S. firms in his own sample, Channon’s (1973) list. Who 
Owns Whom United Kingdom and Ireland, Key British Enterprises, Kompass 
Register of British Industry and commerce, world Directory of multinationals and 
Times 1000 leading companies in Britain and overseas. More than 100 names were 
collected.
The names collected were used for the companies House Search. Here much 
problems were encountered: Many of the firms from Dunning’s (1958) list have 
either changed their names, merged with other firms or liquidated. Some of the 
names from other sources are of firms relatively young in UK and therefore not 
used since they fail to satisfy one of our acceptance criteria (see section 4 above). 
For firms that have some accounting data, the nature of presentation was so lumpy 
that the details required were simply not available. Some firms’ micro fiches were 
so faint or blurred that they were difficult to read, thus requiring the hard copy 
files to be obtained from Cardiff Office - a time consuming affair. In some cases the 
files for the foreign controlled firms were not available on the micro fiche; the 
reason being due to the liberalisation of the filling requirements for private owned 
and controlled firms since 1982. Where some were available the details were scanty 
and for short periods (say) of three years. Putting together the problems of lack of
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details, short length of period of data available, lack of some firms' data on the 
micro fiche, the financial costs and immense delays involved in transferring hard 
copy files from Cardiff to London and time consumed in searching each firm, the 
Companies House search was abandoned as the  m ain source of the accounting data. 
However it has been useful for filling up missing values in what finally became the 
m ain source of data for both foreign and locally controlled firms - the EXSTAT 
Statistical Services Limited data base. This data base is now stored in the South 
Western Universities Regional Computer Centre (SWURC) at the University of 
Bath, England.
While the EXSTAT data base indicates which company is a subsidiary and which is 
an independent company as well as country  o f reg istration , it neither shows who 
the majority shareholders are nor the domicile of the parent companies. This later 
information is highly essential.
To get a current list of the names of foreign controlled firms operating in UK, a 
personal request was made to the BSO (at Newport, England) who in confidence 
supplied the list of the U.S. controlled firms in their files, together with hard copies 
of accounting data for the firms from 1977 to 1980. With this list, it was possible 
to identify the U.S. controlled subsidiaries 'from the EXSTAT data base. All the 
selected foreign firms must have a subsidiary company marker *Y' and country of 
registration must be either England and Wales, ‘EX' or Scotland, ‘EY' for the period 
covered by this study. Other U.S. firms’ names were obtained from the sources 
mentioned earlier and cross-checked by official search at the companies House in 
London.
Having identified the U.S. controlled firms (hereafter called simply, foreign firms), 
in the EXSTAT data base, the next step was to generate from the data base, a lis t of 
these firms so as to identify their data coverage in terms of years in which
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continuous accounting data were recorded for each firm. This exercise is essential 
for the interpretation of the results regarding the impact of changes in the economic 
environment and to avoid distortions that may result purely by introducing or 
removing different firms during each period of regression analyses.
From the list, some trade-offs had to be made in choosing between the following 
samples:
1. a sample covering a large num ber of firms but with only a short period of 
years of data: and
2. a sample covering a relatively sm aller num ber of firms but have data for a 
longer period of years.
Table 9C below shows the opening and terminal years up to 1983 for the data 
coverage and the sample of foreign firms identified in the EXSTAT data base. It can 
be seen that as years progress, from 1980 to 1983, the numbers of foreign firms 
having the required data becomes fewer. For example, 39 foreign firms have 
continuous data from 1971 to 1980. Similarly the table shows that 36 foreign firms 
have data from 1971 to 1981, 32 firms with data from 1971 to 1982 and 21 from 
1971 to 1983. -
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Table 9C
Identified U.S. firms data covered in EXSTAT data base
Terminal year and number of firms with continuous data from opening year
Opening year 1980 1981 1982
■ - " ■ - r ■ ..... ......—■ — ——  ■
1983
1971 39 36 32 21
1972 41 38 35 22
1973 42 39 36 24
1974 43 40 37 24
1975 46 43 40 25
1976 65 6 1 58 38
1977 70 66 63 41
1978 71 67 64 42
1979 72 68 66 43
Similarly, 41 foreign firms have continuous data from 1972 to 1980, 38 from 1972 
to 1981, 35 rom 1972 to 1982 and 22 from 1972 to 1983; and so on. Therefore, as 
one moves from 1979 backwards the number of periods of regression increases and 
reaches maximum from 1971. For example, allowing for lagged values, from 1979 
to 1983 only three periods cross-section regression is possible with 43 firms; 1979 to 
1982, 2 periods; 1979 to  1981, 1 period on 66 and 68 firm s respectively. If the 
opening year is 1978, then the number of years of regression between 1978 to 1983 
is 4 with data on 42 firms; 1978 to 1982. 3 periods with 64 firms data; 1978 to 
1981, 2 periods with 67 firms data; 1978 to 1980, 1 period with 71 firms data; and 
so on until 1971 when the number of regressions would be 11 betw een 1971 to 
1983 with 21 firms data while 1971 to 1980 would yield 8 regressions with 39 
firms while 1972 to 1980 would yield 7 regressions with 41 firms. (See Table 9D 
below)
1980 was selected as the te rm in a l y ear for the regressions. This was done for two 
reasons:
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1. To avoid the possible impact of environmental structure changes due to the 
world wide recessions in the early 1980s coupled with various fiscal changes after 
1980;and
2. avoid the drop in the sample size available as one goes beyond 1980 (see Table 
9C above)
1972 was selected as the opening year since if one selects 1971 or earlier years, the 
number of available firms drops though one would obtain longer periods of 
regressions. By selecting 1972 rather than 1971, one gains two firms but losses only 
one period regression. However as one progresses from 1972 to 1979 more periods 
of regression are lost while more firms are gained but less than would 'compensate' 
for each year of regression lost from the opening year to the terminal year (1980), 
(see Tables 9D and 9C together).
Table 9D
O pening/term inal years and num ber of possible annual regressions
Terminal years/number of annual regressions
Opening year 1980 1981 1982 1983
1971 8 9 10 11
1972 7 8 9 10 *
1973 6 7 8 9
1974 5 6 7 8
1975 4 5 6 7
1976 3 4 5 6
1977 2 3 4 5
1978 1 2 3 4
1979 0 1 2 3
Note: Because of lagged values in some cases for up to two periods, the 
possible number of cross-section regressions had to be less than the 
total period between opening and terminal years.
By selecting 1972, the first cross-section regression is in 1974. This means that the 
regressions would capture any effects of the imputation system of taxation 
introduced in 1973, the stock appreciation relief which took effect from 1973/1974
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fiscal year, and regressions all fall within the periods of increased ceiling on 
dividend control from 5% up to 12% from 1974 to 1977 and 10% from 1977 to 
1979, after which it became abolished giving the firms more freedom to allocate 
their net cash flows as they wished (see Bank of England Quarterly Bulleting 
(March, 1980)).
Having selected the 41 foreign firms, the next step was to refer to the ‘Alpha list of 
companies on (BSO’s) Register’, code: OP625 dated 31 January 1985 received from 
the BSO following a special request. From this list it was possible to identify the 
companies’ CRO numbers, th e  size bands and the industry  of the main line 
activity of each firm (see section 9.7 below). The size bands represent the 
classification of firms in bands within which the book value of their capital 
employed falls.
Having identified the industry and the size bands of the 41 foreign firms using the 
Department of Trade and Industry’s measures, the next step was to select a 
m atching sample of UK controlled firms. While it is possible to obtain UK data 
from other sources such as Datastream’s data base, and Cambridge University Data 
bank, it was decided to collect all the data from EXSTAT data base from .where the 
bulk of the 41 foreign firms sample data were obtained. The decision to do so is 
firstly due to the need to ensure that the data used are stored on the same basis to 
minimize much adjustments that would otherwise be required if a mixture of 
sources were used. Secondly it minimizes the chances of error that may otherwise 
occur if much adjustments are made. Accordingly 41 UK controlled independent 
.companies in the same industry groupings and of similar sizes (in terms of bands of 
capital employed), as foreign firms were selected.
The total number of firms in the m ain  sample is 82. These were used for the 
regressions effectively from 1974 to 1980 inclusive. The actual continuous data
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available for each of the firms are from 1972 to 1980.
Because the 41 pairs of firms in the main sample are restricted by the need for 
continuous data and other criteria discussed above, it was felt appropriate to test 
the hypotheses using a larger sample size. The sample of firms in this larger sample 
is referred to as sample 2 in the rest of this thesis. This sample is made up of 94 
U.S. controlled firms and 94 UK controlled firms making a total of 188 firms. The 
94 U.S. firms are made up of 41 firms from the main sample plus additional 53 
whose data were collected from the BSO’s hard copy files. The 94 UK controlled 
firms are made up of 41 firms in the main sample plus another 53 both of which 
were extracted from the EXSTAT data base. These 188 firms in sample 2 were used 
to run regressions for 1979 and 1980 although data requirement covered records 
from 1977 to 1980 inclusive.
7. DATA COLLECTION 2: INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN OF THE 
SAMPLES
The main activities of the firms in the sample are within the following industries as 
categorised by Department of Trade and Industry.
Table 9E





Chemicals and man-made fibres 26
Mechanical and instrument engineering 33
Electricals, electronic eng., office machinery 36
Vehicles 38
Oil( including petroleum distribution) 90
Note: Although firms arc grouped according to the industry of 
their major activity, one appreciates that, they may also 
operate in other areas of activity. A firm's behaviour is therefore 
assumed to be influenced mostly 
by the changes in the market of its main activity.
To simplify the presentation the firms are reclassified into related activities that 
reflect the diversified nature of their activities. The industries are thus sorted into 
groups: G l, G2, G3 and G4. Table 9F below shows the sample size of the firms 
broken down into foreign firms (F) and locally controlled firms (L). The industries 
in each group are also shown. The operational importance of this grouping would 
be seen later.
Table 9F(a)
INDUSTRY REGROUPING AND CORRESPONDING SAMPLE SIZE
NUMBER OF FIRMS
Group Foreign Local Total Industries
Gl 7 7 14 Food .drink .tobacco
G2 7 7 14 Electricals,electronics,office machinery
G3 16 16 32 Oils .chemicals and man-made fibres
G4 11 11 22 Vehicles, mechanical and Inst, engineering
Total 41 41 82
As already mentioned in section 9.5 above, the firms were chosen with a deliberate
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bias towards large firms because of their major impact in the economy through their 
respective industries as well as the growth, technical and capital capability inherent 
in size. Obviously therefore, the sample does not represent the whole size bands.
As an indication of the relative size of firms in the sample, a reference to the 
s ta tu to ry  definition of firm size is in order. The British Companies Act 1981 
defines small firms as those with gross balance sheet assets of up to 700,000 pounds 
sterling and annual turnover of 1.4 million pounds sterling or 50 employees on 
average per week. Medium-sized firms are those with gross balance sheet assets of 
up to 2.8 million pounds sterling, Turnover of 5.7 million pounds sterling or 
average number of employees of 250 per week. Thus by statutory definition, all the 
firms in the sample are larger than the medium size firms. However, the size bands 
of the firms are as categorized by the Department of Trade and Industry.
The BSO categorises firms into five different size bands according to the capital 
employed by each firm. These categories are shown in Table 9F(b) below.
Table 9F(b)
THE SIZE BANDS AS MEASURED BY CAPITAL EMPLOYED
SIZE BAND CAPITAL EMPLOY ED(pounds sterling)
1 ^25,000
2 25,001 - 100,000
3 100,001 - 4,160,000
4 4,160,001 -‘21,800,000
- 5 ^21,800,001
Source: Business Statistical Office (BSO) o f the Dept o f Trade and 
Industry o f the United Kingdom
With the above size bands, the 41 foreign firms are matched with 41 locally 
controlled firms as shown in table 9G below.
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Table 9G
SIZE/GROUP MATRIX OF MAIN SAMPLE
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
size Gl G2 G3 G4 Total Grand-total
F L F L F L F L F L (F+L)
SI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
S2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
S3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
S4 1 .. 1 .. .. .. 2 .. 4 .. 4
S5 6 7 6 7 16 16 9 11 37 41 78
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 16 16 11 11 41 41 82
Note: F and L stands for foreign firms and locally controlled firms 
respectively
Similarly, the second sample comprising of 188 firms were matched as shown in 
table 9H below.
Table 9H
SIZE/GROUP MATRIX OF SAMPLE 2
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Size Gl G2 G3 G4 Total Grand(total)
F L F L F L F L F L (F+L)
SI ......... ......... ....... ......... ... ... ...• . *
S2 ....... ......... ......... ......... ...
S3 ......... ......... ... ... ......... ......... ...
S4 2 ... 7 5 13 10 4 2 26 17 43
S5 7 9 9 11 31 34 21 23 68 77 145
Total 9 9 16 16 44 44 25 25 94 94 188
Looking at tables 9G and 9H, it can be observed from column (f), that the foreign 
and locally controlled firms are not exactly 100% matched in terms of size only. 
However, since the mismatch is always in favour of foreign firms along size band 4, 
while in favour of local firms along size band 5. in practical terms the entire sample 
can be taken as adequately matched for the following reasons:
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F irstly , the linkage between the size 4 foreign firms with their foreign parents 
would mean that the lesser number of size 5 foreign firms would be adequately 
compensated by the excess size 4 foreign firms who indirectly are similar to size 5 
by virtue of their linkages with the foreign based parent’s group.
Secondly, since both size 4 and 5 firms are by virtue of the companies Act 1981 
categorisation, equally large firms, therefore, all the foreign and locally controlled 
firms are effectively matched size-wise by virtue of statutory definition.
8. DATA COLLECTION 3: NATURE OF DATA AND ITS 
ORGANISATION
The data for both sets of firms are drawn from the following:
1. the consolidated annual financial data of large independent UK controlled 
firms. By including only the independent UK owned firms this means that none of 
the two sets of 41 and 94 local firms are subsidiaries of other corporations.
2. the consolidated annual financial data of large UK based U.S. controlled 
subsidiaries. Some U.S. controlled subsidiaries operating in UK are also ‘sub-parent’ 
companies in their own rights. They prepare their own consolidated accounts. 
Therefore, where a U.S. controlled subsidiary owns and controls other subsidiaries
i
(i.e. sub-subsidiaries in the point of view of the U.S. base parent), the main UK 
base, U.S. controlled sub- parent firms, are selected. The sub-subsidiaries are  not 
separately  included in the sample of 41 and 94 foreign firms in the main sample 
and sample 2, respectively.
The use of the consolidated accounts is justified on three counts: F irst, it helps to 
avoid the problem of accounting which might otherwise occur if parent companies 
are separately included in the sample as well as their subsidiaries. This particularly 
relates to intra-group transfers of goods to affiliates from parents which would 
normally be recorded as sales in the separate parent ,s operating statements but
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which may not have been received or sold by the affiliates. In addition there is the 
influence of intra-group dividends, interests and fees from the subsidiaries, on the 
parent company’s operating statements. The effect of these and other intra-group 
transactions relates to their equal and opposite effects on the reported cash flow of 
the parent company and its subsidiaries. As an illustration, consider a transfer of 
fees andvinterests to the parent company. While these would lead to lower profits 
(an important variable for the three equations) in the subsidiaries, they would lead 
to an increase in pre-tax income of the parent company. Similarly , transfer of 
goods (recorded as sales) by the parent to the affiliates at transfer prices would 
directly affect the profits reported in the subsidiary’s accounts. In addition, to the 
extent that large part of sales by the affiliates represent receipts from parent’s own 
sales, both sales of the affiliates and the parents would be related. Where the above 
scenario holds, as one should expect in parent - subsidiary relationships, introducing 
parents and subsidiaries separately in the samples would introduce the problem of 
autocorrelation with the undesirable consequences for the estimates from ordinary 
least squares regression (see Koutsoyiannis (1984).pp.200-21l).
The problem is made worse because the data being used are cross-section in nature. 
In econometric literature, autocorrelation is taken as being specific to time-series 
data (see for example Koutsoyiannis (op.cit.) p.226). Therefore all the methods of 
solving the problem are related to time-series data. Koutsoyiannis indicates that the 
only reason why autocorrelation may arise with a cross-section data is if the 
sample is not random.
However.the fact is that even if the sample is random and contains large numbers 
of parent companies as well as large numbers of their respective subsidiaries, 
autocorrelation is most likely to be present due to parent- subsidiary relationship 
illustrated above. The only solution therefore is to use data for the parent 
companies only and not to introduce both a parent company and its subsidiaries
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separately in the same sample set.
Second, the use of consolidated accounts would reflect more accurately the situation 
existing at the ultimate locus of actual decision making in a group context. The 
result from the interviews and questionnaire surveys suggest that key financial 
decisions are almost invariably controlled from the group headquarters. This does
V
not however imply that the subsidiary’s top executives have no inputs into the 
pertinent decisions. Although in large corporations, inputs into the decisions process 
are likely to be built up along an incremental ‘path,’ from the plant level up (see 
Quinn (1980)), it is the parent company that has the final say as to where in the 
world its investments should be expanded or funds withdrawn.
Third, the level of disaggregation of data required is high. Since sub-subsidiaries 
are generally private firms, the Companies Acts requirements for their financial 
statements are liberal. As a result, it is not always possible to get a sub-subsidiary 
account sufficiently detailed to satisfy the level of disaggregation of data needed for 
this empirical investigation. Even if it is possible given appropriate details, to 
disentangle the subsidiary’s or sub-subsidiary’s accounting data from that of the 
parent company, already the task at hand is enormous without the additional 
problems of these adjustments. *
The enormity of the task can be imagined from the fact that more than th irty  four 
and half thousand ‘accounts heads’ or data points are required to be organised in the 
form that enables the empirical testing of the models (this is made up of 47 account 
heads x 82 firms x 9 years «= 34686). Bearing in mind the varying number of 
characters per variable, the extent of the computer storage required and the 
processing time are simply enormous. Not only did this space requirement stretch 
the school’s computer space allocations to the limit, but also the ‘blank common’ 
allocation of the processing package at the University was exceeded at the time.
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This contributed to delays of several months as the empirical work had to be held 
up pending installation of larger version of the processing package (TSP), in 1986. 
As a result a lot of problems were encountered but need not be put on paper - part 
of the author's research experience.
8.1 Data Organisation
It is considered important to run down briefly the major successive stages followed, 
from the point where the pertinent data sources were identified and the sample 
selected, to the point where they were ready to be used by the selected statistical 
program for the empirical testing of the hypotheses. One appreciates that much 
details may confuse the reader and so, what is provided is by way of outline only 2.
Stage 1; Extract the variables from the EXSTAT data base in ICL 2980 main frame 
at the South West Universities Regional Computer Center at the University of Bath. 
As the data happened to be stored in 'fixed format’, at the time, a special purpose 
Fortran3 program had to be used for the data extraction task.
Stage 2: Owing to the way the data base was organised, the records extracted from
stage 1 were not in the form directly usable by the statistical package for annual
cross-section regression runs. Thus a second special purpose Fortran-program had to
%
be used to add years to each annual set of records or each 'line’ of data from stage 1 
process. A line of data is made up of a given number, of columns of records, where 
each record is a variable.
Stage 3: Generation of missing values. From the intermediate file created from 
stage 2 process, it was discovered that some variables within the various data lines 
were missing. A program was written and used to generate the names of the firms
2. Any interested Teader may contact the authoT to clarify any points if necessary for understanding the 
empirical analyses.
3. This is a computer programming language referred to as formula translation
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and the years and the missing values. The relatively small sample size and the 
importance ot the missing values, discounts any use of the usual techniques of 
suppressing missing values in regressions, particularly where large samples are used. 
Stage 4: Because of the missing values generated in stage 3. a Companies House 
Search was made at the London Search Room at Old Street, to obtain the missing 
data.
Stage 5: The intermediate files from stage 2 processes were edited to fill in the 
missing data obtained from stage 4. Stages 3 and 4 were repeated until no more 
missing values are left.
Stage 6: It happened that the data as stored in the original data base were in such a 
way that the scaling factor varied sometimes between one period and another. That 
meant that the data were stored in pounds sterling in some years, in thousands for 
some years and in millions in some cases. The scaling factors also varied between 
firms. Thus, the list of firms and the scaling factors were made; and from there, 
edit runs were made to put each firm’s scaling factor the same across the relevant 
years. As for the difference between firms, that was taking care of by the ‘ratio 
approach’ used for this study (see section 9.9 below).
Stage 7: The intermediate files from stage 6 edit runs were converted into a 'TSP’
I
format, using a special purpose program. This program lines up the records by 
‘issuer codes’ and year, for successive firms, a year at a time. Issuer codes are 
simply EXSTAT codes assigned to each firm such that each firm has a separate code 
name. Thus all records for all firms for 1972 (say) would be put together, followed 
by all the records for all the firms in 1973, and so on. Each data line is ‘headed’ by 
the issuer code and year; while the rest of the variables are across the columns, thus 
making the cross-section of firms/variables matrix for each year.
Stage 8: The stage 7 files give no consideration for lagged values required by the 
respective equations. Thus in this stage a special purpose program was written and
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used to organise the data from stage 7 files such that each of the years are put into a 
separate file. That is, all the data for all the firms in 1972 are put into one file while 
those for 1973 are put into a separate file and so on till the terminal year 1980. 
Stage 9: The stage 8 files are finally reorganised using a ‘sort macro’ to put them 
into the format that takes into consideration the lagged values requirements of the 
econometric equations. At this point, the data are ready for the regression 
programs.
The above nine major steps were followed for organising the data for both U.S. 
controlled and UK controlled firms. They were repeated for the sample 2 
comprising 94 pairs of firms.
However in sample 2, additional stages were followed. For the foreign sample, the 
data for 53 firms were obtained from Department of Trade's hard copies supplied to 
the author by the Statistics department at the DTI. These were later merged with 
the data for the 41 foreign firms in the main sample (obtained from EXSTAT) to 
make a total of 94 U.S. controlled firms.
The UK controlled firms in the second sample comprise 41 independent firms’ in the 
main sample,plus a further 53 firms, all obtained, from EXSTAT data base. These
i
additional firms are of course matched with the usual criteria.
Additional stages were followed for organising the entire files for the pooled time- 
series cross-section regression analyses. Here a special purpose program was written 
and used to concatenate records in such a way as to allow the lagged values and the 
current values to be in one extended line of data and cut down the number of 
records that would otherwise have been read into the processing memory. There are 
limits to what the package can cope with in terms of the number of variables it can 
access with one ‘read command’. This program is thus used for organising the data 
in a form suitable for the pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses. To
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do this, the stage 7 files for the respective sample sets were concatenated before 
stages 8 and 9 processes.
Up to stage 9, the assembled data were used for the annual regression runs for each 
sample set. The separate files (for foreign and local firms) had to be merged for 
combined processing during which the foreign control dummy variables were 
introduced.
To sum up the data organisation, the number of firms in the sample for each cross- 
section year are listed in Table 91 below. This table also lists the number of firms in 
sample 2 and the number of observations used for the pooled time-series cross- 
section regression analyses. The number of observations used for the combined 
regressions are also shown.
Table 91
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN EACH SAMPLE SET
YEAR FOREIGN LOCAL COMBINED
1974 41 41 82
1975 41 41 82
MAIN SAMPLE 1976 41 41 82
1977 41 41 82 .
1978 41 , 41 82
1979 41 41 82
1980 41 41 82
Pool 1974-1980 287' 287 574
Sample2
1979 94 94 188
1980 94 94 188
Pool 1979-1980 188 188 376
With the information in table 91 and the number of independent variables for each 
equation (see 8.3; 8.4; and 8.5), Table 9J is constructed giving the degrees of 




SAMPLE SIZE/DEGREES OF FREEDOM USED FOR TESTING PERTINENT STATISTICS
Sample size DividendC equation) Investment(Eqn) External Fin. (Eqn)
41 35 33 33
82 75 73 73
287 281 279 279
574 567 565 565*
94 88 86 86
188 182 180 180
188 181 179 179*
376 369 367 367*
The degrees of freedom is the sample size less the number of independent 
variables including the constant term. * are the combined observations and 
their independent variables includes the foreign control dummy variables
9. SOME PERTINENT STATISTICAL PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS
Four main statistical problems pertinent to the application of the empirical models 
designed for this investigation are:
1. those relating to the sample stratification scheme used;
2. those relating to skewness of the distribution of firms data.leading to the 
problem of heteroscedasticity;
3. those relating to the model structure;
4. those relating to the data structure;
9.1 Sample stratification problem
Each sample set, that is, foreign controlled firms on the one hand and locally 
controlled firms on the other, is made up of firms from a mix of industrial 
activities. The problem arising from this mix of firms from different industries is 
that industry specific circumstances can not be kept constant. For example one can 
not assume uniform capital intensity where firms from different industries are in
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one sample. What results from this is wider scatter or variance and lower 
correlation of most variables with the dependent variable being estimated.
This problem is well recognised in the empirical literature. For instance, Dhrymes 
and Kurz (1967) and McCabe (1979) used industry dummy variables to reflect the 
sample stratification and thus to neutralize inter-industry differences. While 
Dhrymes and Kurz report of some industrial classification contrasts, McCabe failed 
to explicitly show his result even though such dummy variables form part of his 
equations. It is not therefore certain what his conclusions are on the issue. Perhaps 
there may not have been much difference. Of course much would depend on the 
researcher's sample stratification.
However, Peterson and Benesh (1983), using a different normalisation variable 
(sales) which differs from the scheme used by Dhrymes and Kurz (who used a 
mixture of sales and capital stock), found that nearly all the dummy variables have 
insignificant coefficients. They point out that by eliminating industry dummies 
their primary conclusions remain unchanged.
It would perhaps have been best to introduce industry dummies as Dhrymes and 
Kurz and McCabe but the major handicap is sample size. One would risk a loss of
4
several degrees o*f freedom if more dummies are introduced in the models. Due to 
this problem it is decided to follow Peterson and .Benesh's position and ignore 
industry dummies.
There are however ameliorating circumstances. First, the firms in the sample are all 
of similar sizes in terms of capital employed. To this extent the mismatch of capital 
intensity that would otherwise have occurred is minimized. Second, considering the 
context of this study, the fact that the foreign firms sample set and the local 
samples are matched means that non inclusion of the industry dummies would in 
no way affect the main conclusions of the comparative analyses.
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9.2 Skewness problem
Where the sample comprise a mixture of large and small firms there would be a 
skewed distribution of absolute values of observations across firms. This creates 
the problem of non-normality in correlation analysis and heteroscedasticity in 
regression analysis. These are problems because they are assumed to be absent in a
yr
linear stochastic regression model. One of the assumptions of the model is that the 
variance of the error term in each period is constant. Another assumption is that 
the random variable is assumed to have a normal distribution. This assumption of 
normality is necessary for conducting the statistical tests of significance of 
parameter estimates and for conducting confidence intervals. Thus where the 
distributions of firm observations are highly skewed, the variance of the error term 
increases with increasing values of the independent variables (see Koutsoyiannis 
(opcit) p.183). This problem is well recognised in the empirical literature where 
cross-section data are used for regression analyses.
The usual and the simplest method to eliminate the worst aspects of this problem is 
to use an appropriate transformation or weighting scheme for the variables in the 
models. The most popular approach in the empirical literature for crpss-section 
data is to deflate or normalize the original (raw) data by an appropriate measure 
and then use the transformed or deflated data to run the regression or the 
correlation analyses.
There is however a possible trade-off in the form of ‘spurious index correlation’ 
which means that positive correlation may exist between two ratios with a common 
deflator even when no natural correlation exists between the non-deflated variables. 
However, there are convincing reasons to believe that this investigation does not 
suffer from such a trade-off. There are theoretical and empirical justification to 
expect that underlying relationship exists between the dependent and independent
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variables in the models used in this study. Meyer and Kuh (1957, PP.258- 267), 
point out that if the hypothesis being tested has initially been formulated in terms 
of ratios, then spurious correlation do not arise; the models being used are all in 
ratio terms. They also point out (P.84) that to avoid spurious correlation, the 
variables to be deflated must be homogeneously related to the deflator; this 
assumption appear to be reasonably met by the choice of deflator for this study. In 
addition to the above points, the majority of the empirical models used for 
investigating the dividend, investment and external finance behaviour of cross- 
section of firms applied one form of deflation or another. Thus, one follows the 
established methodology (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Most importantly the aim of 
this research is not to establish the properties of some general models for universal 
application to forecasting tasks (more suited to time-series models), but to construct 
a set of models appropriate enough to be applied to investigation of the comparative 
financial behaviour of foreign versus locally controlled firms. Thus as long as both 
foreign and local firm data are applied to the same set of models, the possibility of 
spurious index correlation would not affect the conclusions from the comparative 
study.
The advantages of deflation far out weigh, the minor concern of spurious index 
correlation. Deflation yields a better approximation to normality and more 
homoscedastic (constant) error variances (see Koutsoyiannis (1984), PP.181- 197). 
It also minimizes the possible problem of the regression or the correlation results 
being determined by a few number of firms with relatively exceptional values 
(positive or negative).
Apart from normalising to solve the problem of heteroscedasticity there are two 
other important reasons to it. First, the ‘transformation’ of the variables into ratios 
allows the researcher to dispense with having to adjust the components of the 
variables to take account of inflation. Second, normalisation means that the
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variables (both the dependent and independent) are expressed per unit of a common 
variable and therefore enables direct comparison to be made between the firms.
Six size measures have been identified from the literature as possible deflators. 
These are:
1. Net assets or networth, ( see Dobrovolsky (1951), Meyer and Kuh (1957)).
r
2. Net profits (see Prais (1957)).
3. Logarithms (see Hart (1965)).
4. Share capital (see Fama (1974)).
5. Number of Employees, Companies Act 1981, UK.
6. Net sales (see Rowthorn (1971), McCabe (1979), Peterson and Benesh (1983)).
Each of the above measures or a mixture of them (see Dhrymes and Kurz) has been 
used for normalisation by different researchers. Each has some draw backs which 
have been considered before choosing the most appropriate for this investigation.
Consider first, N et assets. This has a draw back resulting from the differences in
the methods and timing of revaluation of fixed and current assets as well as
intangible assets such as goodwill and other reserves resulting for example in gains
(or losses) from foreign base accounts translations. The methods of -valuation, the
«
purpose as well as the choice of timing are highly subjective. Where a subsidiary's 
earnings remittance is based on a certain percentage of book value of fixed assets in 
the host country (as found in some Latin American countries), there may be 
distortions resulting from frequent revaluations with high subjective content. The 
main draw back for this size measure is therefore the fact that its value has some 
subjective content.
Profit has been used by some researchers in cases where the ratio resulting from 
deflation has intrinsic economic meaning. Between two firms, a more profitable one 
is expected to grow faster. However, profit figures can be subjectively determined
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through depreciation methods, amortisation, provisions for bad debts and 
contingencies. The use of profits would result in unstable estimates as profit tends 
towards zero and may become meaningless where losses are being made. Where 
foreign subsidiaries are concerned, the effect of transfer pricing on goods and 
services would mean that the profits figures become different between independent 
and subsidiaries and also within each subsidiary it would vary between years 
depending on the decisions of the parent company.
Logarithm s, would have been best because it avoids the possible problem of 
spurious correlation. However, there are no logs of negative values so that where 
the set of variable values contain some negative items, logarithm approach breaks 
down. The solution is usually to leave out firms with negative values. But it 
would be impossible to carry out this study due to the fact that there are negative 
values here and there and one could not be able to obtain any meaningful sample 
without negative values. Losses are common during the period of recession.
The use of share capital is inappropriate in this context because of the position in 
subsidiaries where in some cases the share capitals are comparatively small and can 
not be taken as a realistic measure of the foreign firm's true size in comparison with 
locally controlled independent firms. This size measure may also be unstable due to 
convertions of convertible loan stocks or issue of shares (including, fresh, rights and 
script issues), in locally controlled firms. Similarly the use of number of shares in 
issue is not applicable as a measure of firm size in this context since foreign 
controlled firms are, by their nature, not directly ‘widely’ held. At any rate, what 
really matters as far as firm size is concerned, is not so much the number of its 
shares as to its total market capitalization. This is not directly obtainable for the 
foreign controlled subsidiaries in this research sample.
The use of num ber of employees as a measure of size to deflate raw data is not
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appropriate in the context of this study due to lack of economic meaning. Most 
capital investment in firms lead to relative reduction in the dependence on use of 
human labour in production or administration. The introduction of new technology 
often has payroll reduction as one of its advantages. Firms with high capital 
intensity would have lower labour intensity and vice versa. It is therefore not clear 
that heteroscedasticity would be minimized by deflating with number of employees.
Finally, n e t sales tu rnover is the most appropriate size variable for this study. 
The reasons for this choice are as follows: F irst, to the extent that firms compete 
with each other for market share, their investment rates would differ if their sales 
growth differ. The use of sales has therefore an intrinsic economic and statistical 
meaning, but unlike profits, the sales turnover is virtually always positive (and 
non- zero). Second, the sales turnover of independent firm (in a group operating 
statement) as well as those in subsidiaries are not as subjectively influenced as other 
size measures. The use of consolidated accounts for this study avoids the possible 
draw back from the effect of vertical integration where some firms within a group 
are 'tied-in* to supplying only one outlet within the group: and sales prices are 
intra-group fixed. In a consolidated account, intra-group sales are discounted from 
the net sales turnover. From the questionnaire surveys discussed in chapter 4 
(above), there is evidence that not much sales flow back to parents from the foreign 
base affiliates: therefore the sales turnover of subsidiaries is composed to the larger 
extent of sales to third parties and are in general an objective measure of size for 
deflation purposes.
9.3 MODEL STRUCTURE PROBLEM
This comprises two problems. The first is the problem of multicolinearity and the 
second is that of identification.
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9.4 2The M ulticolinearity Problem
One of the assumptions for the application of ordinary least squares is that the 
explanatory variables are not perfectly intercorrelated. Otherwise, it becomes 
impossible to esterblish the values of each parameter seperately as the influence of 
one of the pair of variables may be wrongly arttributed to the other.
Two main sources of this problem are well noted in the econometric literature. The 
first source relates to the introduction of lagged values of some explanatory 
variables. Since none of the equations contains current and lagged values of the 
same explanatory variables, this source of the problem is not applicable to this 
study. The second source of the problem relates to the interrelationship between 
some pairs of economic variables in the models which causes them to move in the 
same direction (see Koutsoyiannis (1984, p.233-40)). A test for multicolinearity in 
line with Frisch’s Confluence analysis (or Bunch-map analysis) was carried out4.
From the test, only few pairs of explanatory variables have any noticeable inter­
correlation (see Table 9K below). In the dividend equation, there are two pairs: 
current profit /  lagged dividend: and external finance /  net current asset investment. 
In the investment equation there are two pairs: external finance /  net current asset 
investment and current depreciation allowances /  lagged capital stock. In the 
external finance equation there is only one pair: current dividend /  current profit. 
Finally, there are two other pairs which (though they do not appear as explanatory
4. This involves regressing each explanatory variable against each of the others in the respective models 
to identify the pairs that move -perfectly in the same direction as measured by the correlation 
coefficients. The alternative approach referred to as the experimental technique involves the regression 
of the dependent variable against each explanatory variable selected on economic considerations, to 
find which gives the most plausible result on both a priori and statistical grounds (e.g, R  ); then 
introduce the rest of the variables in order of their importance and select only those that improve the 
overall R  , while m aintaining the expected signs of thecoefficients of those already introduced 
into the model. Those variables that do not improve the R  or renders the coefficients of others 
unacceptable are simply rejected.
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variables in any one equation) are important in the context of the simultaneous 
equation system. These are: current dividend /  lagged dividend and lagged profit /  
lagged dividend.
Table 9K
INTER-CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF SOME EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (%)
V
Year Finn P:D2 EFB:NCP PC:DEP D:P D:D2* P2:D2*
1974 F 45 36 61 30 22 53
L 50 -17 59 57 88 68
1975 F 22 67 66 53 29 30
L 60 -14 64 59 82 58
1976 F 49 61 9 52 78 53
L -22 -6 81 52 62 58
1977 F 44 77 21 42 55 76
• L 58 0 56 67 83 52
1978 F 52 55 76 50 56 42
L 51 -10 65 70 79 67
1979 F 18 42 3 41 33 50
L 57 30 55 32 67 70
1980 F 39 44 72 45 71 41
L 47 -17 57 60 97 33
POOL 1974-80 F 36 64 57 43 45 51
F 32 -3 64 49 78 51
* This pair ate not explanatory in any one model though it is important 
for the system of simultaneous equations. F = Foreign firms; L = Local firms
The result of the inter-correlation analysis displayed in the above table is quite 
interesting indeed. It can be seen that, apart from the last column where the inter- 
correlation (in the pooled sample) between lagged profit and lagged dividend is 
equal for both foreign and local firms, in the rest there are differences between 
foreign and local firms. The implication of this is that in the context of this study, 
rejecting a variable because of high inter-correlation as a means of eliminating 
multicolinearity is not acceptable. This is not only because there is no prescribed 
degree of collinearity between zero and unity which if present will affect seriously
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the parameter estimates, but also because while a pair of explanatory variables may 
have a ‘high’ inter-relation in local firms sample (which may suggest rejecting one 
of the variables), that same pair may turn out to have a ‘low’ inter-relation in 
foreign firms sample (which suggests no multicolinearity and thus no statistical 
harm to the relevant estimates).
What is therefore more relevant in the context of this research must be to minimize 
specification errors which may arise if one attempts to reject variables purely for 
the purpose of satisfying the statistical criterion (see Resek (1967, p.474)). Faced 
with these two problems, one chooses to err slightly on the side of statistics for the 
following reasons which relates specifically to the nature of this study5.
1. The comparative nature of the study requires one to estimate individual 
coefficients of variables introduced into the models purely on their economic 
considerations, and compare their re la tive  roles in the financial behaviour of the 
two sets of firms.
3. The same models used for estimating the foreign firms sample are also used for 
the local firms. Therefore the problem of multicolinearity would have no effect on 
the central conclusions of the study.
9.5 2The Identification Problem
This problem arises when two (or more) equations in a system have exactly the 
same explanatory variables so that it becomes impossible to pin point the dependent 
variable to which the parameter estimates relate.
5. See Koutsoyiannis (1984, p.252)
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To ascertain that the models formulated and used in this study passes the 
identification test, two formal tests prescribed in the econometric literature are 
used. The first referred to as Order condition states that for an equation to be 
identified, the total number of variables excluded from it but which are included in 
other equations in the system, must be greater than or equal to the number of the 
equations in that system minus one6. The second test is referred to as The Rank 
Condition. This requires that in a system of G equations, for any equation to be 
identified , it must be possible to construct at least one non-zero determinant of 
order G - 1 from the coefficients of the variables excluded from that particular 
equation but contained in the other equations of the system7.
On the basis of both of these two tests, all the equations used for the empirical 
testing of the hypotheses set out for this study are identified (indeed all are 
overidentified).
10. THE DATA STRUCTURE PROBLEM
This relates to the choice of data structure in terms of justifying whether a Time- 
series data or a Cross-section data are more appropriate for the study.
The main difference between the two types of data and therefore the related 
regressions is that on the one hand, while time-series regression assumes that the 
models have the same structure over time, on the other, the cross-section regression 
assumes that all firms have the same structure except for the variables included in 
the models. Of course these assumptions may not necessarily be always true.
6. That i s K - M s G ' l ;  where K is the total variables in the system including both the dependent and 
independent variables; M, is the number of variables ( dependent and independent ), included in-an 
equation being considered; and G, is the number of equations in the system.
7. For details of these tests’ procedures, see for example Koutsoyiannis (1984, pp.346-358).
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As will be seen in chapter 11, it is a documented fact that there were significant 
changes in the economy between 1972 and 1980 inclusive, which have implications 
to the dividend, investment and external finance decisions of large corporations that 
form our sample. The solution would have been to attempt to neutralise the effects 
of these changes in a time-series context by introducing time trend or dummy 
variables in the models. The problem however, is that the number of time-series 
observations available can not cope with additional dummy variables due to loss of 
degrees of freedom considering the number of variables in the individual equations 
and in the simultaneous equation system.
The cross-section data copes with these changes by keeping their effect constant in 
each period. In effect it is saying that if every year remains as the one under 
consideration, the expected long run decisions of the firms is as estimated from the 
regressions. Cross-section data allows one to have more degrees of freedom and so 
more explanatory variables can be introduced in the models. In addition to the 
above advantages of cross-section data over the time-series data, perhaps the most 
important reason for using cross-section data in this research is that one is not 
strictly interested in the short run differences in the decisions of the two sets of 
firms (a time series problem), but rather the focus is on their long run differences (a 
cross-section problem). This is because one feels that it is the long Tun impact of 
foreign control of local firms that is more important for strategic or long term 
foreign direct investment policies of most host countries. Thus cross-section 
analysis which assumes that all firms have the same structure (see McCabe (1979. 
p.122). and Koutsoyiannis (op. cit., p.405)), provides the most appropriate basis for 
comparing the long run behaviour of two sets of firms in terms of the variables 
appearing in the models.
Of course any criticisms of the cross-section analysis by the time-series advocates 
are to a certain extent avoided by the regression of the pooled cross-section and
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time-series data. This enables one to compare what may be referred to in this thesis 
as the stable behaviour of the foreign and local firms8.
All in all the eleven assumptions of ordinary least squares9 have been duely 
considered as far as one is able to do so. given the nature of data (collected as 
reported in the financial statements recorded under existing accounting practices), 
and the nature of this study.
11. H Y PO TH E SE S V A L ID A T IO N  PROCEDURES
Four separate analyses are required to test the proposed hypotheses. All of these 
tests are based on regression analyses and comprise of:
1. Ordinary least squares analyses
2. Two-stage least squares analyses
3. Three-stage least squares analyses
4. The Chow-test analyses.
The justification for the use of the above analytical techniques are presented briefly 
as follows: Having gone through the pertinent literature, it is clear that in a 
majority of cases the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique has -beeii used for 
investigating the dividend, investment and external finance behaviour of firms. 
Therefore the use of OLS in this study is due to its wide acceptance by a large body 
of researchers as being the simplest applicable methodology for the type of 
investigation this study is aimed at. There are of course some econometric 
advantages, the chief of which is that it is less sensitive to specification errors (see 
Koutsoyiannis (1984)). in comparison with the ‘full information methods’ (see the
8. But see Koutsoyiannis (op.cit.), pp.405-406, for problems of interpretation of coefficients of pooled 
Cross-section time-series regressions.
9. See Koutsoyiannis (op.cit.), pp.55-58.
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next paragraph).
However a case has been made for the use of simultaneous estimation techniques by 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). They used simultaneous equation models to investigate 
precisely the same decision triad of interest in this study. Other researchers have 
since followed Dhrymes and Kurz; these include Kumar (1984) who used the 
techniques to investigate the aspects of UK firms growth in the context within 
which activities such as new investment and acquisitions and financing are regarded 
as interrelated. Kumar confirms that this technique produces stable estimates of the 
relationships between the variables. Other researchers who have considered the 
simultaneous nature of corporate financial behaviour are McDonald et al (1975), in 
their study of investment and financing of French firms; Mueller’s (1967) study of 
firm financial decision process; Peterson and Benesh (1983) study of the financial 
behaviour of US firms. The majority of these studies support the simultaneous 
decision hypothesis - that is, that financial decisions are taken simultaneously. 
Further indications of support for the simultaneous nature of corporate planning 
come from McCabe (1979), Nadiri and Rosen (1969), Rowlatt (1978), Jenkinson 
(1981) and Anderson (1981).
The theoretical justification for the simultarfeous view of financial decision in firms 
is briefly stated as follows: As one proceeds from 'one man’ firm to a more complex 
organisation, the various aspects of the firm’s functions and decisions progressively 
become delegated to different executives within the firm. Each functional executive, 
therefore possesses the responsibility of formulating certain decisions. However, 
because the firm must move towards one direction if it is to survive, it has an 
ultimate top executive who co-ordinates the decisions of various departments in the 
organisation. As a result of this co-ordination and balancing activity of the chief 
executive, financial decisions interrelate to each other in a system context. In effect 
decisions in one department would affect that of other departments, quite apart
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from the effect of other factors external to the firm.
The relationship described in the preceding paragraph applies also to the foreign
controlled affiliates. Indeed it is clearly evident in the group of companies where
decisions in one subsidiary has some influences on decisions taken in other related
firms via the parent company. The evidence of this relationship is found from the 
*
interviews and questionnaire surveys discussed in chapters 3 and 4 (above). There 
are however, other researchers who insist that financing and investment decisions in 
firms are separate or are not interdependent. To them the single equation technique 
of the OLS variety is the most appropriate.
There is no intention in this study to enter into full scale investigation of which set 
of researchers are right or wrong. The approach here is to first of all carry out the 
empirical study using the OLS. To find out if simultaneous equation technique is 
required, the approach followed by Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). and McCabe (1979) 
is adopted. This comprises firstly, of carrying out a simple correlation exercise to 
determine the signs and significance of the correlation coefficients of the three 
endogenous variables (dividend, investment and external finance). Where the 
interdependence of the variables are not meaningfully traced in terjns of yielding 
coefficients of correct signs (i.e., signs justifiable on theoretical grounds) then, the 
simultaneous equation technique would be taken as being indicated. To determine 
whether two or three-stage least squares is the appropriate form of the 
simultaneous equation technique to be used, the usual test is to generate a 
correlation matrix of the two-stage least squares residuals for each year of the 
regression. If the residuals of the three equations are highly correlated, then the use 
of three-stage least squares technique would be indicated.
Since all the above techniques are well documented in the econometrics text books, 
there is no need to describe them here. However, since there are alternative
- 2 4 3 -
approaches for the two-stage least squares analysis, a brief description of the 
approach used is considered appropriate. The approach is to estimate the reduced 
form of the three models: dividends, investment, and external finance. The reduced 
form simply means that each equation is estimated with only the exogenous 
variables and no endogenous explanatory variables. This is the first stage. The next
'ft
stage is to introduce the appropriate endogenous explanatory variables in each of the 
equations (using as data the estimated values of the endogenous variables from the 
first stage) and use ordinary least squares method to estimate the coefficients. This 
is the second stage (see Koutsoyiannis (1984),pp.384-393).
Finally, the main hypothesis of the study is directly tested using the Chow test 
analysis. This technique is useful for testing the hypothesis that the coefficients 
obtained from regressing two sets of data on the same model are equal. In other 
words that the difference between their relative coefficients is not significantly 
different from zero.
This simply involves carrying out an OLS regression for both sets of firms (foreign 
and local firms), separately and then on combined data. The sum of squared 
residuals resulting from each of the regressions are used to calculate the F* 
statistic. Thus: ‘
F* =
where CSSR is the sum of squared residuals of combined sample. SSRF is the sum 
of squared residuals of foreign sample and SSRL is that of local sample. nF and nL 
are numbers of observations for foreign and local firms respectively: while k, is the 
number of parameter estimates including the constant term in equations (l),(3 ) and 
(5) in chapter 8. The level of significance of F* is then read off the tables10.
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12. CHAPTER SUMMARY
1. There are two sets of firms : foreign affiliates and locally controlled independent 
firms.
2. There are three dependent variables'  Dividend, investment and external finance 
from borrowing.
3. Three types of analyses ( OLS, Two-stage and three stage least squares ) are 
carried out for each of the dependent variables; and for each of the two sets of firms 
for each year from 1974 to 1980 inclusive and for sample 2, each year 1979, and 
1980.
4. The three types of analyses-OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS, are carried out for each of the 
three dependent variables and for each of the two sets of firms with a time-series, 
cross-section pooled data of the main sample 1974-1980 and the second sample 
1979-1980.
5. The three types of analyses - OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS are carried out for the three 
dependent variables for the combined and pooled time series cross - section data 
with the introduction of the foreign control dummy.
6. The Chow-Tests are carried out for each of the three dependent variables for each 
year and for the pooled time series cross - seqtion data.
7. Other analyses based on OLS are carried out for the purpose of explaining the 
findings from the main line analyses. These are described briefly where they fit into 
the presentation of the results in chapter 11.
8. While theoretical as well as empirical supports exist that favour the use of 
simultaneous equation estimation techniques for the decision triad under 
investigation in this study, there are also those who argue against the existence of
10. For details see Chow (i960), Maddala (1977), Gujarati (1978) and Koutsoyiannis (1984). For result 
of Chow test see appendix A10.5
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interdependence of these decisions. The onus, however, is for the researcher to 
justify statistically that there is such a relationship between the three decisions and 
also show that simultaneous estimation technique is called for. The accepted 
procedure is as follows:
F irst, calculate the correlation coefficient, r . This is of course the square root of the 
coefficient of determination for each pair of the endogenous explanatory variables. 
Second: since the objective is to know if the set of sample data provide sufficient 
evidence to indicate that the relationship between any two of the variables is not 
equal to zero C that is. r  5*^0 ), the null hypothesis is therefore stated as follows: 
H 0:r=0.
Third: compute the test statistic, with the following formula:
* -Jn —2l  — r ---------------- —
1 —r  2
where, n. is the number of observations, r and r 2 are defined above: n —2 is the 
number of degrees of freedom (for more details see Daniel and Terrell (1975), 
PP.252-254)11.
Fourth: read up the theoretical or the critical value of t  from the t-statistics tables 
for a given number of degrees of freedom, and selected point of ‘ Significance, Oi.
t
Where ex. is 0.05 or 0.01, (that is at 5 per cent or 1 per cent). Since this is a two-
Oisided test, the t-statistic of interest i s ‘that at —  on the t-table found in most
econometric text books12. Then compare the computed t  * and the critical value of t. 
If t  * >  t  , then the null hypothesis is rejected, on the basis of non-zero relationship
11. This explanation is necessary since this procedure is not sufficiently common in the literature - 
calculation of test statistic for the correlation coefficient estimates.
12. Two tail-test is used for all the t-statistics tests in this thesis for the simple reason that while some 
independent variables are expected to have a negative impact on the respective dependent variables 
others are expected to have a positive impact. Thus, although one has Teasons to expect positive or 
negative coefficients, it does not rule out the chance of alternative out comes for both sets of firms. It 
is only prudent to cover this chance, (but see Koutsoyiannis (1984), p.84.
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between the pair of variables. As for whether a simultaneous estimation is called
for, the indication would depend on how well the sign of the correlation coefficient
reflects expectations on a priori grounds (see Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), PP.448-
450). The sign of the correlation coefficient is of course the same as that of the slope
of the regression line for the pair of variables under consideration. As already 
*
pointed out elsewhere in the preceding section, the decision as to whether two-stage 
least squares would suffice or whether the efficiency of the parameter estimators 
would be increased by using three-stage least squares method would depend on the 
strength of the correlation of the two-stage least squares residuals.
The results of the above procedures are presented in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 10
EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION 1: SINGLE EQUATION RESULTS
1. THE CONTEXT
In this chapter the ordinary least squares results of the empirical verification of the
hypotheses are presented. Recall that the aim of the investigation is to establish
em pirically  that there is a difference between foreign versus locally controlled
firms in terms of their dividend, investment and external finance decisions. Thus
unlike those researchers who may be more interested in establishing and testing for
♦
the structural performance of models for universal application, the main concern in 
this empirical study is to test investment, dividend and external finance models* 
(constructed on the basis justified on theoretical and empirical grounds) on data of 
the two sets of firms. Accordingly, the discussion on the structural performance of 
each model is kept to a necessary minimum, to keep the focus of the result as sharp 
as possible.
For the  purpose of esterblishing the  existence of a difference betw een the  tw o 
sets o f firms, the follow ing c rite ria  are used:
1. Comparison of the explanatory powers of each model using the two sets of data; 
that is. the relative coefficient of multiple determination R 2, and the associated F- 
sta tistic  which aims to find out whether the independent variables do actually have 
any significant overall influence on the respective dependent variables1.
1. Although the coefficient of multiple determination shows the percentage of the variation of the 
dividend, investment, and external finance explained by the respective independent variables, it is the 
case that in cross-section regressions, the value of R y .X  \X  2—n aTC somc ^mes relatively lower than 
that of time series regression using the same models. It is therefore considered necessary to compare 
also the over all significance of the two sets of regressions as measured by the conventional r  - 
ratio. This tests the null hypothesis H. q * =  P 2 =  =  0  , against the alternative that
: not all the j3* are zero. The more the significance of the regression , the higher the value of 
F  -ratio, see Koutsoyiannis (1984), pp.151-158
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2. Comparison of the arithmetic signs of the coefficient estimates of each set of 
regressions for the foreign against locally controlled firms
3. Comparison of the relative w eights and significance of each of the explanatory 
variables relating to foreign firms, against locally controlled firms.
4. Examining of the signs and significance of foreign control variable2.
It is perhaps convenient, before presenting the result of the econometric analyses, to 
compare some simple ratios as a snap shot indicating the existence of a difference 
between the two sets of firms.
Compare firstly the mean dividend-earnings ra tio , investm ent expenditures-net 
earnings ra tio , profit m argin, p roductiv ity  of capital, and depreciation ra te
over the seven years 1974-1980 (see Table 10.1(a) and Appendix A10.6(i))
2. Criteria (l),is  used to validate the main hypothesis. Criteria (2) and (3) are used to validate the 
second level hypotheses, while criteria (4) is used to validate the third level hypotheses.
Where ever conclusions appear to be drawn on the basis of comparative significance of the t-statistics, 
it should be noted that such conclusions are not based on t-statistics alone but in combination with 
the relative weights of the respective significant coefficients in the applicable equations. In addition 
the signs of the coefficients are also compared even when the applicable coefficients may not be 
statistically significant. This may not be appropriate but the comparison of the signs of the 
coefficients forms a part of coparative criteria as indicated in 2 above.
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Table 10.1(a)
COMPARISON OF SELECTED RATIOS
Div:P Inv:P P:Sal Sal'.Fixa Depr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year F L F L F L F L F L
1974 .413 .261 1.72 1.32 .032 .044 6.8 5.2 .17 .12
1975 .267 .301 1.42 1.98 .033 .040 7.2 5.4 .16 .12
1976 .287 .259 1.31 1.67 .035 .036 8.0 5.7 .16 .13
1977 .354 .251 1.40 1.17 .035 .048 8.2 5.7 .17 .13
1978 .308 .231 1.55 1.34 .033 .047 8.4 5.8 .17 .13
1979 .293 .886 1.23 1.21 .046 .047 8.0 5.5 .17 .12
1980 .185 .341 1.96 1.51 .030 .041 7.7 5.7 .16 .13
Note: Div:P, is dividend/net earnings ratio; Inv:P, is gross fixed investment 
expenditures/net earnings ratio for the period; P:Sal, is the profit margin or 
profit/sales ratio; Sal:Fixa, is the productivity of capital in terms of sales 
or sales/net opening tangible fixed assets; Depr, is the depreciatopn rate or 
depreciation allowances/opening net tangible fixed assets.
From the above table it is clear that the firms come from two different populations. 
Additional insight into the differences could be gained when the mean values shown 
above are examined side by side with the standard deviation of the respective ratios 
shown in appendix 10.6(i). Not much need to be said about these ratios since they 
‘speak’ for themselves. However it is perhaps interesting to observe how the 
dividend-earnings ratio has been consistently higher for the foreign thah the locally 
controlled firms until 1979 when the dividend control was abolished by the 
government. In both 1979 and 1980 local firms generally paid higer dividends as a 
proportion of net profits while the foreign controlled firms did not appear to be so 
‘excited’ by the removal of dividend control. Indeed they appear to be less 
concerned about repatriation of their earnings since the exchange control was at the 
same time removed3.
3. It would be interesting to study the future ratios to know how removal of exchange control influence 
dividend remittances.
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Table 10.1(b)
COMPARISON OF SELECTED RATIOS
Gearing AEFB :Sal Bank:Sal LTL:Sal TCA:TCL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year F L F L F L F L F L
1974 .367 .328 .054 .039 .104 .069 .069 .103 1.6 1.6
1975 .319 .315 -.009 .013 .072 .063 .063 .101 1.9 1-7
1976 .319 .291 .011 .020 .069 .051 .055 .103 1.9 1.8
1977 .290 .291 -.027 .016 .057 .045 .042 .098 1.9 1.9
1978 .284 .286 .008 .020 .065 .042 .032 .103 1.8 1.8
1979 .251 .251 .006 .008 .066 .050 .032 .086 1.8 1.8
1980 .226 .254 .004 .019 .Qj67 .050 .025 .086 1.9 1.7
Note: gearing ratio is defined as bank loans and overdrafts plus other long 
and short term loans divided by equity plus total borrowing; AEFB : Sal 
is change in total borrowing at time t minu* total borrowing at time t-1 
divided by sales; Bank:Sal is bank loans and overdrafts divided by sales;
LTL is'total long and otheT short term loans divided by sales; ‘and TCA:TCL is 
the ratio of total current assets divided by total current liabilities.
From the Table 10.1(b) above, there are indications that the two sets of firms come 
from two different populations. It would be clearer when one compares the mean 
ratios side by side with their standard deviations shown in appendix 10.6(ii). One 
important observation from table 10.1(b) is the difference in the structure of 
external finance between the two sets of firms. Notice that foreign controlled firms 
tend to borrow more on 'current account’ (i.e., bank loans and overdrafts) than the 
locally controlled firms. The foreign firms however borrow less from long term 
sources than the locally controlled frims. In general both foreign and locally 
controlled firms clearly make use of bank loans and overdrafts more than long term 
debt. This is understandable since overdrafts is a cheaper source of funds than term 
loans. This preference of bank credits by the foreign firms more than the local firms 
would surely have some implications on their relative external finance behaviour. 
As for the additional reason why foreign firms prefer current account financing, it is 
perhaps the flexibility this source of finance allows and also the less information 
exposure required in comparison to other sources. One has the impression that 
foreign controlled subsidiaries are more ‘secretive’ than the locally controlled firms.
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My difficulty in obtaining their detailed financial data clearly points to this 
impression.
Thirdly, compare the Total Business Cost Ratio(TBC)4 shown in Table 10.1(c) 
below. It is interesting to notice that locally controlled firms perform better than 
the foreign controlled firms. This is contrary to expectations since foreign 
controlled firms’ production linkage with their parents' group should be expected to 
reduce their production cycle (and thus their business cost), in the host country. 
This does not seem to have been the case. It therefore appears that although some 
components may have been imported, the subsidiaries have paid perhaps as much as
t
it would have cost to produce in the host country. However before one goes on 
board with this point, it is important to observe that, since the net profit figure is 
arrived at after interest, depreciation allowances and tax, the superior profit margin 
performance of the local firms over the foreign firms may have also been due to the 
difference in their depreciation policy (see Table 10.1(a) above). In the same 
'crucible’ the difference in the TBC would be influenced by the depreciation policy.
----------------- EAIDT,
4. TBC is defined as V 1  o T T  '  where EAIDT is earnings after interest, depreciation and tax as
reported in the accounts of individual firms; SAL is the net sales turnover ( i.e., sales after value 
added tax) for the respective firms. The ratios reported in the tables are of course their mean values.
Table 10.1(c)
COMPARISON OF TOTAL BUSINESS COST RATIOS
Means Means Std. Dev Std.Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year F L F L
1974 .938 .928 .055 .038
1975 .939 .933 .048 .039
1976 .939 .935 .048 .047
1977 .939 .925 .053 .042
1978 .942 .926 .048 .034
1979 .928 .927 .056 .039
1980 .945 .932 .06.6 .040
Note: Std.Dev is the standard deviation
Let us now turn to the empirical anlyses.i
In presenting the rest of this result, the approach followed is to discuss the results 
of the pooled cross-section time-series analyses in detail, while the periodic cross- 
section analyses are discussed in a summary form. The tables containing the details 
of the regression results for the annual cross-section analyses are shown in the 
appendix A10. Following the summary results for the annual analyses, is the result 
of the Chow-test measuring the overall strength of the difference between the 
coefficients obtained from the application of the same models to data of the different 
sample sets - foreign versus locally controlled firms.
Before presenting the results, it is convenient to give the outline definition of the 
symbols used throughout the following chapters. The detailed definition has 




Outline definition of m ajor term s used in  the  em pirical study
D dividends
P profit after tax
EFB Net change in total borrowing(external finance)
I Investment in fixed assets
NCP Net change in working capital investment
CAV change in sales-the accelerator variable
D E P depreciation and amortisation provisions
PC Book value of fixed capital stock
ING income gearing(interest as a proportion of net profit before interest)
CAG capital gearing
S sales turnover
a . constant term
FC ’ foreign control dummy
All variables except ING and CAG are normalised by sales 
turnover.
2. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS: DIVIDEND EQUATION 
(POOLED SAMPLES)
In this section the ordinary least squares results of the dividend, equation is 
presented: first for the pooled m ain sample covering the periods 1974-1980 
inclusive: and second for sample 2, covering the period 1979 to 1980 inclusive.
Consider first the result of the main sample regressions displayed in table 10B 
below. Let us start by comparing the goodness of fit statistics.
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Table 10B
OLS Regression Results: Dividend Equation, Pooled M ain Sample 
Dependent Variable: D t
Explanatory Coefficient coefficient
Variable Foreign firms Local firms
a 0.0054* -0.0002
(3.0221) (-0.3968)




E F B t 0.0987* -0.0163*
(4.9075) (-3.6298)
I t  ' -0.0234* 0.0133*
(-6.3048) (3.7136)
N C P t -0.1159 0.0207*
(-0.9170) (3.9524)




No. Obs. 287 287
Notes: F  2.21: F  o iS553.02: 
t  .10— 1.65: t  1.96: t  >qj^ *2.58:
F=F-statistic: D  is the mean of the dependent variable (dividend):
(7 /5=  standard deviation of the dependent variable:
Number in parenthesis is the t-statistics:
No. Obs. = number of observations.
Allowing for the not unusually low goodness of fit statistics (R  2  ^ in cross-section 
regressions, the structural performance of the dividend model is relatively high. 
The first indication as to the difference in the dividend behaviour between the two 
sets of firms is clearly visible from the R  2 measure. While 36.7 per cent of the 
changes in the dependent variable is explained by the changes in the independent 
variables for foreign firms. 70.1 per cent of the variation in the same dependent 
variable is explained by the changes in the same independent variables in locally 
controlled firms. This indicates that other factors play a part in the dividend
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decisions of foreign controlled firms which differentiates them from locally 
controlled firms 5. There is of course no formal tests yet for the significance of the 
differences in R 2.
As for the relative overall significance of the model, the result of the F-statistic 
clearly shows that it is significant at 1 per cent level for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. The difference between the F-statistic at 135.39 for locally 
controlled firms against 34.21 for the foreign controlled firms, clearly shows that 
although the explanatory variables are in  to ta l very significant for each sample 
regression, there appears to be at least one factor important for foreign firms which
l
does not apply to locally controlled firms’ dividend decisions6.
The result as shown by the R 2 and the associated F-statistic  validates the m ain 
hypothesis as far as dividend decision is concerned7.
As for the validation of the second level hypothesis relating to dividend decisions, 
each coefficient is now taken in turn.
The intercept(aO: There is a difference in the sign of the coefficient of this term 
between the two sets of firms. It is positively signed as expected in the case of 
foreign controlled firms, while for the local firms the sign turns out to be negative. 
Not very much need to be said about the negative sign of this coefficient since it is 
not significant. However, to the extent that one wishes to point at the difference in 
the financial behaviour of the two sets of firms on the basis of this difference in sign, 
the negative sign reflects the fact that steady dividend per share does not necessarily
5. see Chapter 2,3, and 4. These factors would include financial and production interdependences 
between affiliates and their parents. To identify the individual effect of these factors more data are 
required. An attempt to obtain them has not been successful. This is however outside the main focus 
of this study but surely a direction for a future research. Recall that this study is directed at 
investigating the reflection of domicile of voting equity control on the financial behaviour of the firm.
6. See note 5 above.
7. The significance of the difference between the two sets of firms w ill be measured by Chow-test later in 
section 10.8.
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mean steady dividend per pound sterling of sales. Therefore the existence of
dividend control through the decade of 1970s up till 1979 (when it was abolished)
may have contributed to the rather negative sign of this coefficient. That is, as
dividend ceiling was more or less pegged by statute during the decade, the change in
sales would lead to increase or decrease in the dividend- sales rate. An upward
movement in sales corresponding to the reduction of dividend ceiling from 12.5 per
cent existing up to the middle of 1975, to 10 per cent for the rest of the period till
1979 (see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1980, P.34) would reflect in a
relatively smaller dividend-sales ratio from the previous levels.
♦
While this should also be the case with foreign controlled firms, empirical evidence 
shows to the contrary. The reason can be attributed to the dividend payment 
patterns found in foreign controlled firms. It is found that out of 287 observations 
comprising the foreign firms data, only in 137 were dividends paid while no 
dividends were paid for 150 company-years. In the case of locally controlled firms, 
out of 287 observations, only in 11 were there no dividends paid. Indeed out of this 
11 observations seven relates to one firm where the government has substantial 
share holdings. This is the only such firm in the sample included because the 
management has little state interference in its operations. Its inclusion is to balance 
the industrial mix of foreign controlled firms.
Thus, in a large number of cases in foreign firms sample, where zero dividends were 
paid, the dividend control had no effect. For those that did pay dividends, they 
appear to pay higher rates of dividend to sales. Since dividends can not normally be 
less than zero (where disaggregated data are used) most of the changes are above 
zero and therefore explain the positive intercept for foreign controlled firms.
The lagged dividend(Z)r _^): The coefficient of this variable has the expected 
positive sign and its magnitude is significant at 1 per cent level for both foreign and
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locally controlled firms. There is however a large difference between the magnitude 
of this coefficient in the foreign firms as compared to locally controlled firms. The 
relative 'weight' of lagged dividend variable in foreign firms estimate as measured 
by the coefficient's magnitude is .27; this is less than three times its weight in 
locally controlled firms (which is .77). This shows that locally controlled firms are 
more inclined towards a stable dividend policy relative to foreign controlled firms.
The Net ProfitCPj ): The estimated coefficients of this variable are positive as 
predicted on a priori grounds for both sets of firms. The significance of the 
coefficients for both sets of firms is at 1 per cent level. The weight of this variable 
as measured by the magnitude of the coefficient and its associated t-statistic, differs 
between the two sets of firms. A look at the table would show that both the 
magnitude of the coefficient and its significance is higher for foreign firms than for 
locally controlled firms. This is the reverse of the result shown by the lagged 
dividend presented in the preceding paragraph. This is an interesting finding which 
has not been found by any other empirical study and certainly have implications to 
dividend theory. Lintner (1956) suggests that firms follow a stable dividend policy 
and pay dividends based on a certain target pay out ratio and a selected speed of 
adjustment to which they adhere to over a long period. This ratio is only adjusted 
up or down by the corporate management, where a permanent change has taken 
place regarding the earnings position of the firm. Thus, as long as the new 
permanent state has not been observed, the  speed of adjusting from the existing 
dividend pattern to a new target or optimal (ideal) dividend rate would be slow, 
resulting in current dividend being highly dependent on lagged dividend as shown 
by the magnitude of its coefficient and its significance.
What the present finding suggests is that where foreign firms are concerned, the 
theory of steady dividend pay out policy does not appear to hold universally, and 
where dividends are paid they respond more quickly to profits. The role of current
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profits relative to lagged dividends in explaining current dividend decisions also 
differs between the two sets of firms (see Table 10B above).
On the basis of the active theory, it is possible using Lintner,s(1956) model, to show 
that the target pay out ratio and the speed of adjustment differs between foreign 
and locally controlled firms(see chapter 5 and chapter 11.7 Table HR). The result 
of such analyses shows the speed of adjustment for local firms to be about 0.28, 
while that of foreign controlled firms is much higher at 0.69. Similarly, the target 
pay out ratio for local firms is 0.22 as compared to foreign firms with the ratio of 
0.25. Thus, while foreign firms appear to be infrequent in their dividend pay outs, 
when paying dividends, their speed of adjustment is more than twice faster than 
locally controlled firms8:
The ex ternal Finance (EFB): The coefficient of this variable is positive as predicted 
for the foreign controlled firms, while it turns out to be negatively signed in local 
firms. In both cases the coefficient is significant at 1 per cent level. The a priori 
reasons for expecting this difference in sign between foreign and local firms are 
discussed in chapter 8.3 (above). It is as well to remind the reader that the reason 
for expecting a positive relationship between external finance and dividends is that 
external finance is a source of funds. Thus, it enables 'the firm to meet its dividend 
commitments while at the same time able to finance its projects. However where 
locally controlled firms (whose shares are widely held by external investors) are 
concerned, dividend has been suggested to have some information content. Thus 
when dividends are announced and it matches expectations, the firm’s share prices 
tend to improve: but when the financing plans are announced later, an increase in 
external borrowing has the tendency to 'dampen' the share prices, as the
8. The possible implications of this to the host government policy are suggested in chapter 12.
-259-
shareholders correct their impressions based on the signal received from earlier
dividend announcement (see Miller and Rock(l985)). This means that if a firm
increases its dividend rate in the current year or pays as much in the current year as
it has always done in the preceding years, it is creating an impression to the market
that all is well. If shortly afterwards the management announces its financing
decisions involving new borrowing or call upon the shareholders to put up more
risk capital, the market reaction would be to ‘mark down’ the firm’s share value in
reaction to the wrong information signal earlier received from dividend increase or
maintenance- The management would obviously wish to avoid sending wrong
«
signal to the market. Therefore where dividends are increased the implication 
would be that permanent improvement in profit performance of the firm has 
occurred. From the budget equation, an increase in profits would lead to less 
dependence on external finance sources, thus leading to the negative relationship 
between current dividend and external finance variable. This is rather interesting, 
as it suggests that the dividend signal by the UK quoted firms should indeed be 
trusted.
2.1 Fixed investm ent (l t ) and net working capital investment (NCPt ):
.The coefficients of both of these variables reflecting 'alternative uses of funds to 
dividends, have the expected negative signs in foreign controlled firms, while both 
have positive signs in locally controlled firms. The coefficient of fixed investment is 
significant in both foreign and local firms but with opposite signs. This is again a 
significant difference. While it is possible to argue that current investments would 
have a positive influence on future profits and thus future dividend flows, it is not 
clear that current investments would move in the same direction as dividends of the 
current period. However, it is not inconceivable that due to the smoothing effect of 
steady dividend policy, the retained earnings from previous years and funds from 
government grants, tax allowances, and depreciation provisions would enable a firm
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maintain its fixed investment expenditure as well as net current asset investment
programmes, while at the same time able to meet its dividend commitments from
current cash flow. Another possible reason relates to the timing of actual dividend
outflows from the firm’s bank account. Dividends are normally paid in arrears of
the period to whose income they relate. Publicly quoted companies in most cases
declare interim and final dividends. It may well be the case that final dividends in
the current period are paid out of the 'cash flows’ part of which relates to the
available funds in the period of actual*payments and not necessarily only from cash
flow of the year the dividend relates. Investment expenditures in the year to which
*
the dividends are attributable, may thus not be influenced negatively by such 
dividends paid out of the next period's cash flows. Thus both dividend and 
investment in fixed assets may be positively related.
While one would have expected the preceding point to apply to foreign controlled 
firms, it does not appear that they frequently pay interim dividends separately 
from final dividends. From the author’s interviews there are indications that, funds 
may be remitted at any time during the current period even if this gives effect to 
borrowing for dividend purposes. Funds may be remitted in advance of its 
recording in the accounts as dividends. Thus in foreign firms current dividends are 
more likely to flow out of current periods cash flows. Therefore investment would 
have a negative relationship with the dividend payments during the same period. 
This point is supported by the fact that external finance variable is positive in the 
dividend equation for foreign firms (Table 10B).
The significant positive relationship between dividend and investment for the local 
firms (using the ordinary least squares model) corroborates the single equation 
results of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967, PP.442-443; 447-448). This unexpected sign 
forms the basis for their criticism of single equation models, particularly where the 
, dependent and independent variables are interdependent. Where this is the case
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they argue that single equation methods would yield biased and inconsistent
estimates particularly for the endogenous explanatory variables in the model. This
is usually attributed to the effect of the covariance of the random term (v t- ) and the
endogenous explanatory variables (such as I t d.ndEFBt ) in the dividend equation.
(see Koutsoyiannis (op.cit P.118. PP.331-335)). It is perhaps necessary to point out
here that in the simultaneous equation result to be shown later in chapter 11, the
impact of investment on dividend is a negative one. Thus, the use of single equation
method may, at least partly have* contributed to the positive coefficient of
investment in the dividend equation9.
♦
Having made the above points, it is perhaps fair to point out that other studies such 
as McCabe (1979, P.125) and Kumar (1984) applied ordinary least squares method 
and obtained the expected negative relationship between current dividend and 
investment. However, not much can be said about McCabe’s results since the 
definition of his explanatory variables including investment expenditures, are based 
on a three-year weighted average of their respective values. The weights were 
chosen by fitting each equation for a grid of values and picking the weights that 
yielded the highest R 2. This definition of variables and that used in this study are 
not comparable. As for Kumar’s study, the nature of the firms in his sample is not 
known - the numbers that are foreign firms, and those that are locally controlled 
firms. While the sample in this study is drawn from manufacturing companies 
only. Kumar’s sample is made up of all sorts of firms, including firms in retail, 
construction, clothing, wholesale and so on. There is no indication as to whether the 
firms in his sample are all independent companies or a mixture of subsidiaries and
9. For an explanation of how the covariance of the error term (V) and the endogenous explanatory 
variable would affect the estimated coefficient of the explanatory variable, see Koutsoyiannis (1984), 
PP. 334-335. The reporting of OLS results is in line with Maddala's (1977, P.231) point that both 
OLS and other structural equation results need to be reported as this w ill be revealing plus the fact 
that even if OLS may yield inconsistent estimates, it is more robust against specification errors and 
may be useful on its own.
- 2 6 2 -
independent companies, in which case there may be double counting. To the extent 
that his sample comprise a mixture of foreign and local firms his (OLS) result can 
not relate strictly to the locally controlled firms and thus not strictly comparable to 
our result on local firms (OLS) estimates.
Finally, an additional exercise was carried out using a larger sample of firms to test 
the same dividend model for two years 1979-1980. This is to find out what the 
situation would be when a large sample is used and when dividend and exchange 
controls have been removed. The results as displayed in Table 10C (below) lead to 
similar conclusions as presented above and need not be repeated. It is however
t
interesting, to note that although the coefficients of investment variables remain 
positive for local firms, they are no more significant. In the case of foreign firms, 
both investment variables have the expected negative sign but as compared to Table 
10B, the significance has switched from fixed investment to net current asset 
investments. It is plausible that these changes may relate to the peculiarities of the 
period being the recession years when much less incentive existed for fixed 
investments. At the same time much more funds are tied up in unsold inventories, 
debtor balances, and perhaps unused cash receipts preserved for precautionary 
purposes. The size of the coefficient of lagged dividends in locally controlled firms 
appears to reflect the effect of abolishing of the statutory dividend control and the 
consequent large dividend pay outs in locally controlled firms (in 1979 and 1980). 
Such excitement does not appear to be reflected in the case of foreign controlled 
firms who perhaps were able to satisfy the parent company’s dividend-requirements 
through other channels during the period when dividend and exchange controls 
were in operation.
Given the finding discussed in this section there are grounds to support the 
hypothesis that a difference between foreign versus locally controlled firms exist in 
terms of the relative influences of the determinants of corporate dividend
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behaviour. This. thus, validates the second level hypothesis relating to dividend 
decisions.
Table IOC
OLS Results: Dividend Equation, Pooled Sample 2 
Dependent V ariable = Dt
Explanatory coefficient coefficient
Variables Foreign firms Local firms
at 0.0096* -0.0046*
(2.6487). (-3.6649)
A - i 0.3700* 1.0501*
(4.3439) (12.7010)












No. OBS. 188 188
* significant at 1 per cent level 
** significant at 5 per cent level
3. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS: INVESTMENT EQUATION, 
POOLED SAMPLES
In this section the results of the OLS estimation of the investment equation are 
presented. As in the preceding section the approach is to report the result of the 
analysis of the main sample and later the result of of sample 2 regressions.
The estimated coefficients of the investment models are displayed in Table 10D
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below.
Table 10D
OLS Regression Results: Investm ent Equation, Pooled M ain Sample
Dependent Variable = 11
Explanatory Coefficient Coefficient





















No. OBS. 287 287
I  is the mean of the dependent variable, O  j  is the
standard deviation of the dependent variable. Numbers in the parentheses
are the t-statistics. * significant at 1 per cent level;
** significant at 5 per cent level.
The goodness o f fit s ta tistic  (R 2): The equation appears to fit the data relatively 
well overall. In comparison, the R 2 for the foreign controlled firms sample 
regression is greater than that of locally controlled firms. The indication is that the 
same investment model performs better for foreign controlled firms than for locally
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controlled firms. Although one can not say whether the difference between the R 2 
is statistically significant, since there is as yet no formal test for this, there is a clear 
indication from this statistic (50 per cent for foreign against 38 per cent in locally 
controlled firms) that there is a difference in the fixed investment expenditure 
behaviour between the foreign and locally controlled firms.
As for the relative overall significance of the investment model, the associated F- 
statistic . clearly shows that it is significant at 1 per cent level for both foreign and 
locally controlled firms. In comparison the model is more significant for foreign 
firms than locally controlled firms and suggests that there is at least one variable
i
that is important for investment decisions in local firms which does not apply to 
foreign firms.
The result of R 2 and its associated F-statistic displayed on Table 10D clearly 
validates the main hypothesis so far as it relates to fixed capital investment 
decisions.
Turning to the validation of the second level hypothesis relating to the investment 
decisions in the two sets of firms, each estimated coefficient is examined in turn as 
follows:
The in tercept(tt ): As expected, the intercept has a positive sign in foreign 
controlled firms sample. This coefficient is however not significant. Surprisingly, 
the intercept for the locally controlled firms sample turn out to have a negative sign 
which is also significant at 1 per cent level. It is rather difficult to explain the 
negative intercept in the investment equation for locally controlled firms. What is 
however of more concern here is to indicate that a difference exists between the .two 
sets of firms.
The ex ternal fmance{EFBt ): This variable as expected has the positive sign for 
both foreign and local firms. The coefficient is significant for foreign controlled
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firms at 1 per cent level while it turns out not to be significant in locally controlled 
firms.
The dividend variable(Z)t ): The coefficient of this variable, as expected, being a
competing use of funds has a negative coefficient in this equation for foreign firms.
But. it turns out to have a positive sign in local firms, thus repeating the
corresponding sign of the coefficient of investment in the dividend equation (see
Table 10B). Although the coefficient of dividend is not significant in both
regressions in Table 10D, the differences in the sign is subtle, but an important
finding. It suggests that due to stable dividend pay out policy in locally controlled
%
firms, and therefore its smoothing effect, the local firms are able to continue their 
investment program at the same time as dividend payments are maintained using 
the ‘stock’ of retained earnings (see chapter 8.4 for the discussion on the a priori 
expectations on this variable).
Lagged profitKPj _ !): This variable as expected has a positive coefficient in this 
equation. In both cases however, it is not significant.
N et investm ent in  w orking cap ita lW C P t ): This variable, being a competing use 
of funds with fixed investment it has a negative sign as expected in foreign 
controlled. firms. It however turns out with a positive coefficient in locally 
controlled firms. In both cases the coefficient of this variable is significant. It is 
difficult to explain this positive sign on a priori grounds except perhaps to suggest 
that additional fixed investment spending may well lead to additional investment in 
net working capital to reflect the increase in the level of activity. This ability to 
finance additional fixed capital expenditures as well as additional net current asset 
or working capital investment at the same time, suggests existence of other sources 
of funds to the local firms not equally used by the foreign firms (such as rights and 
fresh issue of shares). Clearly, as far as this study is concerned, the difference
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between the two sets of firms regarding their investment behaviour is visible from 
this variable (see Table 10D).
Accelerator variableCCAVj): As expected, this variable reflecting a demand 
pressure, has a positive coefficient in both set of firms (see chapter 10.3). However 
the coefficients are not significant in both cases although the t-statistic is higher in 
foreign than in local firms.
Cash flow or depreciation variable(Z)£Pt ): This variable being a source of 
funds, as expected, has a positive coefficient in both sets of firms regressions. 
However, much of the variation in investments is related to this variable whose 
coefficient is highly significant at 1 per cent level. On the contrary, the coefficient of 
this variable, though positive, is not significant even at 10 per cent level for locally 
controlled firms. This difference in significance is rather difficult to explain (but see 
the following paragraph). The high significance of this term reflects the statistical 
evidence showing that foreign controlled firms appear to write off their fixed assets 
faster than locally controlled firms (see Table 10.1(a) above as well as Appendix 
A8.1). As far as this study is concerned, the result of the estimate of this variable is 
another evidence of the difference between the two sets of firms.
Lagged book value o f capital stock (PCt _ i  ): This variable reflecting the effect of 
replacement investments and earlier project starts on gross investment, as expected, 
has a positive coefficient. Surprisingly, while much of the variation in investments 
is related to lagged capital stock variation in locally controlled firms and significant 
at 1 per cent level, this variable, though positive, turns out not to be significant in 
foreign controlled firms. This difference in significance is however difficult to 
explain on a priori grounds other than to point out that this is clearly another 
evidence of the difference between the two sets of firms.
An additional regression exercise was carried out to test the same model using
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larger sample of firms. The period covered is only the first two years after lifting
of dividend and exchange controls which were in operation up to 1978/79 financial
year. While it may not be appropriate to directly compare the regressions of the
main sample covering the period from 1974 to 1980 with that of the period 1979 to
1980 due to the peculiar economic circumstances of the later period being recession
years, it is still possible to observe the differences between the two sets of firms
estimates from this regression. Overall the result from this additional investigation
lead to similar conclusions as that of the main sample regressions, and so to cut
down the volume of the result only major differences are highlighted (see Table 10E
♦
for details).
In the case of foreign controlled firms, all the variables have the expected sign. 
Dividend turns out to be negatively related with investment as expected but it is 
only significant at 10 per cent level. This same variable turns out to have a 
positively signed coefficient which is also significant at 1 per cent level in locally 
controlled firms. Lagged profit turns out to have a positive coefficient which is also 
significant at 1 per cent in foreign firms, while it is positive but not significant in 
locally controlled firms. The accelerator variable which was nearly significant and 
positive in the main sample result (Table 10D), for foreign firms, now turn out to 
be insignificant during the two recession years. In the case of locally controlled 
firms, the accelerator variable becomes significant and positive as expected. What 
this suggests is that during recession, it is those firms that are more able to sell that 
would be in position to expand investment and even though profit margins are low, 
perhaps due to longer credits offered to customers to induce sales, such firms are 
able to raise borrowings to finance investment. However large stock build-ups and 
debtors during this period would have negative impact on fixed investment being 
competing use of funds available. These points are correctly picked up by the 
model in the regression on local firms data. For both foreign and local firms, the
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depreciation variable, have the expected positive sign, but surprisingly the 
significance, though both at 1 per cent, has more weight in local than in foreign 
controlled firms - a complete reversal of the main sample results. As before the 
lagged capital stock variable has a positive sign as expected but not significant even 
at 10 per cent: while in local firms the significance dropped from 1 per cent in the 
main results to nearly 10 per cent in the later sample. These changes would reflect 
the underlying economic climate of the later period: For example, the lifting of 
exchange control meant that local firms could expand investment into foreign 
countries without being limited by controls as before: and the recession of the 
period meant that firms that have the desired cash flow are those that undertook 
investment expenditures. In addition, ‘rationalisation* during the period may well 
have released more cash for investment.
The goodness of fit (R 2) indicates that the model handles the relationships rather 
well considering the not unusually low R 2 for cross-section studies. However the 
F-statistic is significant at 1 per cent for both set of firms and clearly shows that the 
variables introduced in the model together have significant influence on investment 
in both sample sets (see Table 10E (below).
Given the results discussed in this section, there are grounds to support the 
hypothesis that there is a difference between foreign versus locally controlled firms 
in terms of the relative influences of the determinants of corporate fixed investment 
decisions, thus validating the second level hypothesis relating to the investment 
decisions.
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Table 10E
OLS Result: Investm ent Equation, Pooled Sample 2 (1979-1980) 
Dependent V ariable =* 11
Explanatory Coefficient Coefficient







P t-i 0.2608* 0.0918
(4.3373) (1.3854)








R 2 0.4528 0.5829
F 21.2823* 35.9295*
I 0.0581 0.0471
° I 0.0434 0.0369 .
No.OBS 188 188
* significant at 1 per cent level 
** significant at 5 per cent level 
*** significant at 10 per cent level 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.
4* OLS REGRESSION RESULTS: EXTERNAL FINANCE 
EQUATION; POOLED SAMPLES
As in the preceding section, the approach is to present the results of the main sample 
first and then that of sample 2.
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The estimated coefficients of the external finance equation are displayed in Table 
10F below.
Table 10F
OLS Regression Results: External Finance equation; Pooled m ain sample
Dependent Variable = EFBt
Explanatory Coefficient Coefficient

















R 2 0.5113 0.0456
F 43.7420* 2.9498*
EFB 0.0069 0.0192
® (EFB) 0.0717 0.0592
Durb-Wat 1.97 1.96
No.OBS 287 287
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. * significant at 1 per cent 
level. ** significant at 5 per cent level.
EFB is the mean of the dependent variable.
(J (£FB) ^  t*ie standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Durb-Wat is Durbin-Watson statistics.
The goodness o f fit (R  2): In foreign controlled firms the goodness of fit statistics 
indicates that the model relatively fits the data well considering the not unusually
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low R 2 in cross-section regressions. In comparison, the model appears to fit the 
foreign firms data better than locally controlled firms. While no formal test exists 
to determine the significance of the difference between any two goodness of fit 
statistics, a casual look at the results in table 10F (above), shows a clear difference 
between R  2 of 51 per cent for foreign firms against only a 4.6 per cent in locally 
controlled firms.
The fact that the regression line explains only a small part of the total variation in 
the dependent variable (the net new borrowing) in locally controlled firms indicates 
that there is at least one factor that applies more to locally controlled independent 
firms than, to foreign controlled firms. It is however difficult to identify this factor 
directly in the context of this investigation. To the extent that one may wish to 
suggest a reason for this, it is perhaps a reflection of the nature of firms in the 
sample. The firms, being among the largest in their respective industries are mainly 
conglomerates. The effect is that the data for both dependent and independent 
variables are aggregates of the accounting data of the various 'units’ within the 
group (consolidated accounts). Thus when some subsidiaries (the units) are 
increasing their borrowing others may be reducing theirs, while others would have 
no change at all. The result would be cancelling out of increases against decreases in 
external borrowing. Following from this, the net effect would give an impression of 
a small external finance dependence by the firm’s group. This apparent small 
external finance dependence would appear not to be very much influenced by the 
‘normal’ explanatory variables for external finance behaviour of firms who are less 
diversified (or relatively centralised). Other things being equal this same situation 
would be expected for both foreign and locally controlled firms. The fact that the 
variation in net change in external borrowing is rather well explained by the same 
independent variables used for estimating the behaviour in local firms, serves to 
show clearly that there is a difference between foreign and locally controlled firms
in terms of the determinants of their external finance decisions.
The low R 2 found for the locally controlled firms corroborates similar result by 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967, Table 9, P.446). Their sample of 181 firms is made up of 
very large firms in manufacturing sector and their definition of external finance is 
similar to the definition in this study. The explanatory power of their model varied 
from less than zero per cent once , to 51 per cent. Another instance in the literature 
is that of Kumar (1984, Table A3.4, P. 190), who carried out an OLS regression of 
the external finance behaviour of 664* UK firms and found the explanatory power 
(R 2) of their model as low as 1 per cent.
It is .however important to note that although the coefficient of determination 
indicate that economically the explanatory power of the external finance equation is 
not very great for local firms the relationship estimated from this equation are 
significant when judged by the conventional F-test which is significant at 1 per cent 
level. The difference between the F-statistic for foreign firms (of 43.74) and that of 
locally controlled firms (of 2.95) is unmistakeable.
M athem atical signs and significance of each coefficients: To validate the second 
level hypothesis relating to the external finance decision, the estimates of respective 
independent variables are now examined in turn.
The in tercep t term(oO: In both regressions this has the expected positive sign. As 
compared between them, this coefficient is significant in locally controlled firms 
while it turns out to be insignificant in foreign firms. This may well reflect a 
tendency for foreign firms to borrow on current account and therefore resulting in 
an unstable level of borrowing as compared to local firms who tend to borrow both 
on long term and on current account.
C urren t dividends(Z)t ): This variable as expected has a significant positive 
coefficient in foreign firms sample while it turns out to have a negative though non
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significant coefficient in the local sample regression. This negative sign corresponds 
to the negative sign of external finance variable in the dividend equation (see section 
10.2 above).
The fixed investm en t!/£ ): As expected, this variable representing a use of funds 
available to the firm, it has a positive sign which is significant in both sets of firms. 
However, comparing the magnitude of the coefficient and its significance, the 
evidence shows that this variable is more influential in foreign firms than in local 
firms. This perhaps reflects the tendency of foreign firms to match foreign assets 
w ith foreign liabilities.
%
The n e t profit (P t ): As expected, this variable representing a source of internal 
funds and therefore would dilute the need for external finance dependence, has a 
negative relationship with external finance in both sample sets. However, 
comparing the two regressions, the evidence shows that the magnitude of the 
coefficient and its significance are higher in foreign firms (at 1 per cent level), while 
it is significant at 5 per cent in locally controlled firms. Concidering the difference 
between the size of the cefficients in addition to the difference in the significance of 
the estimate of this variable (see Table 10F above), it appears that foreign firms’ 
external finance is more responsive to net profits than locally controlled firms.
The cash flow or depreciation(Z)£P£ ): This variable being a source of funds, as 
expected has a negative relationship with external finance for both foreign and local 
firms' regression. However, comparing the two. while the coefficient is nearly 
significant at 5 per cent level in foreign firms, it turns out not to be significant in 
locally controlled firms.
The in terest or income gearing!/N C t ): As expected, this variable representing 
business risk has a negative relationship with external finance in both foreign and 
locally controlled firms. However, comparing the two sets of regressions, the
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coefficient of this variable is negatively significant at 1 per cent level in local firms, 
while it is not significant in foreign controlled firms.
The capital gearing(CAGt _ i): This variable represents financial risk exposure, 
and as expected it has a negative sign in foreign firms regression while it turns out 
to have a positive sign in locally controlled firms. The negative coefficient in foreign 
firms is significant at 1 per cent level, while the positive coefficient in local firms is 
not significant (see chapter 8.5 a priori expectations CAG).
Net current asset investmentCTVCP* ): this variable representing use of funds for 
current asset investments, has the, expected signs in both sets of sample regressions. 
As expected, the weight of its significance is higher in foreign than in locally 
controlled firms. In the former the coefficient is significant at 1 per cent, while 
non-significant in the later. Over all. much of the variation in external finance is 
related to net change in current assets in foreign controlled firms over the period, 
(see Table 10F above).
Additional regression was carried out to test the same model using a larger sample 
sets for the period covering the two early years after lifting of exchange control and 
dividend control. While it may not be totally appropriate to compare the regression 
covering this later period and that of the main sample covering a longer period, due 
to the peculiar economic climate of the period, it is still possible to observe the 
differences between the two sets of firms.
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Table 10G
OLS Results: External Finance Equation Pooled Sample 2 (1979-1980) 
Dependent Variable = E F B t
Explanatory Coefficient coefficient









D E P t ' -1.4035* -1.5106*
(-3.8437) (-4.9879)
IN C t -0.0032* 0.0077**
(-5.7189) (2.1070)




R 2 0.4382 0.3431
F 21.8365* 14.9544*
E F B 0.0149 0.0100
°EFB 0.1069 . 0.0582
No.OBS 188 188
* significant at 1 per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level 
numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics.
From the table it is clearly observable that both the R 2 and F-statistic indicate 
better performance of the same model for foreign than local firms Cfor the same 
reasons suggested earlier in this section).
In the case of foreign firms all the coefficients have the expected sign (see chapter 
10.4 for discussion on a priori expectations) and all except the constant term are 
significant at 1 per cent level. As for the locally controlled firms, all the variables 
except the dividend and income gearing have the expected signs. The dividend.
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though it has the wrong (negative) sign, it is not significant, while the coefficient of 
business risk or income gearing turns out to have a wrong (positive) sign which is 
also significant. It is not clear why this wrong sign with a complete reversal of 
what the same variable indicated in the main sample results shown in table 10F 
(above). Perhaps the high rate of interests during 1979 may well have led to 
expectations of increasing rates in the following years. Such high rates coupled 
with the efFect of recession on profit margins may be responsible for the significant 
positive income gearing coefficient. The same did not appear to have occurred in the 
case of foreign controlled firms who may well have been helped by the financial 
interdependence, between the affiliates and the rest of the parent’s group. This is in 
addition to their apparent better profit performance as can be seen from the relative 
size of the negative coefficient of the profit variable in the estimate (Table 10G). As 
reported in the main sample (Table 10F), much of the variation in external finance 
is related to the variation in net current assets in foreign firms while much of the 
variation in the external finance is related to the variation in the fixed asset 
investment expenditure both in the main sample and sample 2 regressions for the 
local firms sample.
Given the results discussed in this section there are grounds to support the 
hypothesis that there is a difference between foreign versus locally controlled firms 
in terms of the relative roles of the  determ inants of external finance behaviour. 
This validates the second level hypothesis relating to external finance decision (see 
chapter 8.2).
All in all, from the pooled cross-section time-series regression analyses whose 
results are discussed in this and preceding two sections, there are strong grounds to 
support the three second level hypotheses stated in chapter 8. Thus, there is a 
difference between the foreign controlled versus locally controlled firms in terms of 
the relative influence of the determinants of their dividend, investment and external
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finance behaviours. Together, these findings support the main hypotheses - that 
there is a difference between the financial decisions in foreign versus locally 
controlled firms (see chapter 8.2 above).
In the following three sections, the result of the annual regressions carried out to 
test the hypotheses for the individual years are presented. If the differences in the 
relative R 2, the F-statistic. the mathematical signs and the distribution of t- 
statistics, persists over the years, then this would constitute a firm support for the 
hypotheses.
5. SUMMARY RESULTS ANNUAL REGRESSIONS: DIVIDEND 
EQUATION
5.1 COMPARATIVE GOODNESS OF FIT AND F-STATISTICS: 
DIVIDEND EQUATION ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION 
SAMPLES
To compare the dividend behaviour of the foreign and locally controlled firms three 
OLS regressions were carried out each year for the dividend equation: one for 
foreign firms, one for locally controlled firms and one for combined foreign and 
locally controlled firms, using the same dividend model as applied to the pooled 
sample regressions. The resulting goodness of fit statistics are displayed in table 
10H.
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Table 10H*
Com parative Goodness o f fit Statistics: Dividend Equation 
(Annual Cross-section Samples)
Year Foreign firm Local firms Combined
R \% ) R 2{%) R \% )
1974 13.5 78.1 18.0
1975 32.6 89.2 32.4
1976 65.8 84.3 67.7
1977 41.8 74.9 43.0
1978 40.2 73.4 43.0
1979 60.3 79.7 25.0










Note: see Appendices AlO.l and A10.2(i) for details.
Although there is no formal test for the differences between a pair 
of R 2, the differences between foreign and locally controlled 
firms can be observed by comparing the R 2 of the separate sample set 
with that of the combined sample.
It is clearly evident that, given allowance for the not an unusually low goodness of 
fit statistics in cross-section regressions, the result displayed in table 10H suggests 
that the model handles the data relatively well for each sample set. More 
importantly, when one compares foreign and local firms regressions, it is clearly 
visible that the same estimating model fits the locally controlled firms data better 
than the foreign controlled firms. This corroborates the result of the pooled cross- 
section results of dividend equation. The result of the combined (foreign plus local 
firms) sample shows a generally lower R 2 statistics when compared* with that of 
separate regression of locally controlled firms. This suggests that at least one other 
factor is important to the dividend decisions in foreign affiliates not applicable to 
locally controlled firms.
Turning to the analysis o f variance of the F-statistics, which tests the overall 
significance of the regressions, that is, that the variables introduced in the dividend
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equation, are together significant explanatory factors of the variation in dividends, 
the difference between the two sets of firms is clearly vivid from table 101 (below).
Table 101
Analysis o f Variance Results: Dividend Equation, A nnual and Pooled Samples
Com parative F-Statistics
Year Foreign firms Local firms Combined sample
1974 2.3* 29.6 3.3
1975 4.9 67.3 7.3
1976 16.4 44.1 31.9
1977 6.7 24.8 11.5
1978 6.4 23.1 11.5
1979 13.2 32.3 5.1
1980 8.3 181.7 23.4
Sample 2 
1979 15.6 36.1 18.3
1980 12.7 58.0 26.4
* significant at 5 per cent level. In a .1 other cases the
F-statistics is significant at 1 percent level. See Tables 91
and 9J, in the preceding chapter for the degrees of freedom applicable.
For more details see appendices A 10.1, and A10.2(i)
From the above table, it is clear that the various variables introduced in the 
dividend model are together significant explanatory factors of the variation in 
dividends for both foreign and locally controlled firms. Comparing the two sets of 
firms in terms of the F-statistics, the difference between them is clearly evident. 
This is borne out by the difference between the F-statistics of the combined sample 
regression and that of either the local or foreign controlled firms taken separately.
5.2 M athem atical signs and distribution o f significance o f t- 
statistics
The signs and significance of the coefficients of the independent variables across the 
years are analysed in table 10J, below. The differences between the foreign firms 
sample results and that of locally controlled firms are discussed.
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The results obtained from the annual cross-section regressions are generally similar 
to that of pooled sample regressions (see Table 10B).
Following the usual pattern of presentation, the signs and significance of the
coefficients are now compared in turn between foreign and local firms. From, table
10J, row  C) it can be seen that over the years, the foreign controlled firms have a
positive tendency to pay out dividends as an increasing rate of sales. Thus, out of 9
separate annual regressions (i.e. 7 for the main sample 1974-1980, and 2 for the
second sample 1979-1980), the intercept coefficient is positive for the 9 regressions
of foreign firms data but is significant at 10 per cent only once. Contrarily, locally
%
controlled firms have positive intercept coefficient only in two regressions but none 
is significant even at 10 per cent. However in the 7 remaining regressions where the 
intercept is negative, it turns out to be significant twice . This reflects the fact that 
while the locally controlled firms may follow steady dividend policy, it does not 
necessarily mean constant dividend-sales ratio.
Table 10J
Distribution of OLS Regression Coefficients for dividend Equation 
Main Sample 1974-1980; Second Sample 1979-1980: Annual cross-section Data
Number of Coefficients in each Class (see note)
significance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F L F L F L F L F L F L
a Predicted sign + + + + + + + - -
b Total(+ and -) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
c Positive only 7 2 7 7 7 7 . 6 1 4 5 1 5
d sig. at 10% 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
e sig. at 5% 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 1
f sig. at 1% 0 0 3 7 3 3 1 0 0 2 0 1
g Negative only 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 6 3 2 6 2
h sig. at 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
i sig. at 5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0
j sig. at 1% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0
sample 2
k 1979 + -** +* +* +* + +*** -♦** - +* -* +*
11980 + -* +** +* +* +* +* + -  _*** _ *  _ * *
Note: the results analysed in rows (b) to (j) are for the main sample 
1974 to 1980, while those shown in (k) to (l) are for sample 2,1979 to 1980. 
* significant at 1 per cent; *• sig. at 5 per cent; *** sig. at 10 percent 
F, denote Foreign firms and L, denote locally controlled firms.
Columns ( l )  is the intercept; (2) is the D t _ j ;  (3) is Pt ;
(4) is EFBt ; (5) is 11 (6) is NCPt . For detailed 
results see Appendices A10.1 and A10.2(i).
The significance level reported
for each coefficient relates to its level in individual annual cross-section 
regression. Thus in some years a variable may be significant at a higher 
level (1%), while in another year it may be significant at 5% and in another 
it may be at 10%. Of course where a variable is significant at 1%, it is 
automatically significant at 5% and 10%. However, in the year where the 
coefficient is significant at 1% (say), it is recorded as such leaving out 
the fact that it is also significant at loweT levels (5% and 10%). It is 
convenient to report the result in this way rather than selecting only one 
level of significance since this enables us to see how the foreign firms 
compare with local firms, in terms of the relative levels of significance 
of the individual coefficients in different years. A look at the appropriate 
appendices noted above, will show the relative weights of the respective 
variables in the respective equations. This point applies to the similar 
summary results for the investment, dividend, and external finance 
, regression results reported in this and the following chapter (and is not
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therefore repeated in each case).
Coming to lagged dividend coefficient (row c, column 2), it will be seen that in
both foreign and local firms, lagged dividend has a positive sign for all the years.
This is also the case in the second sample results (rows k and 1, of col. 2). In
comparison, out of the 9 regressions-years, lagged dividend is significant at 1 per
cent four times: significant at 5 per cent twice, and once at 10 per cent (while not
significant in two regressions). In the locally controlled firms lagged dividend
coefficient is significant at 1 percent throughout the nine annual regressions. This
indicates that locally controlled firms tend to have a stable dividend policy, while
*
in foreign controlled firms dividend payment flows tend to be unstable.
In the case of cu rren t profits variable, the coefficients as expected are positive in all 
nine regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. However, while on 
the one hand local firms’ coefficient is significant only five times (once at 5 per cent 
and four times at 1 per cent), the foreign controlled firms on the other hand have 
significant profit coefficient in seven out of the nine regressions (once at 10 per cent, 
once at 5 per cent, and five times at 1 per cent). This corroborates the result from 
the pooled sample results, which shows that in foreign controlled firms profits 
appear to have strong influence on current dividend distributions relative to lagged 
dividends, while in local firms the reverse is the case.
The ex ternal finance variable, as expected have a positive coefficient in eight out of 
the nine regressions in foreign firms while the same variable has a positive sign only 
twice in local firms. Out of the eight times that this coefficient is positive in foreign 
firms, it is significant seven times : twice at ten percent, three times at 5 per cent 
and twice at 1 per cent. This variable is generally never negatively significant for 
foreign firms. For the locally controlled firms, out of the seven times in which it 
has a negative sign, it is significant four times: once at 10 per cent, once at 5 per
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cent and twice at 1 per cent. This variable is never positively significant for local 
firms sample.
The fixed investm ent variable: The coefficient of this variable further exposes the
difference between the dividend behaviour of foreign versus locally controlled
firms. Dhrymes and Kurz(l967) are the first to make a strong case suggesting that
investment expenditures compete with dividend payments and found from their
dividend model a negative relationship between dividend and investment
expenditures in their cross-section sample of U.S. firms data covering 1951 to 1960.
Other studies such as McCabe (1979). Peterson and Benesh (1983), found support
*
for Dhrymes and Kurz contrary to the views of Fama (1974), Higgins (1972) and 
McDonald et al (1975). Kumar (1984. Chap.7), found a negative relationship 
between dividend and investment using U.K. company data. The problem with all 
these studies is that the firms’ data they used, do not seem to differentiate between 
firms according to the domicile of their ultimate majority ownership control10.
On the basis of this OLS regression, there is no clear indication that there is a strong 
trade-off between dividend payments and investment expenditures in very large 
firms. As can be seen from column (5), row c, out of the nine regressions for the 
foreign firms, the coefficient of this variable has a positive sign in four (and negative 
in five). In comparison, the local firms sample have positive coefficient in six out of 
the nine regressions. For the foreign firms the coefficient is never significant when 
positive, while once where significant at 1 per cent level, it is negatively signed. On 
the contrary, in local firms, the coefficient of this variable is never significant at 1 or 
5 per cent levels when negative. However, whenever significant at 1 or 5 per cent
10. Since the various studies so far in the literature fail to indicate whether their data comprise those of 
locally controlled firms only, those of foreign controlled firms only ot a combination of these two, it 
is perhaps more convenient to keep the comparison of this study with other studies to a necessary 
minimum.
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levels, it is always positively signed. For the six times where it has a positive sign, 
it is significant once at 5 per cent and thrice at 1 per cent levels. This finding puts a 
question mark on the results of other studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
and clearly shows that a difference exists in the dividend behaviour of the two sets 
of firms as far as this variable is concerned.
Finally, consider the net cu rren t investm ent variable: From column (6) the 
coefficient of this variable, as expected, has a negative sign in most cases (i.e., in 
eight out of nine regressions), in the foreign firms. On the contrary this variable has 
a positive sign in six out of the nine regressions on local firms data. Where foreign 
firms are concerned, this variable is never significant when positive, while out of the 
eight regressions where it is negative, it is significant in all eight cases (once at 10 
per cent four times at 5 per cent and three times at 1 per cent levels). Where local 
firms are concerned, this coefficient is negative in three regressions and significant at 
5 per cent in 1980 (a recession year). However in the majority of cases where 
significant this coefficient has a positive sign. Thus it is positively significant once at 
5 per cent and twice at 1 per cent levels. This perhaps reflects the smoothing effect 
of stable dividend policy in local firms; when profits increases the stable dividend 
policy means that the adjustment is not instantaneous, so that dividends are 
maintained while retained earnings results in a rise in net current investments. 
Where profits decline dividends may be maintained from retained earnings. 
Persistent decline in profits may lead to cut in dividends, while need for 
precautionary balances would lead to increase in retentions, and result in a negative 
relationship between net current asset investments and dividends. This scenario 
does not seem to apply to foreign firms, who as the result of this study shows, do 
not appear to follow stable dividend pay out policy.
The findings discussed in this section corroborates the results from the pooled 
regressions discussed earlier and clearly validates the hypothesis that there is a
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difference between the dividend behaviour of foreign versus locally controlled 
independent firms.
6. SUMMARY RESULTS ANNUAL REGRESSIONS: 
INVESTMENT EQUATION
Investment model identical to the one used for estimating the pooled cross-section 
time-series data, whose result is presented in section 10.3, is also used to estimate 
the investment behaviour using annual cross-section data of both foreign controlled 
and locally controlled firms. The summary results of the ordinary least squares 
regressions are presented and compared. The summary approach is used to cut 
down the volume of this thesis. The detailed result is presented in appendix A10.3. 
The format used in the preceding section is adhered to in this section.
6.1 Comparative R 2 and F-statistics
The goodness of fit statistic(R 2) shown in table 10K clearly indicates that the 
investment model used for this investigation, handles the data well for both foreign 
and local firms.
Table 10K
Com parative goodness o f fit statistics: Investm ent Equation
Year Foreign R 2(%) Local R 2(%) Combined R 2(%)
1974 83.3 25.1 60.6
1975 88.3 79.0 76.6
1976 66.3 71.0 57.3
1977 63.5 45.9 47.8
1978 47.1 77.0 67.7
1979 68.3 66.7 69.2
1980 64.0 87.2 71.0
Sample 2
1979 45.4 50.3 48.5
1980 41.0 63.8 46.8
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The difference between the R  2 for the two sets of firms is clearly observable when 
one looks at the result of the combined sample relative to that of either foreign 
firms or locally controlled firms.
Turning to the analysis of variance or F-statistic result: again as shown in table
10L, that a difference exist between the two sets of firms is unmistakable. It is also
clear from the table that the independent variables included in this investment
model, together, are significant explanatory factors of variation in investment.
Indeed apart from 1974 when the regression is significant at about 2 per cent for
local firms, in all other cases, the F-statistic is significant at 1 per cent level. The
*
result displayed for the combined sample results, relative to that of either foreign 
or local firms, clearly indicates the difference in the investment behaviour of the 
two separate sample sets (see table 10L, below).
Table 10L
Com parative Analysis o f variance (F- Statistics); Investm ent Equation
Year Foreign firms Local firms Combined
1974 29.1 2.9* 16.2 •
1975 44.3 22.5 34.5
1976 12.2 11.0 14.2
1977 11.0 5.9 9.7
1978 6.1 20.1 22.2
1979 13.3 12.5 23.8
1980 11.1 39.8 25.9
Sample 2
1979 12.1 14.4 24.2
1980 10.2 24.4 22.6 '
* significant at 2 per cent, the rest are significant at 1 per cent level, 
see Appendices A10.3 and A10.2(ii) for detailed results.
6.2 M athem atical signs and distribution o f significance o f t- 
statistics
The signs and significance of the coefficients of independent variables across the
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years are analysed in table 10M below. The differences between the foreign firms 
and local firms results are briefly presented and discussed.
The results obtained from the annual cross-section regressions are generally similar 
to the pooled sample regressions presented in table 10E (above). The majority of 
the coefficients have the predicted mathematical signs as displayed in table 8A (see 
chapter 8). In most cases, where non-predicted signs occur, they are generally not 
significant except the intercept term which turned out to be negative and significant, 
but only once for both foreign and local firm samples.
Table 10M
Distribution o f significance of Regression Coefficients: Investment Equation
Annual cross-section Samples 1974-1980
Number of coefficients in each class
Significance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
F L F L F L F L F L F L F L F L
a.expected + + + + + + + + + + + +
b.Total(+ & -) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
c.+ve total 2 3 6 6 1 3 5 4 1 2 7 5 7 6 6 7
d.Sig. at 10% 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
e.sig. at 5% 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 1
f.sig. at 1% 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 1 2
g.-ve. total 5 4 1 1 6 4 2 3 6 5 0 2 *0 1 1 0
h.sig. at 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i.sig. at 5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
j.sig. at 1% 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sample 2
1979 +♦** - +* +* -  + +* + _** + +*** +♦ +* + +
1980 +*** - + +* -  +* +• + + + +* +* + +***
Column (1) represents the intercept; (2) is EFBt ; (3) is Dt ;
(4) is Pt ; (6) is CAVt : (7) is DEPt (8) is PCt —i
+ve denotes positive, -ve denotes negative. * significant at 1 per cent
level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 10 per cent.
See appendices A10.3 and A10.2(ii)
The coefficient of external finance variable, as expected have a positive sign in the
- 2 8 9 -
majority of instances. In eight out of the nine regressions for each of the sample 
sets, this variable has a positive sign. However, there are differences in the 
distribution of the significance of t-statistics. In foreign controlled firms (column 
2). the coefficient is positive and significant at 10 per cent once, twice at 5 per cent 
and only once a t 1 per cent levels. As for the local firms, the coefficient is positive 
and significant once at 5 per cent and six tim es a t 1 per cent levels. Thus although 
this variable is important for both firms, from the comparison of the size of the 
coefficients (displayed in Appendix A10.2(ii) and A10.3), the locally controlled 
firms appear to be more inclined to finance capital investment expenditures by 
borrowing than the foreign controlled firms.
The coefficient of current dividend variable, as expected, has a negative sign in eight 
out of the nine regressions for the foreign firms’ sample. It is however significant 
only once a t 1 per cent, but this once, it has a negative sign. On the contrary, for 
local firms sample, this coefficient is positive in five regressions out of nine. It is 
never significant when negative; but in the five cases where it is positive, it turns 
out to be significant at 10 per cent once, and tw ice a t 1 per cent. This is clearly 
opposite what obtains in foreign firms. This fails to support Dhrymes and Kurz 
view that dividend and investment are interdependent as far as locally controlled 
independent firms are concerned. There is however no grounds to also reject that 
hypothesis in foreign firms sample as far as the OLS regression is concerned. It has 
already been noted that the behaviour of dividend variable is perhaps explained by 
the smoothing efFect of stable dividend policy in locally controlled independent 
firms.
The coefficient of lagged profit variable (column 4), as expected has a positive sign 
in the majority of the nine separate regressions for both foreign and local firm 
samples. In foreign firms sample, out of nine regressions, this coefficient has a 
positive sign in seven. It is never significant when negative. Out of the seven
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regressions where it is positive, it is significant once at 5 per cent and th ree tim es a t 
1 per cent. On the contrary, in the six regressions where this coefficient is positive 
in local firms sample, it is significant only once at 10 per cent and once at 5 per cent. 
This coefficient is never significant when negative in local firms. The relatively mild 
influence of lagged profits in local firms as compared to foreign firms is not easy to 
explain. One however, recalls the responses by some executives interviewed during 
the course of this research : that foreign base affiliates have to earn their way and 
that other things being equal, investments flow into profitable regions/affiliates.
Since parent companies often do not issue additional risk capital (ordinary shares).
t
the affiliates are compelled to expand on the basis of internally generated funds (i.e. 
profits). Locally controlled firms are not in such a 'straight jacket’ since they may 
decide to raise additional risk capital to supplement internally generated funds 
when necessary.
Net cu rren t asset investm ent (column 5). as expected has a negative coefficient in a 
majority of the regressions. It has already been indicated that this is a competing 
use of funds and obviously, a firm would not normally be induced to expand its 
activity when there is a ‘large’ stock of unsold finished goods inventories. In foreign 
firms’ sample this variable is positive just once but never significant. Out of eight 
regressions when it is negative it is significant four times at 5 per cent level. On the 
contrary, in locally controlled firms out of the two instances when it is positive, it 
turns out to be significant once at 5 per cent. However out of the seven negative 
coefficients, this variable is significant once at 5 per cent and once at 1 per cent. The 
generally more frequent negative significance of this coefficient in foreign firms is 
expected on the basis that production interdependence may lead to shorter 
production cycle resulting from intra-group intermediate goods exchange which 
may well form a large part of stock of net current assets. The mixed influence of 
the variable in the local firms regressions though not expected, is understandable: an
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increase in fixed investment would mean an increase in activity and would require 
additional investment in working capital, resulting in a positive relationship 
between investment in fixed and net current assets. But a large stock pile of 
finished goods inventories or the need to hedge against financial risk by maintaining 
precautionary liquid balances, would compete with fixed investment demand on 
firms financial resources and thus have a negative relationship with fixed 
investment. At any rate there is a difference between foreign and local firms as far 
as the behaviour of this variable is concerned in this equation.
The accelerator or change in sales variable (column 6) as expected, has a positive
♦
coefficient in the majority of regressions for both foreign and locally controlled 
firms. In foreign controlled firms sample the coefficient of this variable is positive in 
nine out of nine regressions. It is however significant once at 10 per cent and only 
once at 5 per cent level. On the other hand, in local firms sample the coefficient of 
this variable is positive in seven out of the nine regressions. It is however 
significant once at 10 per cent and once at 1 per cent levels: It is never significant 
when negative. On the basis of distribution of significance, it appears that, although 
foreign firms always have positively signed coefficients, while locally controlled 
firms sample has negative coefficient in two regressions, this variable has stronger 
influence on local firms. The generally low frequency of significance of this variable 
may be related to various factors including the possible influence of leasing which 
provides the desired capacity and yet not recorded as investment, thus diluting the 
accelerator effect as picked up by the model. Evidence that fairly large amount of 
investments in plant and machinery by firms are off-balance sheet is already on 
record (see for example Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (Sept. 1984), PP.369- 
375). In addition, the introduction of lagged capital stock variable (which is 
equally important), may have diluted the effect of change in sales.
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The cash flow o r depreciation variable (column 7), as expected, has a positive 
coefficient in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled 
firms. In foreign firms sample, this variable is positive in nine out of nine 
regressions, while in local firms sample, it is positive in eight out of nine regressions. 
In foreign controlled firms, the coefficient of this variable is significant once at 5 per 
cent, and eight tim es a t 1 per cent. On the other hand, in local firms sample, the 
coefficient of this variable is significant once a t 10 per cent, and six tim es a t 1 per 
cent. Although the coefficient of this variable is once negative, it is not significant. 
On the basis of the distribution of significance it is clear that depreciation or cash 
flow variable has more influence on the investment in foreign than in local firms. 
The reason for this has been suggested to relate perhaps to the tendency of foreign 
firms to write off their foreign base assets faster than local firms and thus have the 
cash flow to update their fixed assets as fast as is required.
The lagged capital stock or replacement variable, (column 8), as expected has a 
positive coefficient in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. In foreign controlled firms, the coefficient is positive, in eight out 
of the nine regressions; but in locally controlled firms it has positive sign in nine out 
of nine regressions. The negative coefficient is however, not significant. In foreign 
controlled firms the coefficient is significant at 10 per cent once, twice at 5 per cent 
and once at 1 per cent. On the contrary, in the locally controlled firms this 
coefficient is significant once at 10 per cent, once at 5 per cent and twice at 1 per cent 
levels. Thus, on the basis of the distribution of the significance of t-stqtistics of this 
variable it appears that lagged capital stock (a proxy for replacement investment) 
has more influence on local firms’ gross investment than in foreign controlled firms. 
This result is clearly brought out in the pooled regression results (see Table 10D 
above).
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On the basis of the OLS results discussed in this section, there is a strong ground to 
accept the hypothesis that there is a difference between the investment behaviour of 
foreign versus locally controlled firms thus validating the second level hypothesis 
relating to the fixed investment decisions (chapter 8.2).
7. SUMMARY RESULTS ANNUAL REGRESSIONS: EXTERNAL 
FINANCE EQUATION
The external finance model developed and used for the pooled time-series cross- 
section sample estimation presented in section 10.4, is used here to run regressions 
on annual basis. The total regressions are nine each for foreign firms sample and 
locally controlled firms sample. The comparison of the results, in terms of the R 2, 
the F-statistic, the signs of the coefficients and the distribution of the significance of 
their t-statistics. are displayed in the tables and discussed below (for details see 
appendix A10.4 and A10.2).
7.1 Comparative R 2 and F-statistics
The goodness of fit statistic (R 2) displayed in table ION (below), clearly shows 
that in the majority of the regressions, the model handles the data well for each of 
the samples separately. Comparing the two sample sets, it is evident from the 
result of the combined sample (that is foreign plus locally controlled firms) that 
there is a difference in their external finance behaviour over time. The fact that 
with each sample, the value of R 2 varies from one period to another can be 
attributed to the underlying economic environment of the host country (and other 
markets) which was unstable through out (1970s (see chapter 11.5 and appendix 
A l l .3).
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Table ION
Com parative Goodness of fit Statistics: External Finance Equation
Year Foreign(^ 2) Local(i? 2) Combined(^ 2)
1974 29.6 18.7 28.4
1975 49.0 20.4 35.0
1976 56.9 90.1 65.5
1977 69.6 45.9 66.1
1978 39.7 12.6 16.5
1979 55.0 . *40.9 36.7
1980 21.6 49.1 29.2
Sample 2 ♦
1979 30.3 47.2 35.1
1980 58.6 44.0 53.7
As for the associated F-statistics, apart from 1978 when this statistic is not 
significant, in all other cases it is significant. This clearly indicates that even if the 
goodness of fit statistic may be relatively low the included independent variables 
are together significant explanatory factors of the variation in the change of 
corporate borrowing. This is observable from Table 10(0) below.
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Table 10(0)
Com parative Analysis of Variance (F-Statistic): E xternal Finance Equation
Year Foreign F-stat. Local F-stat. Combined F-st.
1974 3.4 2.3 4.2
1975 6.5 2.5 5.7
1976 8.7 2.8 20.0
1977 13.8 5.9 20.6
1978 4.8 1.8** 2.1**
1979 8.0 5.0 6.1
1980 2.6 6.5 4.4
Sample 2 
1979 6.8 12.9 13.9
1980 19.8 11.4 29.8
Apart from those regression marked ** which are not significant, the rest 
are significant at 5 per cent level.
The difference between foreign and local firms is clearly observable from the 
comparison of the F-statistics of the combined sample regressions with the best 
estimates of either the foreign or local firms for each of the regressions. The 
variation between one year and another can be attributed to the underlying changes 
in the economy (i.e., time-series factors), which are for the sake of simplicity, 
considered neutral for the purpose of comparison.
Coming to the m athem atical signs and the d istribu tion  of the  significance of
the individual coefficients displayed in Table 10P (below), the difference between 
the two sets of firms are clearly visible:
The constant term , as expected, has a positive coefficient in most of the regressions 
for both sets of firms. However, while the intercept is significant when negative in 
foreign firms' sample, it turns out to be significant when positive in locally 
controlled firms.
The cu rren t dividend variable (column 2), as expected has a positive coefficient in 
eight out of nine regressions in foreign firms sample while on the contrary it has a
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negative coefficient in seven out of the nine regressions of local firms’ data. In 
foreign firms sample, current dividend is never significant when negative, but where 
positive . it is twice significant at 10 per cent, once at 5 per cent and twice at 1 per 
cent. On the contrary, in locally controlled firms, this variable when positive it is 
never significant, but when negative, it is twice significant at 5 per cent. The a 
priori reason for this difference is already explained in chapter 8.3 and 8.5 and need 
not be repeated here. The evidence speaks for itself that on the basis of this 
coefficient, there is a difference in the external finance behaviour of the two sets of 
firms (see Table 10P).
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Table 10P
Distribution o f Significance o f Coefficients; External Finance Equation 
Annual Cross-section Samples 1974-1980























b.Total(+ & -) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
c.+ve only 4 5 6 1 6 6 1 3 1 3 4 3 1 2 7 4
d.sig. at 10% 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
e.sig. at 5% 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f.sig. at 1% 0 1 2 0 1 4 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2
g.-ve.( only. . 3 2 1 6 1 1 6 4 6 4 3 4 6 5 0 3
h.sig. at 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
i.sig. at 5% 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
j.sig. at 1% 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sample 2
1979 + +• +•** - +* +* +** + _*• _* +* +•
1980 + - + + +* +* -* + _** _*** +♦ +*
Note: column ( l )  is the intercept,(2) is Dt ,(3) is l t ,
(4) is Pt : (5) is DEPt ; (6) is INGt : (7) is CAGt
and (8) is NCPt . * significant at 1 per cent. ** significant at 5%
*** significant at 10 per cent. F, is foreign controlled firms: L local firms 
+ve is positive: -ve negative.
The fixed investm ent expenditure variable (column 3), as expected has a positive 
coefficient in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled 
firms. In foreign firms sample, it has a positive coefficient in eight out of nine 
regressions. Out of this eight, it is significant at 10 per cent once, twice at 5 per cent 
and th rice  a t 1 percent. When negative it is not significant. On the contrary, in 
locally controlled firms, the coefficient is positive in eight out of nine regressions. 
Out of this eight, it is significant at 10 per cent once, once at 5 per cent and six 
tim es a t 1 per cent. Once when negative it turns out to be significant at 5 per cent. 
This happens to be in the recession year of 1975 and therefore not typical. In
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general therefore, this appears to suggests that locally controlled firms have the 
tendency to raise external finance to finance fixed investment expenditures rather 
more than the foreign controlled firms.
The n e t profit variable (column 4). as expected, has a negative coefficient in the 
majority of the regressions. In foreign controlled firms sample, the coefficient of 
this variable is negative in eight out of nine regressions. It is twice significant at 10 
per cent, twice at 5 per cent and fou r tim es a t 1 per cent. In the one year when the 
coefficient was positive, it is not significant. On the contrary, in locally controlled 
firms sample the coefficient is negative in six out of nine regressions. When positive 
it is never significant, but out of six regressions when it has negative sign it is 
significant at 1 per cent tw ice only. The difference between the size of the 
coefficients of this variable suggests that between the two sets of foreign controlled 
firms appear to finance more of their capital expenditures from internally generated 
earnings than the locally controlled firms.
The cash flow or depreciation variable (column 5) as expected has a negative 
coefficient in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled 
firms samples. In foreign controlled firms, this variable has negative coefficient in 
e igh t out of the nine regressions. Once when it is positive it is not significant. In 
eight when it has the negative sign, it is significant once at 10 per cent, once at 5 per 
cent and three times at 1 per cent. On the contrary, in locally controlled firms this 
coefficient is positive in four regressions out of the nine regressions but never 
significant with positive sign. It has the expected negative sign in five out of the 
nine regressions. Out of the five, it is significant once at 5 per cent and three times 
at 1 per cent. The generalisation from the result presented here is related to that of 
the preceding paragraph and need not to be repeated.
The income gearing variable (column 6), turns out to have the wrong signs in the
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majority of the regressions. In foreign firms, it has positive sign in five out of the 
nine regressions but is only significant once at 5 per cent. While it is negative in 
four regressions but significant once at 1 per cent. In the case of locally controlled 
firms, it has a positive sign in five out of the nine regressions, but only significant at 
10 per cent once. However, out of four regressions when it has the right sign 
(negative), it is significant once at 10 per cent and once at 1 per cent. On the basis 
of the distribution of the signs and significance of business risk proxy, one can not 
choose between the two set of firms. However to the extent that one may wish to 
generalise from this, it is that locally controlled firms are more concerned about 
income gearing than the foreign controlled firms. Perhaps if the interest payments 
are on intra-group loans from the parent company, the foreign controlled affiliate 
may be less concerned about the business risk. Obviously not much can be said 
about this since when negative this variable is also significant in foreign firms once 
at 1 per cent. This appears to suggest that although they may be concerned about 
business risk they are perhaps less so concerned in comparison with the locally 
controlled firms. This is confirmed by the pooled cross-section time-series result 
displayed in table 10F (above).
The capital gearing variable (column 7), as expected, has a negative coefficient in 
the majority of the regressions for both foreign and local “firms. In foreign firms 
once when positive it is not significant. In eight out of the nine regressions it has a 
negative sign. Out of this eight regressions, it is significant once at 10 per cent and 
tw ice at 5 per cent. On the contrary, in local firms, the coefficient turns out to be 
positive twice although never significant. In seven regressions when it has the right 
sign, it is significant twice at 10 per cent and once at 1 per cent. To the extent that 
one may wish to generalise from this, comparing the size of the coefficients of this 
variable between the two sets of firms (Appendix 10.4 and 10.2 (iii)). it appears 
that foreign controlled firms are more concerned about capital gearing than the
- 300-
locally controlled firms. While one would have expected more evidence of the 
impact of business and financial risk, it must be remembered that all the firms in 
the sample used for this study are all very large firms with highly diversified 
interests many of which have finance and insurance subsidiaries. It may well be 
that there would need to be really large level of external borrowing to ‘cause much 
concern’ to these large firms (unlike perhaps what one would expect from relatively 
smaller firms).
The n e t cu rren t asset investm ent variable (column 8). as expected being a use of 
funds has a positive coefficient in the majority of the regressions. In foreign
l
controlled firms, this coefficient is positive in nine out of the nine regressions. It is 
also significant at 1 per cent in eight out of the nine regressions. On the contrary, 
in locally controlled firms this coefficient is positive in six out of the nine 
regressions. It is only significant at 1 per cent level four times, and never 
significant when negative. It appears from this that much of the external finance is 
used for financing short term assets in foreign firms than in locally controlled firms. 
Contrast this with the result of the estimation of the coefficient of fixed investment 
reported above under this section, where it appears that much of external finance in 
local firms is applied for financing fixed asset investments.
On the basis of the (OLS) result discussed in this section, there is a strong ground to 
accept the hypothesis that in terms of the relative influence of the independent 
variables there is a difference between the external finance behaviour of foreign 
versus locally controlled firms. This validates the second level hypothesis relating 
to external finance decision of firms.
All in all, from the annual cross-section regression analyses whose results are 
presented and discussed in this and the preceding two sections, there are empirical 
grounds to accept the three second level hypotheses stated in chapter 8.2. Thus.
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there is a difference between the foreign controlled versus locally controlled firms in 
terms of the determinants of their dividend, investment and external finance 
behaviours. Together, these results support the main hypothesis - that there is a 
difference between the financial behaviour of foreign versus locally controlled firms 
in terms of dividend, investment and external finance decisions (see chapter 8.2 
above).
To determine the strength of the difference between foreign and locally controlled 
firms in each of the three aspects of the financial decisions, and therefore validate 
the main hypothesis (see chapter 8.2), a Chow-test is used. The result is 
summarised below.
8. THE CHOW-TEST RESULTS
This procedure tests the null hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients, 
obtained from carrying out separate regressions on foreign and local firms data 
using the same estimating models, is zero.
The test is carried out using the procedure explained in chapter 9.10. The result of 
this test is presented in table 10Q (below), for the three equations. More details on 
the test is displayed in appendix A12.5.
Table 10Q
Sum m ary Result o f th e  Chow-Test
Dividend Investment External finance
Equation Equation Equation
Reg. years F* F* F*
1974 2.03** 2.02** 1.41
1975 2.53** 3.56* 2.07**
1976 1.48 6.06* 8.36*
1977 2.00** 3.65* 2.28**
1978 2.05** 0.18 3.24*
1979 15.36* 1.27 4.34*
1980 0.90 4.85* 3.30*
1974-80 12.02* 4.53** 12.29*
Samp.2 •
1979 9.16* 1.78 1.90**
1980 3.35* 4.51* 2.92*
1979-80 8.24* 5.18* 2.18*
F  -  the calculated value o f F-statistic 
F  >  F: significant at 5 pec cent * **
F  > F: significant at 1 per cent » *
Consider the dividend equation. The result show that apart from 1976 and 1980 
when the differences between the calculated (F*) and the critical or theoretical 
values at the respective degrees of freedom are not significant, the evidence rejects 
the hypothesis of no difference between the two regressions. Most importantly, the 
results of the pooled cross-section regressions clearly rejects the null hypothesis. 
That is the alternative hypothesis that there is a difference between the two 
regressions is accepted. There is a difference between the dividend behaviour of 
foreign versus locally controlled firms.
Consider the investm ent equation. Apart from three regressions where it appears 
that the difference is not significantly different from zero, the overwhelming
number of regressions( eight out of eleven) reject the hypothesis of zero difference
between the two regressions. Thus on empirical grounds, there is a strong evidence
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to accept that there is a difference between the investment behaviour of foreign 
versus locally controlled firms. The summary result of the pooled sample Chow- 
tests clearly supports this conclusion.
Finally, the result of the test for the ex ternal finance equation shows that, apart 
from 1974 (a recession year) when the calculated F-statistic is not significant, the 
rest of the regressions including the pooled cross-section regressions clearly point to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is accepted. Thus 
there is a difference between the two regressions, and therefore supports the 
hypothesis that there is a difference between the external finance behaviour of 
foreign versus locally control firms.
Putting together the three sets of results, there is empirical evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that there is a difference between the financial behaviour of foreign 
versus locally controlled firms in terms of the dividend, investment and external 
finance decisions.
9 . BRIEF SU M M A R Y
In this chapter the results of the ordinary least squares regressions are presented. 
These comprise the result of pooled cross-section, and annual cross-section 
regressions of the main sample data and sample 2.
The results clearly support the three sub-hypotheses and the main hypothesis as 
expressed in chapter 8. Thus there is a difference between foreign and locally 
controlled firms in terms of the determinants of their dividend, investment and 
external finance behaviours. From the Chow-tests. the evidence rejects the null 
hypothesis of zero difference and therefore provides the empirical grounds to accept 
the hypothesis that there is a difference between the financial behaviour of foreign 
versus locally controlled firms.
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In the next chapter, the results of an attempt to verify the hypotheses using 
simultaneous equation models are presented, together with the result of the 
verification of the third level hypotheses (investigating the independent impact of 




SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODELS (SEM)
1. THE CONTEXT
It has been pointed out in chapter 9.10 that some researchers suggest the need to 
view the dividend, investment and external finance decisions of firms as being 
interdependent. For such researchers the appropriate estimating method for 
corporate financial behaviour, is* the simultaneous equation model (SEM). As 
already noted, there are of course theoretical grounds for expecting the 
interdependence of the decision triad under investigation here. However, the high 
degree of decentralisation in most large firms may dent the strict applicability of 
SEM in most of the firms who form the research sample1.
Having presented the result of ordinary least squares analyses in the preceding 
chapter, the approach here is to firstly carry out some correlation analyses to 
determine if the endogenous variables (dividend, investment and external finance) 
have a non zero relationship with one another2. If a significant non zero relationship 
is found, then the interdependence of the endogenous variables is proved and thus 
the applicability of simultaneous estimation method is justified. As to whether a 
limited information (two-stage least squares method) or full information (three-
1. In large conglomerates, where the economic units (i.e., firms), making up a corporate group are quasi 
autonomous, it is the case that the group’s dividend, investment, and external finance are respective 
‘aggregates’ of the figures of the individual affiliates. Thus to some extent, the strict simultaneity of 
decisions may be weak relative to what would be expected in a purely unit firm (i.e., a non - 
conglomerate).
2. One of the assumptions of single equation models (e.g., OLS), is that the independent variables are 
truely exogenous. That is, the independent variables are not also explained by the dependent variable 
in the same equation. Thus E \X  € J—O ; where X  6, is the coyanance of an independent variable 
X, and the random term € , while E, is the expected value. If E then the use of OLS 
may not be appropriate, ( see Koutsoyiannis (op.cit., pp.331-336) but see also the preceding note).
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stage least squares method) is appropriate, the approach followed is to carry out the 
investigation using the two-stage least squares and then to carry out a correlation 
analyses of the two-stage least squares residuals. A significant non-zero correlation 
of the residuals indicates the applicability of full information method.
The results of the two-state least-squares estimation will be presented separately
and in the usual manner, the goodness of fit (R  2) statistic, the analysis of variance
(the F-statistic) and the distribution of the signs and significance of the coefficients
of foreign firms sample will be compafed with that of local firms sample. Similarly
the results from three-stage least squares estimates will be compared. If differences
♦
are found between the two sets of firms in terms of the determinants of their 
financial behaviours, this will further strengthen the conclusion drawn from the 
OLS analyses presented in the preceding chapter.
The empirical stability of coefficients is discussed and the causes of the instability 
are suggested. The third level hypotheses are tested (using the three stage least 
squares method) and the results are presented and discussed.
2 . ST A T IST IC A L  JU ST IFIC A T IO N  FOR SEM
As already indicated, the first test, to establish interdependence between the three 
decisions under investigation, is to carry out a simple correlation analyses of the 
endogenous variables with one another. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
relationship between the three endogenous variables (dividend, investment and 
external finance all deflated by sales). The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
correlation coefficient between each pair of endogenous variables is significant (see 
chapter 9.11 for details of test procedure).
The results of the simple correlation analyses are displayed in Tables 11A and 11C. 
The results displayed in table 11A relates to the analyses of the main sample 
(1974-1980). while the results in table 11C relate to the analyses of sample 2
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TABLE 11A SIMPLE CORRELATION MATRICES, ENGODENOUS
VARIABLES, 1974-1980
FOREIGN FIRMS LOCAL FIRMS
VARIABLE D/S V s EFB/S D/S I/S EFB/S
1974 D/S 1.0000 1.0000
I/S .2674* 1.0000 -  .0235 1.0000














D/S 1.0000 « 1.0000
I/S -.0025 1.0000 -  .0905 1.0000
EFB/S -.0221 -.2483 1.0000 -.2269 .8333*** 1.0000
1977
D/S 1.0000 1.0000
I/S .2627* 1.0000 .0444 1.0000
EFB/S -.1690 .0969 1.0000 -.1297 .5907*** 1.0000
1978
D/S 1.0000 1.0000
I/S .2414 1.0000 . .2252 1.0000
EFB/S .0142 -.0319 1.0000 .0910 .4461*** 1.0000
1979
D/S 1.0000 1.0000
I/S .1785 1.0000 .1666 1.0000
EFB/S .0617 .1634 1.0000 .0199 -.0207 1.0000
1980
D/S 1.0000 1.0000
I/S .1921 1.0000 ■ 7086***' 1.000
EFB/S -.0321 .0186 1.0000 .3614** •6803*** 1.0000
,* Significant at 10%. See chapter 9.11 for description of sign ificance t e s t .  
* *  Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
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(1979-1980).
Consider first, table 11A. The result is somewhat surprising but interesting. Out
of the seven annual correlation matrices for foreign firms, only in 1976 is there a
negative relationship as expected between investment and dividend payments. Even
here the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In the rest, fixed
investment turns out to have a positive relationship with dividend. However the
coefficients are not significant except in two years (1974 and 1977) when they are
mildly significant at 10 per cent levfel. For the seven annual analyses, external
finance shows no significant relationship with dividends except in 1974 when it is
*
mildly significant at 10 per cent. Similarly, external finance is shown to have no 
significant relationship with investment. Indeed in 1976 and 1978, their correlation 
coefficient turn out to have a negative relationship with investment. These results 
are revealing. It appears that foreign firms finance much of their fixed investments 
from internally generated funds. To the extent that foreign firms borrow, from this 
result, it appears that external finance is directed at another use other than fixed 
investment and dividends. That other use appears to be net change in working 
capital investment (see Table 10P in the preceding chapters).
Apart from the mild positive significance of investment relationship with dividend 
in 1974 and 1977 and the positive relationship between external finance and 
dividend in 1974, the result of the correlation analyses of foreign controlled firms 
does.not appear to indicate the existence of strong interdependence in the decision 
triad under investigation. However, in the two years when the mild significance is 
reported, the correlation coefficient has the wrong sign. On a priori grounds, one 
would not expect investment and dividend (both being competing uses of funds) to 
vary in the same direction. This, therefore gives an indication that an elaborate 
estimating method (such as as simultaneous equation model) would perhaps 
improve the efficiency of parameter estimators.
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In the case of locally controlled firms, the picture is different. While the 
relationship between investment and dividend is only mildly significant in foreign 
firms in 1974 and 1977, it turns out not significant at all in local firms for the same 
periods. However, while investment and dividend show no significant relationship 
in foreign firms during 1975 and 1980, in locally controlled firms, the two variables 
are strongly positively related (i.e. positive and significant at 1 per cent level). In 
the rest of the years the relationship between investment and dividend is not 
significantly different from zero. Again from this wrong sign, it would appear that 
more insight may be gained in using SEM. The relationship between external 
finance and dividend is significant in two years (1975 and 1980). However while 
the relationship is negative and significant in 1975, it turns out to be positive and 
significant in 1980. While the relationship in the later year is expected, that of 1975 
is surprising since external finance being a source of funds, it would normally be 
expected to have a positive relationship with dividend payments (a use of funds).
Regarding the relationship between external finance and investment, while it is 
never significant in foreign firms for the entire period both in the main sample 
(table 11A), and sample 2 (table 11C), in the case of locally controlled firms, it is 
significant in all years except in 1979. Surprisingly, the correlation coefficient is 
significant and negative in 1975. This is rather difficult to explain. The two years 
where this negative coefficient occurred are 1975 and 1979. both of which are 
turning points in UK government’s dividend control policy and general economic 
activity (see section 11.5 below). This result again suggest that further insight may 
be gained by using SEM rather than just OLS.
Overall, while the relationships in foreign firms are not highly statistically 
significant and does not strictly warrant the application of SEM. in the locally 
controlled firms, it would appear that the correlation coefficients are sufficiently 
high to warrant the expectation that efficiency of the parameter estimators would be
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increased by the use of SEM to investigate the financial behaviour of firms.
As to whether a limited information (Two-stage least squares) or full information 
(three-stage least squares) is more appropriate, the result of correlation of two-stage 
least squares residuals indicate that as far as locally controlled firms are concerned, 
the three stage least squares would yield additional insights into the understanding 
of their financial behaviour (see table 1 IB and 11D below). But for the foreign 
controlled firms, the indication as to the need for three-stage least squares is scanty.
In tables 11B and 11D, it will be seen that while the relationship between 
investment equation residuals an<4 the dividend equation residuals in foreign firms 
is significant in 1976. at 10 per cent and negative, in locally controlled firms there is 
no significant relationship between the pairs of residuals. There is however one 
interesting finding relating to these two residuals. From table 11B, it can be seen 
that apart from 1978 when the relationship of investment and dividend residual is 
positive, the rest of the period show a negative relationship in foreign firms; on the 
contrary, apart from 1979 when the relationship between the two residuals is 
negative, in the rest of the years it is positive, in locally controlled firms. The 
relationship between external finance equation residuals and those of dividend is 
positive and significant in 1974 and 1976 only fn foreign firms, while the 
relationship is positive and significant in 1978 and 1979 only in locally controlled 
firms.
The relationship between the external finance residuals and those of investment 
equation is significant only in 1974 and 1979 in foreign firms. On the contrary, in 
locally controlled firms, the relationship of the external finance and investment 
residual is significant and positive in 1974, 1976. 1977. 1979 and 1980 (see Table 
11B). Similar pattern of relationship is found in larger sample as shown in table 
11D below.
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* Significant at 10%. See chapter 9.11 for description of significance t e s t .
DIVEQ = Dividend equation 
** Significant at 5%. INVEQ = Investment equation
*** Significant at 1%. EFBEQ = External finance equation
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TABLE 11C SIMPLE CORRELATION MATRICES, ENDOGENOUS
VARIABLES,. SAMPLE 2 1979-1980
FOREIGN FIRMS LOCAL FIRMS





























TABLE 11D CORRELATION MATRICES OF TWO-STAGE LEAST-SQUARES
' RESIDUALS: SAMPLE 2, 1979-1980
FOREIGN FIRMS LOCAL FIRMS





























* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
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In sum, while the evidence from the matrix of residuals in foreign firms is not very 
strong in support of using three stage least squares technique, the evidence appears 
to support it in locally controlled firms. On balance it would appear that additional 
insight may well be gained in using three stage least squares analysis. Because of 
the comparative nature of this study, both two-stage and three stage least squares 
methods'are used to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables and the 
results from each method are separately compared.
3 . SIM U L T A N E O U S E Q U A T IO N  R E SU L T S I: T W O -ST A G E  
L E A ST  SQ U A R E S (T SL S)
The results of the estimates of the pooled samples are displayed in table HE 
(below). The evidence in table 11E(A) clearly demonstrates that a difference exists 
between the foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the determinants of 
dividends. This therefore broadly supports the overall conclusions from OLS 
results (see chapter 10).
However, there are three interesting differences between the OLS results (shown in
Table 10B of chapter 10) and the TSLS result in Table 11E(A). First, notice the
reversal of sign of the coefficient of investment variable from being negatively
»
significant in Table 10B to being positive (though not significant) in table 11E(A). 
Not much can be made out of this positive sign since it is not significant. But it 
reflects correctly the results of the simple correlation analyses between the 
investment and dividend displayed in table 11A and discussed in the preceding 
section. Second, notice the change in significance of the negative coefficient of net 
change in current assets (NCP). The OLS understates the negative relationship 
between NCP and current dividends in foreign firm; while it is not significant in 
Table 10B, it turns out to be negative and significant at 1 per cent as shown in Table 
11E(A). The third intersting difference is in the relationship between the external
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TABLE 11E TMQrStAGE LEAST SQUARES RESULTS: POOLED CROSS-SECTION DATA (1974-1980)
A / B ,
C
DIVIDEND EQUATION INVESTMENT EQUATION EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION
VAR
--------- p.
































































































































N OBS 287 287 NOBS 287 287 NOBS 287 287
* Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 10% - 3 1 0 a -
finance variable and dividend which changes from being highly significant and 
negative in OLS in (Table 10B) to being insignificant but negative in local firms, as 
shown in table 11E(A). This again reconciles with the result of the simple 
correlation analysis displayed in table 11B, which shows that apart from 1975 
when the correlation is negative and significant at 1 per cent, it is not significant and 
negative'in the rest of the years for locally controlled firms.
3.1 Investm ent equation pooled sample
The result of TSLS estimate of the pooled samples are displayed in table 11E(B). 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that a difference exists between the foreign and 
locally controlled firms in terms of the role of the determinants of fixed investment 
expenditures. This broadly supports the overall conclusions from OLS results 
discussed in chapter 10.3.
There are however two interesting and important differences between the OLS 
results (Table 10D in chapter 10.3) and the TSLS results (Table 11E(B, above). 
First, notice the reversal of sign of net change in borrowing coefficient from positive 
and significant in table 10D, to negative and significant in TSLS. This negative 
coefficient of net change in external finance (a source of funds)- is not easily
i
explainable. It however reflects the findings from the simple correlation analysis 
which shows (Table 11 A) that external finance is not significantly related to fixed 
investment. This perhaps suggests that the large foreign controlled firms finance 
much of their fixed investment from retained earnings. It may also reflect the 
nature of foreign firms borrowing particularly on current account (Bank short term
t
loans and overdrafts) which would obviously be unstable as funds are paid into 
and drawn out of the account. The second important difference between the OLS 
and TSLS results so far as investment equation is concerned is the reversal of the 
sign of the coefficient of net change in net current assets from being negative and
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significant as expected in OLS result (Table 10.D), to being positive and significant 
in TSLS estimates (Table 11E(B)). This is rather surprising since both variables 
being alternative uses of available funds would not be expected to vary in the same 
direction. It will be found later from the full information method that the impact 
of net current investment on fixed investment expenditures is contemporaneously a 
negative one. This corresponds with the OLS estimate on the same variable.
3J2 External finance equation, pooled sample
The result of TSLS estimate of the pooled samples are displayed in table 11E(C). 
The evidence clearly indicates the existence of a difference in terms of the roles of 
the determinants of external financing in foreign and locally controlled firms. This 
broadly supports the overall conclusion from OLS results discussed in chapter 10.4 
(above).
At least three aspects of the results of TSLS in comparison with that of OLS 
warrant some comments. First, notice the reversal of sign of the coefficient of fixed 
investment variable from being positively significant for foreign firms in table 10F, 
to being negative and mildly significant in Table 11E(C) above. This reversal in 
sign is difficult to explain except to say that the negative coefficient of-investment in
i
external finance equation reflects the negative sign of external finance coefficient in 
investment equation. It will be shown later from fu ll information (three stage least 
squares) results that this variable has a positive coefficient as desired. Secondly, 
depreciation rather than having a negative coefficient (being a source of funds) as 
shown rightly in OLS estimates turns out to have a positive coefficient in TSLS 
result. This appears to indicate that cash flow from depreciation allowances add to 
the debt capacity of the foreign firms thus, allowing them to be able to increase 
their borrowing. The third difference relates to the coefficient of dividend variable 
in the local firms sample results. Notice the change in sign, from being negative and
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significant in OLS estimates (table 10F), to being positive and significant at 5 per 
cent in TSLS estimates (table 11E(C), above). Although this is the expected sign on 
apriori grounds, the result of the simple correlation analyses displayed in table 11A 
does not appear to indicate such a turn round in sign and significance. The full 
information estimates, as will be discussed later, on the contrary, show a negative 
relationship between dividend and external finance; that result more nearly reflects 
the result of the correlation analyses.
All in all, the results from the TSLS analyses of pooled samples clearly show that 
there are differences between foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the 
(roles of the) determinants of dividend, investment and external finance decisions.
3.3 Summary results, annual cross-section samples: Comparative
R  2 and F-statistics
From table 11F below, it will be seen that despite the not an uncommon low 
goodness of fit statistics in cross-section regressions, the model used for the three 
decisions handle the data rather well.
However, there are differences between the values of R ^  in one year and another 
for reasons suggest in section 11.5 below. When the value of this statistic is 
compared between foreign firms and local firms, the evidence of a difference 
between the two sets of firms becomes ‘clearly visible. The difference exist in all 
years as well as in the pooled sample regressions. Unfortunately there is no formal 
test for the significance of the difference between two goodness of fit statistics.
As for F-statistic, table 11G shows that, apart from few instances when the F- 
statistic is not significant at 5 per cent and 1 per cent, overall the coefficients of the 
variables in the dividend, investment and external finance equations are 
significantly different from zero. The differences in the determinants of the three 
decisions between foreign and local firms are clearly visible.
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I£fl?.yLA1f ^  COMPARATIVE GOODNESS OF FIT-SATISTlC; R2„ TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARE RESULTS
DIVIDEND EQUATION INVESTMENT EQUATION • EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION
YEAR
FOREIGN LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL
R2<%) R2(%> R2(%) R2(%) R2(%) R2(%)
1974 21.0 86.0 88.1 30.3 24.0 25.4
1975 47.2 85.1 93.6 83.3 56.1 31.1
1976 65.6 84.8 67.1 43.3 61.0 60.9
1977 47.5 77.4 69.2 46.4 74.1 34.8
1778 43.8 77.3 56.4 81.6 58.0 41.1 •
1979 48.2 78-. 8 71.1 63.1 32.2 33.2
1980 55.1 96.4 73.5 86.9 37.7 46.1
Sample 2
1979 45.9 67.3 41.4 45.8 20.9 40.0
1980 36.5 77.4 47.4 63.0 55.75 35.6
Cl) See Appendix A11. 1(i)>  A H .K ii)  and A11.1<iii)
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( 1 )TABLE 11G COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (F-STATISTIC),  TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES RESULTS
PIVIDEND EQUATION INVESTMENT EQUATION EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION
YEAR Iforeign LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL
1974 1.9* 43.1 34.8 2.0* 1.5* 1.6*
1975 6.3 39.8 69.4 •23.5 6.0 2.1*
1976 13.3 39.0 9.6 3.6 7.4 7.3
1977 6.3 24.0 10.6 4.1 13.5 2.5
1978 5*5 23.8 6.1 20.9 6.5 3.3
1979 6.5 26.0 11.6 8.0 2.2* 2.3
1980 8.6 189.1 13.0 31.1 2.9 4.0
Sample 2 
1979 14.9 36.2 8.7 10.4 3.2 8.2
1980 10.1 60.4 11.1 20.9 15.5 6.8
Apart from those marked the rest are sign ifican t either at 5% or 1%. 
(1) see Appendix A I I .K i) , A11 *1 Cii) and A11.KIII)
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3.4 D istribution o f signs and significance o f coefficients dividend 
equation
The summary result of the TSLS analyses of annual cross-section samples is 
displayed in table 11H for the dividend equation. As expected, the intercept term 
for the foreign controlled firms have the expected signs in the majority of the 
regressions. On the contrary, the intercept term has a negative sign in the majority 
of the regressions for the local firms. This is similar to the result from OLS 
estimate of the dividend equation displayed in table 10J (chapter 10).
The coefficient of lagged dividend variable has the expected positive sign in both 
foreign and local firms results. However the lagged dividend payments have a more 
significant role in influencing the current dividends in the local firms than in the 
foreign firms. This is similar to the result from OLS regressions (Table 10J).
The coefficient of current profit has the expected positive sign in both set of firms. 
Similar to the OLS result, the current profit variable play a relatively lower role 
than lagged dividend in influencing the current dividends in locally controlled firms; 
while on the contrary, current profits appear to have about the same influence as 
lagged dividends in foreign firms.
I
The coefficient of external finance variable as expected has a positive sign in the 
majority of the regressions in foreign firms, while on the contrary the same variable 
has a negative sign which is also significant at 1 per cent in two regressions for the 
locally controlled firms. In locally controlled firms the coefficient of external 
finance variable is never significant when positively signed. This is similar to the 
result of OLS (Table 10J).
The relationship between investment and dividends is not clear in foreign firms 
although the coefficient has a negative sign as expected in four out of seven annual 
regressions. In locally controlled firms, the influence of investment is not again
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c Positive only 
(total)
5 3 7 7 7 6 4 3 3 3 1 5
d Significant at 
10%
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e Significant at 
5% ‘





0 1 2 7 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0
9 Negative total 2 4 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 4 6 2
h Significance 
at 10%
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .
i Significance 
at 5%




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1
k 1979 ' - -  * + * + * + * + + + + + * — ★
I 1980 + + * + Ilf + * + * + + + -  * — ★ -  *
* = Significant at 1%
+ = Positive coefficient 
-  = Negative coefficient 
(1) see Appendix A11.1(i)
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clear. Out of the nine regressions the coefficient turns out to be significant and 
negative in two regressions, while being significant and positive in another two. 
Overall, the coefficient is negative in the majority of cases. The two periods when 
this coefficient is negative and significant are 1974 and 1980 both of which are 
recession years. To the extent that one may wish to generalise on this result, it 
would appear that investment has a negative impact on dividend of the same period 
in local firms when the cash flow gets squeezed by low economic activity. On the 
contrary when profits are flowing, the local firms are able to meet their dividend 
and investment plans.
The coefficient of net change in net current assets has the expected negative sign in 
the majority of the regressions for the foreign firms. The result is similar to that of 
OLS analyses displayed in table 10J (chapter 10). On the contrary, the coefficient 
turns out to have a positive sign in the majority of the regressions for the locally 
controlled firms. This result is similar to that of OLS. However while this 
coefficient is never negatively significant in OLS result, the TSLS result shows that 
out of the nine regressions, the coefficient is negative and significant in two, both of 
which are in 1974 and 1980 (again recession years).
In general, the result of TSLS analyses shoves that there is a difference between the 
foreign versus locally controlled firms in terms of the determinants of their 
dividend behaviour. Similar to the OLS results, TSLS results indicate that the 
relative roles of some variables appear to differ sometimes, when one compares one 
year with another (see section 11.5 below).
3.5 D istribution o f signs and significance o f coefficients: 
Investm ent Equation
The summary results of the estimates of investment equation is displayed in table 
111 (below), and the corresponding OLS result is displayed in table 10M (chapter
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TABLE 11 SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF COEFFICIBTTS
TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES AWUAL CROSS-SBCTION DATA 1974-1960 
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a Predicted sign + + + + - * + - - + .+ + + + +
b Total positive 
and negative
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
c Positive only 
(total)
3 2 4 A 2 2 A 4 2 4 6 5 7 5 5 7
d Significant at 
•10%
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
e Significant at 
5%
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1
f ' Significant at 
1%
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 3 3 3
g Negative (total) 4 5 3 3 5 5 3 3 5 3 1 2 0 2 2 0
h Significant at 
10%
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i Significant at 
5%




1 1 1 0 0 0 • 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k 1979 +
**+ + + ***f **+ _ ■+ + *+ + -+
I 1980 +
*** + + ★+ t **f ★+ *+ + + **+
* Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 10%
+ -  Positive coefficient 
-  = Negative coefficient 
(1) see Appendix All.1Cii)
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10).
The coefficient of the constant term is similar to the result of OLS analyses. As for 
the coefficient of external finance variable, out of the nine regressions for the foreign
r
firms it turns out to have a negative sign in the majority of the cases and indeed 
significant in three. This is a reversal of the OLS result. Not much can be said 
about this since as the full information method will show, external finance does 
have a positive relationship with fixed investment in the majority of the years for 
both foreign and local firms. The coefficient of the dividend variable, as expected 
has a negative sign in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. However, on the basis of significance it is not clear that dividend 
has a negative impact on investment. As expected, lagged profit play a positive role 
in influencing investment, more so in foreign firms than the local counterparts. The 
coefficient of net change in working capital investment as expected has a negative 
sign in the majority of the regressions in both foreign and local firms. As between 
foreign and local firms the variable has a more negative influence in foreign than in 
local firms. This is similar to OLS result.
The coefficient of the accelerator variable as expected, has a positive sign in the 
majority of the regressions and plays mofe significant role in foreign firms as 
compared to locally controlled firms. This is a similar result to that from OLS.
The coefficient of cash flow or depreciation variable is positive in most cases as 
expected both for the foreign and locally controlled firms. In comparison the 
depreciation variable play a more significant role in influencing investment in 
foreign firms than in locally controlly firms. This is similar to OLS results.
The coefficient of lagged capital stock has the positive sign as expected in the 
majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. In 
comparison, this variable plays a more significant positive role in influencing
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investment in local firms than in foreign controlled firms. This is similar to OLS 
result.
In general the TSLS result leads to the same conclusions as that from OLS analyses 
and shows that there is a difference between foreign versus locally controlled firms 
in term of the determinants of capital investment expenditures.
3.6 D istribution of signs and significance o f coefficients:
External Finance Equation
The result of TSLS analyses of external finance equation is displayed in table 11J 
(below). Contrast this’ with the result of OLS analyses of the same equation 
displayed in table 10P (chapter 10).
Similar result for the intercept term appear in both OLS and TSLS results. Foreign 
firms appear to have a lower tendency to borrow than the locally controlled firms. 
The coefficient of current dividend as expected, has a positive coefficient in the 
majority of the regressions for both foreign and local firms. In comparison this 
variable plays a more significant positive role in influencing external finance in 
foreign firms than in local firms. This is similar to OLS result.
The coefficient of fixed capital investment variable as expected has a positive sign in 
the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. In 
comparison, this variable plays a more significant positive role in influencing 
external finance in local firms than in foreign firms. This is similar to the OLS 
result.
The coefficient of current profit variable, as expected, has a  negative sign in the 
majority of the regressions in both foreign and local firms. In comparison, this 
variable appears to play a more significant negative role in influencing external 
finance in foreign than in locally controlled firms. This is similar to the OLS result.
- 3 1 7 -
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F L F L F L F L F L F L F L F L
a Predicted sign + +■ + + + + + +
b Total positive 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
and negative
c Positive only 3 3 4 4 5 5 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 7 6
(total)
d Significant at 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
. 10%
e Significant at 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
5%
f Significant at 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
1%
g Negative (total) 4 4 3 3 2 2 6 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 1
h Significant at 0 0 0 0 1 0 '1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
10%
i Significant at 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1
5%
j Significant at 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
1%
SAMPLE 2:
i **'J ★★i irk * * X ★
k 1979 + + •T
T T i *r
★ krk'k * * irkk ★ *
I 1980 ■+ + t + + + + + +
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
+ = Positive coefficient 
-  = Negative coefficient 
(1) See Appendix A11.1(iii)
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The coefficient of cash flow or depreciation variable, as expected, has a negative sign 
in the majority of the regressions in both foreign and local firms. In comparison, 
this variable appears to play a more significant negative role in influencing external 
finance in local firms more than in foreign controlled firms. This result is similar to 
that of OLS.
The coefficient of income gearing, as expected, has a negative sign in the majority of 
the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. In comparison, this 
variable plays a more significant negative role in influencing external finance in local 
firms than in foreign controlled firms. This result is similar to that of OLS 
analyses.
The coefficient of capital gearing variable, as expected has a negative sign in the 
majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms samples. In 
comparison, this variable plays a more negative role in influencing external finance 
in foreign firms than in locally controlled firms. Although OLS results indicate 
similar conclusion, the TSLS brings out the difference between foreign and local 
firms more clearly.
The coefficient of net change in working capital, as expected, has a positive sign in 
the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. In 
comparison, this variable plays a more significant positive role in influencing 
external finance in foreign controlled firms than in locally controlled firms. This is 
similar to OLS result.
In general, the TSLS result leads to the same conclusion as OLS results and shows 
that there is a difference between the foreign and locally controlled firms in terms 
of the (relative roles of the) determinants of external finance behaviour.
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4. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION RESULTS II: THREE-STAGE 
LEAST SQUARES (THSLS)
4.1 Dividend equation pooled samples
The result of the THSLS estimate shows that current profit and lagged dividend 
variables have positive influences on current dividends. This is similar to the 
results from TSLS and OLS. As found from these other methods of analysis, 
current profit play a large role relative to lagged dividends in foreign firms while 
the reverse is the case in locally controlled firms. In contrast to TSLS and OLS, the 
THSLS shows that in locally controlled firms lagged dividend dominates. The loss 
of significance by profit variable (Table 11K(A), below) is rather surprising. This 
perhaps reflects the effect of dividend control which restricts dividend payments to 
the percentage of preceding year rates with a statutory ceiling. The ability of 
THSLS to trace this effect perhaps reflects its efficiency.
There are three interesting differences between the result from THSLS analyses and
those of TSLS and OLS. First, the net change in working capital variable has a
negative and significant coefficient in TSLS and OLS results for foreign firms but
turns out to have a positive coefficient in THSLS results. This ’ is not easily
«
explained on apriori grounds. However, it appears to reflect the finding that foreign 
firms* dividend are unstable, in the sen§e that some remit dividends infrequently. 
On the contrary this variable turns out to have a negative coefficient as expected in 
the locally controlled firms, instead of the positive sign it has in OLS and TSLS.
The second interesting insight gained from THSLS is that the fixed investment 
variable turns out to have a negative coefficient as expected in both foreign and 
local firms. Previously the TSLS and OLS suggest that investment has a positive 
relationship with dividend in locally controlled firms. THSLS appears to suggest 
that in a long term, investment and dividends are competing uses of available
- 3 1 9 -
• TABLE 11K THREE-STAGELEAST SQUARES RESULTS: POOLED CROSS-SECTION DATA (1974-1980)
DIVIDEND EQUATION "INVESTMENT EQUATION EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION









































































SER 0.0219 0.0086 SER 0.0407 0.0646 SER 0.0505 0.0644
D 0.0140 0.0118 I • 0.0498 0.0622 EFB 0.0069 0.0192
<*D 0.0226 0.0080 <Ti 0.0448 0.0737 ^EFB 0.0717 0.0592
DU 1.8551 1.9150 DW 1.2965 1.7508 DU 2.0383 1.9930
N.OBS 287 287 N.OBS 287 287 N.OBS 287 287
* Significant at 1% 
*** Significant at 10%
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funds.
The third interesting insight gained from THSLS is in the increase in the negative 
relationship between external finance and dividend in locally controlled firms. The 
single equation estimates understated the significance of external finance. What is 
now clearly established is that while external finance appears to have the expected 
positive impact on dividends in foreign firms, the same variable has a negative 
relationship with current dividend in locally controlled firms. The possible reason 
for this has already been discussed in chapter 8.3 and chapter 10.3 and need not be 
repeated here. These results clearly reflect the better efficiency of THSLS over OLS 
and TSLS.
All in all, the evidence from THSLS result displayed in table ll.K (A ) clearly 
indicates that there is a difference between foreign and locally controlled firms in 
terms of the (relative roles of the) determinants of dividends.
4.2 Investm ent equation, pooled samples
The results of THSLS analyses corresponds with those of TSLS and OLS in two 
main respects. First, in foreign firms depreciation or cash flow variable plays more 
role than lagged capital stock in influencing capital investments, while on the 
contrary, in locally controlled firms, lagged capital stock dominates (see Table 
11K(B) above). This alternation of influence of depreciation and lagged capital 
stock is not easy to explain on a priori grounds. It would be interesting to 
investigate this in future studies. To the extent that one may wish to suggest a 
reason for this, it appears that much of the gross investment in local firms relates to 
replacement while that by foreign firms relates more to expansion.
Another interesting finding from THSLS is the reversal of sign of the coefficient of 
net change in working capital. In TSLS and OLS this variable has a positive 
coefficient (in this equation), which appears surprising since it is a competing use of
funds. However, although this variable (NCPt ) turns out to have the expected 
negative sign, it is not significant in both foreign and locally controlled firms. One 
other finding that is difficult to rationalise is the negative sign of external finance 
variable in the investment equation for foreign firms. Both OLS and TSLS estimates 
indicate that external finance has a positive relationship with investment. The 
indication, however, is that foreign controlled firms appear to finance their gross 
investments mainly from internally generated cash flow.
All in all, the THSLS result shows that a difference exists between foreign and 
locally controlled firms in terms of the determinants of their fixed investments.
4.3 External finance equation, pooled samples
A look .at table 11K(C) clearly shows the difference in the relative roles of the 
determinants of external finance in foreign controlled firms as compared to the 
locally controlled firms.
There are similarities in the finding using TSLS and OLS on the one hand and 
THSLS on the other. First, the three methods show that in foreign controlled firms, 
net investment in working capital dominates in influencing external finance, while 
in locally controlled firms fixed capital investments is the main factor with positive
i
impact.on investment. In addition, dividends have a significant positive influence on 
external finance. This is similar to the result of OLS analysis displayed in table 10F 
(chapter 10).
There are however three differences between the THSLS results and those of OLS 
and TSLS. The first is the reversal in the sign of the coefficient of current profit 
variable from being negative as expected to being positive in THSLS estimate (Table 
11K(C). One would have expected that since profit and depreciation are both 
sources of funds to the firm, they would dampen the demand for external finance 
by the firms. What rather appears to happen in foreign firms is that availability of
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profits encourages local borrowing. One can attribute this to the influence that 
profit has on debt capacity of the firm. That is, the larger the profits a firm makes, 
the more it is able to obtain external finance at competitive rates.
Similarly capital gearing reverses in sign from negative in OLS and TSLS, to positive 
in THSLS for foreign controlled firms. This is rather surprising given Kalecki’s 
Theory of increasing risk, which suggests a negative relationship, since financial risk 
would be expected to increase the higher the firm’s dependence on external 
borrowing. The positive coefficient of capital gearing which is significant a t 10 per 
cent appears to reflect the positive coefficient of current profit variable as follows:- 
the current profit margin increases the debt capacity of the foreign firm; the firm 
would tend to match foreign assets with foreign liabilities as a foreign risk 
minimisation strategy; the thin equity provisions of the Inland Revenue would 
mean that a foreign firm has to maintain a certain balance of debt to equity ratio; 
this ratio would therefore have to be kept in balance, so that as profits increase, the 
level of gearing needs to rise in order to keep the balance. On the contrary, in 
locally controlled firms the profit and depreciation has the dampening effect on 
external finance dependence. The lagged capital gearing has the expected negative 
coefficient, although income gearing lost its negative significance, and turns out to be 
positively signed though not significant.
All in all, the result from THSLS shows that there is a difference between foreign 
and locally controlled firms in terms of the (relative roles) of the determinants of 
external finance behaviour. To this extent, the result discussed above corresponds 
with that of OLS and TSLS.
4.4 D istribution o f significance o f coefficients: Dividend 
Equation
The summary results of the estimates of dividend equation is displayed in table
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F L F L F L F L F L F L
a Predicted sign + + + + + - - - - -
b Total positive 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
and negative
c Positive only 6 7 7 6 5 4 3 3 4 3
(total)
d Significant at 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
10%
e Significant at 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
5%
f Significant 4 7 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0
at 1%
9 Negative total 1 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 3 4
h Significance 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
at 10%
i Significance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0
at 5%
j Significance 0 0 0 0 1 1- • *0 1 0 1
at 1% .
SAMPLE 2
irk ★ * ** *k 1979 + + + +. + — — — + —
* * irk k ★ *** * * ** ★I 1980 + + + + + + + +
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 10%
+ = Positive coefficient 
-  = Negative coefficient
(1) See Appendix A11.2(i)
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11L (above). The corresponding OLS and TSLS results are in Table 10J (chapter 
10), and table 11H (above) respectively.
Consider the lagged dividend variable (column 1); as expected, the coefficient of this 
variable has a positive sign in the majority of the regressions in both foreign and 
local firms. In comparison, this variable play more significant positive role in 
influencing current dividend payments in locally controlled firms than in the 
foreign controlled firms. This is similar to the OLS and TSLS results.
The coefficient of current profit variable (column 2), as expected, has a positive sign 
in the majority of the regressions with both foreign and locally controlled firms 
data. In comparison this variable appears to play a more significant positive role in 
influencing dividends in foreign controlled than in locally controlled firms. This is 
similar to the OLS and TSLS results.
The coefficient of external finance variable (column 3), as expected has a positive
sign in the majority of the regressions. In comparison, this variable plays a more
significant positive role in influencing dividends in foreign controlled firms than in
locally controlled firms. In locally controlled firms, this variable when significant,
the coefficient is negative. This is similar to the OLS and TSLS results:
«
The coefficient of fixed investment variable (column 4), as expected, has a negative 
sign in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. 
In comparison this variable appears to have a more significant negative influence on 
dividend in locally controlled firms than in foreign controlled firms. However 
within the locally controlled firms the sign of this coefficient and significance 
appears not to be stable. In 1980 for example, after lifting of dividend control, 
investment appears to move in the same direction as dividends and the coefficient 
becomes significant and positive reflecting both the change in dividend control policy 
of the UK government and the lagged response of investment to the decline of
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economic activity due to the recession (see appendix A11.3, charts 2, 4 and 10). The 
result from THSLS differs from that of OLS to the extent that in the later method 
the result appears to indicate that investment and dividends move in the same 
direction. The result from THSLS indicates that although both variables do 
sometimes appear to move in the same direction, in the main investment being a 
competing use of funds have a negative relationship with dividends in the long run.
The coefficient of net change in working capital (column 5), as expected, has a 
negative sign in locally controlled firms regression, in the majority of the cases and 
also more significant when negative. On the contrary, inforeign controlled firms 
regressions this variable turns out to move in the same direction as dividends in the 
majority of the regressions, and is significant only when positive. This is a reversal 
of the result of OLS and TSLS regressions and is rather difficult to rationalise on a 
priori grounds. Perhaps, this reflects the infrequency of dividend remittances by the 
foreign controlled firms; or where dividends are declared albeit not remitted, but 
converted to intra-group loans by the parent company, and used to finance net 
current assets in the affiliate. This represents an additional insight from using 
THSLS showing its superiority to the other methods in this respect.
All in all the result of annual regressions 6f the dividend equation using THSLS 
leads to the similar conclusions as those of OLS and TSLS; it shows that foreign 
controlled firms differ from locally controlled firms in terms of the (relative roles 
of) dividend determinants.
4.5 D istribution o f signs and significance o f coefficients: 
Investm ent Equation
The summary results of the estimates using THSLS method for the investment 
equation are displayed in table 11M (below); that of TSLS is in table 111, while 
that of OLS is in table 10M, (chapter 10).
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REF OF COEFFICIENTS
F L F L F L F L F L F L F L
a Predicted sign + + - - + + - - ■+ + + + + •+
b Total positive 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 7
and negative
c Positive only 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 7 4 6 7
(total)
d Significant at 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
♦ 10%
e Significant at 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
5%
f  Significant at 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 2
1%
g Negative (total) 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 0 3 1 0
h Significant at 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 010%
i Significant at 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
5% *
j Significant at 0 0 0 1 ‘ 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1%
SAMPLE 2:
★★ ** ★ ★k 1979 — + — — + + — ■+ + + + + + +
★ irk ic *I 1980 + + + + + + + + + +
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
+ = Positive coefficients 
-  = Negative coefficients 
(1) See Appendix A11.2(ii)
- 3 2 4 a -
The coefficient of external finance variable (Table 11M, column 1), as expected, has 
a positive sign in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. In comparison, this variable appear to play a more significant 
positive role in influencing fixed investment expenditures in foreign firms than in 
locally controlled firms. However where significant this variable is positive in 
locally controlled firms. On the other hand in two regression-years, this variable 
turns out to have a significant negative relationship with investment in foreign 
controlled firms. This is unusual since external finance is a source of funds and 
would normally be expected to vary in the same direction as investment. A close 
look at the annual regressions shows that this unusual sign relates to two ‘unusual 
years’, 1974 and 1980, both of whom are recession years. Perhaps, due to low level 
of economic activity, investment activities declined, while increase in borrowing 
may well have been diverted to financing short term investments in stocks and 
debtors. In the case of stocks, the introduction of 'stock appreciation relief’ in 1974 
may well (on its own) have encouraged a larger build up of stocks in that year in 
addition to the effect of recession on stock holdings in the early periods of recession. 
In the case of debtors, there may well be the need to offer longer credit periods to 
customers as part of marketing strategy to stimulate sales during the recession.
i
The coefficient of current dividend variable (column 2). as expected, has a negative 
sign in the majority of the regressions in foreign controlled firms. On the contrary, 
in the locally controlled firms sample this variable turns out to have a positive 
influence on investment in the majority of the regressions although never significant 
when positive. It. however, is significant when negative in one regression only. 
This one period when dividend has a significant negative relationship with 
investment in locally controlled firms is a recession year as well as the year 
following the lifting of dividend control. In effect two factors may have been 
responsible for this negative relationship. On the one hand, the recession
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discouraged investment expansion while the lifting of dividend control resulted in 
large dividend payments in 1979 and 1980 (see Appendix A l l .3, charts 2 and 10). 
Other than this, the result of THSLS is similar to that of OLS and TSLS in 
suggesting that, in locally controlled firms, dividend appear to move in the same 
direction as investment, reflecting tha smoothing effect of stable dividend policy in 
foreign controlled firms.
The coefficient of lagged profit variable (column 3), as expected has a positive sign in 
the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. In 
comparison, there does not appear to be much difference between the effect of. this 
variable in the investment equations for foreign controlled firms and for locally 
controlled firms. In the later, however, lagged profit is positive and significant once 
and not even once in foreign controlled firms. The lack of generally high 
significance for this variable in both foreign and local firms, may well have been due 
to the introduction of lagged capital stock in the same equation.
The coefficient of net change in working capital investment (column 4), as expected, 
has a negative sign in the majority of the regressions, for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. In comparison, this variable appears to have a more significant 
negative impact on investment expenditures in locally controlled firms than in 
foreign firms. This is a reversal of the result from OLS and TSLS regressions. At 
any rate, on the basis of the number of years when this coefficient is negative in 
foreign controlled firms, the impact of production interdependence may not be 
totally ruled out. But for the purpose of statistical inference, one is not certain 
from the evidence resulting from THSLS analyses that production interdependence 
is very strong.
The coefficient of accelerator variable as expected has a positive sign in the majority 
of the regressions for locally controlled firms. On the contrary, in foreign
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controlled firms, this variable turn out to have a negative impact on investment in 
most cases, but only significant at 10 per cent once when negative. This reversal of 
the result of OLS and TSLS analyses, is rather difficult to explain. However, to the 
extent that one may wish to generalise on the basis of THSLS result on this, 
variable, it would appear that gross investment in foreign firms during the period 
covered by this study has less to do with responding to capacity pressures than to 
other reasons such as labour reducing investments or efficiency improving 
investments, and replacements and renewals of existing w ritten down assets. It is 
plausible that capacity pressures would not be as intense in foreign controlled 
affiliates (as it would be in locally controlled firms), since intra-group supplies to 
the foreign firm would take off the heat from capacity pressures.
The cash flow or depreciation variable (column 6). as expected, has a positive 
coefficient in the' majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled 
firms. In comparison, the evidence strongly suggests that depreciation allowances 
play a relatively more significant positive role in influencing investment 
expenditures in foreign controlled firms than in the locally controlled firms. This is 
similar to OLS and TSLS results.
The coefficient of lagged capital stock variable (column 7) as expected, has a positive 
sign in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. 
In comparison, the evidence strongly suggests that, lagged capital stock play a more 
significant positive role in influencing investment in locally controlled firms than in 
the foreign controlled firms. This is similar to the OLS and TSLS results.
All in all, the result of annual regressions of the investment equation using THSLS, 
leads to a similar conclusion to those of OLS and TSLS analyses; the evidence shows 
that foreign controlled firms differ from locally controlled firms, in terms of the 
(relative roles of) fixed capital investment determinants.
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4.6 D istribution o f significance of coefficients: Ext. Finance 
Equation
The result of THSLS analyses of external finance equation is summarised in Table 
13N (below). Contrast this with the results of OLS and TSLS analyses summarised 
in tables 10P and 11J respectively.
The coefficient of current dividend variable turns out to have a negative sign in the 
majority of the annual regressions for the foreign and locally controlled firms. 
However the coefficient is not significant when negative. In comparison, from the 
evidence available, it appears that this coefficient when significant it is positive in 
foreign firms. On the contrary, it is never positively significant in locally controlled 
firms. This is similar to the OLS and TSLS results.
The coefficient of fixed investment variable (column 2), as expected, has a positive 
sign in the majority of the annual regressions for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. In comparison, the evidence shows that this variable plays a more 
significant positive role in influencing external finance behaviour in locally 
controlled firms than in foreign controlled firms. This is similar to OLS and TSLS 
results. *
i
The coefficient of current profit variable (column 3), turns out to have a positive 
sign in the majority of the regressions in both foreign and locally controlled firms. 
This is rather surprising, since profit, being a source of funds, would be expected to 
dampen the demand for external borrowing. To the extent that one may wish to 
generalise on the available evidence it would appear that current profits improves 
the debt capacity of the firm and so firms that are profitable are those more able to 
raise external finance. This is equally plausible since lenders would be more willing 
to lend to such profitable firms (at 'fine' rates of interest). In comparison, it appears 
that this variable play more positive role in influencing external finance in foreign
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TABLE 11N(1) SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNS AND SIQEFICWCE OF COEFFICIBflS 
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES AMUAL CROSS-SECTION DATA 1974-1980 
EXTERNAL FINANCE BQUATIGN
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a Predicted sign + + + + + +
b Total positive 
and negative
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
c Positive only 
<totaD
3 3 4 5 5 4 .4 7 5 4 4 5 6 4
d Significant at 
10%
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0
e Significant at 
5%
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
f Significant at 
1%
1 0 1 5 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
g Negative (total) 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 0 2 3 3 2 1 3
h Significant at 
10%
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i Significant at 
5%
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 . 0 0 0
j Significant at 
1%
0 0 0 1 0
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* Significant at 1% + = Positive coefficient
** Significant at 5% -  = Negative coefficient
*** Significant at 10% (1) See Appendix A11.2(iii)
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controlled firms than in locally controlled firms.
The coefficient of depreciation variable (column 4), turns out to have a positive sign 
in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. 
This is rather surprising since depreciation being a source of founds is expected to 
‘dampen’ the demand for external borrowing by the firm.
On the basis of this (THSLS) result, it does appear that depreciation, like profit, 
adds to the debt capacity of the firm in the sense that the ability to ‘earn’ the 
depreciation allowances increases the firms ability to raise external finance. In 
addition, since fixed investment is to a large extent positively influenced by 
depreciation, and fixed investment positively influences external finance, then 
depreciation becoming positively related with external finance is only logical. By 
comparing together the size of the coefficients and their significance between foreign 
and locally controlled firms (see Appendix A11.2(iii) and A11.2(iv)) this result 
indicates that this variable appears to play a more significant positive role in 
influencing external finance behaviour in locally controlled firms than in foreign 
controlled firms.
The coefficient of income gearing variable (column 5) turns out to have a positive
i
sign in.the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally controlled firms. 
This is rather surprising. Being a proxy for business risk it is expected to have a 
negative influence on external finance. The positive coefficient appears to indicate 
that firms borrow as their profits get squeezed. This appears plausible particularly, 
where the firms concerned are large enough, and the profit squeeze is expected to last 
for a short period, so that lenders would be willing to lend to such firms in the hope 
that the 'tu rn  round’ is just ‘arround the comer*. This positive relationship may 
also indicate that the borrowing contract acts to reduce the speed of adjustment; 
that is. the firm may be constrained by the debt contract to liquidate the borrowing
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if the rate of interest increases during the year of debt contract. The underlying 
economic conditions during the decade of 1970 to 1980 have been very unstable, so 
that the above reasoning appears plausible (see section 11.5 (below)). In 
comparison, this variable appears to have a more significant positive relationship 
with external finance in locally controlled firms than in foreign controlled firms.
The coefficient of capital gearing variable turns out to have a positive sign in the 
majority of the regressions for foreign and locally controlled firms. However the 
coefficient is never significant when positive. When significant the coefficient is 
negative in locally controlled firms. Not much can be said about the unexpected 
positive coefficient of capital gearing, since it is never significant. However it would 
appear that the firms in the sample are so experienced as to have a stable gearing 
ratio to which they consistently adhere to. This is even more important in foreign 
controlled firms where the ‘thin equity’ provisions of the Inland Revenue would 
mean that foreign controlled firms keep to a stable debt-equity ratio3.
The coefficient of net working capital investment (column 7). as expected, has a 
positive sign in the majority of the regressions for both foreign and locally 
controlled firms. In comparison, the evidence clearly shows that this .variable plays 
a more significant positive role in influencing external finance in foreign controlled 
firms than in locally controlled firms. This is similar to the OLS and TSLS results.
All in all, the evidence presented in this section leads to the similar conclusion as 
those from OLS and TSLS analyses. It shows that, there is a difference between 
foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the relative roles of the external 
finance determinants.
3. It should be born in mind that the definition of debt in this study includes all borrowings both loans 
and overdrafts; so that this may contribute to the apparent positive coefficients of capital gearing as 
well as income gearing discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
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From the summary results of annual cross-section regressions of the dividend, 
investment and external finance equations, using OLS, TSLS and THSLS, it is 
observed that some of the signs and significance of coefficients are not unchanged 
throughout the regressions-years. This is so despite the fact that the data used for 
the investigation are continuous data belonging to the same firms over the entire 
period covered by the study. The changes in significance and signs can not therefore 
be due to such a reason as change in sampling mix of firms, which would have been 
the case if different firms are used in different years. The changes can not be related 
to change in sample size since the sample size remained stable and fixed throughout 
the period of the study.
The changes therefore can be attributed to the underlying economic conditions 
during the period covered by this study. In the next section these underlying 
conditions are discussed, together with other contributing circumstances.
5. TEMPORAL STABILITY OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
A casual inspection of the goodness of fit (R 2), and analysis of variance statistics 
displayed in chapters 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 11.3 will clearly show that the 
explanatory power of the variables together, are unstable from one year to another
i
and some coefficients’ signs sometimes changed (see Tables 10J, 10M, 10P in chapter 
10; Tables 11F and 11G).
While one is not very much concerned with the structural performance of the 
models across-periods as much as one is concerned about comparing the behaviour 
of foreign and locally controlled firms using the same models for each regression, it 
is considered important to point out that coefficients’ instability problem does exist, 
when one looks at one period relative to the others. This is not however unusual in 
annual cross-section regressions analyses of corporate financial behaviours (see for 
example Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Kumar (1984), Pogue (1971), McCabe (1979),
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Peterson and Benesh (1983)).
The three main reasons for this temporal instability and the impracticability of 
unscrambling all their effects are discussed below. The three main reasons are as 
follows:
1. The lagged effects of government economic policy changes that are likely to 
extend their effects on the financial behaviour of firms over different accounting 
reference periods.
2. The influence of variables that vary over different time periods but not across 
firms within the same industry, such as prices of capital goods, interest rates, 
exchange rates and labour supply.
3. Exclusion of some pertinent cross-section variables from the equations, such as 
change of management, change of majority shareholder(s) within the same domicile, 
industry effects due to capital intensity, unequal age of assets reflecting cyclical 
variations in depreciation coefficients, differences in the purpose of investments: 
expansion or capital widening investments, efficiency or capital deepening 
investments and replacements or renewal investments; and the possible effects of 
unequal capital assets sizes of the firms in the regression sample.
The first and second reasons above are interrelated and are thus discussed under one 
heading - th e  economic setting: The survey of the economic environment existing 
over the period covered by this study provides the background on which the 
structural performance of the economic models should be judged. In other words, it 
is not a straight forward matter to simply compare the structural performance of 
the models used here in terms of the size and significance as well as the arithmetic 
signs of the coefficients, with that of other studies carried out over different periods 
and countries. This is because of impracticability of isolating the lagged effects of 
so many changes within the economic environment so that it is not possible to 
measure separately the effect of each in any one model.
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Consider the period of 1960s up to early 1970s. Apart from:
1. the introduction of corporation tax in 1965 Finance Act whose aim was to 
encourage plough back of retentions (see The Budget Address, Hansard, April 6. 
1965) and which created an incentive to delay dividend payments until after the 
first quarter of 1973 following the introduction of im putation system  of taxation4;
2. the introduction of statutory dividend restraint from the mid-1960s and
3. the sterling devaluation of 1967, the period covering 1960s up to 1972/73 
financial year was stable relative to the period from 1973/74 to 1980. The 
inappropriateness of comparing the results of studies in the 1960s and th a t 
covering th e  period from  1973 to  1980 can be imagined when one considers the 
economic setting of the later period. This will also point to the difficulties that any 
econometric study applying a periodic cross-section regression analysis would face 
when it comes to judging the structural performance of the models as they stand.
Firstly, there was the introduction of investment grants and 100% initial 
allowances on investment in plant and machinery and other government policy 
incentives by the Industry Act 1972. It is plausible that the expectations of the 
introduction of these incentives may have affected the timing of capital investments 
before and after the Act was introduced. The length of the lagged effect is however 
not certain, but it is not unlikely to have positively affected the level of 
investments particularly in the periods immediately following the introduction of 
the Act in 1972 and 1973 resulting in lower levels of investments in 1974 and 
1975.
Secondly, from April 1973. the tax changes introducing imputation system of 
taxation came into effect in UK. This allows tax credit on dividend payments to the
4. sec Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (March, 1980) esp. PP.34-35.
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shareholders. The anticipation of this tax change from the earlier approach (since 
1966 during which dividends were effectively taxed twice) to the imputation 
system, would have affected the timing of dividend payments. Thus the level of 
dividends paid during the periods immediately following the new system is likely 
to be affected by the carry over of dividend payments to benefit from the tax 
change. \Vhile it is not certain how long the lagged effect endured, it is likely that 
the dividend payments during the rest of 1973, 1974 and perhaps 1975 may well 
have been effected by the change-over, (see the Economic Trends Annual Series, 
CSO, January 1974, 1975 and 1976).
Thirdly, from Ju ly  1974 there was a change in the dividend ceiling which was set 
at 5% and existed since November 1972. Thus, between July 1974 to mid 1975 the 
ceiling was raised to 12.5%. During the second half of 1975 the ceiling was reduced 
to 10% limit and continued at that rate till the dividend control was abolished 
during the mid-1979. Chart 10 (appendix A11.3) gives the indication as to the 
difference between the 1960s and 1970s as well as the differences between one 
period and the other during the decade of 1970s.
Another important government induced distortion was the introduction of stock 
appreciation relief in the 1974 Finance Act with effect retrospective to 1973/74 
financial year. The aim was to improve the post tax rate of return by discounting 
the inflation element in taxable profits due to stock price changes.
Having noted the government induced distortions which are likely to affect inter- 
period comparisons, it is as well to point out o ther influences in  th e  economic 
env ironm ent during the period covered by this study and whose respective effects 
on the structural performance of the models can not be easily disentangled. These 
include influences that vary over time in their magnitude and effect but which do 
not vary across firms in the same industries.
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Consider the periods since 1970. There was a decline from the peak in 1970 to 
lower levels of growth in 1971 and 1972. A rapid growth followed in 1973 
following the introduction of capital allowances by the industry Act 1972 
(appendix A l l .3, Chart 2). Between 1973 and 1974 inclusive, inflation accelerated 
particularly as a result of the quadrupling of crude oil prices. The effect of inflation 
is likely* to have affected the raw materials prices, and the anticipation of further 
rises may well have led to defensive stock accumulation (see appendix A11.3, Chart 
6). Between 1974 and 1975 there was a recession resulting to a profit squeeze.
The implications of the expectations of further price rises coupled with the profits 
squeeze are the rapid increase in the income and capital gearing during 1974 
(perhaps) as firms geared up to complete the investments commenced in 1973 (see 
Charts 8 and 9, appendix A11.3).
By 1976, the inflation moderated and at the same time a modest upturn was 
recorded as the petroleum prices stabilized. The modest upturn in 1976 continued 
into the recovery periods of 1977 and 1978. However, this recovery was short 
lived as the economy plunged once again into recession between 1979 and 1981 (see 
appendix A11.3 Chart 3). While higher dependence on external borrowings 
occurred as profits were squeezed, fixed invfestments tended to lag cyclical changes 
in the economic activities because of contracts already ‘in place’. For example the 
large profit squeeze in 1974 was not matched by the decline in investment 
expenditures in 1974 (see Appendix A l l .3, Charts 2 and 3 respectively). Similarly 
the moderate upturn in 1976 was not matched by investment expenditures during 
the same period (ibid); this is perhaps due to available unused capacity from 1973 
to 1975 enough to meet the increased demand in 1976 (ibid).
The decline in production during recession would lead to a drop in stock turnover as 
firms draw down excess inventories accumulated during the favourable preceding
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period. While the stock turnover decline during the mid 1970s. the working capital 
turnover rose from the depth in 1974 to plateau from 1975 to 1978 (and dropped 
sharply from 1979 to 1980) as firms increased credit periods to their customers as 
part of the marketing strategy to increase sales during the depressed periods (see 
Chart 6 Appendix A11.3). This would have some effects on the instability in the 
coefficient of net working capital investment variable.
There are o ther influences during the decades of 1970s and 1980s which are not 
exactly parallel in the 1960s and beyond. F irs tly  there is the acceleration of the 
role of new technology on the factory floors (robbotization of production). This is 
an example of capital deepening investments in search of most efficient technology 
of production and which may not be in response to demand pressures as much as an 
effort to cut production costs. Since most of the new technology processes are still 
'young’ (that is. their production capacities may well be under-utilized as yet), 
increases in sales may not have as much effect on investment as one would expect in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, there was an increase in the use of off-balance 
sheet financing through equipment, plant and machinery leasing during the period. 
The effect of this on the accelerator variable is mentioned briefly in chapter 10 (but 
see also Bank of England quarterly bulletin^ (Sept. 1984), P.356). T h ird ly , there 
was an increased use of variable rate loans resulting from volatile interest rates, 
high inflation and the general uncertainty during the decade of 1970s. The lack of 
confidence that existed encouraged both suppliers of loanable funds and the 
corporate borrowers to use the variable rate loans rather than fixed rate long term 
loans. The higher use of ‘on demand’ financing from the banks, would partly 
account for the instability in the external finance variable, and may also lead to 
instabilities in the effects of income and capital gearing in the external finance 
equation. The instability in the external finance variable from the use of on-demand 
borrowing would result from the fact that, depositing of earnings into the current
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accounts would have the effect of reducing the balance of borrowing in the current 
account at the end of the accounting year; while drawings from such an account 
would increase it. Therefore, the timing of depositing of earnings and sundry 
receipts to (or drawings from) the account, would influence the level of borrowings 
as recorded in the year-end financial statements. In the case of the instabilities in 
the income and capital gearing, this may result from firms borrowing on the current 
account even during periods of depressed profits in anticipation that rates could 
fluctuate in their favour. If profits are squeezed a situation would arise where the 
income gearing may be high as well as the use of external borrowing.
Having discussed the various macro-economic changes during the period as well as 
the government induced distortions which can be held to account for some of the 
temporal instabilities in the regression coefficients, the attention is now turned to 
the third possible source of such instabilities - t h e  exclusion o f pertinent cross- 
section variables. Some variables that are likely to have some effects on the 
estimates are sometimes left out in cross-section regression models; and the 
estimates of residuals would reflect these unspecified influences since for individual 
firms, some of the omitted variables are likely to be stable over time. According to 
Pogue (1971, P.211), the error terms estimates for each firm in the periodic cross- 
sections may be systematically higher or lower than the mean estimated error for 
the whole sample; in effect, the estimated errors for each firm may not cancel. This 
influence, Pogue termed the ‘firm  effects’. Another way of looking at this is to 
consider each firm against the others. It is unlikely that managements would be 
identical in every respect. For example, there may be differences in their attitudes 
towards the ‘appropriate’ level of external finance. As Donaldson (1961) found out. 
the major barrier to debt usage by firms is managerial distaste for creditor 
interference in the management of the firm. There may be differences between 
managements’ views about their shareholders’ interests. A change in management
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of a firm may result in a change of strategy, resulting in a temporal instability in 
the coefficients.
There is also the possible effects of the unequal age of assets between firms and 
within firms so that replacement investments may occur in ‘waves’ leading to the 
instability of coefficients. Similarly as McCabe (1979, P.125) pointed out, firms 
that float new debt in one year often do not repeat the same exercise every year, and 
so the coefficient of the net debt variable may be unstable between one year and 
another.
Coefficients instability may also result from 'industry effect’ excluded from the list 
of variables. The industry effect arises due to possible differences in capital 
intensity across industries and the associated clientele effects may result also in 
differences in dividend patterns and together the investment and dividend patterns 
may affect borrowing patterns across industries. By excluding industry variable, it 
is possible that the excluded influence would reflect on the residuals and thus on the 
overall performance of the equations. For this study, the industry effects are 
neutralized by selection of matching sample of firms from different industry 
groups. It is possible that the industry effects may be present in the separate 
foreign and locally controlled firms’ data*. However Pogue (1971, P.211) and 
Peterson and Benesh (1983) found from experimentation that industry dummy 
variables have insignificant effects and would not affect the primary conclusions 
from cross-section studies. However, Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). identified some 
significant industry effects in their dividend and investment equations but none in 
the external finance equation.
It would have been better to introduce industry dummies so as to further neutralize 
industry effects that may be present in the separate sample regressions. For 
technical Teasons resulting from the sample size and therefore the problem of loss of
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degrees of freedom, one has to abandon such a step. Having said so, the empirical 
evidence from the two studies namely: that of Pogue (1971) and Peterson and 
Benesh (1983) both of which are relatively recent, indicate that not much would be 
lost in not introducing industry dummies.
Finally, there is a possible effect of differences in the actual size of the various firms 
in the samples. Mayer and Kuh (1957, PP.159-180) suggests that small firms grow 
faster than the larger ones. This firm specific effect would also contribute to the 
explanation of the temporal instability of coefficients from cross-section regression 
analyses.
Since it is impracticable to unscramble fully  the lagged effects of the macro- 
economic (time-series) factors, government induced changes, firm and industry 
specific effects in any one cross-section regression model, it is as well to bear them in 
mind as being responsible for the temporal instabilities in the relative explanatory 
power of the variables when one period is compared against another (in the separate 
regressions).
Having made these points, it is important to remind the reader that as far as this 
study is concerned, much of the underlying problems mentioned above would not
i
adversely affect the conclusions from the empirical study. This is because the 
results of regressing a m atching sample of foreign and locally controlled firms are 
compared against each other fo r  each cross-section regression, using exactly the 
same models.
6. VERIFICATION OF THE 'THIRD LEVEL’ HYPOTHESES
So far, the empirical evidence presented and discussed in this and the preceding 
chapter demonstrates that there are differences between foreign and locally 
controlled firms in terms of the relative roles of some common dividend investment 
and external finance determinants.
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TABLE 11(0)
DIVIDEND EQUATION
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP CONTROL AND FINANCIAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE FIRM
B • C.
INVESTMENT EQUATION EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION
VAR COEFFICIENTS
(t-S ta t is t ic s )
VAR COEFFICIENTS
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A question arises as to, what is the long run impact of degree of foreign control on 
the dividend, investment and external finance behaviour of host base firms?
On the basis of the conceptual issues discussed in chapter 2, empirical studies 
discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the first hand knowledge derived from the 
fieldwork - the interviews and questionnaires presented in chapters 6 and 7, the 
three hypotheses relating to the impact of the degree of foreign control on the 
decision triad under investigation, are put forward in chapter 8.2, The empirical 
implementation comprise introducing a foreign control dummy (FC) variable into 
the usual dividend, investment, and external finance equations. The foreign control 
dummy is assigned a value of unity when a firm is foreign controlled and zero if 
otherwise. The same set of firms used for testing other hypotheses are used to test 
these hypotheses. The number of observations is 574 made up of the combination 
of the pooled cross-section data of foreign and locally controlled firms. Three stage 
least squares method is used as it is known to be the most efficient among the other 
applicable regression models due to the simultaneous nature of corporate financial 
decisions.
The results are displayed in table 11(0) above. Consider first, .the •dividend 
equation (Table ll(O )A ). The coefficient of foreign control variable as expected, 
has a positive sign which is also significant at 1 per cent level. On the basis of this 
empirical evidence, there is a statistical ground to accept the hypothesis that in the 
long run, the dividend decision of a firm would be influenced by the degree of 
foreign ownership control of its voting equity shares.
Second, consider the investm ent equation, (Table ll(O)B). The coefficient of 
foreign control variable turns out to have a positive sign which is also significant at 
5 per cent level. This is contrary to expectation. One would have expected that the 
majority foreign controlled firms would invest less per pound sterling of sales than
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the locally controlled firms due to the various reasons expressed in chapter 2, 
including production interdependence, international market allocation, and foreign 
risk considerations by the foreign parent companies. In the next section an attempt 
would be made at the tentative explanation of one of the possible reasons for the 
result obtained here. However, on the basis of the empirical evidence, the 
investment decisions of a firm would depend on the degree of foreign control of 
corporate equity capital.
Third, consider the external finance equation (Table ll(O)C). The coefficient of 
foreign control variable (FC), has a negative sign as expected. This coefficient is also 
significant at 1 per cent level. On the basis of this empirical evidence, there is a 
statistical ground to accept the null hypothesis. Thus one can conclude that in the 
long run, other things being equal, the external finance decisions of a firm would be 
influenced by the degree of foreign ownership control of its voting equity shares.
All in all, the results of the third level hypotheses presented in this section support 
the main hypothesis, that a difference exists between foreign and locally controlled 
firms in terms of their dividend investment and external finance decisions.
7. THIRD LEVEL HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS: SOME 
CRITICAL QUESTIONS
Following from the result of the test of the ‘third level hypotheses’ presented in the 
preceding section, three key questions may be asked. Thus:
1. Why should foreign ownership control appear to have a positive impact on 
investment by the affiliates, contrary to expectations?
2. If foreign control of the firm has a positive impact on its dividend, and positive 
impact on its investment, why a negative impact on its external finance dependence?
3. If the foreign control coefficient is not significant in the equations, what would 
that mean for the result that a difference exist between foreign versus locally
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controlled firms, in terms of the relative roles of the determinants of their dividend, 
investment and external finance decisions?
7.1 W hy positive relationship between FC and investm ent?
Three tentative reasons are hereby suggested and include the following:
1. Possible disparity of plant size and therefore scope for expansion:
2. Disparity in acquisition activities, and
3. Disparity in capital intensities
In the first place, it depends on when the local firms and the foreign affiliates 
reached their existing plant sizes. The implication of this, is that the scope of, and 
the rate of expansion may be less as a plant reaches a certain size (see chapter 9.5). 
Being that the locally controlled firms in this research sample are among the oldest 
in their respective industries, it is plausible that they may well have reached their 
average plant size earlier than the foreign controlled firms. If so, it is likely that 
the foreign firms may have more scope for expansion than their local counterparts. 
Having said so, it is plausible to expect that over a long period, the effect of possible 
disparity in plant size on the relative rate of expansion would be diluted, since 
larger replacem ent investments would compensate for the lower rate of Expansion 
by the locally controlled firms. This is said because the investment variable used in 
this study is gross of replacement and expansion and other forms of capital 
investments, and the data are from pooled cross-section sample.
In the second place, the investment behaviour being investigated relates to ‘organic’ 
investment activities and therefore does not include acquisitions of subsidiaries. If 
the locally controlled firms are more able to expand via acquisition than the foreign 
controlled affiliates, it is likely that the rate of their ‘organic’ growth would be 
diluted. However, as Kumar (1984) pointed out, acquisition investment is highly 
discontinuous because firms do not normally acquire new subsidiaries each year.
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While foreign controlled firms may be free to acquire subsidiaries too, they may be 
restrained by the negative sentiments in the host country against foreign 'take over’ 
of local economy and the consequent effect on the image of the affiliate. Such 
sentiments were openly expressed in UK in 1986 relating to the General Motors’ bid 
for parts of UK’s BL; the "Westland Helicopter Company affair and the Ford Motor 
Company’s bid to take over Austin Rover (see chapter 1). Foreign acquisition may 
also be restrained by the parent company through the foreign market allocation 
policy (see chapter l) . Having said the above, it is likely that the size of 
replacement investment following the acquisition would compensate for the 
possible diluting effect of acquisition on local firms’ organic investment. The use of 
pooled cross-section data would further dilute the effect of unequal acquisition 
activities between the two sets of firms.
7.2 D isparity in capital in tensities
The third likely reason for positive coefficient of foreign control in the investment 
equation, relates to the possible disparity in capital intensities between foreign and 
locally controlled firms. The firms in the sample are matched in terms of various 
criteria including industry groups, and size bands. Size bands are measured in terms 
of capital employed. This comprises both fixted capital assets and current assets. Of 
course this does not necessarily mean that they are exactly matched in terms of 
their capital intensities. ’Technology’ of production may still differ between firms 
in the same industry so that some firms may be more labour intensive than the 
others. If so, a relatively more labour intensive firm would be expected to expand 
fixed assets relatively less than a capital intensive firm.
There are reasons to expect a negative relationship between capital and labour 
employment rates. The main reason is the substitution effect. Capital allowance 
provisions introduced by the Industry Act 1972, which allow tax deductions on
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corporate investment expenditures in plant and machinery, would have the 
tendency of encouraging the use of machines rather than expansion of human labour 
in some firms. To this, is added the effect of technological change, bringing about 
the introduction of more and more labour saving processes operated by industrial 
robbots including data processing machinery. These points together with the effect 
of Employment Protection Legislations, redundancy payments provisions and Trade 
Union 'power’, are likely to generate a preference for capital than labour. Large 
locally controlled firms with large labour force may be restrained by the ‘cost’ of 
redundancies which may result from large scale acquisition of labour replacing 
machinery. However, the increasing numbers of redundancies announced in recent 
years re-enforces the point about the effect of new technology and therefore the 
negative relationship resulting from substitution effect.
Where foreign controlled affiliates are concerned, additional factors come into the 
picture. Poynter (1978) reports from his research, that one of the factors that 
increase the ‘interest’ of host government’s authorities in a foreign controlled 
subsidiary, is the size of the employees: the larger the number of employees the 
more the host governments interest; and the more the technological sophistication of 
the firm’s operations (and therefore less labour intensity), the less the possible 
interference from the host government’s authorities. From this finding, it appears 
that there are additional incentives for the foreign firm to expand capital input 
relative to labour as a deliberate effort to minimize the level of local labour input 
and avoid Union problems which often arises where large workforce is involved. 
By so doing the foreign firm would also avoid the possible loss of ‘goodwill’ if 
uncertainties eventually lead to termination of the services of some employees.
Putting together the points made in the preceding two paragraphs, one would expect 
a declining use of labour input relative to capital for both local and foreign 
controlled firms (see Figure 11A above). However, since the result from the test of
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‘third level hypothesis’ suggests that foreign ownership control has a positive 
impact on investment by the affiliates relative to locally controlled firms, one would 
expect that the reason would be related to their relative capital intensities.
To test if the relative capital intensity is a possible reasons for the positive sign of 
the foreign control variable in the investment equation an OLS regression was 
carried out to estimate the employment behaviour of foreign controlled firms in the 
sample, relative to locally controlled firms. If foreign control has a positive impact 
on investment, then it should have a negative relationship with employment of 
labour input. The null hypothesis is therefore that in  the  long ru n  th e re  would 
be a  no negative relationship  between th e  degree of foreign control o f a  host 
base firm  and its  em ploym ent behaviour.
For convenience, the test of the reabove hypothesis is restricted to simple 
application of available econometric models which have successfully linked output 
(sales), employment and capital, in the firms production function. This relieves one 
of having to delve into the ocean of literature on employment which is of course 
outside the focus of this study.
The two main econometric models linking output, capital and labour are the well
i
known Cobb-Douglas production function (see Cobb-Douglas (1928)), and the 
alternative known as the constant Elasticity of substitution (CES) put forward by 
Arrow et al (1961).
F irst, consider the Cobb-Douglas production function. Without delving into the 
details, this version of production function can be expressed conveniently as in 
Gujarati (1978, P.107) in a natural logarithmic form as follows:
LnYit =  Po+faiLnX, )t +H2(.LnZi \  (1)
where L n  = natural log5: Y( , is the output, (taking here to mean sales) for the i th
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firm. Xt , is the labour input for the i th firm (taken here to be the number of 
employees in the i th firm). Z t , is the capital input (taken here to be the total 
capital assets at cost) of the i th firm. /3q. is the intercept or the change in Y when 
X and Z are kept constant. $1 and /32, measure the elasticities of output with 
respect to labour and capital inputs, t  , is the time sub script.
The main assumption of this model is that the capital-to-labour elasticity of 
substitution is unity. That is, a unit increase in capital input would reflect a 
corresponding decrease in labour input in the production process. These changes are 
of course motivated by cost minimization objective, leading to maximization of 
profits.
From equation (l) , one derives the employment equation linking labour input and 
capital input. This is done by keeping output constant; that is by finding the 
relationship between employment and capital for each unit of sales (or output). 
Thus the adaptation of Cobb-Douglas production function for the employment 
equation is expressed as follows:
LnXit =  3 o + /3 ( L t iZ z. \  (2 )
To equation (2) above, the foreign control d,ummy variable is added to measure its 
relative effect on employment behaviour. The two equation adapted from Cobb- 
Douglas production function are more conveniently restated as follows:
l o g SAL, =  Po+faLogEMP, ) t + $2(LogFAi ) t (3 )
l o g EMPlt =  /S o + jB jd o g FA, ), +FC (4 )
Where SAL, EMP, FA, and FC represent sales, employment, fixed assets at cost and
5. That is, log to base e ; where e = 2.718. Therelationship between the natural log and the ordinary 
log to base 10 is expressed as follows: JLTle X  = 2.3026 log X. The statistical package used for this 
study (ie TSP), calculates the natural logarithms rather than the common logs (or log to the base 10).
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foreign control dummy and variables respectively.
The employment, sales and fixed assets data axe pooled cross-section data belonging 
to the firms used in this study and cover the same periods. As usual the FC dummy 
variable is assigned a value of unity when a firm is foreign controlled and zero 
when otherwise.
To test the Cobb-Douglas production function equation (3) was estimated and the 
result is shown in table IIP  below. To test the null hypothesis using Cobb-Douglas 
adaptation, equation (4) was estimated and the result is displayed in table 11Q 
below. We will return to the result later.
Second, consider the CES production function. Again, without delving into the 
details, .the linearized form of the model conveniently links output (sales) with 
factor inputs. That is, there is a linear relationship between capital input, labour 
input and the covariance of capital and labour inputs on the one hand and the 
output (or sales) on the other. This is expressed more conveniently as in Gujarati 
(1978, P.331), thus:
K:
logYit =  /Bo+ftOogA:, ) r +/32(1ogLi \  +/33[log(-r-i-)]2+vl- t (5)
M t
i
The definition of Y, K, and L are as already given above. The term in square 
brackets are included to capture non-linearities which makes the difference between 
CES and the Cobb-Douglas production function. The former contends that the 
relationship between capital and labour is not unity, hence the introduction of the 
'non-linear term', while the later argues that the relationship is unity. It is due to 
this arguments which is as yet unresolved that made it necessary to test the null 
hypothesis under investigation using both technologies.
Assuming that total demand (sales) of a product depends very much on the external 
market conditions, the corporate management of each firm would, in order to
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maximize their firm’s market share, among other things, choose the mix of factor 
inputs (labour and capital), so as to minimize their total input costs. Thus, keeping 
the output/demand (sales) constant, and introducing a lag in the ‘non-linear’ term6, 
the relationship between labour (employment) and capital input can be adapted 
from equation (5) above as follows:
logL;, = jS0+3i(logKi \  +/32[log(-r i—p+ui( (6)
■ H - i
By introducing the foreign control dummy (FC), to equation (6) and re-stating 
equation (5) and (6) in a more convenient form, we have the following estimated 
equations:
FA-logSALit= /30+/3 j (logEMP, \  +02(logFAS \  +g3[ l o g ( ~  \  ]2+ vu (7)
FA-
logEMPU =  /So+ISiClogFA, )t + g2[log( - - ^ ' -‘- )1 Y+FC (8)
To test the CES model, equation (7) was estimated and the result is displayed in 
Table IIP  below. To test the null hypothesis using this version of production 
technology, equation (8) was estimated and the result is displayed in Table 13Q
i
below..
Turning to the results, it is convenient to examine the result of the test of the two 
alternative technologies ( equation (3) and (7) ). The result displayed in table IIP  
below suggest that both alternative views of production technology handle the 
relationship well. However, there is a slight improvement in the in favour of 
the CES model. On the basis of F-statistic, both models are significant at 1 per cent
6. The introduction of a lag simply reflects the assumption by the CES model, that a firm maintains its 
existing tecnnology.
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with Cobb-Douglas production technology showing a better performance.
Table IIP
Relationship between Sales, Em ployment and Capital Investm ent 
Dependent variable = logSALt
CES Model (version) Cobb-Douglas Model (version)
Variables Foreign Local Foreign Local
OL -0.261 2.210* 2.901* 2.365*
(-0.455) (9.494) (12.688) (11.995)
log(EMP) 0.869* 0.130* 0.052 0.077*
(6.167) (2.760) (1.592) (3.705)
log(FA) 0.159 0.788* 0.802* 0.832*
(1.426) (20.248) (29.173) (49.414)
log(KL) 1.914* 0.1018 n.a n.a
(.R 2) 0.870 0.922 0.854 0.922
F 637.0* 1133.8* 836.7* 1696.6*
n.a variable not applicable in Cobb-Douglas Production function 
* significant at 1 per cent.
Having established that the production function handles the data rather well, the 
adapted models based on the proven technology relationship are now estimated. 
The result of estimating equations (4) and (8) are displayed in Table 11Q. below. 
On the basis of R 2, the CES model performs better than the Cobb-Douglas 
adaptation.
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Table 11Q
Relationship between Employment, Capital Investm ent and Foreign Control
Variable CES model (adaptation) Cobb-Douglas (adaptation)
Variables CES model (adaptation) Cobb-Douglas Adaptation
a 3.362* 4.181*
(19.777) (12.491)








n.a not applicable in this equation 
* significant at 1 percent level.
The main interest is of course the sign and the significance of the coefficient of 
foreign control variable. It will be seen from the table that the coefficient of this 
variable is negative and at the same time, it is highly significant (at 1% ) in both 
models.
On the basis of this empirical evidence, there is statistical ground to reject the null 
hypothesis. That is, one accepts the alternative hypothesis. Thus, in the long run 
there would be a negative relationship between employment in a firm and the degree 
of foreign control of its equity ownership. This therefore suggests that over the 
period covered by this study, foreign controlled firms are more capital intensive 
than the locally controlled firms in similar industries and explains why the foreign 
control variable have a positive impact on capital investment expenditure behaviour 
in the host country.
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7.3 W hy ‘FC* has negative coefficient in external finance 
equation given that it  has positive sign in both dividend and 
investm ent equations
It would have been expected that if FC has a positive relationship with dividend 
and also with investment then a positive relationship should be expected with 
external finance on logical basis. However the result has not supported the logic.
First of all, to establish why a positive relationship between FC and dividends, a 
regression was carried out using the OLS method. The approach is to calculate the 
target pay out ratio and .the speed of adjustment as described by Lintner (1956), for 
both foreign and locally controlled firms and then compare them. For convenience 
of the reader, the Lintner model of dividend is expressed as follows7:
D t =  OiJrbPt + d D t —i~>rv t (9)
Where D. is the dividend: P is the current profit, u, is the error term and t  is the 
time subscript while a , is the constant term: b, and d are coefficient described by 
Lintner as follows b «= re and d = 1-c; where r, is the target pay out ratio and c is 
the speed of adjustment.
From the regression of the pooled cross-section data for foreign and locally 
controlled firms separately, it is possible to derive r and c. The result of this 
exercise shows that the target pay out ratio for the foreign firms is .25, while that 
for locallly controlled firms is .22. In addition the speed of adjustment for foreign 
firms is .69, while that for local firms is .28. This suggests that not only is the 
target pay out ratio on average higher for foreign controlled firms, their long run 
speed of adjustment is also faster. This is shown in table HR below.
7. See chapter 5 for more details.
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Table HR
Com parative Speed of Adjustm ent and Target Payout Ratio
A< =  <Xu+bPit+dDit_t+vt
Foreign Local Foreign Local
Year Speed of Adj speed adj TP/Ratio TP/Ratio
1974 0.93 0.41 0.13 0.10
1975 0.77 0.22 0.44 0.17
1976 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.16
1977 0.57 0.18 0.26 0.31
1978 0.72 0.35 0.20 0.31
1979 0.54 -0.19 0.43 0.17
1980 0.54 . 0.18 0.14 0.34
1974-80 0.69 0.28 0.25 0.22
speed of adjustment = 1-d , where d  is the coefficient of lagged dividend
b *
TP/Ratio = —  where 0  , is the coefficient of current profit as 
C
shown in the model above.
If this is so. one would expect larger borrowing from such foreign firms. However, 
a closer look at the data reveals (as already pointed out) that dividend payments by 
foreign firms are infrequent although when they do pay dividends the empirical 
evidence suggests that it is larger than that of local counterparts (per pound of 
sales). The second possible reason is that dividend ‘announced’ may well not be
i
remitted immediately and thus serves to reduce the demand for external finance 
(where such allocated dividends form part of sundry creditors). Thirdly, foreign 
firms appear to borrow more on current account and so the balance of external 
borrowing at the balance sheet date may be very much affected by the timing of 
deposits from sales receipts.
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1A If in  any event the coefficient of FC is not significant in  any  
of the models, w hat would that mean for the result w hich  
shows that a difference exists based on the comparison o f the 
relative roles o f the determ insnts o f the decision triad ?
If FC (foreign control dummy) has no significant positive or significant negative 
coefficient in any of the three equations, it does not affect the results of the cardinal 
and the three sub-hypotheses. The results relate to a difference in the re la tive  
roles of the  determ inants of dividend, investment and external finance in the 
separate sample sets of foreign versus locally controlled firms. The relative roles of 
the determinants of the decision triad remain as found.
What a non-significant FC would suggest is that although a difference exist in the 
relative roles of the determinants of the decisions triad under investigation, in the 
long run, the fact of foreign control of a firm would make no overall difference in 
the dividend, investment and external finance rates in foreign firms in comparison 
with locally controlled firms. This does not mean that there axe no differences in 
the relative roles of the determinants in the different sets of firms.
Take for example, in the OLS, TSLS, and THSLS results reported in this and the
i
preceding chapter; the empirical evidence consistently show that for the dividend 
equation, current profits play a strong role relative to lagged dividend in 
determining the current dividends in foreign controlled firms; while lagged 
dividends play more significant role than current profits in locally controlled firms. 
For the investment equation, the result from the three methods show tha t current
i
depreciation play more role than lagged capital stock in determining investments in 
foreign firms; while in locally firms, lagged capital stock play more significalt role 
than current depreciation allowances. Finally, for external finance equation the 
result shows that in foreign controlled firms net current asset investments play a
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strong role relative to fixed investment in influencing external finance; while in 
locally controlled firms, fixed capital investment play more role in determining 
external finance.
From these results it can be seen that FC variable is more like a summary indicator 
as to the direction of the long run influence of foreign control of a firm on its 
overall dividend, investment and external finance flow rates, relative to locally 
controlled firms. The matter of significance obviously depends on which level that 
one wishes to pitch his confidence (see Koutsyiannis (1984, PP.91-97) taking other 
factors into consideration.
8 . BRIEF SU M M A R Y
In this ‘chapter, the results of the empirical verification of the hypotheses using 
simultaneous equation models are presented. The chapter started with justifying 
the applicability of the simultaneous equation regression analysis to the financial 
decisions of interest in this study.
Although there are some differences in the signs and significance of some coefficients 
resulting from two-stage and three stage least-squares methods, over the result of 
single equation models, the overall empirical evidence points to the same 
conclusions. In the external finance equation, for example, additional insights from 
three stage least squares relates to the reversal of signs and significance of profit and 
depreciation variables from being negative as expected, in ordinary least squares 
results, to being positive in the three-stage least squares results. The implication is 
that for large firms, improvement in cash flow increases their debt capacity and thus 
have a positive rather than negative impact on external finance. Similarly large 
firms appear to maintain a stable debt to net asset ratio (where debt is expressed as 
total borrowing, and net assets relates to total assets less current liabilities 
excluding bank loans and overdrafts and other short term loans). Another insight
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from using simultaneous equation models is the reversal of signs of investment 
variable in the local firms’ dividend equation, from being positive in OLS, to being 
negative in the THSLS, indicating the interdependence between dividend and 
investment expenditures.
The comparison of separate regressions for foreign and local firms show that there 
are some variations in significance of coefficients when one compares one year 
against another. This is attributable to the underlying economic and government 
policy changes which may have some lagged effects not specifically taken account of 
in the models.
All in all, the empirical evidence from both TSLS and THSLS suggest that there are 
differences between foreign and locally controlled firms in terms of the relative 
roles of the determinants of corporate investment, dividend and external finance 
decisions.
The test of the third level hypotheses shows that in the long run, the dividend, 
investment and external finance decisions in host base firms are influenced by the 
degree of foreign control of their voting equity capital. The tests show that foreign 
control has a positive impact on dividend payments and filed investment
i
expenditures, while it has a negative impact on external finance.
The suggested reasons for FC’s positive impact on investment, include the
/
following: possible disparity of plant size between foreign and local firms: disparity 
in acquisition activities and most importantly, the disparity in relative capital 
intensities. The result of empirical analyses to investigate this later point, suggests 
that foreign controlled firms are more capital intensive than the locally controlled 
firms.
Putting everything together, this result shows that in a universe of large industrial 
corporations, other things being equal, their long run dividend, investment and 
external finance ctertsicns would depend cn various factccs as veil as cn vtetior 
the cbuiijfciiL orEcdrip cf their voting equity locally cr steal «•
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CHAPTER 12 
SU M M A RY  A N D  CONCLUSIONS
1. T H E  C O N T E X T
This chapter has seven main aims. The first is to present the highlight of the 
motivation for this study and thus put its focus in perspective. The second is to 
present the summary of the fieldwork. The third is to review the hypotheses and 
present the summary of the main empirical findings discussed in the preceding two 
chapters. The fourth is to discuss the implications of the findings for business 
finance and economic theory; the fifth is to discuss the implications for the host 
governments’ foreign direct investment policies. The sixth and seventh aims are 
respectively to discuss the implications for economic forecasters and other interest 
groups, and put forward some suggestions of potential areas where further research 
efforts can be beneficially directed, to enhance the understanding of the financial 
decisions of firms operating directly in countries other than the ultimate home (or 
domicile) of the dominant ‘voting equity’ shareholders.
2 . M O T IV A T IO N  A N D  PER SPEC TIV E OF TH E ST U D Y  *
i
The concern about the possible negative effects of the foreign control of ownership 
of corporate equity rights, has resulted’ in the restriction of the degree of foreign 
participation in the ownership of host base firms. The mandatory codes and 
legislations precipitate from the ‘suspicions’ by the various host countries’ 
authorities, regarding the financial decisions in foreign controlled subsidiaries.
While some countries allow freedom of choice of the degrees of foreign and local 
ownership of equity to foreign direct investors, others have introduced mandatory 
codes, and some countries are uncertain as to the best course of action, resulting in 
frequent changes of policy. The ultimate effect of the proliferation of mandatory
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local ownership codes is not yet absolutely clear. It. however, appears to be a recipe 
for a retardation in the economic growth of mandatory code adopting countries. 
One of the implications may be economic instability in such countries, particularly 
in the present stage of international economy, where trade liberalisation 
arrangements have virtually overtaken the era of rampant protectionism. Countries 
are not now able to introduce strict import controls without the cost of retaliatory 
policies by other nations. The freer flow of goods and services would result in 
outflow (and inflow) of foreign income on current basis, with more immediate 
impact on balance of payments. It is easy to see why some countries vie to attract 
foreign direct investments into their economies, but not as clear to see why, on 
economic grounds, others introduce policies less likely to encourage long term 
commitment of foreign investors in their countries. The majority of countries 
w ithout mandatory ownership restrictions are among the more prosperous nations, 
while those with these codes are mainly the less industrially advanced nations, with 
more incidence of economic instability. Perhaps, this is a coincidence.
Despite the high 'temperature’ sometimes raised by the foreign equity ownership 
control issue, economic and business researchers have so far not yielded enough 
help, from empirical studies, to aid more realistic and stable foreign direct 
investment policies by host countries. The host countries’ authorities have thus 
been left to introduce restrictive policies on foreign direct investment, based on 
opinions, perhaps formed from isolated facts that have not been empirically proved 
to be typical of most foreign controlled firms.
The dissatisfaction with this apparent lack of interest by academic researchers in 
this important policy area, and the inadequacy of the approaches of the few studies 
in the general area, created the need for this study. The search for the appropriate 
framework and the investigation of the implication of foreign control on corporate 
financial decisions are the general objectives of this study.
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3. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE FIELDWORK
Based on the review of the literature and research works of others in the general 
area of corporate finance, the appropriate questions were structured and used for the 
field research. The field research as used here refers to interviews and mailed 
questionnaire surveys of top corporate finance executives of some large 
multinational corporations within the OECD member nations.
The objective of the interviews is threefold. The first, is to generate first hand 
information, from large multinational companies, about the financial decision 
considerations with respect to their foreign controlled affiliates. The second is to 
augment the information gleaned from earlier surveys of others, to help in 
explaining the relative roles of the determinants of financial behaviour of foreign 
versus locally controlled firms. The third, is to test some questions before mailing 
them to larger sample of multinational firms to strengthen the information 
generated from interviews.
A search for the information about the financial decisions in the domestic 
independent firms is restricted to what is already amply available in the literature.
From the field research, the summary of the main findings are as follows:
1. Various MNCs operate directly in various host countries for various motives. 
Some indicate the need to guard their ‘former* export market against possible import 
controls by the host governments. Some indicate the need to serve the world 
m arket more effectively by establishing production bases at, or near, the point of 
sale. Some indicate the desire for raw materials (and other factors of production) as 
the major drive for entry into foreign host countries. The differences in motivations 
and the nature of operations appear to reflect on the choice of ownership structure 
in the affiliates.
2. MNCs prefer to control the voting equity of their affiliates whether they are
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based at the home or in a foreign (host) country. This enhances the administrative 
flexibility or discretion available to the parent company in terms of the authority to 
allocate the group’s resources efficiently and effectively on a global basis.
3. Approval of investment expansion (or cut back) depends on the parent 
company’s strategy towards investment in a particular host country and thus on 
the corporate plans of the parent and its group. Major use of external finance 
sources have to be approved by the parent company.
4. Much interdependence exists in the financial allocation within the multinational 
corporate group. The allocations of subsidiary’s funds depends on its circumstances 
and that of the parent company. The parent company decides on the level of fees, 
transfer prices and interest charges on the intra-group lending to the affiliates. 
These are charges to the subsidiaries’ profit before tax. Thus the parent company 
sometimes effectively determines the level of reported profits and thus dividend 
payments by the foreign controlled subsidiaries. Dividend, according to the 
respondents, is the major single channel for foreign earnings transfers but not the 
only one.
5. There is production interdependence and the degree depends on the nature of the 
parent company, the particular activity set for the subsidiary and the degree of 
ownership control by the parent company.
6. The most important single market for’ the affiliates’ products is the host country, 
and only secondly other foreign markets put together. In very small number of 
cases, the home country is mentioned as a market for the foreign subsidiaries’ 
exports (e.g, Petroleum, Mining and Electronics firms).
7. Retained earnings are the most important sources of finance for the foreign 
affiliates’ operations. The foreign affiliates, normally do not finance their operations 
by new equity issues, and when they borrow, it is normally obtained from host 
country base sources.
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4. HYPOTHESES REVIEW AND SUMMARY OF MAIN 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This research was designed to investigate empirically the reflections of foreign 
control of voting equity on the financial decisions of host base firms. The financial 
decisions here refers to dividend, investment and external finance decisions. To 
carry out this empirical study, there is the need to select a control group of firms all 
of which are locally controlled firms matched by various criteria with the foreign 
controlled affiliates. The analytical framework centers on the various theories and 
empirical evidence which suggest that within each firm, the dividend, investment 
and external finance decisions are interrelated. Within this framework is structured 
the various determinants of each of the decision triad as synthesised from the 
theory and supported by the existing empirical studies.
The main hypothesis advanced in this study is that, o ther th ings being equal, th e  
financial behaviour o f firm s would depend, among o ther factors, on th e  
domicile o f m ajo rity  ow nership of of voting equity. In effect one expects a 
difference between the financial decisions of foreign and locally controlled firms in 
the host country. This difference is over and above the normal differences that may 
exist between firms that are owned and controlled by shareholder(s) who domicile 
in the same country as the independent firm based in the host country. This is 
referred to as the first level hypothesis.
The validation of the first level hypothesis depends on the results of the tests of the 
second level hypotheses, each relating to the three aspects of financial decisions in 
a firm - dividend, investment and external finance decisions. The second level 
hypotheses are as follows:
1. D ividend decisions: other things being equal, there is a difference between 
foreign versus locally controlled firms in terms of the relative influences of the
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major determinants of corporate dividend decisions.
2. Investm ent decisions: other things being equal, there is a difference between 
foreign versus locally controlled firms, in terms of the relative roles of the 
determinants of corporate capital investm ent decisions.
3. External finance decision: Other things being equal, there is a difference 
between foreign versus locally controlled firms in terms of the relative roles of the 
determinants of corporate external finance decisions.
To determine the long run (overall) independent impact of the degree of foreign 
ownership control on the financial decisions of firms, the th ird  level hypotheses, 
are tested:
1. Dividend decision: In the long run. the degree of foreign ownership control 
would have an independent influence on its dividend decisions.
2. Investm ent decision: In the long run. the degree of foreign ownership control 
of a firm would have an independent impact on its capital investment decisions.
3. E xternal Finance decision: In the long run. the degree of foreign ownership 
control of a firm would have an independent impact on its external finance 
decisions.
Consider the dividend decision first. The hypothesis, relating to dividend decision 
of firms maintains that, there would be a difference between foreign and local firms’ 
dividend behaviours for various reasons including the following:
a) the dividend decisions in the subsidiaries has to consider -the financial 
requirements of the parent company as well as its own financial requirements;
b) consider the host governments restrictions on earnings transfers as well as the 
home government’s requirements at the particular point in time;
c) consider the risk exposure situation in the host country and also the perception 
of the ultimate shareholders regarding the remittability of foreign source earnings; 
and
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d) the decisions would be influenced by the existence of information symmetry 
between the affiliates and the parent company (shareholders). This hypothesis 
relating to the dividend decisions is validated.
There are other key findings from the test of dividend hypothesis including the 
following:
a) Dividend payments by foreign controlled firms are relatively more infrequent 
and thus their dividend behaviour is more unstable in comparison with locally 
controlled firms.
b) the foreign controlled firms appear to have over a long term a higher target pay 
out ratio as well as higher speed of adjustment, than the locally controlled firms:
c) while current profits play a relatively strong positive role in determining current 
dividends in comparison to lagged dividends in foreign firms, lagged dividends play 
more positive role than current profits in determining dividends in locally 
controlled firms:
d) while external finance consistently have a positive relationship with dividends in 
foreign firms, it turns out to have consistently a negative relationship with 
dividends in locally controlled firms.
Consider secondly the result of test of third level hypothesis relating to dividend 
behaviour. Empirical evidence clearly shows that in the long run, the degree of 
foreign ownership control of a firm has a positive influence on its dividend decision. 
This is so even though there may be short run variations.
Next, consider the investm en t decision. The hypothesis relating to investment 
decision of firms maintains that, there would be a difference between foreign and 
local firms' investment behaviour for various reasons including the following:
a) investments in foreign base affiliates would reflect the production and marketing 
interdependences between the affiliates and the parent group:
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b) reflect the foreign risk aversion of the home base shareholders and their 
managerial agents, leading to a strategy of setting an optimum size for each host 
base affiliate;
c) reflect the need to avoid duplication of effort within the parent’s group and 
therefore reduce the production cycle for each affiliate. The empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that a difference exist between the foreign and locally 
controlled firms in terms of the determinants of corporate fixed investment 
expenditures.
There are other important findings; the summary is that there are differences 
between the relative roles of the various determinants of investment expenditure as 
estimated using the same models. The most prominent finding in this regard which 
is consistently shown by the three estimating methods used are as follows:
a) While current depreciation allowance is a relatively strong positive determinant 
of investment in foreign controlled firms, the same variable has no similar 
significant influence on investment in locally controlled firms.
b) While lagged capital stock variable is the most important positive determinant 
of investment in locally controlled firms, th e . same variable has no parallel 
significant influence on investment in foreign controlled firms.
Coming to the third level hypothesis related to the investment equation; the 
hypothesis that in the long run the degree of foreign ownership control of a firm 
will have an independent impact on its fixed capital investment is clearly validated. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the long run relationship between foreign 
control and investment is positive. This is opposite the a priori expectations. Thus 
further empirical tests were carried out to establish (at least part of) the reason for 
this relationship. The result of this supplementary test strongly indicates that the 
foreign controlled firms are more capital intensive than the locally controlled firms. 
The by-product of this supplementary test is that in the long run, there would be a
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negative relationship between the degree of foreign control of a firm and its 
employment of labour. Other reasons suggested for the positive relationship 
between foreign control and investment relate to possible disparities in average 
plant-size and therefore scope for expansion as well as possible disparities in 
acquisition activities between foreign and locally controlled firms. To these reasons 
one may add that the entry of UK into the EEC (by virtue of European 
Communities Act 1972), from 1973, and the introduction of common external tariff 
from 1977, may have had the effect of encouraging capacity expansion in the UK by 
foreign controlled firms whose parents are domiciled in home countries outside the 
new boundaries of the EEC. This obviously would make their products more price 
competitive than would be the case if they depend very much on importing a large 
proportion of their intermediate products from outside the EEC.
Finally, consider the ex ternal finance decision. The hypothesis relating to external 
finance decision of firms maintains that, there would be a difference between foreign 
and locally controlled firms for various reasons including:
a) The parent company (being the dominant shareholder) has other sources of 
funds and so would not w ithdraw  so much funds from the subsidiary as to make it 
vulnerable on liquidity grounds; ,
b) The more dependent a firm is on external sources of funds, the more the outside 
providers of funds get to know about the firm's investment plans. In a highly 
competitive host country. MNCs may be more sensitive regarding the information 
about their subsidiaries’ activities and would therefore be less inclined to borrow on 
long term basis (e.g.,debentures), to minimize unnecessary information exposure;
c) There is the ‘thin equity provisions' by the Internal Revenue, restricting the 
degree of loan capital in the foreign controlled affiliates’ capital structure to a ratio 
(about 75:25), beyond which interest payments would not be tax deductible. To 
avoid getting involved w ith the Inland Revenue in this area, it is likely that foreign
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controlled firms would finance more of their operations from retained earnings 
rather than increasing dependence on external borrowing;
d) There is also financial and production interdependencee between the afiiliates and 
the parent company, so that dividends and other remittances may be postponed 
rather than resort to external borrowing.
From the empirical evidence, the second level hypothesis relating to the external 
finance decisions of foreign versus locally controlled firms is validated. There are 
other important findings relating to this decision. The most prominent is that while 
capital investment is the most important positive determinant of external finance in 
locally controlled firms, the net change in working capital play a relatively strong 
positive role in comparison with fixed investment expenditures in determining 
external finance in foreign controlled firms. Secondly, while dividend is a positive 
determinant of external finance in foreign controlled firms, it is generally not a 
significant determinant of external finance in locally controlled firms. Thirdly, 
rather than dilute the demand for external finance, profits appear to improve the 
debt capacity of foreign controlled firms relatively more than the locally controlled 
counterparts, and therefore has a positive relationship with external finance.
Coming to the third level hypothesis related to the external finance equation, the 
hypothesis that in the long run the degree of foreign ownership control of a firm 
would have an independent influence on its external finance decisions is validated. 
As expected, the result shows that there is a significant negative relationship 
between foreign control of the firm and its external finance behaviour in the long 
run.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR BUSINESS 
ECONOMICS THEORY
Consider firstly, the dividend theory. The seminal research study of Lintner(l956),
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serves as the basis of most dividend models since late 1950s. Other than lagged 
dividends and current profits variables, nothing else seem to be of any explicit 
importance. The research study of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), introduced some 
improvements in the dividend theory by including the investment and financing 
variables in the dividend equation. Other studies have tended to support either of 
these studies. Some researchers such as Peterson and Benesh(l983) have integrated 
these two frameworks. What this research has shown is that the accuracy of the 
various dividend models in establishing the dividend behaviour of host base firms, 
using aggregate data, would be improved if the data for foreign controlled firms are 
separated from that of locally controlled firms, or the domicile of ultimate 
ownership control be represented explicitly in the estimating model.
Second, consider the corporate investment theories and models, such as the 
neoclassical models of Jorgenson variety, the accelerator models of Eisner variety, 
the profit/liquidity models of Tinbergen-Klein variety, and securities valuation (q) 
models of Brainard and Tobin, and other empirical models (see chapter 6). To the 
extent that these models used aggregate industry data comprising foreign and 
locally controlled firms data, the evidence from this research, suggests that some 
improvements would be gained by separating the aggregate data between foreign 
and locally controlled firms and testing the models for the separate samples.
Similar separation of data or modification of the models is required for studies that 
dealt with the external finance decision of firms, where aggregate data are used. 
Thirdly, Modigiliani and Miller’s(1958) research study on the cost of capital, 
corporation finance and theory of investment, needs to be reviewed in the light of 
this research findings. Their theory of cost of capital ignores the differences in the 
ow nership u tilities and simply assumes that market value maximization is the 
universal objective of all shareholders at all times. Their work explicitly ignores 
the fact that at any one period of time there are shareholders prepared to hold
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equity investments in relatively ‘low performing' industries while others hold 
theirs in high risk (and therefore high market value) industries. Their study also 
ignores the consideration of shareholders of firms whose shares are not freely 
marketable. They also ignore the implications of the domicile of the dominant 
shareholders on investment decisions in the foreign base affiliates. Unless the u tility  
of the investors are considered, their path breaking work seems to be showing only 
part of the picture and thus not universally applicable.
There is no evidence from this study to reject the interdependence hypothesis of 
Stevens(1970); and none to support the gamblers earnings hypothesis of Barlow and 
Wender (1953) and Penrose (1956) which implied that foreign controlled firms 
financial behaviour would equate that of locally controlled firms. Evidence from 
dividend equation results, indicate that foreign parent companies are more risk 
averse when it comes to dealing with their foreign base affiliates’ income. Their 
target pay out ratio as well as the speed of adjustment, in the long run. are higher 
than that of locally controlled independent firms.
Finally, the studies by Dunning(1958), Safarian (1966. 1969) and Brash (1966) 
suggest that local management flexibility, in terms of freedom to make investment 
decisions, becomes less as the degree of foreign control increases in the affiliate. 
Similarly, Remmers(l969) suggests that foreign affiliates’ performance in the host 
country is biased towards the parent company’s desires. A casual impression from 
these studies appears to be that foreign control of a firm would be detrimental to 
the investment behaviour of that firm in the host country. The evidence from this 
research suggests otherwise. There is a clear indication that in the long run, the 
degree of foreign control of a firm has a positive influence on its investment 
decisions.
From the above, it is clear that this study adds to the building of our knowledge in
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the financial operations of firms operating directly in countries other than the 
domicile of their dominant ownership.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTERS AND OTHER 
INTEREST GROUPS
National* product forecasters and those concerned with building macro-economic 
models for the economy require the full knowledge of the factors that determine 
the pattern of host country’s economic growth and employment. To such 
forecasters, the evidence from this research suggests that it is not only important to 
know the degree of foreign control of the host economy, but it is of direct 
importance for the quality of their forecasts (and the use to which they are put), to 
understand how the financial behaviour of firms operating in the economy are 
reflected upon by the domicile of controlling ownership of the means of production 
in the firm. The empirical result from this study suggests that macro-economic 
models would perform better if the data of foreign and locally controlled firms are 
separated. From this angle, this research would contribute in enhancing the quality 
of information required for proper national economic management.
This research evidence would be of some importance to business cycle and other 
studies that seek to investigate the impact of government policy changes on 
domestic economy. Such policy changes’may relate to government’s tax incentives 
and other subventions. For more accurate results, this research suggest that such 
investigations rather than use aggregate data, or combine a mix sample of foreign 
and locally controlled firms, the researcher should separate them.
The result from investment behaviour suggests that foreign parent companies of 
subsidiaries based in OECD countries feel at home in the OECD member country 
and thus in line with expectations since the 'National Treatment Declaration’ by 
OECD countries in June 1976. That Declaration requires member states to treat the
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foreign controlled subsidiaries owned by direct investors originating from member 
states, no less favourably than the indigenous firms. The implication is thus that if 
a host country treats a foreign controlled subsidiary like a locally controlled firm, 
the firm would behave more like locally controlled firms in terms of investment 
decisions.
For the organised labour unions in the host country, non-realistic demands from 
firms by unions, could lead to the situation where more capital input would be used 
in substitution to labour input. This would have some negative consequences for 
employment and also Trade Union membership. The evidence from this study does 
suggest that foreign controlled firms appear to be more capital intensive relative to 
equivalent locally controlled firms. It is possible that if the local firms learn from 
the foreigners and become more capital intensive, there may be some detrimental 
consequences for manufacturing employment.
For the organised labour in the home countries, this research suggests that the 
concern about loss of employment at home may in the long run be over estimated. 
The evidence shows that the foreign controlled affiliates appear to be more capital 
intensive than the locally controlled counter- parts and thus do not- seem to export 
jobs to the extent the home unions may imagine.
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST COUNTRIES’ FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT POLICY
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) codes of some host countries compel the foreign 
direct investors in particular the MNCs, to share their equity ownership with the 
local nationals, as a precondition for entry or continuation of direct investment in 
the host country. The rationale appears to be that by sharing equity control and in 
some cases being in a minority, then the MNC would invest more, pay out less 
dividends and generally behave as if the host country were its own home country.
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The multinational firms on the contrary argue that ownership freedom would 
enable them operate more effectively and profitably on a global basis. In their view, 
investment expansion would take place where the affiliates are commercially viable 
given the ‘investment climate’ in the host country.
The empirical evidence from this study suggests that in the long rim, the degree of 
foreign control has a positive impact on dividend. At the first glance, this appears to 
support the host countries’ argument. However, other evidence needs to be 
considered. First, the evidence suggests also that the dividend payments (per pound 
sterling of sales), by foreign controlled affiliates are relatively more infrequent 
when compared with the local counterparts. Second, their dividend behaviour 
appear to respond relatively more significantly to profits in foreign affiliates than is 
the case in the locally controlled firms. Thus the long run positive relationship 
between degree of foreign equity control and dividend behaviour may have little or 
no detrimental effect on the balance of payment of the host country, since dividend 
remittances are made more in the years when the economy is more prosperous. 
Such out flows during more prosperous years may have the effect of depressing the 
exchange rates, and depending on the host country's export potential and the price 
elasticity of the products, they may even, make the economy more prosperous 
through improvement in exports. Third, since the dividend remittances are 
infrequent, this indicates that there are some delays in repatriation of earnings and 
would obviously put much less pressure on the host country’s balance of payments 
them would payment for imports which are generally more current. This depends 
on whether the host country imports most of what the foreign firms would 
otherwise produce if they established in that country.
The evidence from the investment hypothesis suggests that the host countries may 
be wrong to expect that foreign firms would not expand as much as locally 
controlled firms simply for the fact of being controlled from abroad. Indeed the
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evidence provides no statistical grounds to accept such host governments’ 
expectations. Rather it appears that the foreign controlled firms, given conducive 
investment climate would behave as much as or even better than locally controlled 
firms. Therefore the long run positive impact of foreign control on dividends by 
foreign affiliates, does not affect negatively their investment behaviour. It is 
however true to say that this does have some negative impact on manufacturing 
employment as firms become more capital intensive. It is important of course to 
point out that this negative influence is rather relative, and does not imply that 
foreign controlled firms employ no labour. Indeed there may well be spill over 
effects if the fixed assets are acquired from the host country. Whether this is so 
depends on other factors, such as availability, costs and quality of the fixed capital 
assets sold in the host country and the availability of local supply of funds at 
competitive costs, all of which are not directly controllable by the affiliates 
individually.
The evidence from the external finance behaviour suggests that although the long 
run relationship between dividend and foreign control is positive, foreign control 
does have a long run negative impact on external finance from borrowing. Thus, 
foreign controlled firms do not remit large amounts of dividends only to rely 
heavily on local borrowing. This suggests the advantage of financial 
interdependence between the affiliates and the rest of the parent company’s group. 
The spill over effect of this seems to be that undue pressure is not put on demand 
for local sources of funds which would otherwise lead to high interest rates with 
consequence for small firms needing cheaper external finance.
Putting together all the above findings, one could find no evidence to suggest that 
freedom of equity ownership choice by foreign base MNCs have a net detrimental 
effect on the financial behaviour of the host base affiliates. From the result of this 
empirical investigation one appears inclined to suggest that host governments would
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benefit more from a policy of openness by allowing MNCs freedom to choose the 
ownership structure in their affiliates. This will make the firms to feel really 
welcome, and thus encourage more commitment by these firms in the host country. 
In addition, the policy of ownership freedom to the foreign direct investors would 
make it easier to integrate the host country into the world economy, than the policy 
of restriction of ownership choice.
This does not mean that for strategic or cultural or political reasons that host 
countries should have no FDI policy, but that on economic grounds one finds no 
em pirical evidence that in the long run, foreign ownership control of firms would 
be detrimental to their investment expenditures in the host country. Since foreign 
controlled parent companies (MNCs), sell their ownership specific advantages 
(capital, technology, management skills, marketing) to ‘buy’ the host country’s 
location specific advantages, the policy that deters foreign investors from investing 
directly in the host country does nothing to help a potential host country who is in 
competition with other countries with similar location advantages but who among 
other incentives allow freedom of ownership choice *.
8. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
i
As this- research is the first of its kind, more work needs to be done. W hat is certain 
is that, host governments desperately heed ‘help’ in the area of inward foreign 
direct investment policy. Similarly, the policy in the area of outward direct 
investment is uncertain as to its impact on the economic prosperity and stability of 
the home country. One listened to the United Kingdom’s House of Lords’ debate
1. It is of course understandable why, on political grounds, the host governments would not be ‘at ease' 
if large proportion of its industries are wholly controlled from foreign countries : the problem of 
extraterritoriality. However it does not appear that the appropriate solusion is to limit host country's 
economic growth by imposing policies that discourage foreign direct investment in the form of 
mandatory local equity participation. (See for example Watkins Commission Report (1968).
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(on Monday 23, March, 1987), relating to possible takeover of a British Bank by 
foreign institutions. The emotional statements from their Lordships’ House, leaves 
one in no doubt as to the degree of concern about foreign control of corporate equity 
of host base firms. The challenge is for the researchers in the area of foreign 
business finance and economics to provide additional empirical evidence needed for 
proper perspective in this policy area.
This research has built the main ground work for future research in the area of 
financial decisions in MNCs with particular reference to their FDI in host countries. 
The focus of this study has been deliberately narrowed down with the goal of 
getting an ideal match of host and home countries. The sample size has been 
dictated by data availability. Therefore, there is scope to widen the sample size but 
making sure the foreign and locally controlled firms are 'matched’ by the various 
criteria as listed in chapter 9.4. There is also scope to investigate the financial 
behaviour of foreign affiliates in the host country other than those from the model 
home country. The behaviour-of foreign affiliates owned by parent companies from 
different home countries can be compared with each other relative to the ‘control 
sample’ - locally controlled independent firms. This would help t the host 
government authorities in targeting their inward foreign direct investment 
promotion efforts to attract firms from home countries whose firms feel welcome in 
the host country. The degree of welcomeness can be measured in terms of the 
relative closeness of financial behaviour between firms from different home 
countries and those locally controlled by indigenous investors domiciled in the host 
country.
It has not been the intention of this study to develop a model specific to either 
subsidiaries or to independent companies. However the result from this research 
suggests that it would be a fru itfu l extension to direct a future study towards 
developing models that specifically explain the differences between foreign firms*
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financial behaviour. This need follows from the results of the R  2 , which suggest 
that there are other important factors.
Having pointed out the above general direction, certain issues resulting from this 
research are worth further investigation for the proper grounding of the emerging 
theory relating to the long run financial decisions by firms operating directly in 
countries other than that of the domicile of the ultimate majority shareholder(s). 
These issues are as follows:
1. Dividend payments by foreign controlled firms are unstable relative to those of 
locally controlled firms.
2. Current profits play more significant positive role in influencing current 
dividends in foreign controlled firms than they do for locally controlled firms.
3. Lagged dividends play more positive role in influencing current dividends in 
locally controlled firms than they do. relative to profits, in foreign controlled firms.
4. Current depreciation allowances play more significant positive role in influencing 
capital investment in foreign controlled firms than they do, relative to lagged 
capital stock, in locally controlled firms.
5. Lagged capital stock play more significant positive role in influencing capital 
investment in locally controlled firms, than it does, relative to current depreciation 
allowances, in foreign controlled firms.
6. Net working capital investment (or change in net working capital) play more 
significant positive role in influencing the change in external finance in foreign 
controlled firms, than it does, relative to capital investment, in locally controlled 
firms.
7. Fixed capital investment expenditures, play more significant positive role in 
influencing the change in external finance in locally controlled firms than they do. 
relative to net working capital investment, in foreign controlled firms.
8. Change in external finance plays a positive role in influencing dividend payments
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in foreign controlled firms, while it plays a negative (or non-significant positive) 
role in influencing current dividends in locally controlled firms.
9. There is a long run negative relationship between the degree of foreign control 
and the employment behaviour of host base firms.
For carrying out research into the above issues, it is adviseable that a proper 
normalisation scheme is selected. Sales turnover is particularly appropriate since if 
all firms are identical to begin with, those with better sales performance 
subsequently, are more likely to expand than others. It is important for 
comparability that the researcher’s definitions of variables correspond to those used 
in this study as shown in chapter 8. Finally, since the decision triad (dividend, 
investment and external finance decisions) are usually co-ordinated by the chief 
executive, these decisions are effectively simultaneously made. The appropriate 
econometric method of analysis appears to be the full information (three stage 
least-squares) method2.
Further research evidence is desperately required, to consolidate the emerging 
knowledge, about the long run  reflection of foreign control o f voting equity , on 
the  financial behaviour o f firms aw ay from  th e ir  ‘domicile of origin’.
2. However, the nature of conglomerates’ data appears to indicate that the use of both single equation 
and full information methods would throw more light on the investigation.
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SURVEY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CODES 



















Foreign equity ownership 
restricted. The percent­
age of foreign equity 
vary between activities 




:or highly technical 
personnel for a 
period to allow 
transfer to locals
Local and foreign 
borrowing subject to 
approval by tl\e Royal 
Bank of India.
Local borrowing is 
regulated for firms 
with foreign majority 
control
Approved investments 
lave no restrictions 
under the statement of 




1956 and Industrial 
Policy Statement 
of 24 July 1980 
and FERA guideline 
section 29 of 1974
2
INDONESIA
Foreign equity restricted 
with eventual mandatory 
local control
Management and 




o^ restrictions for 
dividends and other 
income but capital is 
not allowed to be 
repatriated when 
company is receiving 
incentives
Foreign capital 
Investment Law No. 
1 of 1967 as 
amended by Invest­
ment Law No. 11 of 
1970. '
Presidential 
decrees No. 53 
and 54 of 1977, 
government 
directive on 
Joint Venture with 
locals of January 
1974.
3 MALAYSIA NO restriction on foreign 
equity at the moment but 
the New Economic Policy 
expresses that by 1990 
majority control would be 
held by the MALAYSIANS.
No restriction 
although the govern­
ment emphasis is on 
engaging local 
personnel.
Not specified There is annual limit 
of $2million above 
which is subject to 
approval.
No legislation 





















RIHUHNES oreign equity participa­
tion restricted from 1968 
::or new firms but percent­
age depends on export 
volume (sales).
restriction imposed on
Regulated in favour 
of Phillipinos
oreign loans subject 
to approval
Remittance of income 
are permitted but 
vary according to the 
nature of business in 
accordance with the 




existing firms except if 
they seek incentives.
PAKISTAN Other than Industries 
reserved for the state 
there is No statutory 
limit on foreign equity 
though existing firms are 
encouraged to sell 30-40% 
to locals.




restricted to the 
degree of foreign 
equity participation
No restriction but 










Prior to 1980* restrict 
foreign participation 
beyond 50% but from 1980 
these restrictions have 
been relaxed.
No requirement 
specified 7oreign borrowings 
mst be approved by 
minister of Economic 
Planning. No Infor­
mation on local 
borrowing
Remittance subject to 
an annual ceiling 
although beyond the 
ceiling remittance is 
allowable if due 
information is sent to 
the EPB 90 days before 
end of fiscal year
Foreign Capital 
inducement Law 
No. 2598 of 1973 
as amended in 
subsequent 
periods.



















SINGAPORE No RESTRICTION to the 
degree of foreign equity
No direct restrict­
ion but subject to 
work permits. No restriction No restriction





8 PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA
Restricts foreign equity Committed to 
localisation of 
management and 
personnel per the 
Employment of Non- 
Citizen Act.
No restriction but 
foreign loans subject 
to government 
approval





ment Act chapter 
120 of the 
revised Laws as 
amended in 1981 
by the NID 
(amendment) Act
control in mbst activities 
except for mineral 
development
9 MIDDLE No RESTRICTION on the 
degree of FOREIGN EQUITY 
participation
No restriction 
though work permit 
required No restriction No restriction
No specific 
legislation on 
FDI other than 
the Currency 








No direct restriction of 
percentage of foreign 
equity in local enterprises 
25% local ownership is a 
conditibri for local tax 
incentives. Banking and 
oil mUst be majority 
iocal.
Restricted to at 
least 75% local and 
at least 51% local 




No restrictions as to 



























11 IRAQ Restricted to foreign 
minority participation
Restricted to 
expatriate to local 
ratio of 1 to 10
local and foreign 
debt subject to 
approval
Subject to annual 
ceilings which vary 
between activities
Government 




despite Law No. 






12 E* EUROPE 
YUGOSLAVIA
Foreign equity restricted 
to miriotlty participation 
maximum 49%
Under self-manage­
ment principle the 
employees and 




determined by contract 
with annual ceiling on 
annual profits.
Subject to available 
foreign exchange
Law on Invest­






of 7 April 1978 
replacing 1967 and 
1976 Laws on the 
subject.




but subject to 
approval of the 
minister of the 
Interior.
Not specified Remittances allowed 





6224 decree No. 
8/168 as amended


















14 HUNGARY Restricted to foreign 
minority
Local management 
and staff  majority 
as indicated by 
ownership
Not specified
No restrict ions but 
subject to memorandum
Law D 28/72 
Art. 4 and Art. 
11(1).
15 ROMANIA Restricted to foreign 
minority
No specific  
restri ction
No specific  
restri ction
Restricted to the 
firm’s foreign 
currency earnings 
from exports or loans
Law on foreign 
Trade of 17/3/71 
Law on Joint 
Ventures of 
2/11/72
16 CHINA Restricted to foreign 
minority
Chief executive 
must be a Chinese Not specified
Freedom to repatriate 
capital and income 
through the Bank of 
China in currency 
specified in the 
investment contract







EGYPT Not s tr ic t ly  specified  
but understood to ins is t  
on reasonable local 





No restrict ion  
speci fied
No restriction Law No. 43 of 
1974

















18 MOROCCO Restrict foreign ownership Indigenous top 
management to be in 
the majority at the 
Board of Directors; 
restrict  foreign 
labour except for 
scarcity of locals
Not specified
Repatriation of income 
and capital subject 
to authorisation and 
withholding taxes
Dahir of 2 March
of local firms and in most 




Law No. 73t210 
of 2 March 1973 
as modified by 
Law No. 73-339 
of 7 May 1973
19 IVORY
COAST
No restrict ion on foreign, 
equity though they are 
encouraged to share 
ownership with the locals
Encourage hiring of 
local labour in 
absence of which 
no restriction  
against foreign 
personnel
Not specified No restriction  
speci fied




20 KENYA No direct restriction on 
foreign equity/ except 
indirectly via restrict ion  







restricted to the 
percentage of local 
participation
No restriction  




Act 1964 (Law 
No. 35) f

















21 NIGERIA Foreign equity ownership 
i s  regulated ranging 
from 0% to 40% in most 
cases and 60% allowed in 
relat ive ly  fewer 
a c t iv i t i e s
Expartriate manage­
ment restricted  
except in asbsence 
of local managers
Foreign loans subject 
to approval. Local 
debt financing 
control not specified






Decree No. 3 
amending the 
decree No. 4 of 
1972 o f f ic ia l  
Gazette No. 10 
vol. 59 
28 Feb. 1972.
22 SUDAN No restrict ions at 
present. In 1970 Sudan 
nationalised fore ign’ 
firms but have returned 




regulated by the 
Manpower Act 1973









is  subject to 
agreement with the 
Ghanaian Investment 
Centre.
Local short and 
medium term loans 
restricted to the 
























24 TANZANIA Restricted to foreign Restricted to ■ 
expatriate management 
control
No restrict ion but 
proof of repayment 
of a l l  local loans 
must be shown before 
exchange controll will  
permit remittance of 
capital
No restriction for 
approved enterprises
Exchange control 
Law CAP 294. 
Foreign Invest­
ment Protection 
Act- CAP 5333 
No. 40 of 1963
minority participation
25 ZAIRE No statutory r e s tr ic t ­
ion but expresses 
preference for at 
least 40% local 
participation
Restricted to 
expatriates except in 
cases of local 
scarcity
No definite  res tr ic t ­
ion for local loans. 
No restrict ion for 
foreign borrowing 
providing the total  
of loans is  not more 
than 30% of total  
Investment
No restrictions  
though subject to 




Law No. 79-1027 
of 1979
26 ZAMBIA Certain areas of 
business a c t iv i t ie s  
are restricted while 
others are open to 





Local borrowing is  
regulated. Foreign 
borrowing not 
regulated but subject 
to gearing of 1 to. 3 
debt-equity ratio
Dividend remittance 
limited to an annual 
ceiling of 50% of 
distributed profits  




No. 18 of 30 
August 1977

















2 7 ALGERIA Restricted to foreign 
minority
Local management and 
labour majority. 
Foreign labour 
subject to Art. 9 of 
the Code
Not specified Repatriation of income 
restricted to an 
annual ceiling of < 
15% of the amount of 
foreign participation
Ordinance No. 66 
-284 of 15 Sept. 
1966 (The 
Investment Code)




require local majority 
ownership/ export 
firms may be held 
100% by foreign 
investors
No restrict ion to 
foreign management 
control but are 
encouraged to employ 
TUNISIANS
Not specified
No restrict ion but 
transfers subject to 
approval
Code of Invest­
ment Law No. 69- 
35 of 26 June 
1969 Law No. 72- 
38 of 27/4/72 
Law No. 74-74 of 
3/8/74
29 LIBYA Restricted to foreign 
minority
Restricted in favour 
of locals
Not specified No restriction Law No. 37, 4 
August 1968 
o f f ic ia l  gazette 
No. 63 of 28 Dec. 
1968 .

















s .  America






No restriction Previously there was 
a ceiling of 12.5% 
but at present no 
more ceiling except 
that non-invested 
post-tax profit in 
excess of registered 
capital is subject 
to graduated excess 
profit tax
Law No. 21, 382 
of 13/8/76 Foreign 
Investment Law as 
modified by Law 
No. 22, 208 of 
March 1977
31 BRAZIL Restricted to foreign 
control of equity
More than two thirds 
local minimum
Borrowing restricted  
and relaxation 
subject to executive 
authority





No. 3.131 of 
3 Sept. 1962 as 
amended by Law 
No. 4.390 of Aug. 
1964; executive 





















32 CHILE No restrict ion  
presently but 
previously restricted  
to at least 51% local 
until  Chile le f t  




No specific  res tr ic t ­
ions on local 
borrowing
No restrictions but 
subject to Central 
Bank approval. 
Previously restricted  
to 14% of registered 
capital
Decree-Law 1.748 
of 18 March 1977 
replacing Decree- 
Law of 600 of 1974 
Decree-Law 258; 
Decree-Supreme 
471 of 1977 and 
others
33 COLUMBIA Foreign equity 
participation is  
restr icted.  Percent­








loans of not more 
than 3 years 
maturity
Remittance ceiling  
exists
Decree 1900 of 
1972 implementing 
Decision No. 24 
of the ANDEAN 
Pact of Dec. 1970 
ratif ied in 1971
34 GUYANA No restrict ion to 
foreign equity except 
that where the state  
is  involved the level  
of foreign to local  
equity is  subject to 
negotiation
Not specified Restricted subject 
to approval of Bank 
of Guyana
No restriction Investment Loans 
based on the 
Caribbean Community 
Treaty signed in 
1973 and also the 
Investment Code of 
1979


















35 MEXICO Restricted to maximum 
of 49% foreign 
participation
Majority of manage­
ment and workforce 
must be locals
No restrict ion of 
local source 
financing
No restrict ion Foreign Investment 
Law Nos. 1 to 15 
implementing the 






No local ownership 
code is  yet in place 
despite preference 
expressed for i t
High level of local 
management and work­
force up to 90% and 
minimum of 85% of 
payroll mandatory
Foreign loans 
allowed only for 
import of capital 
goods
No restriction though 
remittances are 
subject to exchange 
control
A member of CACM 
and ratified  
various agreements 
including that on 
f i sca l  incentives 
for Industrial 
development of 31 
July 1963 (Law No. 




No mandatory res tr ic t ­
ion on foreign equity 
participation except 
for state controlled 
industrial firms
At least 90% of labour 
force must be locals 
and at least 90% of 
payroll
No restrict ion on 
local or foreign 
borrowing
No restr ict ion ,  no 
Central Bank and no 
exchange control
No specific  
statute governing 
foreign investment





















Restricted. No firm 
may be 100% foreign 
owned






subject to Central 
Bank's approval
Fiscal incentives 
Act 1979 (o f f ic ia l  
Gazette Act No.
22 of 1979) prior 
legislations on 
the area of 
investment now 
replaced by 1979 
Act
39 CARICOM Member states to keep 
under review the 
question of local  
equity participation  
with the view of 
increasing the extent 
of national participa­
tions
Not Specified but 
should relate to 
agreement on equity 
participation
Not specified Not specified
Treaty of






Policy highly biased 
towards substantial  
local participation  
though not mandatory
Policy biased towards 
local managerial 
control
No restrict ion on 
local borrowing but 
foreign borrowing 
must be authorised 
by the Central Bank
Subject to Central 
Bank control
No specific  leg is ­




exist  from 1976

















41 CANADA No blanket mandatory 
restrict ion on foreign 
equity. There are 
differences across 
provinces but in 
general there is  a 
strong bias towards 
high level of local 
participation
Majority of the Board 
of top management 
must be Canadians in 
Federally incorporated 
companies and this  
Canadian majority must 
be present for any 
bihding Board meeting
No restrict ions . No restrictions
Foreign Invest­
ment Review Act 
(Statutes of 
Canada 1973-4 





42 FRANCE No specif ic  foreign 
equity participation  
restrict ion except for 
the nationalised 
industrial firms
Not specified-but  
indications would 
suggest local bias
No restrictions for 
existing firms but 
new firms are 
regulated
No restrict ions
No specific  FDI 
Law but other Laws 
serve their 
purpose such as 
Law on Financial 
relations with 
foreign countries 
No. 66-1008 of 
28 Dec. 1966 
Decree No. 68-1021 
of 24/11/68 and 
Decree No. 70-441 
of 1970
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43 U.S.A. No restrict ion on No federal res tr ic t ­ No specific . No restrict ion No specific  code
foreign equity ion but some states* restrict ion on local or law on foreign
participation except corporate statutes or foreign borrowing direct investment
for certain ‘key1 require proportion either outward or
industries (U.S. Code of local (U.S.) inward FDI
1970) di rectors
44 JAPAN Previously, restricted No specific Local borrowing is Foreign invest­
foreign equity to restriction on subject to valida­ No restriction ment Law No. 163
minority but have now mana-gement control tion; foreign loans speci fied of May, 10, 1950







of 6 June 1967 on 























No r e s t  ri ct  i on on 
l e v e  I of  f o r e i g n  
e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a ­
t i o n
No r e s t r i c t i o n  to 
expat ri a te  s t a f f
No r e s t  ri ct  i on on 
borrowing loca  I 
or f o r e i g n
No r e s t r i c t i o n  on 
c a p i t a l  repat r i a-  
t i on
No s p e c i f i c  
code on FDI 
except  the  
comme r c i a I 
compani es code 
of 1946
46 AUSTRIA No r e s t  ri ct  i on on 
f o r e i g n  e q u i t y  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n
No s p e c i f i c  
r e s t r i c t i o n  on 
expat ri a te  
employment
LocaI f in a n c in g  
of f o r e i g n  f irms  
requi re Cent ra I 
Bank author i  s a -  
t i on
No r e s t r i c t i o n
An OECD member 
count ry r e : 
N ational  
t reatment  
p r i n c i p l e  of 
21 June 1976
47 ITALY No restrict ion on 
foreign equity 
participation





foreign firms are 
allowed local loans 
up to 50% of equity






Law No. 43 of 
7/2/56 also 
OECD Declara­





















No restrict ion on 
foreign equity 
participation




No specific  




49 SPAIN No restrict ion on 
foreign direct  
investment 
participation
Not specified Require government 
authorisation for 
local borrowing but 
freedom of foreign 
borrowing
No restriction
Law on Foreign 
investment 1974. 
B.O.E. No. 266 
of 6/11/74 
(Boletin o f f i c ia l  
del Estado)
50 SWITZER­
LAND No restrict ion
Majority of the 
Board of Directors 
must be local Swiss
No Specific 




























51 FED, REP. 
OF
GERMANY
No blanket restrict ion  




No restriction  
except for worker 
participation in 
the Supervisory 
Board under the 
codetermination 
laws of 1951; 1956
No restrict ion *
No restriction but 
for reporting 
requi rements




52 SWEDEN Not restricted to 
foreign participation 
except for state  
controlled firms
Locals required at 
the Board of 
di rectors
No restriction for 
an ongoing firm but 
for new investments 
foreign funds have 
to be transferred 
to Sweden,equivalent 
to foreign equity
No specific  
restri ction
OECD member state,  
subject to the 
National treat­
ment principle
























No blanket restrict ion  
on foreign equity 
proportion in UK 
registered firms. 
However under the 
industry Act 1975 
Government reserves 
the right to take 
action i f  national
interest is to be 
affected by transfer of 
control to foreigners 
in key business firms
No restrict ion for 
foreign director­




must be retained 
as an undertaking 
from the foreign 
f i rm






firms but since 
1979 the regulation 
was dropped
No restrict ion  
since abolishing of 
exchange control 
in 1979
No specific  code 
or legilsation  





SOURCES: Apart from the actual reading of the codes from o f f i c ia l  sources in London eg at the foreign Embassies, the
commonwealth library and the OPL, the following United Nations documents were particularly consulted: (1) National 
leg is lat ions  and regulations relating to Transnational Corporations. U.N. New York docs ST/CTC/26 of 1983,
(2) document ST/CTC/35 of 1983, (3)' doc. ST/CTC/6 of 1978, (4) doc. ST/CTC/6 Add. 1 of 1980. See also
R.b. Robinson National Control of Fore-ign Business Entry: A Survey of Fifteen Countries (Praeger, 1976).
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APPENDIX A2.1
A PROFORMA MANAGEMENT AND SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PARENT AND FOREIGN BASE AFFILIATE
This agreement made and entered into this____________________ , day
of_____________________,  , bv and between (the base company),
a corporation organized under the laws of (the base jurisdiction) and (the parent 
company), a corporation organized under the laws of the State 
of____________________ .
W itnesseth:
Whereas, (the base company) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of (the parent 
company), and
Whereas, (the base com pany) has entered into contracts for the m anufacture, 
pursuan t to designs furn ished  by (the base company) of ( type of product), and has 
and will enter into contracts for the sale by (the base company) of such (product) 
to others, and
Whereas, it is the intention of the parties hereto tha t  (the parent company) will 
from  time to time as requested by (the base company) furnish and make available 
to (the base company) engerineering, drafting, and other technical services, and 
genera] adm inistra tive management services including the services of certain of (the 
parent company's executives and administrative personnel, and that (the parent 
company) will from tim e to time at the request of (the base company) m anufacture  
certain parts  of such (product),
The parties hereto in consideration of the m utual agreements herein contained 
hereby agree w ith  each o ther as follows:
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\1. (The parent company) will furnish  and make available to (the base company) as 
(the base company) may from time to time reasonably request, engineering designs, 
blueprints, and like services, at a price per hour for the services of (the parent 
com pany’s) engineers and other technical personnel as listed and described on 
Schedule A attached hereto;
2. (The parent company) will m anufacture  for and sell to (the base company) such 
parts, components, tools, or other machinery and equipment as (the base subsidiary) 
may from time to time reasonably request, a t a price per hour for the services of 
(the parent company's) m anufacturing  and related personnel as listed and described 
in Schedule B attached hereto. Material to be billed at cost plus a 10% handling 
charge;
3. (The parent company) will furnish to (the base company) general and 
administrative services, including the services and advice of (the parent com pany's) 
executive, sales. and adm inistra tive personnel, for an annual fee
of____________________ % of the gross sales of (the  base company). This fee w ill be
deemed to include reim bursem ent to (the parent company) of the allocable portion 
of the salaries of such personnel and staff so engaged and of incidential expenses for 
telephone, cable, s tationery, stam ps, stenographic materials, and similar expenses of
I
(the parent company) as (the  parent company) may incur in the performance of 
such services. In the event th a t  any personnel of (the parent company) shall be 
engaged, at the request of ( the  base company) in any services for (the base 
company) outside of (the city in which the parent company has its headquarters), 
(the base company) will, in addition to such annual fee, reimburse (the parent 
company) for any travel or o ther expenses incurred by (the parent company) w ith  
respect to such personnel;
4. This agreement shall continue in force until term inated by one m onth 's  w ritten  
notice given by either pa r ty  to the  other.
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In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto signed as of the date first 
above w r i t te n 3.
APPENDIX 2.2
Excerpts from  a management and technical assistance contract between 
foreign-base subsidiary company and its paren t company
It is agreed that (the service company) shall provide the following services to you
from its domicile in the United States through correspondence, telegraph and
telephone communications, and periodic visits of your personnel, or by w hatever
means of communication we may from time to time m u tua lly  agree upon: *  *
* * * * * * * *
A. Sales
1. Provide advice, assistance, and instruction on sales problems and techniques by 
appropriate means.
2. Provide m arket su rveys and interpretations thereof on new products.
3. Furnish price information on competitive produces.
4. Assist and advice in the selection of sales personnel and the expansion of the 
sales organization. .
B. Financial and Legal
1. Assist in the form ula tion  of accounting policies and procedures.
2. Assist in the preparation of m onthly  financial reports in accordance with 
established policies and procedures.
3. Design and install standard  cost system and analyse results  and comparisons for 
the use of sales and m anufactu ring  personnel.
1. (Source: N1CB: SBP No. 110 P.18 Exh 3)
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4. Assisi in the preparation of annual financial budgets and the review thereof 
m onthly  for comparisons with actual experiencs.
5. Assist in legal and corporate matters.
6. Assist in form ulation of policy and carrying out the work in connection with 
financing for tem porary needs or on a permanent basis.
7. Assist in procuring tradem ark  registrations and in all other m atters  pertaining to 
such registrations.
C. W arehousing, Shipping and Traffic
1. Assist in arranging insurance coverage under open marine policy for export 
sh ipm ents and filing necessary claim in case of loss.
2. Supply technical advice regarding warehousing procedures and export traffic 
procedures and regulations.
3. Assist in securing transporta tion services.
D. Method of Payment
As agreed, the method by which your company shall pay (the service company) for 
services hereinbefore referred to will be periodic billings by (the service company) 
to y ou r  company. Such billings shall not be more frequent than m on th ly  and the 
costs charged to you will be the actual cost to (the service company) of supplying 
your company w ith  the services as indicated.
Notw ithstanding  the above, paym ents from lime to time will be subject to the 
consent of your appropriate  local government authorities as any from time to time 
be required according to law. * * * * * * * * * *  
This contract shall be effective from its date, and shall continue until the expiration 
of th i r ty  days after  w r i t ten  notice is given by either pa rty  to the o ther of its intent 
to cancel2.
2. (Sairce:NICB: SBP No. 110, P.19 Exh A)
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University of Bath
Schobl of Management 
Claverton Down 
Bath BA2 7AY
Professor IL Manghem 
Tel: (0225) 61244 Professor R EThomas
Telex 449097 Professor CRTomkins
July 1983
Dear Chairman
The growing tendency for many host countries to demand as an entry precondition 
that foreign domiciled parent companies share their equity and managerial control 
with indigenous investors and personnels, calls for an investigation into the 
implications to foreign direct investment strategy.
With the above need in mind, we are conducting a survey of large multinational 
companies domiciled in OECD countries to collect first-hand information that would 
enable us to study the implications of shared control on allocation of foreign 
income and capital flows within multinational enterprise systems.
This is a non—sponsored academic research study being undertaken in this University 
and in accordance with the standard academic practice, the information collected 
from participants is absolutely confidential.
You will receive our feedback in the form of a summary of the-major findings and 
conclusions which will be sent on request .only to those companies who complete and 
return the enclosed questionnaire. This feedback will be sent to you before the 
end of the year given that you return the completed questionnaire by the end of 
July 1983, if possible.
We appreciate that this questionnaire will take up some of your valuable time. 
However, we believe that our findings will contribute to a greater understanding 
of the intricacies of foreign direct investment in general across industrial 
sectors and major nations.
We would appreciate it if you complete and return the questionnaire as soon as 
possible. If any questions do arise, please contact me, (tel (0225) 61244 ext 426). 
All correspondence should be addressed to Felix Onyenemelu at School of Management, 
Corporate Finance Group, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, England.
Thank you for your anticipated co-operation and early reply.
University of Bath
School of Management 
Claverton Down 
Bath BA2 7AY
Professor IL  Mangham 
Tel: (0225) 61244 ProfessorR EThomas
Telex 449097 Professor CR Tomkins
• July 1983
Monsieur
La tendance de plus en .plus marquee pour beaucoup de pays dlaccueilvareclamer 
comme condition n^cessaire d’entree qu les societes mere ^tablies'a 1 * Stranger 
partagent
Lecontrol e de leurs capital-actions et deleur gestion avec le personnel et 
les actionnaires indigenes demande. une enqufete en ce qui concerne les 
implications de la strategie d1investissement direct b 1 Stranger.
Gardant la necessit^mentionnee ci-dessusla I1 esprit, nous faisons une ^tude de 
grandes socidtes multinationales etablies dans les pays de l ’OCDE pour rassembler 
des informations de premifere main qui devraient nous permettre d ’^ tudier les 
implications du contr£le partagd" sur 1*.allocation de revenue Stranger et des 
flux de capitaux au sein des systfemes d’entreprises.multinationales.
Le travail de recherche universitaire entrepris dan cette university n ’est
pas parraind''financiferement et, suivant la pratique universitaire habituelle,
les renseignements recueillis chez les participants sont strictement confidentiels.
* ^
Vous receviez les resultats de notre enqu^ t-e sous la forme d’un resume des
constatation's et conclusions les plus importants que sera envoye' sur demande
seulement aux societes qui auront compl^t^ et renvoy€ le questionnaire ci-joint.
Les resultats vous seraient envoy^s avant la fin de I'ann^e”^  condition que
vous retourniez le questionnaire pour le milieu du mois d’aoftt 1983 si possible,
Nous somme conscients du fait que.ce questionnaire vous prendra du temps qui 
vous est pr^cieux. Neanmoins, nous pensons que nos conclusions 
contribueront & une meilleure comprehension des complexites de I1investissement 
direct h 1*Stranger en general^ travers les secteurs industriels et les 
nations les plus importantes.




Professor IL Mangham 
Professor R E Thomas 
Professor C R Tomkins
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Sehr
die wachsende Tendenz der Gastlander,-von Muttergesellschaften mit Sitz im 
Ausland zu verlangen, daB.sie Kapitalanteile und unternehmerische Kontrolle mit 
einheimischen Investoren und Mitarbeitern.teilen, verlangt eine Untersuchung 
der Implikationen fur die Strategie der auslandischen Direktinvestitionen.
Im BewuBtsein dieser Notwendigkeit fuhren wir eine Untersuchung groBer 
multinationaler Gesellschaften mit Sitz in OECD-Landern durch, urn Informationen 
aus-erster Hand zu sammeln, die es uns ermoglichen wurden, auf die Verteilung 
auslandischen Einkommens und den KapitalfluB innerhalb multinationaler 
Unternehmenssysteme zu studieren.
£s handelt sich hierbei urn eine nicht geforderte Untersuchung, die an unserer 
Universitat in Ubereinstimmung mit den MaBstaben akademischen Arbeitens 
durchgfuhrt wird; die Information, die bei den Teilnehmern eingeholt werden, 
werden absolut vertraulich behandelt.
Eine Ruckmeldung wird Sie in Form einer Zusammenfassung der hauptsachlichen 
Ergebnisse und SchluBfolgerungen erreichen, die auf Anfrage nur denjenigen 
Unternehmen -zugesandt wird, die den beigefugten Fragebogen ausgefullt haben.
Diese Ruckmeldung wurde Ihnen vor Ende des Jahres zugesandt werden, wenn Sie den 
vervollstandigten Fragebogen bis Mitte* August zurucksenden — falls das moglich ist.
Bitte, nehmen Sie keinen AnstoB daran, daB der Fragebogen auf Englisch ist. Da die, 
Zeit drangt und da wir wissen, wie gut das Englisch der leitenden Angestellten  ^ j 
setzung verzichtet. Die Beantwortung der Fragen ist einfach, und in der Regel gilt 
es lediglich, an der richtigen Stelle einen Haken zu machen.
In einigen Fallen bitten wir Sie um weitergehende Angaben. Hier bleibt es Ihnen 
uberlassen, ob sie’die deutsche oder englische Sprache verwenden. Die Verwendung 
der englischen Sprache wurde allerdings die Auswertung sehr erleichtern.





A SURVEY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHARED CONTROL* 
OF FOREIGN BASED AFFILIATES* TO THE FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Most of the questions in this survey only require to 
be answered by ranking or placeing check marks in 
the appr o p r i a t e  locations, and there is a part where 
statistical figures are requested.
If you cannot answer a question please indicate in 
the margin adjacent to the question expressing your 
reasons. We would appreciate your suggestion 'as to 
how else we could get such an answer.
In this investigation we want you to express your 
opinions of the subject and spaces have been left 
for you to include your comments and suggestions.
If there is insuficcient space please use the blank 
spaces at the rear of the question booklet or 
additional sheets.
Please place the questionnaire when completed in the 
return postage - p a i d  envelope provided and mail to us 
as soon as possible.
If you have any queries regarding the questionnaire, 
please telephone us.
Felix O n yenemelu Dr M Levis
Unive r s i t y  of Bath University of Bath
Tel: (0225) 61244 Ex 426
*see defin i t i o n  on the next page.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Shared control exists where the equity and management 
of your foreign based affiliated companie.s are shared 
between yourselves and other investors outside your 
group.
Repatriation is used in the q uestionnaire to mean a 
permanent transfer (not necessarily remmitance) of 
earnings by a foreign base affiliate to its parent 
company based in another country.
Foreign based affiliates include all subsidiaries 
and principal associated companies based abroad.
Principal a s sociated companies are foreign based 
affiliates where your company is involved directly 
with policy formulation and stategic management 
including equity shares ownership of not less than 
20%.
Periodic earnings are foreign based affiliate's 
yearly income net of host country un d e r l y i n g  taxes 
(Corporation tax) but before w i t h h o l d i n g  faxes.
The units of account to be used everywhere in the 
questionnaire is the dollar and the conversion rate 
is 31 = 1  unit of any currency .
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I: GENERAL COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS
1.1 INDUSTRY
(a) What is your main incjustpy? . •
(b) Is this the industry where more than 50% 
of your foreign based subsidiaries and 
principal associated companies are engaged? 
(Please check J )
□ YES □
(c) Which other industry?
NO
1.2 SIZE
Your answer to the following question would 
enable us to classify your company into an 
appr o p r i a t e  statistical group. (You do not have 
to be 100% exact).
(a)
( b . )
(c)
What is the number of all employees in your 
foreign based subsidiaries, (in thousands). 
(000's) _
What is the balance sheet figure of all 
overseas subsidiaries' fixed assets,
(551 + 1 unit of currency) 2(000) ______
What percentage of your world wide turnover 
is accounted for by your foreign based 
principal affiliates (subsidiaries and 
principal associated companies) ?
, %
21.3 OWNERSHIP
(a) How many parent companies own your world wide group?
□  ONE | } TWO or more
(b) Are the other co-parents registered in.the same 
country as yours?
ZD YES □  NO I | NOT APPLICABLE
(c) What proportion of your foreign affiliates are
j 1 Wholly-owned □  Partly-owned
(d) In this question we are interested to identify the 
predominance of the following investors in sharing 
the equity ownership of your foreign based 
affiliates. Please rank (1st, 2nd, and 3rd accord­
ing to the number of times you share ownership with 
each. Mark 'X' if you have never shared ownership 
with the investor/country. For example if the 
institutional investors of the home country is 
greater of your partners mark 1st, then 2nd for host 
countries in the boxes as appropriate and so on for 
other investors B, C, D, etc.





B A company or 




D Government and 




F A company or


























1.3 (e) Are some of your subsidiaries and principal associated
companies quoted in the host country's stock exchange?
I I KES ZD N°
In which regions (please see question 1.7 below 
for the regions).
1.4 YEARS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVOLVEMENT
For how long has your company been directly operating
mor 
20 yrs
overseas? | | 0 _ 1 Q  yrs j j 11-20 yrs | | e than
1.5 EXTENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
How many foreign based subsidiaries and principal 
associated companies are in your group?
1------ [ 3 - 1 0  I------1 1 1 -2 0  Z D  more than 20
1.6 . DOMICILE*
Please indicate with a check mark (\/) the parent company's 
domicile. (You may check more than one country if your 
combined group is owned by more than one parent company 
of different origins).
■ ZD UK j | USA ZD CANADA ZD NETHERLANDS 
ZD FRANCE ZD FRG ZD JAPAN CD USSR
ZD- BELGIUM ZD SWITZERLAND' j \ SWEDEN
1.7 Below is the classification of some activities against two 
ownership.forms. Please show the number of your foreign 
based subsidiaries in each box provided. . (You do not have 
to be 100% exact, Principal subsidiaries and principal 
associated companies would do).
Wholly owned Partly owned 
• subsieiaries subsidiaries
(A) Independent Manufacturing - [
(B) Assembly operations [[
(C) Marketing Subsidiaries c
(D) Services






5.8 The answers to this question will be used for producing 
the regional analysis of activities.
Against each geographic area shown below, please fill in 
the number of your foreign principal subsidiaries plus 
principal associated companies under each activity.
bO
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PART II: FOREIGN DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AND CONTROL STRUCTURES
In this question we are interested to identify tne 
more popular methods of foreign direct involvement 
and control structures.
2.1 When considering direct foreign involvement, which one 
of the following control structure does your company 
use more than others?
| j Total Equity ownership and managerial control
I | Equity joint venture with managerial control
—  | I Equity joint venture without managerial control
I | Other (please specify) _____________ ____________
2.2 Please rank the following reasons in the order of their 
influence on your choice in question 2.1 above.
C Z I, Managerial and administrative convenience
' Nature of business operation in the foreign
□ based subsidiaries (eg, Risky, high researchcontent, capital - intensive).
'  C Z  Home government regulations
□  Host countries’ regulations
□  Competitors approach . .
CZI Other (please specify)
A
62.3 Please rank the following reasons according to their
frequency in explaining your reasons for foreign direct 






Country specific factors such as Raw materials, 
labour, land and climate
Market penetration eg, to 'avoid' the effect of 
importing governments' restrictions which would 
otherwise lead to a loss of export markets
Efficiency seeking, that is, to serve world market 
more cost effectively, eg, by assembly operations.
To counter competitors' moves ----
Other (Please specify) ____________________________
2.4 Against each colum below indicate with a check mark (>/)
 the source of supply of materials, components, and








































2.5 In this question we are interested to identify the rela 
tionship of foreign affiliates activities with the 
nature of dependence on the Parent Companies.
Please indicate in the spaces provided the following 
activities according to the degree of dependence on the 
Parent Company for the resources listed.
. A - Independent manufacturing affiliates 
B - Assembly operations affiliates 
* C - Marketing affiliates 
D - Services affiliates 
E - Contract manufacturing affiliates
For example, if Independent manufacturing affiliates 
are very dependent on Parent for Materials and 
components, write 'A' against very dependent row and 
under Materials colum and so on.
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8.6 (a)
(b)
Which of the following best describes the direction 
of flow of your foreign principal affiliates1 
products? Please rank the following according 
to proportion of products sold.
To host country markets 
Export to the home country
Export to the third countries
If your answer to 2.6 (a) is ’C ’ please 
specify the major regions (ses question 1.7 
above for the list of regions).
A □  
B □  
c □
9
PART III: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND EARNINGS
TRANSFER OPTIONS
In this part we are interested to find out the most popular 
method of withdrawing the benefits of foreign direct 
investments.
3.1. The following are some of the criteria used for 
periodic performance measurement of subsidiary 
•companies.
Please rank them as they apply to your company’s 
foreign based subsidiaries, indicating what applies 
to a wholly-owned subsidiary and a partly-owned 
affiliates.
A Return on Investment
B Level of Earnings 
repatriated to the 
parent company
C Net assets growth
















The following are some of the options used for transfer- 
ing foreign earnings to the parent. Please rank them in 
order of their importance or frequency to your company. 





ment, technical aids 
and others
C interest paymensts
D loan capital repayment
E insurance premium to home 
based insurers
F expenses by the foreign 
subsidiary for the 






transfer pricing □ □
3.3 This question is aimed at determining the reasons
for the choice of the options in question 3.2 above.
The list does not include all possible reasons; 
space has been left at the end for you to include 
other reasons. If your reasons are more than one 
please rank them in the order of their weight on 
your first choice in 3.2 above.
Company's circumstances and convenience eg, 
ownership of equity
□ Cost to the group of alternative channels eg, tax treatment in the home country and exchange risks
Other (please specify)
1 2
4 (A) How do you calculate management fees, royalty fees
(and so on) charged to your foreign based 
subsidiaries?
IZD Different percentage on each product line's 
scapital invested
□  A percentage of subsidiary's total turnover
□  Other (please specify) ---- :---------------
(B) Do you review fees periodically? (Please check 
mark ( \/) as appropriate)
I | res C C
(C) Do you have any time limit for fees?
I I res Q  no
If ?ES is the length of time determined?
5 What type of interest rates does your company charge its 
foreign based subsidiaries and associated companies for 
loans made out to them by the parent company?
Wholly-owned Partly-owned 
subsidiary subsidiary
(A) Fixed interest rates c m . c m
(B> “Variable rates based on 
host's lending rates ■ ■ ' c m c m
(ci Variable rates based on 
domestic lending rates c m □
(D) Variable rates based on 
Euro-currency bond rates
c m i— ii____i
(E) Other (Please c m c m
specify)
1 3
PART IV DECISION VARIABLES
This part aims to identify the factors that directly 
influence the choice (in the Company's view) of the 
optional level of reinvestment and repatriation of 
periodic income to the parent company.
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
4.1 ‘ NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS
■ (a) Rank the following environmental risks according,
to their importance on your company's periodic earn­
ings allocation decisions, that is,.between repatria­
tion to parent company and reinvestment in the 






A Nationalisation of 
your foreign assets 
B. Expropriation of your 
-foreign subsidiaries 
C Terrorism against 
your company 
D Company’s image deter­
ioration in the Host 
country
E Fear of Equity partici­
pation forced upon 
your company by the 
host's authorities
F Company's image
deterioration in the 
home country
G War
H Devaluation of local 
currency 
I Devaluation of parent 
company's country 
currency 
J Other (please specify; 
use extra sheets if 
' necessary)













.1 (b)(i) Which of the risks in 4.1(a) above are insured?
Please check mark ( \/) below the boxes 
corresponding to the risks in 4.1 (a) .
* □  » □  c p  
f  □  o n  n o  i p  j a
(ii) Who are the major insurers of your above risks?
□  ECGD (Export Credits Guarantee Department)
□  Private insurers
| j Other public insurers (please specify)
(c) Please rank the following according to their 




A Host countries' regulat- 
- ions on earnings trans­
fers to abroad (eg tax 
and exchange restrict­
ions)
B Home countries mandatory 
and voluntary requirements
C A third country’s govern­
mental regulations (one 
from where your company's 
foreign earnings are very 
significant)
D Other (Please specify)
□  □





Does the anticipation of your major competitor's actions 
influence your earnings allocation decisions?
Please check (V )
Wholly-owned Partly-owned 
subsidiaries affiliates
A’ very strongly i— i i— i
B- fairly strongly
C little I I \ I
D not at all
4.3 OTHER INTEREST-GROUPS
Rank the following actors according to the weight of 
their respective influence in your company's foreign 
earnings allocation decisions: (eg, 1st, 2nd, etc;








. E Other (please 
specify)
CD CZI
CD . , 1—1
CD CD
□
1— 1 , □
A . A ECONOMIC FACTORS
Please rank the following general economic conditions 
according to the respective importance on your company’s 
repatriation and reinvestment decisions, (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 






A Economic conditions of 
host countries
B Economic conditions of 
home countries
C Economic conditions of 
your main foreign market
A.5 Please check mark ( \/) the following general economic 
indicators of host and home countries that you consider 
while deciding on foreign earnings repatriation or 
reinvestment in the foreign subsidiary. (Mark ’d ’ for 
home country, 'h' for host country).
Wholly-owned Partly-owned 
subsidiaries affiliates
A Balance of payment 1 1 CZ
B National Income 1 1 CZ
C Inflation CD , .CZ
D Interest rates CZI CZ
E Exchange rates CD I—1
F Tax rates (with 
holding and underly­
ing tax changes..... * -
1__1 CZ
G Per capita disposable 
income
CZI CZ






A.6 Please rank the following internal factors according to 
their importance on your decisions to repatriate and/or 
reinvest your foreign affiliates’ periodic earnings.
A Principal affiliates 
needs for funds
B Parent companies needs 
for funds







A.7 Which of the following best describes the authority of 
your foreign subsidiaries’ chief executives in the area 
of foceign earnings allocations decisions?
Wholl-owned Partly-owned 
subsidiaries affiliates
The foreign subsidiaries' 
chief executives have 





The foreign subsidiaries 
chief executives provide 
the data based but have 
no veto on foreign earn­
ings allocation to repa­
triation and reinvestment.
The parent company's Board 
of Top Executives decide 
on repatriation and rein­
vestment of foreign 
earnings.
The area management or
product division general _____
management make the rein- □  CZ
vestment decisions, inform
the parent company, and
direct the subsidiaries’ chief
ex ecu tiv es  to take action
PART V DECISION APPROACH
We are aiming in this part to find out themost popular 
approach to deciding what should be reinvested and what 
should be repatriated to the parent company out of annual 
earnings of foreign based principal affiliates..
5.1 Which of the following best describes your method for 
arriving at the sum to be transferred to.the parent 
from foreign based subsidiaries and principal 
associated companies.
A fixed percentage of 
earnings are transferred 
to the parent company 
periodically
A fixed percentage of 
operating assets are 









□  CZI 
CZ CZI
CZI CZ
The amount (ie, %)   ;-- - --- -
allowed by the host____________ |____| I----1
country
The amount (ie, %) as
directed by the home___________ ■____  .
country's government L___l I___ I
(either mandatory or 
voluntarily)
Transfers depend on    .




Please describe how the variable percentages are 
arrived at in question 5.1 (a) above.
1. Wholly-owned ______________________________
subsidiaries




Please briefly explain your company’s step-by-step 
approaches used for allocating periodic foreign earnings 
between reinvestment at the host country (foreign 
subsidiary) and repatriation to the parent company:
(use extra sheets if necessary).
(a) When your overseas based subsidiary is wholly-owned
(b). When your overseas based subsidiary is partly-owned 
but not quoted in the host country's stock exchange.
A
5.3 In this question we are interested to identify the most 
popular form of organisation structure for globally 
based enterprises.
Briefly describe in the space below how your world wide 
group is organised. Please append a diagramstic 
representation of your world wide organisation 
. structure showing broadly how the subsidiaries and 
affiliates are linked together with the parent company.
2 2
PART VI FINANCING OF OPERATIONS
The aim in this part is to determine the sources 
and application of funds for both wholly-owned and 
partly-owned foreign based affiliates.
6.1 (a) Rank the following sources of funds according to 
their frequency in financing your foreign subsi­
diaries operations. Please differentiate between 
the frequency of use in wholly-owned and partly-







A Parent Company's 
loans CD CZI
B New permanent 
capital CZI . CZI
C Retained earnings 
of the affiliates CZI CZI
D Loans and credits 




from home country's CD CD
institutions and
banks ............   • - -
F Loans from
— - international  C Z ) C Z I
cred it and bond
- market ........ -
(Euro financing)
G Leasing




If 'G' in question 6.1(a) above is used, please 
briefly state your accounting policy for leased 
assets.
(i) For wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries
(ii) For partly-owned foreign based associated 
companies
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G Loans from sister subsidiaries ' : 1 | 1 | | | ( j | | j ( ( |
• ; •  • • ■  " •  • _ ________ . ' __________ •  i  i
H Leasing . CZ CZ O  C Z  C Z  C Z  CZS?)
Other (eg, Bank overdraft 
other current liabilities
I and j— j j— -j j— j j j— j
. ' ' ■ ■ ' - ' • ■ e: ,• • •
_ ■ ■■ •. ■ ;■ - y\-_.
r;Vr~5*-*• ^ v . . -r-
□  E d
□  Ed
□  E d  E d  E d  E d  C Z  E d
Loans and cred its from‘host; " :- i i r~ ■—I i —  i i ■'■ i * r--------- 1 i —■ t i    j
country's in stitu tio n s  I— I . I— I 1— 1 I— 1 I------- 1 1— 1 L— 1
■ - • ■ ■ . . “a  . ; w  - ■
A , Parent company■
B ' New permanent.
C Retained earnings o f subsidiary Vi
Other
-  * -- V '  • C -■other
7.3
: * ' ' i i ; \ \ i. «• ;V-* ' 5 ? ’ ' • -i *
In the question would you 
please analyse the incremental 
investments in  your partly-owned 
foreign base a f f i l ia t e s ,  . Ld 
(21=1 unit of .currency) _
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7.4 In this question we wish to determine the burden of
withholding taxes (per geographic area) borne by foreign 
based affiliates.
Please fill in the withholding taxes paid to host 
country tax authorities in each of the regions and 
during each of the periods shown below.
Withholding taxes (3(OOP's)
1962-64 65-67 68-70 71-73 74-76 77-79 80-82
z • • HSi i ! ■: s i.. : ■' . Z„ z :: *, ; z z z
ASIA - . 'CZI CZI CZILZJ c z c z c z• "-if'fV-
africa: r : . a I c z i CZI c z c z c z c z; &
S. AMERICA : □ I CZI IZZI c z c z c z c z
C. AMERICA C D I CZI CZ|i CZ IZJ c z c z
. - . ■‘i •
SCANDINAVIAN * ' 
COUNTRIES □ I CZ] c z I c z c z c z c z
, ..  - *.
\ " i'* f USSR C D  C D c z I c z CZ c z c z
MIDDLE EAST C D  CZI C D  c z c z c z c z
ZZ
AUSTRALIA AND 
NEW ZEALAND t z I CDc z i c z c z c z c z
CANADA CZ CZI c z  CZ c z C D c z
USA CZI CZI c z  c z c z t z c z
! • i 
■ UK C D t z  c z c z c z c z
-
W. EUROPE CZI c z  c z c z c z c z
.
JAPAN----- C D , c z  □ c z c z c z .
REST OF 
FAR EAST t z  c z i c z  c z c z c z c z
Thank you for your co-operation.
I f  you wish to receive a copy of the resu lt of th is survey 






A ^ P  ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES
F i m  SERIAL COOES/CHOICE OF ANSWER OPTIONS
QUESTION DESCRIPTION RATKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 SLW1ARY FINDINGS PARAGRAPH
REFERENCE
NO.
2.1 Control p re fe rence 1 A A A B A A A A A B B A B A B
A A=68.8% 1
2.2 Reason fo r  choice o f  
(2 .1 ) 1 B A D D A B A A A D A B B A
B B A=43.8%, B=37.5% 2
J
2.3 Motivation fo r 1 B C C B A B C C B A E B A
C B B B=43.8%, C=31.3% 3
f o r e i y i  investment
2 D B C B D B A B - - C C A D
-
2.4 S ip p l ie s  t o  fo re ig n  
a f f i l i a t e s
- Evidence o f  i n t r a ­
1 bV aV aV A 3 A1A3 aV A3 aV A1 aV - A 3 aV A3 A1 D3
group s u p p l i e s  o f  
m a t e r i a l s ,  * 4
2 -  _ G dV o V D1D3 dV D3 D3 D1 D1D3 - o1 D3 D3
- G3 components a n d
3 G1 G3 G1G3 G1 G3 G1G3 G3 G1 G1G3 - G1 G3 G3 G3
- -
c a p i t a l  a s s e t s
2 . 5 D e p e n d e n c e  o f  
s u b .  o n  P a r e n t s 1 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A2
H ig h  d e g r e e  o f  
i n t e r  d e p e n d e n c e H
2 . 6 S u b s i d i a r y ' s  m a in  
m a r k e t
1 A A A A A A A A A C A A A A A A A = 9 3 .8 %
5
3 .1 P e r f o r m a n c e
m e a s u r e
D i f f e r e n c e  i n  54%
1 BC2 » V AB2 AA2 AA2 B A AB2 CC2 AA2 AA2 A BA2 AB2 AB2 AB2 o f  f i r m s
6
2 -  - A1 BD2 CC2 BB2 A D DA2 AB2 CB2 D AB2 CD2 BA2 BA2
A = 5 5 .2 % ;  B = 2 7 .6 %
3 . 2 M a jo r  c h a n n e l  f o r  
e a r n i n g s  t r a n s f e r
1 BA2 GG2 AB2 BB2 AA2 A A CA2 AB2 AA2 AA2 G AA2 BB2 BB2 AA2 No D i f f *  i n  6 9 ,2 %  
A = 5 5 .2 % ;  B=31% 7
3 . 3 The r e a s o n  f o r  
c h o i c e  o f  ( 3 . 2 )
1 A A A A A A B A A A A B A B A B A=75%; B=25%
8
I n t e r e s t  c h a r g e s  
on  P a r e n t s  l o a n s
No d i f f e r e n c e
3 . 5
1 C BB2 EE2 AA2 AA2 B - A CC2 - B2 C C B A DD2 N/A A=3C%; B=25%; 
C=25%
9
t o  s u b s i d i a r i e s
4 . 1 ( a ) M ain  e n v i r o n m e n 2 2 ? . ._ 2 2 H=48%; A=24%; 10
t a l  r i s k  o f 1 HH2 AA2 J J 2 HH2 HH2 -  - H BB2 AA2 AA
HH GG HE HH B=8%
c o n c e r n No 1
2 BB2 I I 2 ----- A AA2 BB2 BB2 I I 2 BB2 H2 EE2
9 1 .7 %  d i f f e r e n c e
A4B > ; Contd
> •
QUEST­
ION DESCRIPTION RANKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NO.
4 . 1 ( c ) G o v e rn m e n t  
e f f e c t s  on  
d i v i d e n d  a n d  
i n v e s t m e n t
1 BA2 AA2 AA2 AA2 AA2 A AA2 AA2
4 . 2 E f f e c t  o f  
c o m p e t i t o r s 1 BC2 BB2 BB2 BB2 pD2 B c CC2 cc2
4 . 3 A f f i l i a t e s  manage­
ment f l e x i b i l i t y * 1 BC2 BB2 AA2 AA 2 AA2 A A AC2 AA2
4 . 4 R e l a t i v e
c o u n t r y
e c o n o m i c s  e f f e c t 1 BA2 AA 2 AA2 AA2 AA2 A A AA 2 AA2
4 . 5 M acro  e c o n o m ic  














4 . 6 R e l a t i v e  n e e d  o f  
P a r e n t / a f f i l i a t e 1 BC2 AA2 AA2 BB2 BB2 A B A AA2
2
• 1
AB - BB2 AA2 AA2 B A C BB2
4 . 7 A f f i l i a t e ' s  
M anagem en t  
f l e x i b i l i t y *
1 BA2 BB2 BB2 BB2 BB2 B B BB2 cc2
5 .1 D i v i d e n d  a l l o c a ­
t i o n  t o  P a r e n t 1 DF2 DF2 cc2 FF2 cc2 D BB2 DD2
6 . 1 F i n a n c i n g  o f  
s u b s i d i a r i e s 1 * cc2 DD2 BB2 AA2 DD2 D cc2 cc2
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
- 4 0 2 -
1 3 14 15 1 6 SUMMARY FINDINGS
AA2 AA 2 BB2
—
A = 78%
2 C DD2 D
B=37%; A = 2 9 .6 % ;  
C = 2 5 .6 X
BB
AC2 AC2 AA2 BB2
A = 5 7 .1 X ;  B = 2 8 .6 %
AA 2 AA2 AA2 A A = 8 8 .9 %
Ah Cdh Chd E
M a i n l y  h o s t  
c o u n t r y ' s  No d i f f
2 2
Chd
_2 b/w 100%/ <100%
Ah Cdh F
AA2 BA2 BB2 BB2 B = 5 1 .8 % ;  A =44 .4%
BB2 AC2 AA2 AA2
OR
A=49%; B = 4 5 .1 X
BA2 BA 2 BA2 BA2 B = 6 7 .9 %
CF2 CF2 AF2 CC2
F=50%; C=40% 
D=33%




Colum n 4 shows the serial codes of the firms and these codes 
corresponds to the similar codes in table 7A above. It is therefore 
convenient to refer to table 7A through this link if the need arises. 
Serial code 1, represents Swedish Forest, serial code 2, represents 
Finish Metal, and so on, till serial code 16 which represents Scottish 
Textile. The alphabetic character codes represents the answer options 
ranked either 1st, 2nd or 3rd for each question.
Column 5 shows the summary of the results. The contents of this
%
column is arrived at by counting the answer option codes and finding 
the percentage of the sum of each over the number of firms 
responding to the particular question. Again, to simplify the 
presentation further, not all option codes percentages are shown. In 
all cases the highest answer option codes selected by the respondents 
are shown. However, where the first, the second, and the third 
choices are close, their percentages are shown, to highlight t-he relative 
importance of the answer options.
Where applicable, the respondents were asked to differentiate what 
would normally be the case if the ownership is wholly owned against 
when the ownership is partly owned. Where this is the case and 
where the respondents answered accordingly, their ranked options are 
shown side by side; the rank for the answer option applicable to 
partly owned affiliates are superscripted in a second degree. Thus in 
column 5, where a difference exists between what applies to wholly 
controlled against partly controlled affiliates, it is indicated by a 
percentage which is calculated by counting the number of firms that
•
- 4 0 3 -
J
ranked different answer options for the different ownership control 
types and finding the percentage this sum bears to all those that 
ranked their answers for both ownership control types. As an  
illu s tra tio n , consider six firms that ranked answer options to a 
certain question as follows: A A 2, B B 2, C A 2, BC2, B A 2, B - ,  
respectively. It can be seen that the last firm failed to rank an 
answer option against the partly owned firms. Therefore, the five 
firms that ranked accordingly indicate that there is a difference 
between the behaviour of wholly and partly owned affiliates to the
tune of about 60 per cent' ( y ) *  100. The ranks also show that
answer option ‘B’ is more popular to the firms than other options to
the tune of about 45.5 per cent 100. Similarly the second
most important answer option for the same question is ‘A’, to the
4tune of about 36.4 per cent ( — )x 100.
Finally, colum n 6 shows the paragraph or the row references to 
which the summary findings are referred to in the next section.
Coming back to column A , ©f appendix* A4B, one more point 
is i n  order. The -answer options for question number 
2.4 as shown in the table differs to a small extent from the rest of the 
questions. A reference to the questionnaire will make this clear ( see 
Appendix A7.1 ). For example, the first rank by the first company 
simply shows that the subsidiaries are in most cases (B), supplied 
with materials, components and so on, produced (1), by the parent 
company, but sometimes (A) some of these supplies are, purchased 
(3) for the subsidiaries by the parent ( that is, B lA  3 ).
-404-
APPENDIX A8.1
TABLE COMPARATIVE DEPRECIATION AND AMORTISATION: (ALL SECTORS)
A8.1 MAJORITY LOCALLY CONTROLLED FIRMS (ML) Vs MAJORITY 
OPERATING IN UK. (Depreciation + amortisation)
FOREIGN CONTROLLED FIRMS (MF) 
x 100
Gross fixed assets
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
MAJORITY FOREIGN 
CMF) (A) 8.60 8.74 9.50 9.40 9.38 9.29 9.27 ' 9.97 9.36 9.38 9.24
MAJORITY LOCAL 
CONTROLLED (ML) (B) 7.26 7.37 7.15 7.21 7.23 7.43 7.85 7.50 7.60 8.00 7.78
% ii o (C) 1.34 1.37 2.34 2.19 2.15 1.86 1.42 2.47 1.76 1.38 1.46
f  =100 (D) 18.46 18.59 32.87 30.37 29.74 25.03 18.09 32.93 23.16 17.25 18.77
mfjM
A (E) 11.63 11.44 10.53 10.64 10.66 10.76 10.79 10.03 10.68 10.66 10.82 AV. NO. OF 
YRS. = 10.79
MLVEU . (F) 13.77 13.57 13,99 13.87 13.83 13.46 12.74 13.33 13.16 12.50 12.85 AV. NO. OF 
YRS. = 13.73








(Loan capital x 100)/(EQUITY + LOAN CAPITAL)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
MAJORITY
FOREIGN (MF) = A 21.71 22.42 21.32 19.80 20.13 22.51 19.61 18.03 19.92 19.02 17.83
MAJORITY
LOCAL (ML) = B 20.29 20.52 20.50 19.99 18.28 17-17 16.11 14.70 14.85 12.54 11.48
A -  B = C 1.42 1.90 0.82 0.19 1.85 5.34 3.50 3.33 5.07 6.48 6.35
% DIFFERENCE
C x 100 % 
B 7.0 5.80 4.0 0 10.12 • 31.10 21.73 22.65 34.14 51.67 55.31
SOURCE OF RAW DATA: As in Table A8.1
- 4 0 6 -
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"APPENDIX A9.1 INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
Companies are c la s s i f ie d  according to their main a c tiv ity  whenever possible.  
However, some companies have such a wide range of interests that no one 
activ ity  is  predominant and these companies are c la ss if ied  to either mixed 









TOBACCO 24 429 .
CHEMICALS AND MAN-MADE FIBRES 26 11 and 12; 15; and 26
METAL MANUFACTURE 31 22
MECHANICAL AND INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING 33 32 and 37
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING: OFFICE
MACHINERY ETC 36 33 and 34
SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIRING 37 361
VEHICLES 38 35; 362-365
METAL GOODS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED 39 31
TEXTILES 41 43
LEATHER, LEATHER GOODS 43 44
CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 44 45
NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 46 24
TIMBER, FURNITURE, ETC 47 46
PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 48 47
PROCESSING OF RUBBER AND PLASTICS: OTHER •
MANUFACTURING 49 48 and 49
MINERAL AND ORE EXTRACTION 18 21 and 23
MIXED ACTIVITIES IN MANUFACTURING 05
CONSTRUCTION 50 50
TRANSPORT (EXCLUDING SEA TRANSPORT AND 
COMMUNICATION 70 71 and 72; 75-79
SEA TRANSPORT 75 74
WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION (EXCLUDING PETROLEUM 
DISTRIBUTION) 81 611; 612(pt); 613-630
RETAILING: HOTELS AND CATERING: REPAIR OF 
CONSUMER GOODS AND VEHICLES 82 64-67
REAL ESTATE 86 85 '
BUSINESS SERVICES; LEASING 87 834-839; 84
MISCELLANEOUS 88 92-99
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHING 15 01-03
OIL (INCLUDING PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION) 90 13 and 14; 612(pt)
MIXED ACTIVITIES IN NON-MANUFACTURING 10
i
These Companies are categorised in 5 size bands according to their capital 
employed as fo llow s:-
SIZE BAND 1 up to £25,000 
SIZE BAND 2 between £35,001 and £100,000 
SIZE BAND 3 between £1001001 and £4,160,000 
SIZE BAND 4 between £4,160,001 and £21,800,000 
SIZE BAND 5 £21,800,001 and above
APPENDIX A 10.1
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS):
DIVIDEND EQUATION. MAIN SAMPLE (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L C P t A - l  E F B t l t N C P ,  cr R 2 F
1974 F 0.01 i 0.097 0.073 0.119
(1.559) (1.186) (0.698) (2.133)
L 0.001 0.052 0.567 0.0054
(0.797) (2.121) (8.328) ' 0.629)
1975 F 0.004 0.441 0.336 0.057
(0.591 ) (4.136) (1.859) (0.845)
L 0.0006 0.0125 0.822 -0.026
(0.713) (0.727) (11.905) (-4.411)
1976 F 0.004 0.239 0.535 0.111
(1.078) (2.766) (4.894) (1.971)
L 0.0005 0.050 0.609 0.020
(0.588) (4.37) (11.61) ( 2.21 )
1977 F 0.002 0.212 0.405 0.114
(0.384) (1.742) (2.409) (2.596)
L 0.001 0.014 0.911 0.015
( -0.838) (0.506) (7.195) ( 1.079)
1978 F 0.0005 0.186 0.334 0.094
(0.160) (2.289) (3.335) (2.23)
L 0.0008 0.1045 0.6822 0.0006
(-0.576) (3.913) (6.278) (0.053)
1979 F 0.0081 0.539 0.151 0.254
(1.674) (6.607) (0.770) (3.815)
L 0.002 -0.045 1.030 -0.072
(-0.937) (-1.449) (7.20) (-3.413)
1980 F 0.002 0.055 0.467 -0.018
(0.431) (1.01) (5.10) ( -0.328)
L -0.0007 0.053 0.863 0.005
0.002 0.097 0.0211 0.1349 2.247
(0.024) ( 1.602)
0.0036 0.0084 0.0062 0.7813 29.55
( -0.274) (-0.894)
0.109 -0.141 0.0256 0.3257 4.865
(-1.329) (-2.163)
0.0125 -0.006 0.0066 0.8924 67.349
(4.41) (-0.836)
-0.049 -0.116 0.0241 0.6579 16.382
(-0.845) (-2.515)
0.021 0.011 0.0051 0.8434 44.086
(2.113) . (1.313)
0.055 0.099 0.0229 0.4178 6.7411
(0.746) ( 2.59)
0.013 0.033 0.0063 0.7488 24.8413
(0.999) (2.387)
0.019 0.098 0.0157 0.4012 6.3592
(0.428) ( 2.455)
0.006 0.00004 0.007 0.7339 23.0641
(0.381) (1.390)
-0.201 -0.403 0.0278 0.6029 13.1459
(-2.71) (6 .4 2 )
0.066 0.111 0.0113 0.7966 32.3278
(3.056) (7.953)
0.004 0.038 0.0204 0.4777 8.3157
(0.080) (0.742)
0.003 0.007 0.0106 0.9576 181.661
( 0.24) (0.689) .(-1.12) (3.69) i 15:01 .1 1 0.627)
Notjjs: t  0 5 ^  1 .9 6 :  t  QJ '=:::2 . 5 8 :  t  1 . 6 5 :  t statistics in brackets;
R  ~ goodness of fit statistics: F F-statistics;
<j -  standard deviation of the dependent variable 
F - Foreign. L - Local; C. is the intercept or Ck as used in the 
main body of this thesis.
Number of observations = 41.
- 4 0 8 -
APPENDIX A10.2(i)
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS)
SAMPLE 2 (1979-1980) DIVIDEND EQUATION.
YEARS F/L C P, A - i NCPt I, EFB cr R 2 F
1979 F 0.004 0.319 0.319 0.254 0.073 0.040 0.0299 0.4389 15.551
(0.897) (5.958) (3.10) ( 5.52) ( 1.25) ( 1.604)
L 0.003 0.028 0.897 .0.062 0.079 0.018 0.0106 0.6536 36.0958
( 2.07) (1.219) (9.815) (5.162) (3.569) (-1.653)
1980 F 0.014 0.230 0.350 -0.259 -0.052 0.1196 0.0421 0.3859 12.6893
(2.391 ) (3.846) (2.613) (-5.30) (-0.61) (3.10)
L 0.005 0.222 1.097 -0.061 -0.074 0.002 0.0189 0.7539 57.9916
( 2.76) (6.431 ) (8.009) ( 2.33) ( 1.98) (0.082)
Notes: t  q^^I.96:^ 1.65: t statistics in brackets;
Number of observations = 94;
F Foreign. L Local.
F = F statistic
-409-
APPENDIX A10.2(ii)
DETAILED CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS)






F L F L !1





1 ’ (1.597) (-0.295) (1.888) (-1.554)
DEPt 0.875 1.50 1.056 1.068
(3.372) (6.85) (4.33) (4.301) [
0.050 0.015 0.039 0.048 111
(1.197) (0.628) (0.981) (1.559) j!
CAVt
1
0.021 0.025 0.001 0.061
I
i (0.861) (1.619) (0.084) (3.027) :
| ^ - i 0.365 0.119 0.211 0.066
j (3.367) (1.033) (2.858) (0.759) |
\NCPt -0.153 -0.269 -0.034 -0.145 ;
{ (-2.30) (-5.59) (-0.646) (-2.285) :
1 EFBtt 0.133 0.216 0.034 0.278 j1! (3.695) (4.047) (0.875)
j
(5.004) |
\ D< -0.158t 0.474 -0.104 0.493i1!
i1





0.0448 0.0335 0.0421 0.0401
1 - i: R 2 0.4544 0.5030 0.4101 0.6377 ;
I Fii 12.065
14.444 10.238 24.383 :i
Notes: t 0 5  ^  1 .9 6 : t  01^-2 .58 ; t 1 *65: t-statistics in brackets: 
No. obs. = 94; F “  Foreign. L = Local. F = F-statistic
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APPENDIX A10.2(iii)
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS)
SAMPLE 2 (1979-1980): EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION
COEF. 1979 1 9 8 0
j F L F L
C 0 .0 2 7 0 .0 4 9 0 .0 1 3 -0 .0 1 3
( 1 .1 6 2 ) ( 3 .7 6 3 ) . ( 0 .6 9 8 ) ( - 1 .1 4 1 )
p t -0 .9 1 7 - 0 .2 2 2 - 0 .7 0 6 -0 .4 9 2
( - 3 .9 4 ) ( - 1 .2 8 8 0 ( - 4 .8 9 7 ) ( - 2 .7 6 7 )
D E P t ' -1 .6 7 1 - 2 .7 1 6 - 0 .9 3 8 0 .2 4 3
\ ( - 3 .1 0 5 ) ( - 6 .3 7 ) ( - 1 .9 2 8 ) ( 0 .6 1 5 )
! I  N G t 0 .0 2 9 0 .0 7 5 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 6
( 2 .0 2 9 ) ( 1 . 2 4 3 ) ( - 6 .0 8 ) ( 1 .3 9 4 )
C A G t -0 .0 8 3 - 0 .1 2 7 - 0 .9 0 6 -0 .0 5 4
( - 1 .9 4 ) ( - 3 .3 7 ) ( - 2 .1 7 4 ) ( - 1 .6 2 2 )
N C P t 0 .7 8 7 0 .4 8 9 0 .8 1 9 0.491
( 4 .1 1 4 ) ( 5 .2 6 6 ) ( 8 .6 3 9 ) (4 .7 1 5 )
• I t 1 .237 1 .0 6 6 0 .6 4 8 0 .8 5 3
\ ( 4 .9 7 2 ) ( 5 . 1 6 2 ) ( 2 .6 7 3 ) (5 .8 5 6 )
D , 0 .6 2 3 - 0 .3 9 3 0 .8 2 9 0 .1 9 0
Ii|
( 1 . 5 8 6 ) ( - 0 .6 9 7 ) ( 3 .9 1 0 ) ( 0 .5 4 5 )
iII
O 0 .1 0 2 6 0 .0 6 3 3 0 . 1 1 1 3
!
0 .0 5 2 7




6 .7 8 4 1 2 .8 6 2 19.771 11 .4 2 9
Notes: t  .0 5 ^  1 *96; t  q i i:::52 . 5 8 :  t 1 *65; t-statistics in brackets: 
N um ber of observations = 94:
F = Foreign, L = Local.
- 4 1 1 -
APPENDIX 10.3
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS):













o . o i 3  ;
(-1.41) (0.836) (-2.88) (-1.18) (0.583)
i
(0.621) j
DEPt 1.549 0.722 , 1.377 -0.714 1.399 0.194 |
• (7.558) (1.619) (9.87) (-0.816) (5.591) (0.447)
PCt ^  i 0.1026 0.0242 0.118 0.763 0.008 0.047
; (1.837) (0.307) (3.377) (7.452) (0.136) (0.697) ;
i  CAVt) L 0.0067 -0.023 0.068 -0.013 0.013 0.029 :
\ (0.216) (-0.348) (2.575) (-0.086) (0.387) (0.617) ;
\ p t - l 0.299 0.555 0.082 -0.088 0.304 -0.300
\
1 (3.314) (1.338) (-1.147) (-0.126) (2.337) (-0.852)
! NCP.i -0.158 -0.136 -0.019 0.087 -0.183 -0.099 |ii! (-2.093) (-0.865) (-0.384) (0.354) (-2.215) (-0.822) j
; EFBt 0.105 0.299 0.118 -0.199 0.174 0.682 ij
1
I
(1.473) . (2.505) (2.35) (-0.87) (1.652)
j
(6.771) |




(-0.865) (-1.28) (0.434) (-0.365) (-2.78) (1.657) ;
j
| at 0.0586 0.0450 0.0442 0.1525 0.0411 0.0662
1 R 2i 0.8308 0.2505 0.8834 0.7903 0.6627 0.7096 |
k 29.062 2.910 44.292 22.531 12.2283 14.963 |
| N. OBS. 41 41 41 41 41 41 :i
Notes: t l-96.-r.oi~ 2.58; t 1.65; t statistics in brackets;
F =^Foreign. L -  Local;
R ~ = Coefficient of determination adjusted lor d.f.; 
cr = standard deviation of the dependent variables.
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APPENDIX A 10.3  (contd)
COEF 1977 1978 1979 1980
F L F L F L F L
C 0.006 0.0007 0.004 0.013 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 1 6 0.009 0.037
(0.373) (0.035) (- 0 . 1 6 2 ) ( 1.186) ( 0.916) ( 1.277) I 0.779) (-3.67)
DEPt 1.723 0.944 1.117 1.387 0.995 1.93 0.997 1.356
(5.962) (2.77) (2.524) (4.98) (3.11 ) (7.05) (3.75) (4.629)
PCt - i 0 . 0 1 0.072 0.134 0.105 0.194 0.043 0.189 0 . 0 6 8
(- 0 . 1 2 6 ) (1.244) (1.033) (3.423) (2.391) (1.087) (2.425) (2.166)
CAVt 0 . 0 2 0 0.008 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 2 0 0.057 0.26 0.024 0.081
(0.424) (0.156) (0.164) (0.714) (1.932) (1.08) (0.766) (3.49)
P t-i 0.015 0.394 0.153 • 0.129 0.150 0.315 0.081 0.077
• ' r 0.134 ) (2.24) (0.595) (0.725) (0.672) (1.522) (0.691) (-0.748)
NCPt 0.078 0.189 0.013 0.0004 -0.173 0.32 0.0129 0.0009
( 0.81 ) 1 1.37) (-0.117) ( 2 . 1 6 8 ). (-2.09) (3.76) (0.146) 0 .0 1 2 2 )
E F B : 0.0664 0.639 0.117 0.019 0 . 2 0 6 0.381 0.052 0.234
(0.848 ) (4.355) (0.971) (0.276) (2.14) (3.546) (-0.51 ) (3.636)
A 0.141 0.324 -0.158 0.376 -0.197 0.097 0.259 1.891
(-0.569) (-0.274) (-0.36) (0.544) (-0.99) (-0.156) (-1.09) (5.271)
cr 0.0459 0.0453 0.0475 0.0445 0.0463 0.0399 0.0439 0.0532
R 2 0.6351 0.4592 0.4713 0.7695 0.6834 0.6672 0.6395- 0.8717
F 10.947 5.8518 6.0941 20.072 13.332 12.455 11.137 39.810
N. OBS. 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Notes: t  1 - 9 6 ;  t  q j '==::2 . 5 8 :  t  j q ^  1 . 6 5 :  t statistics fn brackets: 
F = Foreign, L = Local;
R  “ = Coefficient of determination adjusted for d.f.;
<r = standard deviation of the dependent variables.
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APPENDIX A 10.4
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (OLS):







C 0.018 0.047 -0.054 0.044 0.009 0.007
(0.68) (1.121) (-2.007) (0.858) (0.683) (0.473)
Pi -0.534 0.325 0.057 0.135 -0.547 -0.673
(-1.89) (0.522) (0.166) (0.213) (-2.08) (-4.72)
D E P t ' ’ -1.41 -1.09 -1.138 0.078 -1.287 -0.195
(-1.63) (-2.27) (-1.296) (0.124) (-3.17) (-0.917)
I N G t -0.013 0.058 0.007 -0.015 -0.123 -0.008
(-1.30) (0.946) (0.769) (-0.427) (-0.065) (-7.17)
G A G -0.054 -0.104 0.039 0.036 -0.201 0.008
(-0.947) (-1.34) (0.716) (0.371) (-0.71) (0.274)
N C P t 0.308 -0.1002 0.537 0.141 0.611 0.486
(4.04) (-0.55) (3.695) (0.591) (6.566) . (5.544)
It 1.068 0.582 0.802 -0.184 0.501 0.877
(2.572) (2.685) (1.607) (-2.108) (2.185) (12.755)
A 1.007 -0.994 0.643 -3.611 0.943 -2.527
(2.186) (-0.53) (1.535) (-1.70) (3.043) (-2.58)
cr 0.0642 0.0583 0.0713 0.0678 0.0538 0.0765
R 2 0.2961 0.1869 0.4903 0.2042 0.5692 0.9006
F 3.4035 2.3134 6.4965 2.4660 8.5490 52.7910
N. OBS. 41 41 41 41 41 41
Notes:? 1.96; ? q j ? lO'"''' 1 *65; t statistics in brackets; 
F -  Foreign. L = Local:
R  * = Coefficient of determination adjusted for d.f.: 
cr = standard deviation of the dependent variables.
- 4 1 4 -
A PPEN D IX  A 10.4 (con td )








C 0 . 0 0 1 0.0306 0.0307 0 . 0 0 2 0.0099 0.0389 0.0085 -0.023
( 0.06) (1.209) (1.687) (-0.052) ( 0.714) (2.721 ) (0.508) ( 0.855)
Pt 1.079 -0.414 -0.753 0.443 0.976 0.148 0.365 0.329
1 2.872) (-1.28) ( 2.18) (- 0 . 8 8  ) ( 4.92) < 0.84' ( 1.926) (0.746)
DEPt 0.365 -0.689 -0.1298 0.1644 1.153 1.641 0.468 0.081
(-0.444) (-2.69) (-0.24) (0.172) ( 2.91 ) ( 3.34) (0.902) (0.099)
I NGt 0.029 -0.032 0.007 0.030 0.008 0.033 0.003 0.0304
(1.388) ( - 1 .6 2 ) (0.576) .(1.312) (0.834) (1 .2 8 6 ) (-0.53) (1.865)
CACt -0.073 0 . 0 0 0 6 -0.077 - 0 . 0 6 2 -0 . 0 1 0 0.048 -0.049 -0 . 1 1 1
(-1.49) (- 0 .0 1 ) (-1.94) (-0.75) (-0.35) ( - 1 .0 2 ) (-1.18) ( - 1 .8 8 )
NCPt 0.707 0.1977 0.5323 0.0004 0.869 0.4524 0.4626 0.096
' < 8.3.52) (1.400) (4.197) (-0.95) (6.793) (3.987) (3.254) (0 .5 1 8 )
i. 0.417k 0.6595 0.1082 0.6556 0.9467 0.6696 -0.0499 0.955
' 1.094 ) (4.683) (0.472) (1.737) (4.663) (3.327) (-0.169) (3.273)
P 0.9645 1.1803 0.4663 0.5183 1.3412 -0.777 -0.1596 1.4161
1 1.646) ( 1.025) (0.801) (0.294) (4.859) ( 1 .2 0 ) (-0.40) ( - 1 . 1 2 2 )
0 . 1 1 0 2 0.0453 0.0599 0.058 0.0514 0.0401 0.0511 0 . 0 6 0 2
\R 2 0.6906 0.4592 0.3974 0.1258 0.5497 0.4090 0.2164 0.4906
F 13.752 5.8520 4.7690 1.8220 7.9766 1.9543 2.5780. 6.5040
N. OBS. 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Notes:? 1 .96: ? q]~‘':2.58:? jq252 1 .65: t statistics in brackets: 
F = Foreign. L = Local:
R ~ Coefficient of determination adjusted for d.f.: 
cr standard deviation of the dependent variables.
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APPENDIX A10.5G)




S S R f
(c)
S S R l
(d)
(b*c)












1974 0 . 0 1 6 2 0.0135 0.0003 0.0138 41 82 70 2.33 2.24 5cc
1975 0.0191 0.0155 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0157 41 82 70 2.53 2.24 5<1-
1976 0.0080 0.0070 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0071 41 82 70 1.48 2.24 **
1977 0.0150 0.0107 0.0004 0 . 0 1 1 1 41 82 70 2.30 2.24 5tc
1978 0.0067 0.0052 0.0005 0.0057 41 82 70 2.35 2.24 5rc
1979 0.0271 0.0108 0.0Q09 0.0117 41 82 70 15.36 3.09 1 °(-
1980 . 0.0084 0.0076 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0078 41 82 70 0.90 2.24 ♦♦
1974-80 0.1090 0.0912 0.0052 0.0966 287 574 562 1 2 . 0 2 2.80 1  <T
Sample 2:1979 0 . 0 6 2 2 0.0440 0.0034 0.0474 94 188 176 9.16 3.03 Vc
Sample 2:1980 0.1152 0.0957 0.0077 0.1034 94 188 176 3.35 3.03
1979-1980 0.1832 0.1474 0.0139 0.1613 188 376 364 8.24 2.80
(a —d ) / b
Notes: t  =  —  ;
a /h
Where 6  is the number of coefficients:
j -  Critical values of F obtained by interpolation from the conventional F tables; 
h = denominator degrees or freedom:
** not significant at 5cx> level.
APPENDIX A10.5GD
INVESTMENT EQUATION: CHOW-TEST 2
YEARS (a ) 
CSSR
( b)
S S R f
(c >
S S R f
(d)













1 974 0.08605 0.01914 0.05002 0.06916 41 82 6 6 2 . 1 2 2.09 5<*<
1975 0.24101 0.00750 0.16086 0.16836 41 82 6 6 3.56 2.80 1 <S-
1976 0.10536 0.01879 0.04194 0.06072 41 82 6 6 6 . 0 6 be O 1 %
1977 0.09599 0.02532 0.04123 0.06655 41 82 6 6 3.65 2.80 l (v
1978 0.05540 0.03930 0.01491 0.05421 41 82 6 6 0.18 2.09 *
1979 0.04599 0.02238 0.01747 0.03985 41 82 6 6 1.27 2.09 *
1980 • 0.05545 0.02294 0.01197 0.03491 41 82 6 6 4.85 2.80 1 <5p
1979 SO 1.30072 0.27984 0.9415 1.22134 287 574 558 4.53 2.51 1 ‘ t -
Sample 2 : 1 9 7 9 0.15379 0.0940 0.0480 0.1420 94 188 172 1.78 1.95 *
Sample 2:1980 0.16959 0.0900 0.0502 0.1402 94 188 172 4.51 2.52 \Ci-
1979 SO 0.33282 0.19235 0.10609 0.29844 188 376 360 5.18 2.51 l cv
 ^  (a - d  )rs~
Notes: r  =   r —;--------:a jh
Where 8  is the number of coefficients;
j -  Critical values of F obtained by interpolation from the conventional F tables; 
h = denominator degrees of freedom;
■ not significant at 5cr level.
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APPENDIX A10.5(iii)
EXTERNAL FINANCE EQUATION: CIIOW -TEST 3
YEARS <a> ( b > (cl (d) le> (f> (h) (i) (j) Point of
CSSR SSRf  SSR[ (h e) nt -ni N ( 2 "e) (f )- 2 x 8  F  Crit F Sig
1974 0.2190 0.0958 0.0912 0.1870 1 1 82 6 6 1.41 2.09 •
1975 0.2577 0.0854 0 . 1 2 0 6 0 . 2 0 6 0 1 1 82 6 6 2.9 2.09 5<*
1976 0 . 1 2 1 6 0.0412 0.0192 0.0604 41 82 6 6 8.36 2.80 1 %
1977 0.2050 0.1241 0.0366 . 0.1607 41 82 6 6 2.28 2.09 5%
1978 0.2343 0.0713 0.0969 0.1682 41 82 6 6 3.24 2.80 1 *
1979 0.1076 0.0392 0.0313 0.0705 41 82 6 6 4.34 2.80 1 (V’
1980 • 0.1799 0.0675 0.0610 0.1285 41 82 6 6 3.30 2.80 V'v
1974-80 1.9229 0.7019 0.9329 1.6348 287 574 558 12.29 2.51 1 crc
Sample 2 : 1 9 7 9 0.8851 0.6310 0.1820 0.8130 94 188 172 1.995 1.95 5(\
Sample 2:1980 0.6530 0.4410 0.1339 0.5750 94 188 172 2.92 2.52 1 <5-
1979 80 1 .6323 1.1563 0.4007 1.5570 188 376 360 2.18 1.94 5<r
( a - f r ) T K
Notes: F  = d / h
Where 8  is the number of coefficients;
j Critical values of F obtained by interpolation from the conventional F tables: 
h denominator degrees of freedom:
* not significant at 5cr level.
- 4  1 8 -
Appendix 10.6(i)
COMPARISON OF SELECTED RATIOS (Standard Deviations)
Div:P P:Sal Sal:Fixa Depr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year F L F L F L F L
1974 .703 .370 .046 .027 3.69 2.14 .108 .063
1975 .401 .236 .036 .026 3.70 2.33 .093 .058
1976 .420 .163 .033 .055 4.24 2.58 .099 .058
1977 .646 .170 .035 .031 4.69 2.55 .116 .073
1978 .479 .248 .031 .026 4.44 2.55 .093 .068
1979 .499 3.64 .044 .033 4.07 2.43 .097 .059
1980 .322 .542 .055 .033 4.38 2.79 .092 .058
Note: Div:P. is dividend/net earnings ratio: Inv.P, is gross fixed investment 
expenditures/net earnings ratio tor the period: P:Sal. is the profit margin or 
profit/sales ratio; SahFixa. is the productivity of capital in terms of sales - 
or sales/net opening tangible fixed assets; Depr. is the depreciatopn rate or 
depreciation allowances/opening net tangible fixed assets.
It is interesting to observe that while the standard deviation differs between 
the two sample sets, within each group the variation appears roughly 
consistent except for the dividend-earnings ratio (column (2)). The standard 
deviation for this ratio appears to be responding to the dividend control 
limits during the period between 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 9  for the locally controlled firms in 
particular, see also Table 10.1( a ) chapter 10.
Appendix 10.6(ii)
COMPARISON OF SELECTED RATIOS (Standard Deviations)
Gearing A EFB :Sal Bank:Sal LTLiSal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year F L F L F L F L
1974 .210 .127 .064 .058 .096 .088 .094 .043.
1975 .219 .136 .071 .068 .101 .092 *.086 .045
1976 .228 .138 .054 .076 .082 .040 .083 .115
1977 .207 .144 .110 .045 .060 .032 .078 .117
1978 .205 .147 .060 .058 .076 .031 .069 .111
1979 .219 .125 .051 .040 .079 .033 .071 .086
1980 .234 .130 .051 .060 .085 .048 .062 .102
Note: gearing ratio is defined as bank loans and overdrafts plus other long 
and short term loans divided by equity plus total borrowing; A EFB : Sal 
is change in total borrowing at time t minus total borrowing at time t 1  
divided by sales: Bank:Sal is bank loans and overdrafts divided by sales;
LTL is total long and other short term loans divided by sales; and TCA:TCL is 
the ratio of total current assets divided by total current liabilities.
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APPHNDIX A l l . l ( i )
DETAILED ANNU AL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (TSLS):
DIVIDEND EQUATION, MAIN SAMPLE (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L C P, A - i E F 3t A NCR, cr R 2 F
1974 F 0.0082 0.1028 0.0301 0.408 0.064 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 0 2 1 1 0 . 2 1 0 0 1.8634
11.131 ) (1.245) (0.271 ) (1.541 ) ( 0.544) ( 1.588)
L 0.0091 0.0624 0.648 0.017 0.1007 0.0396 0.0062 0.8600
43.093
(3.677) (2.855) (10.799*) (-3.15) (-3.35) ( 3.376)
1975 F 0.0175 0.5983 0.3259 -0.557 -0.069 0.2265 0.0256 0.4720 6.263
( 1.72) (4.964) (2.018) ( - 2 .2 2 ) (-0.87) (1.434)
L 0.0018 0.0322 0.8061 0.0511 0.0225 0.0073 0.0066 0.8510 39.817
( 1.174) (1.414) (9.109) (1.494) (5.874) (-0.747)
1976 F 0.004 0.1647 0.6038 0.0522 0.0404 0.0276 0.0241 0.6560 13.329
- (0.410) (1.678) (5.131) ( 0.13) ( 0.159) (0 .1 4 5 )
L 0.0018 0.0603 0.6242 0.0057 0.0118 0.0014 0.0051 0.8480 38.9810
(1.972) (4.351) (10.476) (0.624) ( 1.008) (0.148)
1977 F 0 . 0 0 1 1 0.302 0.3105 0.2195 0.0907 0.179 0.0229 0.4750 6.3310
( 0 . 2 2 1  ) (1.836) (1.834) (1.932) (0.922) ( 2.193)
L 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0204 0.9061 0.0116 0.0051 0.0299 0.0063 0.7740 24.002
< 0.803) (0.642) (7.071) (0.470) ( 0 .2 0 2 ) (1.809)
1978 F 0.0007 0.2646 0.2487 0.1827 0 . 0 2 6 0 0.1463 0.0157 0.4380 5.4520
(-0.175) ( 2.094 1 (2.338) (1.529) (0.362 > (1 .9 3 2 )
L -0.0015 0.0958 0.7015 -0.0277 0.0284 0.00003 0.0070 0.7730 23.7990
(-0.965) (3.457) (6.438) ( 0 .6 8 ) (0.997) •0.733)
1979 F 0.0029 0.3867 0.2595 0.0227 0.3265 0.2435 0.0278 0.4820 6.5097
(0.438) (1.708) (1.099) ( 0.028) ( 0.239) • 0.678)
L 0.0019 0.0144 1.0145 0.1502 0.0055 0.1153 0.0113 0.7880 25.9520
(0.769) ( 0.407) (6.487 ) f 3.36) ( 0.36) (6.306)
1980 F 0.0003 0.0810 0.4536 0.0822 0.0328 -0 . 0 1 2 2 0.0204 0.5510 8.5721
(0.054) 10.922) (4.930) (0.398) (0.399) ( 0.109)
L 0 . 0 0 0 6 0.5386 0.8705 -0.0113 0.0050 0.0054 0.0106 0.9640 189.08
l 0.824) (3.802) (18.50) (-0.801 ) (-0.397) (0.578)
Notes: t  1 . 9 6 :  ? q j '=::' 2 . 5 8 : ^  j q ^  1 .65: 1 -statistics in brackets:
F - Foreign. L - Local;
R  ~ -  Coefficient of determination unadjusted for d.f.; adjusted 
R  “ =  (  1 —R  ~ ) ( -------- —  ); where n. is the
n —K
number of observations, K, is the number of parameters being estimated, and
R  ~ is the unadjusted coefficient of multiple determination ( s e e  KOU t s o y i a n n i s  ( 1 9 8 4  , p . 1 2 9  ) 
c=standard deviation of the dependent variable.
- 4 2 0 -
APPENDIX Al l . I ( i i )
DETAILED A NN U AL  CROSS-SECTION RLSLI I S ( TSLS):
INVESTM ENT EQUATION. MAIN SAMPLE (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L C DEPt PC:- CAVt P,-> NCR. EFBt D, cr *3
1974 F 0 . 0 1 6 2.286 0.0144 0.005 0.3896 0.3125 -0.938 -0.1155 0.0586 0.8810
(-0.85) (7.383) (1.395) t 0.16) (2.547) ( 1.806) ( - 2 . 8 6 ) (- 0 . 1 1 2 )
L 0.0418 0.1715 0.0459 0.0311 1.0847 0.3017 -0.223 -4.217 0.0450 0.3030
(0.818) (0 .2 1 0 ) (0.541 ) (0.511) (1.908) (-1.18) (-0.33) (-1.931)
1975 F -0.0265 1.2019 0.1548 0.6906 -0.3246 -0 . 2 2 6 0.515 0.6429 0.0441 0.9360
(-2.55) (91728) (4.920) (3.432) (-3.91) (-2.26) (3.449) (2.763)
L 0 . 0 2 0 6 1.841 0.7999 -0.0959 0.2549 0.0910 1.3170 -4.632 0 . 0 5 2 5 0.8330
(0.189) (-1.07) (9.(545) ( 0 .6 6 ) (0.403) (0.354) ( 0.70) ( 1.405)
1976 . F • 0.0052 1.4551 0.0093 0.0204 0.3229 0.1877 0.2023 -0.482 0.0411 0.6710
( 0 .2 6 6 ) ' 2 . 2 1 1  ) ( 0.14) (0.527) (2.06) ( 0.14) (0.275) (1 .5 6 )
L 0.006 0.321 0.2905 0 . 0 6 0 0 0.003 0 . 2 2 0 0.0195 1.782 0 . 0 6 6 2 0.4330
( 0.191 ( 0.48) ( 2.928) (0.830) ( 0.004) (1.131 ) (0.086) I 0.558)
1977 F 0.0091 1.6878 0.003 0.0051 -0.0155 0.0107 0.033 -0.2747 0.0459 0.6920
(0.579) (6.184) ( 0.039) ( 0 . 1 1 1 ) (-0.104) 1 -0.088) (-0.208 1 (-0 .359 1
L 0.004 1.0788 0.1164 0.0072 0.5715 0.1777 0.8924 1.7464 0.0497 0.4640
(-0.185) (2.513) (1.745) (-0.117) (2.414) (-1.14) (2.198) (-0.917)
1978 F 0.0033 1.2317 0.0885 0.0096 0.2467 0.0198 0.0875 -0.698 0.0475 0.5640
(0.142) (2.797) (0.712) (0.1491 (0.899) ' 0.116) ((5.339) (-0.875)
L 0.017 1.490 0.1067 0.0182 0 . 0 1 2 0.0003 -0.063 1.194 0.0443 0 . 8 1 6 0
(-1.52) (2.932) (3.914) (0.659) ( 0.055) ' 1.309) (-0.207) ( 1 .2 1 1 )
I 1979 F 0 . 0 2 2 0.770 0.224 0 . 0 6 2 0.03-3 0.096 0.251 0.576 0.0463 0.7110
( 1 .6 0 ) ( 2 . 1 2 2 ) (2.619) ( 1.970' (0.154) ( 0.38) (0.279) (0.874)
L 0.0057 1.8891 0 . 0 2 1 0.316 0.349 0.207 0.223 -0.698 0.0399 0.6310
( 0.356) (5.019) (0.432) (1.119) (1.484) ' 1.407) (0.590) (-0.802)
1980 F 0.006 1.1878 0.177 0.0091 0 . 0 2 2 0.249 -0.588 -0.394 0.0439 0.7350
( 0.59i <4.61 ) (2.55) (0.32) (-0.17) ( 1.82) (2 .2 8 ) (-1.15)
L 0.033 1.108 0.081 0.080 -0.223 0.017 0.271 2.295 0.0532 0.8690
(-2.85) (2.03) (2.15) (2.90) (-1.905) ( 0 .2 1 ) (1.428) (5.277)
Notes: t  0 5 ^  1 . 9 6 ;  t  q 2 S::2 . 5 8 ;  t  io'"’'"' 1 . 6 5 ;  t statistics in brackets; 
F -  Foreign, L = Local;
R  ~ = Coefficient of determination unadjusted lor d.f..
(see note in A l l . l ( i )  above ).
cr - standard deviation of the dependent variable; 
Number of observations -  41.
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DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS SECTION RESULTS (TSLS)
APPENDIX 1 l . l ( i i i )
EXTERNAL FINANACE EQUATION : MAIN SAMPLE (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L C P i DEPt I NGt C.4Gt _, NCPt A a R
1974 F 0.023 -0 . 1 1 2 0.125 0.004 0.0497 0.477 0.359 -0.322 0.0642 0.24
(0.345) (0.186) (0.064) ( 0.37) I -0.78) (1.714) (0.355) (-0.08)
L 0 . 0 0 6 0.395 2.071 0.048 0.088 0.039 1.922 -2.93 0.0583 0.25
(0.133) (0.456) ( 2.297) (0.627) ( 1 . 0 1  ) (0.156^ (1.737) ( - 1 .2 1 )
1975 F 0 . 0 6 2 -0.731 1.341 0.0064 0.0592 0 . 6 8 8 0.7394 2.827 0.0712 0.56
(-2.59) ( I . 11) ( -1.03) ’ (0.711) ( 1 .2 6 2 ) (3.697) (0.994) (2.003)
L 0 . 0 2 6 0.469 0.1784 -0.0133 0.135 0.3171 -0.311 2 . 1 2 0 1 0.0678 0.31
(-0.48) ( 0.64) (0.272) (-0.37) (1.295) (1.297) ( 3.327) (0.771 )
1976 . F ■ 0.024 0.884 -6.123 -0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.0117 0.6885 4.3202 0.2744 0.0538 0.61
( 1.091) (-2.318) (-2.82) (-0.263) (-0.39) (5.763) (2.516) (0.566)
L 0 . 0 1 6 -0.256 0.029 0.0082 0.0689 0.299 0.960 3.792 0.0765 0 . 6 0
i 0.41 ) (0 .6 5 ) (-0.055) ( 3.50) (0.996) (1.408) (2.982) ( 1.356)
1977 F 0.035 -0.194 -11.57 0.0303 0.1373 0.594 7.252 0.943 0 . 1 1 0 2 0.74
( 0 .6 0 ) (-0.277) (-1.194) (1.41 ) (-2.87) (3.684) (1.241) (-0.436)
L 0.003 -0.649 -0.8065 0.017 0.0528 0.3707 0.9915 1.1529 0.0453 0.34
(-0.084) (-1.399) (-2.24) ( 0.72) (0.755) (1.914) (2.236) (-0.585)
1978 F 0.0762 0.1254 3.6881 0.0097 0.1082 0.5323 -2.4594 -2.4803 0.0599 0.58
(3.396) (0.283) (1.834) (0.865) ( 3.03) (3.901) *(-1.829) (-2.015)
L 0.004 1.1009 2.823 0.029 0.081 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 1 2 2 1.9398 0.0580 0.41
(0.132) (1.9051 1 - 2 .0 2 ) (1.415) ( 1.08) (-2.18) (3.335) (0.831)
1979 F 0.0186 1.7813 1.353 0.0003 0 . 0 0 0 2 1.447 0.9044 3.756 0.0514 0.32
( 0.33) (- 2 .0 6 ) I 1.36) (0.023) (0.004) (2.531 ) (1.517) (1.748)
L 0.0403 0.099 0.7374 0.058 0.009 0.2632 -0.004 0.1316 0.0401 0.33
(1.845) (0 .4 4 4 ) (-1.72) ( 1.87) ( 0.15) (1.674) (-0.033) (0.125)
1980 F 0.018 -0.360 1.537 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.048 0.428 -0.814 0.119 . 0.0511 0.37
(0.972) (-1.809) (1.517) (-0.488) (-1.23) (3.004) (-1.199) (0.198)
L 0.042 0.295 0.257 0.041 -0.136 0.018 • 0.679 0.825 0 . 0 6 0 2 0.46
(-1.33) (0.56) (0.129) (2.115) (-1.834) (0.085) (0.945) ( 0 . 6 2 6 )
Notes:? q5'=''1.96;? q j '^ -'2.58: ? 1.65; t-statistics in brackets;
F = Foreign, L = Local;
R  “ = Coefficient of determination unadjusted for d.f..
(see note in appendix A l l . 1(0  above);
a  - standard deviation of the dependent variable; 
Number of observations = 41.
- 4 2 2 -
APPENDIX A l l . l ( i v )
DETAILED ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION RESULTS (TSLS)









C -0.0051 -0.0051 0.0030
1
-0.0018 J
(-0.798) (-2.444) 00.368) (-0.803) 1|
Pt 0.2842 0.0318 0.1830 0.2517
(4.620) (1.290) ’ (2.859) (6.836)
1
D z-i ' 0.2857 0.8272 0.3848 1.0344 1
(2.671) (8.594) (2.827) (8.626)
EFBt 0.0622 0.0011 0.0440 0.0775 |j
(0.688) (0.036) (0.573) (1.012) !1








(-3.773) (4.925) (-2.926) (-2.541)
1
11




: R 2 0.4590 0.6730 0.3650 0.7740 |j
F 14.940 36.196 10.107 60.399
N. OBS. 94 94 94 94 !
Notes: t  1.96; £ 01^2.58; 2 1.65: t-statistics in brackets:
F - Foreign. L Local;
R “ =■ Coetficient of determination unadjusted for d.f..
(see note in appendix A l l . l ( i )  above);
cr = standard deviation of the dependent variable;
- 4 2 3 -






C 0.0123 0 . 0 2 1 1 0.0128 0.0082
(1.152) (1.877) (1.775) ( 0.796)
DEPt 0.8509 0.7603 1.0514 0.7245
(2.30) (1.569) (4.333) (1.182)
PCt 0.0406 0.0504 0.0371 0.0642
(0.893) ( 1.82) (0.959) (1.983)
CAVt 0.0403 0.0158 0.0065 0.0624
(1.535) (0.963) ( 0.40) (2.922)
P t - 1 0.2534 0.3476 0.0936 0.1765 |
(1.885) (2.486) (1.078) ( 1 *647 ) 1
NCPt -0.0244 -0.0544 0.1397 0.1295
(-0.27) ( 0.56) (1.958) I 0.864)
EFBt -0.063 -0.372 -0.127 , 0.289
(-0.45) (1 .4 7 ) (-1.79) (0.843)
A  • O’. 1743 0.2647 0.2390 1.2190
(0.548) (0.529) (1.105) (4.969)
a 0.0448 0.0335 0.0421 0.0401
R 2 0.4140 0.4458 0.4740 0.6300
F 8.6698 10.3937 11.088 20.906
N. OBS. 94 94 94 94
Notes: t  .05 ^  1 .9 6 :  L .01 ~::::2 . 5 8 ;  t   ^ * 6 5 :  t-statistics in brackets;
F Foreign. L Local; o'*K  ~ Coefficient ol determination unadjusted for d.f..
(see note in appendix \ 1  l . l ( i )  above);
cr standard deviation of the dependent variable;
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C 0.0054 0.0145 -0.0311 -0.0176 :
(0.151) (0.641) (-1.01) (-1.3!) 1
Pi -0.4377 -0.1215 -0.9123 -0.9168 ;
(-0.85) (-0.54) (.-3.69) (-3.63) |
DEPt -2.729 -4.276 -2.509 0.409
(-2.33) (-3.63) . (-1.82) (0.525)
; INGt ' 0.028 -0.0002 -0.0031 0.0063
! (1.804) (-0.03) (-5.66) (1.428) ij
CAGt _j -0.774 -0.041 -0.067 -0.037 ;
(-1.57) (-0.85) (-1.57) (-0.98)
NCPt 0.476 0.680 0.897 0.636
( 1.256) (3.633) (5.361) (4.945) !!
I t 2.1 10 2.032 1.933 0.556 !i
(2.326) (2.385) (1.851) (1.349) i|
A -1.007 -0.618 1.280 1.864 |
(-0.68) (-0.70) (1.679) (2.99)
o 0.1026 0.0633 0.11 13 0.0527
\ R 2 0.2090 0.4000 0.5575 0.3560
F 3.2390 8.1860 15.477 6.790
Notes:? 0 5 1 . 9 6 ;  ? qj'■'::' 2 . 5 8 ;  ? jo'"'-'1 . 6 5 :  t statistics in brackets; 
F = Foreign, L = Local;
R  -  = Coefficient of determination unadjusted tor d .l.,
'.see note in appendix A ll.H i.) above);
cr = standard deviation ol the dependent variable;
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APPENDIX A11.2(i)
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES RESULTS: DIVIDEND EQUATION
ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L P, A - ! N C P t h EFBt cr
1974 F 0.0784 -0.0057 0.1359 0.0134 0.4380 0 . 0 2 1 1
((0.94) (-0.087) ( 1.55) (0.174) (2.952)
L 0.052 0.6167 0.0059 0.0039 0.0195 0 . 0 0 6 2
(1.729) (10.60) (0.502) (0 .2 0 9 ) (-1.301)
1975 c 0.4133 0.3361 0.0936 0.1295 -0.2529 0.0256
(3.241 ) (1.906) ( -0.64) . ( 1 .6 2 6 ) (-2.33)
L 0.031 0.8042 0.0363 -0.0270 0.0106 0 . 0 0 6 6
(1.483) (11.35) (2.373) (-5.75) (1.088)
1976 F 0.1346 0.6559 -o.oiio 0.0044 0.0075 0.0241
, (1.224) (4.890) (-0.108) (-0.07) (0.069)
L 0.0156 0.7169 -0.0455 -0.0035 -0.0072 0.0051
(0.427) ( 10.51) (-1.45) (-0.25) (-0.573)
1977 c 0.1535 0.5997 0 . 1 0 6 1 0.1089 0.1873 0.0229
(1.078) (3.625) (1.936) (-1.367) (2.653)
L 0.0594 0.8105 0.0003 0.0045 0.0089 0.0063 |
(1.589) (7.428) ( 0 .0 1 2 ) (0.257) (0.348)
1978 F 0.1685 0.3486 0.1095 0.0442 0.1242 0.0157
(1.086) (2.641) (0.482) (-0.79) (0.954)
L 0.0965 0.6901 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0099 0.0070
(3.554) (6.705) (-1.49) ( 0 . 0 1 0 ) (0.357)
1979 F 0.5677 0.0312 0.4853 0.0368 0.1280 0.0278
(5.205) (0.159) (4.207) (0.485) (0.913)
L 0.0171 0.9464 -0.1410 -0.0218 -0.1617 0.0113
( 0.51) (6.113) (-6.55) (-0.84) (-3.36*)
1980 F 0.0077 0.4431 -0.1197 -0.0429 -0.1751 0.0204
(0.086) (5.009) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-1.65)
L 0.0364 0.9686 0.0280 0.0370 0.0164 0 . 0 1 0 6
( 1 .8 0 6 ) (12.44) (-1.67) (1.975) (1.058)
Notes: t  1 . 9 6 :  t  0 1 ^ 2 . 5 8 :  t   ^ - 6 5 :  t statistics in brackets;
cr standard deviation of the dependent variable:
Number of observations = 41.
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APPENDIX A 11.2 (ii)
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES: INVESTMENT LIQUATION
ANNUAL CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L DEPt PCt -, 0 4  v ; Pt - 1 NCPt EFB, A <7
1974 F 2.1399 0.1290 0.0488 0.2466 0.5816 2.0306 -2.5693 0.0586
(3.037) (1.129) ( 0.43) ( 1.03) ( 1.03) ( 2.53) (-1.881)
L 1.1140 0.0183 0.0382 0 . 1 0 6 0 0.0944 0.3487 1.1596 0.0450
(2.928) (0.369) (0.637) (0.409) (-0.64) (0.907) ( 0 .0 1 1 )
1975 F 1 . 2 0 2 0.1579 0.0196 0.0329 0.8569 1.0891 -0.3799 0.0441
(3.341) ( 2 .0 1 2 ) (0.576) (-0.17) (1.682) (2.985) (-1.096)
L -1.901 0.8648 -0.3426 0.1626 -0.9643 0.5863 2.4358 0.1525
(-2.03) (6.09) (-2.77) (0.192) (-1.592) {0.877) (0.72)
1976 F 1.915 -0.023 0X)03 0.0104 0.1816 0.5813 0.0878 0.0411
. (3.141) (-0.23) (0.238) (0.037) (1.038) (1.613) ( 0 .2 0 6 )
L -0 . 2 2 0 2 0.2867 0.0169 -0.0290 -0.4486 0.1705 2.3540 0 . 0 6 6 2
(-0.42) (3.18) (0.337) (-0.072) I -1.978) (0.807) (1.179)
1977 F 1.1825 0.3269 0.1183 0.3867 -0.3772 0.3278 1 . 1 6 2 6 0.0459
(2.829) (2.229) (-1.79) (1.358) (-1.47) < 1.623) (1.534)
L -5.7515 2.0399 0.8012 6.8183 3.2519 9.3317 3£ 471 0.0497
(-1.05) ( 1.081 ) (0.80) (0.831) <0.685) ( 0.75) <0.898)
1978 F 0 . 6 0 0 6 0.0877 0.0574 0.6982 1.3462 0.595 4 1.2563 0.0475
(0.707) (0.646) (0.423) (1.401) i 1.024) ( 1.899) < 0.535)
L 1.3622 0.0257. 0.0172 0 . 1 6 1 6 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.3991 0.4045 0.0443
(4.23) (0.993) ( 0 . 8 6 8 ) (0.914) i -2.79) (2.487) ( .0.414)
1979 F 1.3912 0 . 1 0 1 0 -0.0013 0.2302 -0.0818 0.6747 -0.3445 0.0463
(3.532) (1.392) (-0.042) (- 0 . 2 2 ) (-0.34) (1.726) ( 0.303)
L 1.7990 0.0432 -0.0182 0.7453 0.4194 -0.1804 1.1331 0.0399
(5.573) (0.847) (-0.422) (2.144) (1.787) (-0.67) (1.017)
1980 F 1.3881 0.1246 -0.0174 0.1576 -0.1286 -0.7050 0.7736 * 0.0439
(4.087) ( 1 . 8 1 6 ) (-0.397) (0.884) (-0.50) (-2.198) (1.656)
L 0.8379 0.0225 0.0292 -0.0444 0.0196 0.5339 -1.4877 0.0532
(2.135) (0.904) (1.458) (0 .3 1 9 ) (0.182) (3.393) (-3.282)
Notes: t  1 .9 6 :  t  q j =::i2 .5 8 :  t  K)'"*'2 1 .6 5 :  t statistics in brackets:
cr standard deviation ol‘ the dependent variable;
Number of observations = 41.
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APPENDIX Al l -2( i i i )
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES: EXTERNAL El NANCE EQUATION 
ANNU AL CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES (1974-1980)
YEARS F/L DEPt Pt IN G t C A C ;_J NCP. It A cr
1974 F 0.157 0.135 0.0004 0 . 0 0 1 0.308 0.032 2.134 0.0642
(- 0 . 1 2 1 ) (0.405) (0.049) ( 0.041 ) (1.653) i 0.05) (2.484)
L 1.949 -0.376 0.036 0.044 0.236 1.431 0.151 0.0583
(2.592) (- 0 .6 1 8 ) (-0.799) <0.501 ) ( 1.034) < 2.607) (0.079)
1975 F 0.969 -0.283 -0.003 0.0117 0 . 6 6 6 0.463 1.046 0.0712
(0.877) (-0.903) (-0.209) (0.461 ) ( 1 .6 2 8 ) (0.637)
L 0.306 1.455 0.0778 0.1802 1 . 1 1 2 0.4067 2.5563 0.0678
(0.566) (2.076) (2.301) (-2.678) (2.30) (-3.803) (1.297)
1976 F 3.0582 0.1668 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0047 0.4238 1.6907 0.3331 0.0538
(3.584) (0.514) (0.247) (0.229) (1.978) ( 2 . 8 6 1  ) (0.723)
L 0.0171 1.5342 0.0079 0 . 0 1 0 1.1669 0.7624 0.5033 0.0764
(0.05) (1.725) (6.047) (0.234) (1.548) (4.67) (-0.316)
1977 F 3.646 1.403 -0.01 5 0.057 0.745 2.276 1.565 0 . 1 1 0 2
(1.646) (2.842) (-0.753) (1.407) (7.128) ( 1 . 8 2 6 ) < 1.474)
L 0.6084 0.4372 0.0179 - 0 . 0 1 1 0 0.1720 0.6857 0.6340 0.0453
(2.280) (0.799) (0.917) (-0.245) (0.530) i 2.922' (0.471 )
1978 F -1.248 1.294 0 . 0 1 2 1 0.0148 2.0435 0.2718 1.589 0.0599
(-0.40) (1.141) (0.388) (-0.223) ( 1.704) ( 0.17) ( 0.596)
L 2.789 0.442 0.008 0.049 0 . 0 0 2 2.0898 . 1.008 0.0580
( 1.740) (0.921) (-0.579) (1.074) ( 2 .6 6 ) (2.97) (-0.478)
1979 F 2.925 1.283 0.009 -0.0079 1.4016 1.5504 2.0548 0.0514
(1.006) (-0.52) (0.699) (-0.097) ( 0.57) (1.327) (-0.57)
L 0.2208 0.2407 0.0078 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.1545 0.0426 0.1483 0.0401
(0.132) (-0.78) (0.145) (0.019) (0.433) (0 .0 4 ) (-0.127)
1980 F 0.949 0.2581 0.0039 0.0047 0.7300 -0.4222 -0.5276 0.0511
(-0.92) (0.994) (0.771) ( 0 . 1 2 1 ) (1.475) (-0.63) (-0.971)
L 1.0498 -0.0862 -0.0074 0.0745 -0.0772 1.5031 -2.4385 0 . 0 6 0 2
(1.180) (-0.18) (-0.73) (1.61) (-0.257) (4.071) (-1.523)
Notes: t  1 .96; ? qj''::'2.58: £ jq''*''1 .65: i-statistics in brackets;
cr standard deviation of the dependent variable: 
Number of observations = 41.
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APPENDIX A11.2(iv)
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES RESULTS










' Pt 0.3461 0.0211 0.1279 0.3398
(3.929) (0.692) ( 1*.662) (5.620)
A - i 0.2776 0.7687 0.4058 0.8659 |j
(2.390) (9.200). ’ (2.479) (4.563) j
NCPt 0.4099 -0.5212 0.0328 0.1765
(2.606) (-1.804) (0.161) (2.836)
It -0.0422 -0.0694 -0.1680 0.2324
! (-0.621) (-2.176) (-1.879) (3.296)
! EFBt 0.0619 -0.0061 0.0255 0.2059 ;
(0.988) (-0.299) (0.301) (2.771)
o 0.0299 0.0106 0.0421
j
0.0189 |
N otes:? lO ”" ' 2 1 *65; t-statistics in brackets;
cr standard deviation ol the dependent variable;
Number of observations = 41.










DEP,I C 0.9717 1.6243 1.2279 1.0881j
(3.583) (6.618) (4.923) (4.762)
\PC t- 1 0.0067 0.0199 0.0407 0.0145
i (0.086) (0.622) (1.211) (0.691)
CAV, 0.0789 0.0131 -0.0075 0.0167
(2.422) (1.039) .(-0.466) (0.892)
P ,-i • 0.5285 0.2010 0.2639 -0.0365
1! (0.734) (1.112) (2.251) (-0.429)
'\NCPt -0.0568 0.3080 0.1410 0.0599
(-0.16) (1.989) (0.781) (0.532)
! EFBt -0.1048 0.2702 -0.0594 0.4364
■ (-0.49) (2.152) (-0.772) (3.357)
0.3052 -0.0385 -0.1925 -0.7901
I
(0.188) (-0.06) (-0.64) (-4.29)
iI! o 0.0448 0.0335 0.0421 0.0401
Notes: t  0 1 ^ 2 . 5 8 ;  £ j q ^  1 . 6 5 :  t-statistics in brackets;
cr standard deviation o f the dependent variable;
Number of observations = 41.










\DEPt 2.7520 4.8284 1.8080 1.3985 :
iI (1.109) (2.648) (0.576) (2.217)
P: 0.9814 0.2026 0.8584 0.2948
\ (0.997) (0.315) .(3.319) (0.846)
, IN C t -0.0339 -0.0077 0.0032 -0.0026
(-1.799) (-0.82). (4.005) (-0.857)
; c A c t • 0.0657 0.0934 0.0253 0.0361
1 (0.81) (1.369) (0.170) (1.526) I
NCP. 1.0785 0.3562 1.3047 0.2315
j (0.742) (0.672) (3.087) (0.865)
k 2.2219 3.0973 0.9656 1.5003
i
i
(1.125) (2.106) (0.364) (3.944)
A -0.2969 -0.6987 0.9711 -0.52471
(-0.09) (-0.58) (0.506) (-0.631)
i
i O 0.1026 0.0633 0.1113 0.0527
i
Notes:? 1.96: ? qj ^ 2 .58; t   ^*65: t-;statistics in brackets;
cr standard deviation of the dependent variable;
Number of observations = 41.
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